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This thesis seeks to explain irredentism by identifying the set of variables that 
determine its occurrence. To do so it provides the necessary definition and 
comparative analytical framework, both lacking so far, and thus establishes 
irredentism as a field of study in its own right.
The thesis develops a multi-variate explanatory model that is generalisable yet 
succinct. It builds critically on Donald Horowitz’s theory of irredentism (1985;1991) 
which, like many studies of ethno-nationalism, underperforms due to a bias towards 
rationalism, materialism and individualism. The present study improves explanatory 
value by identifying three further variables that tackle ethno-territorial retrieval on its 
own terms. It argues that irredentism is primarily determined by shared ethno-national 
identity and the political system factors that condition its politicisation domestically and 
internationally. The resulting combined model is applied in two, variable-centred parts. 
First, it is quantitatively tested on a dataset of irredentism which the thesis collates 
based on its novel definition of irredentism. Second, the theory is applied in a historic 
case study of so-called "inconsistent irredentism" (Saideman 1998), i.e. an instance 
where retrieval was abandoned in an outwardly identical setting and therefore must 
result from factor change over time. The chosen example is that of the Hungarian 
irredenta in the interwar period (1920-1940), contrasted with its absence in the post­
communist era (1989-2005). To enhance generalisability, the thesis adds a 
comparison across space by examining Hungary and not one, but two transborder 
Magyar minorities (in Southern Slovakia and Transylvania).
By offering a comprehensive definition of irredentism this thesis unifies previously 
disjointed cases for analysis. It avoids a rationalist and materialist bias in favour of 
what genuinely matters: namely the ethno-national bond and the factors shaping its 
politicisation. Because this approach does greater justice to ethno-national 
movements it furnishes a more explicative, generalisable and, potentially, predictive 
model of irredentism.
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Introduction
“If Poles should now march into Danzig or Czechs into 
Reichenbach, the first thing to do is to train a German 
irredentist movement I myself cannot do this, for reasons of 
health I am unsuitable. But every nationalist must do it  
Irredenta means: nationalism based upon revolutionary violent 
means. ”
Max Weber, 19181
On the stuff World Wars are made of
More than eighty years after Max Weber had thus urged for an irredenta that 
Hitler was to implement, the citizens of Erevan cut down the last trees of 
Armenia’s capital in order to survive the harsh winter of 1991. For the sake of 
retrieving their ethnic brethren from adjacent Azerbaijan they had accepted 
war and penury. Newly independent Armenia was also undeterred by the 
complicated military operation this involved, occupying an Azeri populated 
corridor in order to reach the kindred enclave of Nagomo Karabach. At about 
the same time, the Milosevic government in Belgrade warned Yugoslavia’s 
secessionist republics that it would prevent them from taking along local Serbs 
as stranded minorities. The latter in turn readied themselves to join their ethnic 
parent state by whatever means this would require. The following years 
illustrated their respective determination to achieve this goal, notwithstanding 
human sacrifice, economic ruin and the broad array of international sanctions.
Irredentism is fascinating. Few other ethno-national movements elicit such 
passions, such a willingness for sacrifice. More than any other situation of 
communal politics it builds on the imperative to remedy the fragmentation of an 
ethnic group and of its ancestral territory. Irredentist folklore frequently
1 Letter to Professor Goldstein, November 13, 1918, quoted in Dronberger (1971:248).
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expresses this idea in metaphors of physical truncation, like the Somali song 
which asks "how can an amputated man sleep comfortably at night?” 
(Neuberger 1991:99). Irredentism is a simultaneously puzzling and yet forceful, 
affirmation of nationalism. It challenges our conventions about self- 
determination as coterminous with secession, as an ethno-national group's 
pursuit of a sovereign state unit. Rather than independence it is here unitary 
statehood, the Gellnerian congruence between group and state, that matters. 
Retrieval is thus also the clearest rejection of being ruled by ethnic strangers. 
More than any other confrontation between an ethnic minority and its host 
state, irredentism signifies the latter’s incapacity to retain a minority’s political 
consent and loyalty. These are not only withdrawn, but transferred onto 
another state which, because of its kindred nature, is deemed more legitimate. 
All this seems especially remarkable in an age where many see the state as 
increasingly irrelevant, ethnicity as irrational, and nationalism as outdated. 
Finally, irredentism has proven more explosive than any other form of ethnic 
conflict. Arguably the cause of both World Wars (Midlarsky 1992; Zartman 
1992), the triangulation between ethnic parent state, transborder group and its 
host state is found to be more intractable and tense than any other type of 
conflict (Carment and James 1995; Moore and Davis 1998), for it links inter- 
communal with inter-state strife. Adding to this is the scarring legacy of enmity 
and mistrust left behind on both these levels.
For more than two centuries now, ethno-territorial retrieval has been a reality of 
both domestic and inter-state politics. The recent Balkan wars, as well as 
ongoing conflict in ex-Soviet republics and in Africa and Asia, prove its 
continued virulence. And the sheer number of “multi-state nations” (Ryan 
1995:6) holds more in store for the future: “of the 230 groups in the Minorities 
at Risk project" Gurr observes, "nearly two thirds have kindred groups in 
adjacent countries: 66 (29 per cent) have one cross-border kin group, 47 (20 
per cent) have kin groups in two or more neighbouring countries, 34 (15 per 
cent) ... have kindred in three or more countries” (1992:1). High time then we 
paid attention.
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Badly defined, badly explained: the lack of “irredentism theory”
Remarkably for such a salient subject we still know very little about it. To start, 
with, what exactly is irredentism? Retrieval is difficult to pin down because it 
straddles academic disciplines (international relations, government, sociology), 
presents a misfit in ethnic conflict taxonomies (being both internal and external 
to the state), and sparks disagreement over actors, methods and time frames. 
It hence still lacks a broadly recognised definition that would standardise 
approaches. As a result, irredentist examples are wrongly categorised and 
analysed out of the context of their cohort. For example, even T.R. Gurr's 
authoritative Minorities at Risk dataset lists irredentist cases in no less than 
four out of his seven categories. In short, irredentas still go unrecognised as an 
aggregate group of cases, being consequently mistaken as “prerogative of the 
few” (Horowitz 1991). Elaborating a workable conceptualisation, a comparative 
analytical framework that comprehensively defines and describes irredentism, 
is hence the first concern of this study. Whatever the merits and drawbacks of 
the descriptions that have been presented until now (see chapter 1), I define 
irredentism as 'the bilateral and simultaneous pursuit by both parent state and 
its ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno-territorial retrieval 
across inter-state borders'.
My other - and principal - focus is to find out how irredentism works, by which 
factors it is determined. This is where the lack of a comparative framework 
bears consequences. So far there is no such thing as an “irredentism theory” 
(Gavrilis 1999), a coherent and cumulative body of literature researching 
retrieval. Presently, there exist a handful of mostly unrelated studies that often 
cover a whole range of phenomena together with irredentism. Even when they 
focus specifically on retrieval, they use diverging definitions and concentrate 
on different numbers and combinations of actors. Most explanations are low on 
generalisability because they are monocausal, case-specific accounts, while 
the few multi-variate analyses in turn are imprecise in their definitions or low in 
parsimony. Only one theory combines quantitative and qualitative testing of its 
variables. Finally, nearly all are rooted in a normative-rationalistic 
understanding of what ethnic groups strive for. I contend that, over and above
18
methodological-definitional problems, this is the main reason why irredentism 
has so far not been satisfactorily explained. In. overview we can broadly 
differentiate existing accounts along two axes:
The number of actors they see as determining irredentist politics
■ Single actor accounts locate decision making and agency with 
exclusively one party, on whom the proposed causal variables then 
focus. The overwhelming majority of these models are parent state 
oriented, due to this actor’s clear advantage in terms of power and 
resources.
■ Bilateral analyses limit their attention to those two groups immediately 
pursuing retrieval -  the parent state and its transborder ethnic brethren. 
Their deliberations and actions are seen in various ways as mutually 
relevant or even complementary, though most accounts strongly lean 
towards the state as the more powerful player.
■ Triadic interpretations of irredentism extend agency beyond the 
retrieving and retrieved to the affected host state. Usually, the nature of 
minority vs. host-state interactions is emphasised due to its 
reverberation onto the other relationships within the triangle (host state 
vs. parent state and parent state vs. transborder community).
■ Multi-actor models finally either differentiate the existing parties into 
further sub-groups (e.g. leadership vs. electorate / clientele) or draft in 
even further ones, such as regional powers, international organisations, 
NGOs etc.
The motivational bases they assume for irredentism
■ Instrumentalist accounts attribute irredentism to the elite- or, less 
frequently, group interests it is seen to serve. Based on normative 
premises of rationality and individualism, they discard identities and 
ideas as entirely manufactured and (ab)used at will. The focus here is 
on competition for economic resources and / or power, often together 
with the structural-strategic scope for irredentism (parent state
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expansionism) and comparative risk assessments (e.g. minority 
security).
■ Ideational approaches explain irredentism primarily in the light of the 
notions it involves - nationalism and self-determination. Past 
experiences, competing or transforming nationalisms, symbols and 
territoriality are cited as determinants. These studies are more likely to 
analyse the group as a whole. However, they overwhelmingly support 
their interpretation with instrumental aspects.
■ Identificationist analyses argue with the non-rational (as distinct from 
irrational) elements of ethno-nationalism by presenting the emotional 
and psychological power of ascriptive ties as primary factor. The level of 
analysis ranges from strictly elite-focused down to encompassing the 
whole group. Combined accounts realistically incorporate interests and 
ideas to varying extents, often in function of or constrained by, ethno- 
national identity.
In summary, a cross-tabulation of explanations along these two criteria yields 
the following clusters below.
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Table 1.1 Overview of irredentism literature2
Type of 
model*
Number of 
actors**
Instrumentalist Ideational Identificationist
Combined
instrumentalist-
ideational
Combined
instrumental-
identificationist
Combining 
all three
1
PS
Von Hippel
(1993) (IR) 
Saideman 
(1998) (IR) 
Andreopoulos 
(1981) (CP)
Katsiyiannis 
(1996) (IR) 
Carment & 
James (1995)
m
Van Evera
(1994) (IR)
1
TC
Reichman & 
Golan (1991) 
(GY)
2
PS +TC
Saideman & 
Ayres (1999. 
2000) (IR/PS) 
Gavrilis (1999) 
(CP) 
Posen(1993) 
(IR)
Kitromilides
(1990)
(HY) Connor (1980) (CP)
Ambrosio (2001) 
(IR)
Horowitz (1985, 
1991) (CP) 
Neuberger(1991)(HY)
Fuzesi 
(2006) (CP)
3
PS +TC+HS
Suhrke & 
Noble (1977) 
(CP)
Brubaker
(1996) (SOC)
Weiner
(1991) (IR)
4
(sub- 
differentiated 
or several 
actors)
Suhrke (1970) 
(CP)
Key: * Type of model: multi-variate models are in bold script, quantitative studies
underlined.
** No. of actors: PS = Parent State; TC = Transborder Community; HS = Host State 
***Disciplines are abbreviated: CP = Comparative Politics; GY = Geography;
SOC = Sociology; HY = History; IR = International Relations
Given this heterogenous choice of studies, the question arises which particular 
type of approach should serve as base for an improved analysis, and why so. 
A closer look however reveals the scarcity of useful models available for 
constructive theory building:
2 Included are all theories that specifically or even indirectly explain irredentism, whether they 
profess to do so or not, and independently of whether their particular definition of irredentism is 
compatible with my own.
21
1. Only theories that deal concretely with irredentism are relevant. 
Excluded are those covering a whole array of similar phenomena 
(Connor 1980; Posen 1993; Van Evera 1994; Brubaker 1996) and those 
explanations targeting retrieval, but using fuzzy definitions and thus 
compromised data (Saideman and Ayres 1999, 2000).
2. Theories which restrict irredentism to one ethnic actor, usually the 
parent state, are not useful because they ignore the crucial components 
of bilateral consent and activism that define ethno-territorial retrieval 
(Andreopoulos 1981; Reichman and Golan 1991; von Hippel 1993; 
Carment and James 1995; Katsiyiannis 1996; Saideman 1998; 
Ambrosio 2000). Other approaches in contrast disqualify themselves 
because they confuse agency and structure by including the host state 
as actor, instead of as conditioning environment (Weiner 1991; 
Brubaker 1996). Some are in turn unworkable because they introduce 
multiple or internally over-differentiated actors, thus creating 
unnecessarily complicated settings that are neither generalisable nor 
parsimonious (Suhrke 1970; Suhrke and Noble 1977).
3. Mono-causal models are unable to explain complex processes such as 
irredentism, especially not across the vastly different scenarios of 
several dozen cases. They are for this reason discarded, even if some 
argue convincingly for their own specific examples, (Saideman 1998; 
Gavrilis 1999). Conversely, we can also rule out models with an 
unfeasibly large number of factors (Saideman and Ayres 2000), and 
those that profess to be more descriptive than explanatory (Kitromilides 
1990; Weiner 1991; Carment and James 1995).
By progressive elimination we have narrowed the focus to one realistic and 
workable theory we can build on: Horowitz’s model on the “structural bias” for 
or against irredentism (1985; 1991 ).3 It is a multi-variate, irredentism-specific 
explanation which includes both ethnic actors. Drawn from comparing case 
studies in post-colonial Asia and Africa and contrasting against secession, this
3 Neuberger’s intelligent application of Horowitz's grid to post-colonial Africa (1991), is left 
aside as affirmative (if mildly critical) reiteration.
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is a generalisable, predictive explanation of retrieval. Given however its 
prescriptive bias towards rationality and correlate under-estimation of identity, 
his theory only grasps part of the irredentist phenomenon. This, and our 
overview, consequently indicates what the present study will need to include in 
order to furnish an improved theory of irredentism. For one, any analysis 
needs a reasoned and cohesive analytical framework. Secondly, "a study of 
nationalism must follow a comparative method" Kohn (1967:9-10) rightly 
insisted, "it cannot remain confined to one of its manifestations." Based on the 
definition I present, this study has tried to collate all identifiable cases of 
irredentism in order to test both Horowitz's variables and my own. Thirdly, if we 
want to find out what determines irredentism, we need to apply them in a 
historic case study, ideally an example of "inconsistent irredentism" (Saideman 
1998). Since retrieval is abandoned here in an outwardly identical setting, the 
change in group behaviour must stem from factor change over time. I have 
chosen Hungary's interwar irredenta (1920-1940), which has been 
discontinued in the post-communist period (1989-2006). To this contrasting of 
time periods I have also added a comparison across space by examining not 
one, but two transborder Magyar minorities, namely in Southern Slovakia and 
Transylvania. Given their differences in size and homogeneity, as well as their 
historical-sociological divergences, this should provide additional verification.
Case study: the Hungarian irredenta
In order to understand the merits of this particular case, it is worth taking a 
brief look at the two time periods and the actors that form the subjects of this 
comparative study.
Hungary's partition in 1920 under the Trianon peace treaty constituted a 
persisting national trauma: for the first time in the country's millennial existence 
ethnicity and territory did no longer coincide, a fact that had hitherto been 
commonsensical. Magyars had naturally equated their country with the historic 
territory of its foundation in the ninth century A.D. After World War I, these 
"Crownlands of Saint Stephen" disintegrated under the boundary drawing of
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Great Powers who applied the Wilsonian principle of self-determination with 
remarkable selectivity. Thus Hungary lost seventy per cent of its territory 
(retaining merely 92 963 of the former 282 876 square kilometres) and one 
third of its Magyar speaking population alone (estimated at around 3 million; 
see maps 1.1 and 1.2). The majority of these went to Romania and 
Czechoslovakia as the treaty's main beneficiaries, with about 1.7 million and 
893 586 ethnic Hungarians respectively.4 Following partition, interwar 
Hungarian politics revolved around Trianon's integral revision, principally 
focusing on the two largest severed territories: Transylvania5, now Romanian, 
and ‘Upper Hungary’6 in Czechoslovakia.
Both at home and across the newly drawn borders, irredentism, as core of a 
general territorial revisionism, became the unanimous cause celebre of the 
Magyar nation. In Hungary, support for retrieval was irrespective of age, class 
or political affiliation and persisted through the entire interwar period (Balogh 
1988:55; Zeidler 2001:33-43;159-191). Indeed, “no Hungarian government 
could survive without seeking 'justice for Hungary’ ” (Balogh 1988:57). The 
theme was a rallying cry for a deeply divided nation just emerging from civil 
war. Its genuine appeal however also served to divert public attention from the 
country's numerous socio-economic problems which worsened with the 
conservative freeze on reform. Hungary's difficulties were collectively blamed 
on the "Trianon Diktat", with irredentism acquiring the promise of a national 
salvation. Budapest's policies represented a blend of vigorous campaigning
4 In terms of total population losses, Hungary retained of about 20.8 million inhabitants only 7 
980 143 million (Janos 1982:205)
5 “Transylvania" denotes here more than the former historic region (roughly 57 000 km2 on its 
own). Instead, it describes all territory lost to Romania in 1920 (103 093 km2) and 
subsequently referred to and seen as, part of ‘Erdely’ (Transylvania). This includes Romanian- 
annexed areas of the Hungarian kingdom - the historic Partium area (counties Maramaros, 
Szatmar, Szilcigy, Bihar, Arad) and the Bansag / Banat region (Temes and Krasso-Szoreny) - 
plus the 9 counties of Transylvania proper further east. Not included in this dissertation are the 
Csango Hungarians (CsAngomagyarok) and their areas, because they are situated outside 
Transylvania, beyond the Carpathians.
6 The name ‘Felvid£k’ (Upper Hungary) is sometimes used to summarily denote all areas 
annexed to Czechoslovakia. This thesis however adheres to its tighter, more frequent 
definition of the former administrative region within the Dual Monarchy (‘North-Western 
Felvidek) including the Csallokoz area. Thus excluded from my examination is the adjacent but 
distinct, territory of KSrpatalja (“Subcarpathia" or Ruthenia). This was also ceded to 
Czechoslovakia under Trianon and at the time contained a Hungarian minority of 123 000 
(1930). It, too, was subject to interwar Magyar irredentism, and was retrieved separately in 
March 1939. Today, it is part of Ukraine and home to around 152 000 Magyars, though 
unofficial estimates put the figure at 200 000 (HMTH 2005c).
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abroad, secret negotiations with Europe's two other revisionist powers - 
Fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany - while retaining a low profile on the issue 
when confronted with powerful disapproval.7
Traumatised by their sudden change to minority status, ethnic Magyars across 
the borders, were equally unwilling (and arguably unable) to accept their 
situation. Subject to forced assimilation and discrimination by their new host 
states, their reaction could however not afford the same vehemence. After an 
initial spell of protest and civil disobedience, transborder Magyar attitudes 
overwhelmingly settled into a defiant siege mentality, characterised by 
communal self-reliance via tight internal organisation. The goal was to 
consolidate and survive until retrieval would eventually occur. Like their 
mainland kindred, minority Hungarians were convinced that national truncation 
was only temporary because it was untenable in its historic injustice. They 
viewed their presence in the successor states "...by no means as 
acknowledgement of this illegal fact [i.e. Hungary's partition], but as living and 
permanent protest against this cruelly unjust decision made against us and 
without us..." (Hoensch 1967:19).8 The Magyar irredentist slogan of “nem, 
nem, soha” ("no, no, never" - the triple refusal of Trianon) thus represented the 
credo of virtually the entire nation.
At the end of the 1930s it finally seemed as if Hungary's "active foreign policy" 
(aktiv kulpolitika) had achieved the irredenta.9 The two Vienna Arbitrations of 
1938 and 1940 restored at Hitler's will all of the Felvidek ("Upper Hungary", i.e. 
Southern Slovakia) and the northern part of Transylvania (see map 1.3). A 
pyrrhic victory it was, since Budapest was now indebted to the Axis powers, as
7 Foreign Minister Kanya complained to US envoy Montgomery "that he considered 
revisionism insanity, but that there was nothing he could do about it since the Hungarian 
people were not quite sane on the subject and foreign policy could not be divorced entirely 
from politics" (Hoensch 1967:12).
8 Ethnic Magyar MP Dr. Lajos Kormendy-Ekes, stating his community's attitude in the 
Czechoslovak parliament on June 2 ,1920 , two days prior to Trianon's signing.
9 The term used at the time was ‘revision’. Contemporary Hungarian historians still like to 
distinguish between legalistic treaty renegotiation (revision) and irredentism ("recovery of 
national territories under foreign rule" - see for instance Zeidler 2001:50-1). This may be 
because of irredentism’s negative connotations (Ben Israel 1991: 31; see also section 1.5.2), 
but presumably also seeks to underline entitlement. I contend that revisionism is instrumental 
part of irredentism (especially in this case), and that it is therefore a means to an end rather 
than a separate category in its own right.
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whose ally it subsequently joined and lost the war - together with the retrieved 
territories. During the following 45 years, the USSR's military and ideological 
domination of the region pre-empted Magyar irredentism from resurfacing.10 
With the collapse of communist regimes in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, 
independent foreign policy and the issue of national truncation has re- 
emerged. Hungarian irredentism however, has not.
Today, Budapest's foreign policy is emphatically non-irredentist and 
cooperative, up to the point where it faces accusations of sell-out and neglect 
of its minority Magyars (see e.g. BBC 1995). After some initial inconsistencies, 
Western observers agree that by March 1993 Hungary had clearly "rejected all 
thought of changes in the country's frontiers by force. The entire political 
spectrum in parliament supported this new defence concept" (Schopflin 
1993:14-15).11 Hungarian public opinion equally endorses this stance. Despite 
the continued affective and symbolic value especially of Erdely (Transylvania) 
to mainland Magyars, they are "not primarily concerned with righting the 
wrongs of Trianon." Indeed, the matter is regarded as "first and foremost an 
intellectual issue" (ibid.:10).12 Mainland extremists calling for revision like the 
Independent Smallholder Party's faction under Jozsef Torgyan, or Istvan 
Csurka's Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), are scarce and receive a 
lukewarm response at best. Marginalised by mainstream politics, their 
dwindling electoral support13 basically reflects domestic social issues and is 
"minimal on the question of the minorities" (Schopflin 1993:12). Post­
communist Hungary has very deliberately assumed the role of an ethnic 
patron, acting as a protective power by securing cultural reproduction and 
constitutionally anchored collective rights for its ethnic kin in the region.14 The 
conclusion of Basic Treaties with all host states, laboriously negotiated and
10 Arguably both Romanian and Hungarian irredentist aspirations about Transylvania's post­
war status were briefly used as Soviet divide and rule tactics in 1945-6. This however was a 
matter of political engineering rather than ethnic group choice.
11 See also Bardi (2004a) or Zellner and Dunay (1998:205-297)
12 See also Szarka in Brunner (1996:165) for the role of intellectuals in this matter.
13 In the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections Csurka's MIIzP respectively received only 4.37 
and then 2.2 per cent, both below the 5 per cent electoral threshold for participation in the 
legislature.
14 This self-defined role is set out in the amended Hungarian constitution of 1989. Article 6, 
paragraph 3, stipulates that "the Republic of Hungary feels responsible for the fate of those 
Magyars living outside of its borders and promotes their relations with Hungary."
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unilaterally instigated by Budapest, proves amongst others its commitment to 
the status quo.
Contemporary transborder Hungarians have equally rejected retrieval. Neither 
Romanian nor Slovak Magyars seek to rejoin Hungary -  in fact they even 
adapted their plans for local autonomy in order to underline their moderation 
(see for instance Duray 1999; Egyed 2000 and Rlz 2000). They continue to be 
sizeable minorities within their respective host states (see maps 1.5, 2.6. and 
3.5). The political platforms of Hungarian minority parties, nearly co-terminous 
with their electorates’ opinions, today demand collective recognition as nation- 
constituting groups, instead of past defectionism.15 Sociological surveys 
conducted amongst Transylvanian and Slovak Magyars show that strong 
regional identities have emerged, while affiliation to the parent state has 
transformed and is even becoming tenuous in some respects (Gereben 1995, 
1999a, 2001; Lampl 1999; Langman 1997; Veres 1997). Most tellingly 
perhaps, the mainland referendum of December 2004 about dual citizenship 
for transborder Hungarians was received by the latter with very mixed feelings 
and, upon its failure, with downright rejection. All of this is not only remarkable 
in a comparative historical perspective, but also in view of their continued 
problems within both Romania and Slovakia.
In short, one or more conditioning factors must have changed for both 
mainland and minority Magyars in such a way that they do not consider a post­
communist irredenta as option.
Concept formation and constructive theory-building: towards an 
explanation of irredentism
This thesis has two linked aims. It firstly seeks to establish irredentism as a 
field of study in its own right. It will show that retrieval is a clearly definable fact 
of both modern history and contemporary politics, it is neither infrequent nor 
indistinct. Chapter 1 thus establishes a comparative analytical framework for
15 See the respective electoral program of the Romanian Magyar party RMDSZ (2005) and the 
detailed self-description of the Slovak Magyars as "co-nation" by Egyutt6les Politikai 
Mozgalom / Political Movement Coexistence, Slovakia (2005).
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irredentism by devising a workable definition and, collating all cases based on 
it, by describing its universal characteristics.
Secondly, my study will demonstrate that retrieval is determined by a clear set 
of factors that partly interact in a positive feedback effect. It aims to provide a 
generalisable explanatory model about its occurrence by building on Donald 
Horowitz’s hypotheses about ethno-territorial retrieval. Two complementary 
methods will be used to achieve this. Chapter 2 will undertake quantitative 
testing of Horowitz's and my own variables on the collation of cases 
established by my definition. By converting each factor into measurable 
indicators it will probe its explanatory value across cases. Chapter 3 to 7 in 
turn will apply each variable in depth to the inconsistent Hungarian irredenta. 
Through the Magyar case study we will be able to compare factor changes and 
the extent of their causal effect across both time (inter-war versus post­
communist periods) and space (Felvidek versus Transylvanian irredenta).
Both quantitative and empirical evidence will show that Horowitz's three factors 
are merely secondary elements in the decision-making of actively or potentially 
irredentist groups. They are flawed by the normative liberal bias that 
dominated the study of ethnicity and nationalism until recently. Premising 
individualism, materialism and rationality, such approaches see ethnic 
collectives as merely functional groups. They systematically under-estimate or 
discard the ethno-national bond that is so central to group behaviour, and 
particularly to irredentism. From their perspective ethno-nationalism - as 
opposed to "civic-territorial" nationalism - is either "irrational" or merely 
instrumental to elites. Depending on the view taken, it is varyingly explained 
away as reaction to - or deficiency in - cosmopolitan modernity (retardation or 
contact theory), or indeed as surrogate struggle for power and economic 
resources (relative deprivation theories). Horowitz's three variables faithfully 
mirror this prescriptive take. In his view irredentas firstly depend on whether 
they bring a comparative economic advantage, tackled for the Hungarian case 
in chapter 3: minorities will want to unite if the parent state is better off, the 
latter in turn will not retrieve without gaining material benefits. Secondly, 
irredentist projects are determined by parent state calculations about
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demographic and strategic feasibility. Chapter 4 will thus examine his 
suggestion that retrieval is more likely when the minority is situated in a 
compact, homogeneous and border-near position. Finally, Horowitz 
emphasises elite ambitions (subsumed in chapters 6 and 7): minority leaders 
may object to the pooling of their power which retrieval entails, while mainland 
elites do not want to divide theirs in case the joining group differs enough to 
insist on retaining its own representatives. Such reluctance is only offset by 
mainland leaders' personal ties to the transborder region or group, but - and 
here comes the caveat - this is only effective in "patriarchal" (read: backward) 
societies.
Because of the omission - or re-casting - of a group's central gist, such 
explanations "are a poor guide to ethno-nationally inspired behaviour" (Connor 
1994:74) and, consequently, to irredentism. To be clear, the problem with 
Horowitz's theory is not that irredentists are invested with rationality, but rather 
the normative slant on what they should be concerned about: power, 
feasibility, material benefit. My explanation in contrast re-focuses on what 
actually matters to irredentists, and thus joins the growing non-prescriptive 
literature on ethno-politics that corrects the fallacies described above (e.g. 
Connor 1994 and 2001; McGarry 1995; McGarry and O'Leary 1993 and 2004; 
Kymlicka 2001 a, 2001b and 2002).
Irredentism is, as I have noted above, principally concerned with solidarity 
rooted in shared identity and with the twin components this inherently 
commands: nation-state congruence (nationalism) and freedom from 
domination by non-members (self-determination). Changes within this engine 
and its conditioning factors will result in irredentist inconsistency. Where do 
these changes stem from? Like Milton J. Esman (1994) and Walker Connor 
(1980; 1994; 2001) I see ethno-national movements - including retrieval - as 
affected by a combination of subjective/internal and objective/external givens. 
“Problems posed by the external environment are as likely as historical 
experiences and collective aspirations of the group to determine its dynamics -  
its definition of problems, needs and strategies. The polar extremes of 
primordial givens and instrumental opportunism seldom account for the real
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behaviour of ethnic communities” (Esman 1994:14). In short, ideas, interests 
and identities all matter. Yet Esman (ibid.) also points out that specifically 
“homeland groups” (which irredentists are by definition) are governed more by 
the essence-side of these two poles. So the three components are not quite 
equal. For one, elites and their interests are as much constrained by ethnicity 
as the masses they lead. Secondly, and retrieval is exemplary for this, identity 
is not one option amongst many but prevails over all other sources of 
mobilisation. The ethno-national bond enjoys ultimate priority, simply because 
“ethnicity normally taps deeper layers of socialisation, experience, emotion, 
and pride than collective identities that are more instrumental to the individual" 
(ibid.:15). This is why Horowitz's interest-driven account captures so little of 
retrieval.
What my three variables consequently focus on are irredentism's identity 
component and the two factors affecting its correlate self-determination 
(ideational) element. I will start with the former. Chapter 6 probes changes in 
the strength and nature of the ethno-national bond16 on which irredentism is 
crucially based. Ethnicity is made up of a set of traits by which members 
recognise each other and differentiate themselves from other groups.17 Even if 
these features are not always externally verifiable (e.g. common descent), they 
are nevertheless perceptually "real" to the group, and therefore analytically 
important. Connor summarises this brilliantly: "it is not what is, but what people 
believe is that has behavioural consequences" (1994:75, emphasis original). 
Furthermore, the intangible or constructed nature of markers does not mean 
that they can be used randomly: “ethnicity cannot be politicised unless an 
underlying core of memories, experience or meaning moves people to
16 Within the study of nationalism and ethnicity this work follows the modernist school. It posits 
nationalism as modern phenomenon and group identity as relying on both constructed and 
objective criteria. The internal cohesion based on these features is however empirically real 
and thus a (co-)determinant of group mobilisation. This follows moderate constructivists such 
as Gellner, Kedourie, and Walzer, while leaning somewhat further towards an identificationist 
premise. Conversely, my view opposes instrumentalist accounts like Brass' or Hobsbawm's.
17 I understand an ethnic group as “...any collective identity and solidarity based on inherited 
culture, racial differences, belief systems and sentiments of common nationality" (Esman 
1994:16). I furthermore add here the group's association with a defined ancestral territory, 
which it may or may not inhabit completely or exclusively. This broad delineation is necessary 
because the primary bases of differentiation vary from group to group, but are equally valid in 
their diversity (e.g. religion, race, cultural-linguistic heritage). “Ethnic" thus denotes groups 
whose identity and solidarity are based on shared criteria, which can according to individual 
case in- or exclude any combination of such traits.
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collective action.... Either way, the solidarities are authentic, not imagined, 
constructed or fantasised” (Esman 1994:14, emphasis added). In other words, 
the flexibility of groupness and its (sometimes selective) politicisation by ethnic 
entrepreneurs does not make it any less strong or genuine.18 
This is what my variable reasons with. If we accept that identity informs 
nationalism, then shifts or changes in group identity must (at least in part) 
cause changes in national aspirations. Irredentism mobilises both parent state 
and minority as a (self-perceived) cohesive community. I suggest that retrieval 
is centrally dependent on one particular basis of cohesion, namely kinship 
conceived in the narrow, literal sense: a (perceived) shared ancestry. Integral 
to this organic understanding of the nation is residence on and identification 
with, ancestral homelands. Much like its subjectively shared blood, the 
irredentist group has a shared subjective ‘map image’ of its soil. In short, 
retrieval is an expression of ethnic nationalism, it needs exclusive, narrowly 
conceived markers to preserve cohesion across boundaries. A group’s identity 
can however shift due to changing markers. This in turn entails changes in 
their politicisation, i.e. in that group’s nationalism and its goals. Cultural and 
civic markers instead of ethnic-exclusive ones are more voluntary, inclusive 
and thus no longer provide the precise demarcation of membership and 
territory vital to irredentas. They furthermore do away with the need to (re)unite 
‘dismembered’ nations, and thus allow for differentiation of communal and 
political loyalties which irredentas automatically equate. In such settings 
retrieval is longer commonsensical nor even desirable to a group. So the 
ethno-national bond may well be "beyond reason" or "non-rational" as Connor 
(1994) stipulates, but the effects of its change on irredentism are not: when the 
"self' in self-determination ceases to be clear-cut, then so does the project.
18 I have made an effort to avoid reifying ethnicity wherever possible. This study 
wholeheartedly acknowledges the need for an internally differentiated analysis of ethnic actors, 
yet it is severely limited by research design and -scope. For instance, Astri Suhrke’s (1970) 
remarkable study attempts to do so yet falls well short of that goal. Throughout I try to avoid an 
overly monolithic examination by noting any significant divergences within Magyar elites 
(mainland and transborder) as well as between them and their respective electorates. Overall 
however, the multi-variate explanatory model presented in this thesis cannot afford internally 
well differentiated actors, not least because its argument aspires to be parsimonious and 
universally applicable. Also, the limitations of quantifying (i.e. reducing and operationalising) 
social facts preclude in themselves a more nuanced examination.
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This is where two further factors tie in, this time external to the group and 
objective, if not to say rational. Looking within the framework of the state, the 
politicisation of ethnicity is surely conditioned by the regime type in which it is 
set. Chapter 7 will argue that it is democracy that matters here, since - as 
Lijphart (1999; 2002) reminds us - research has confirmed it as the unique 
setting capable of managing ethno-nationalism. Democracy matters differently 
for our two actors. In terms of the parent state, the absence of democratic 
institutions or incomplete democratisation allows for ethno-nationalism to 
become state policy (Snyder 2000; Snyder and Mansfield 2000a and b). The 
strong institutions of consolidated democratic systems in turn severely limit the 
conflation of group and state interests, both by the civic nationalism they foster 
as well as via mechanisms of accountability and deliberation. Institutional 
performance can thus help to shift group identity to different bases.
For the transborder kindred in turn the particular character of a democracy is 
relevant: is it majoritarian or consensus based? Since even substantive 
democracies are in some form "culturally coded" (Schopflin 2004), i.e. since 
there is no such thing as an entirely 'civic' nationalism, assuaging an irredentist 
minority's aspirations within the host state means introducing consociational 
features as described by Lijphart (1977). Power-sharing acknowledges the 
central importance of a group's identity and can accommodate its yearning for 
self-rule via either segmented and / or territorial autonomy. This is especially 
likely to succeed once a group’s identity and thus its national aspirations have 
transformed (see above), and further reinforces this trend. By contrast, the less 
accommodative the host state is - pursuing assimilationist policies or 
establishing hegemonic control (Lustick 1993) - the more a minority will seek 
retrieval, or in case of compromised cross-border affinity, convert its exit 
strategy into secessionism.
My third variable, presented in Chapter 5, reasons conversely with the 
international (dis)incentives for irredentism. Even more than secessions, 
retrieval has seemingly insurmountable odds stacked against it since the 
international system is by default governed by a restrictive consensus about 
redrawing boundaries. Still, the history of irredentism shows slight, temporary 
variations in world-political attitudes, windows of opportunity that tolerated this
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particular variant of national self-determination. I suggest that such periods - 
though often short and area-biased - encourage retrieval. What furthermore 
promotes parent state irredentism is the existence of a supportive patron 
power, usually irredentist itself and in regional vicinity. Minority defectionism in 
turn is heightened by international disregard for its treatment within the host 
state. A restrictive consensus, absent friends and externally supported minority 
rights or power-sharing cannot by themselves dissuade irredentism, yet they 
do modulate its methods and vehemence. When combined and interacting 
with our previous two factors, they can however be decisive. Given pre­
existing or developing changes in group cohesion, inter-state restrictions and 
incentives double up with regime-specific ones (parent state), or promote 
ethno-national aspirations within existing boundaries (minority).
Making sense of irredentism means making sense of ethno-nationalism. 
Central to explaining both is a re-evaluation of group solidarity and of its 
imperatives bar any normative bias. My model explains inconsistent retrieval 
via changes in and feedback effects between, its primary engine - shared 
ethno-national identity - and the domestic and international factors that 
condition its politicisation.
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1. Defining irredentism
“Today most people would rather be governed poorly by their 
ethnic brethren than well by aliens, occupiers or colonisers... 
indeed to be ruled by ethnic strangers is perceived as worse 
than oppressive.”
Joseph Rothschild (1981:14)
1.1 Introduction
Ethno-territorial retrieval represents one of the methods by which communal 
groups seek nation-state congruence, it is self-determination of a special kind. 
Yet irredentism is little explored, it constitutes so far something of a black box: 
at one end, there is a communal group bisected by borders which it either 
accepts, or conversely challenges via secession or demands for autonomy. At 
the other, one finds the (re-)union of that group and its territory within an 
ethnically kindred state. What is in between has largely remained unexplained. 
Ethno-territorial retrieval thus represents the unknown in an equation whose 
other components -  the ethnic group, the state etc. - research has so 
thoroughly investigated.
The description and classification of real-world phenomena always bears the 
double risks of arbitrariness and reification1, yet this does not explain the 
absence of an attempt. In contrast to highly researched issues like genocide, 
there is no scholarly agreement over what irredentism actually denotes. Yet 
neither is this disagreement generating any debates, indeed this particular 
subject seems to lack the usual challenge and response patterns of academia. 
Instead, the study of retrieval is rarely cumulative and at best sporadically 
recursive, i.e. irredentism can take any meaning to anybody. The literature 
consequently abounds with definitions which, based on minimal cross-
1 See for instance Sartori (1984:15-63) on the trappings of concept analysis.
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referencing, mutually ignore and contradict one another.2 Alternatively, some 
do not even attempt clarification, contending that “although irredentism is 
conceptually distinct from ethnicity, separatism, pan-cultural movements, and 
border skirmishes, it is in fact best characterised as an active mixture of all 
these ingredients” (Chazan 1990: 141). Given that the scientific analysis of 
reality crucially depends on consistent and workable descriptions, it is 
therefore unsurprising that research to date lacks a comprehensive, universal 
theory of irredentism.
There is in short the need for a precise, differentiated and reasoned definition 
of irredentism in order to subsequently elaborate on the variables that 
condition its occurrence and demise. The lack of conceptualisation testifies not 
only to the disregard of ethno-territorial retrieval as a political reality, but as a 
field of study. Hence my task here is not merely to describe and establish what 
an irredenta is, but -  equally importantly - what it is not. Based on this 
definition, we will be able to collate all irredentas and compare irredentas in 
their essential and therefore universal, qualities. Opening the black box of 
irredentism thus entails the development of a comparative analytical 
framework for it.
1.2 Irredentism as a concept
Irredentism needs to be coined as concept -  i.e. as a notion or idea in social 
science -  and subsequently categorised as real world phenomenon as well as 
described in its standard attributes. Turning to the concept first, it requires 
distinction into variants: irredentism is in fact conceptually heterogeneous and 
consists of two rarely differentiated subtypes.3
2 Compare for example Landau’s (1991) definition that centres on ethnic affinity (“...expression 
of passionate interest in the well-being of an ethnic or cultural minority...” ) with Ben-lsrael’s 
(1991) materialist emphasis on the homeland (“... irredentism pertains in the first place to 
territory demanded by a state”). Some definitions concentrate on the minority (Reichman and 
Golan 1991 ), while most others focus exclusively on the parent state (e.g. Saideman 1998, 
Chazan 1991, von Hippel 1993, Yagcioglu 1996, Mayall 1990). Only few are bilateral (Suhrke 
1970, Connor 1980, Horowitz 1985 ).
3 The only exception to date is Horowitz in Chazan (1991:10). The types are, however, 
distinguished without consequence for his subsequent analysis.
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1.2.1 Differentiation -  “irredentism’* has two faces
T h e  first variant, which I call type 1 or conventional, is the m ost frequent form  
of irredentism  and will form the subject of this work. It features the situation of 
a parent state (A) and its transborder ethnic brethren (B) which is situated in a 
neighbouring host state (C ).
Figure 1.1. R epresentation of a conventional irredenta
T h ese  m ovem ents seek to detach land and people from one state in order to 
re/incorporate them  into another. Interw ar H ungary and the Transylvanian  
M agyar com m unity in R om ania provide a good exam ple of such an irredenta. 
A  type 1 irredenta is potentially anywhere possible, provided two basic  
structural requirem ents are fulfilled:
• the existence of a parent state. This is a state w here  one ethnic  
group is num erically and/or politically dom inant as titular nation, 
i.e. w here  other groups cannot thwart the retrieval of ethnic kin.
• the existence of one or m ore ethnically kindred com m unities in 
an adjacent state or states, ideally - but not necessarily - in a 
com pact, border-near situation.
Th e  second, less frequent, variant is w hat I label so-called unificationist (or 
type 2) irredenta. It is not to be confused with pan-m ovem ents  - m ere cultural 
projects to create a larger entity, like for instance pan-ls lam ism  (see Landau  
1 99 1 :9 1 -9 2  and 1 99 5 :1 8 0 -1 8 2 ). Instead, it applies only to pursuits involving 
com m on kinship and a shared idea of and attachm ent to, an ethnic hom eland. 
H ow ever, these can som etim es start off on the cultural plane and grow into an
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unificationist irredenta.4 Type 2 irredentas consist of an ethnic group (a, b, c, d) 
which is dispersed across several host states (I., II., III.) and lacks a parent 
state of its own. It seeks to establish the latter by detaching and unifying land 
from several states. Apart from the m ore widely known Kurdish and Basque  
cases, the Baluchi, Palestinians and Ew e provide further exam ples of this 
irredentist type.5
Figure 1.2. Representation of a pan-m ovem ent
In sum, the d ifference betw een the two variants is one of joining as opposed to 
creating, a political unit. How ever, these distinctions are  som ew hat ideal 
typical. For one, w e  have to take into account irredentism ’s dynam ic character. 
Empirical evidence shows an evolutionary connection betw een the two 
categories. Thus, unificationist irredentas develop into the conventional type  
after having successfully established a core parent state; they function as a 
sort of transitional s tage.6 Indeed, m any conventional irredentas are follow-ups  
to an unificationist irredenta: they logically continue w here  the preceding  
project of retrieval end ed .7 This is how the G re ek  M egali m ovem ent and the  
Italian, G erm an, Rom anian, and Som ali cases evolved. I would argue that this
4 Cases like the Megali Idea and Pan-Germanism did invoke cultural-linguistic arguments, but 
the actual irredentas they spawned were primarily underpinned by (perceived) shared ancestry 
and a ‘map image’ of communal homelands -  see also chapter 6 .
5 Unificationist irredentas occur in two different situations. One is where the irredentist minority 
challenges a majority in the host country, be that mono-ethnic (e.g. Kurds versus 
homogeneous Turks) or multi-ethnic (Basques versus heterogeneous Spain). In the second 
scenario, the unificationist group is a domestic majority itself (e.g. Germans pre-1871, 
Romanians in Moldova and Wallachia prior to 1859).
6 1 am not aware of instances where this development was reversed. The relation between the 
two types seems unidirectional.
7 The few type 1 irredentas not preceded by unificationist movements are generally those 
involving a historic parent state that was however subsequently dismembered via secession 
(like Yugoslavia) or partition (e.g. Ireland, Hungary).
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also describes the current Palestinian situation8. Put into a nutshell, our 
identified subtypes appear more continuous than discrete, they function as 
phases of the same process.
Secondly, there is also the problem of borderline cases, which are difficult to 
classify. Some movements want to turn their host into a parent state (i.e. into 
one which they dominate) exactly by retrieving ethnic kin. This makes the 
situation reminiscent of type 2 irredentas, with two or more kindred groups in 
different states wishing to unite. But, in contrast to unificationist irredentas, 
these movements do not want to defect. To the contrary: the envisaged 
political unit already exists, and this would in turn indicate a type 1 case. An 
example are the Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa in Nigeria, who respectively demand 
to be reunited with their kin from neighbouring countries in order make Nigeria 
-  which they equally share -  into a parent state they dominate. The same is 
true for Djibouti's Afars, who wish to retrieve fellow Afars in Eritrea and 
Somalia in order to outnumber the local Somalis with whom they share their bi­
national state. Yet another case are Afghani Pashtuns, today a medium-sized 
communal group in their country, who wish to incorporate enthusiastic fellow 
Pashtuns in Pakistan in order to restore their former demographic and political 
dominance within Afghanistan. I have resolved that, since none of these 
groups actually dominates “their” state, i.e. since there is no parent state 
integral to the definition of conventional retrieval, they all remain sub-variants 
of unificationist irredentas.
Thirdly, the presence or absence of a parent state can be expected to 
generate very different determinants for the two irredentist categories, and my 
thesis will only focus on those for the more frequent, conventional irredentas. 
Firstly, there is an appreciable qualitative contrast as to their aims. Building a 
new political entity is incomparably more ambitious - and difficult - a goal than 
joining a pre-existing one. Furthermore, the constellation of actors is radically 
different. Type 1 features a bilateral situation in which the retrieving unit
8 The areas currently under Palestinian self-government represent a gradually consolidating, 
but as yet semi-sovereign, Palestinian parent state. Much like the nineteenth century Greek 
case, the latter is the product of a partially successful unificationist irredenta. The territories 
(still) left out yet inhabited by ethnic kin, are perceived as essential Palestinian homeland 
(most notably East Jerusalem). These areas are now the subjects of a conventional irredenta.
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nevertheless ultimately takes the lead. In contrast, a unificationist irredenta like 
that of the Basques or Kurds involves multiple equal players, i.e. kindred ethnic 
groups. These have to co-ordinate their goals and activities against the 
different backgrounds of incentives and deterrents of their respective host 
countries. What logically follows from these considerations is that such 
irredentas should have a far lower success rate than conventional ones. Oddly 
enough, my statistical evidence suggests the exact opposite. What we can 
nevertheless assume for certain is that irredentist prerequisites must vary in 
character and weight across these two subtypes, and it will make an 
interesting future research project to establish to what extent they do so and 
how.
1.2.2 Conventional irredentism defined: actors and features
But let us return to conventional irredentas. Although we know now what they 
entail and how to recognise them, we still lack an operationalised definition. 
For reasons I shall detail below, I propose the following formula:
Irredentism is the bilateral and simultaneous pursuit by both parent 
state and ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno- 
territorial retrieval across inter-state borders.
Ethno-territorial retrieval represents one policy pursued by two distinct actors 
whose behaviours interact, i.e. they are not independently variable.9
Irredentist actors: the parent state
Let us look at our actors first. Parent states display a few basic attributes. They 
are invariably a sovereign political entity which is either politically and / or 
numerically dominated by one communal group. The term “sovereign” denotes 
here the formal freedom to determine domestic and foreign policies, but not 
the Weberian monopoly on the legitimate exercise of coercive power. Were 
one to apply that criterion, it would disqualify a number of irredentist states,
9 Horowitz (1985:286) claims the opposite: “the desire to pursue irredentism and the desire to 
be retrieved are thus independently variable.”
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such as Somalia or Armenia. In other words, there are parent states that are 
themselves challenged in their authority, but nevertheless perfectly capable of 
pursuing retrieval.
The feature of demographic or political dominance is vital for three reasons. 
Firstly, as we have seen, the criterion neatly distinguishes our two irredentist 
types as well as similar, but different events (see below). Secondly, it is the 
very gist of irredentas to unite an ethno-national group and its ancestral 
grounds within an entity that it ‘owns’, i.e. one that is not controlled or (co- 
)defined by ethnic strangers. The linchpin is hence not exclusivity (indeed 
many parent states contain minorities), but control: others are tolerated, 
provided they subordinate to the titular nation, there is no shared statehood. 
Finally, ‘dominance’ describes a state that is capable of irredentism without 
decisive opposition by its own minorities. These may worry that retrieval would 
upset the domestic ethnic balance at their expense (Horowitz 1985:284; 
Neuberger 1991:106). I distinguish here between situations of genuine and 
qualified homogeneity, i.e. variations in the freedom of political action even a 
dominant ethnic group has (see section 4.2, below).10 Genuine homogeneity 
describes parent states where titular groups exercise perfect control over 
politics. This may be because there really are no minorities or, crucially, 
because existing ones have no veto power. Parent states marked by qualified 
homogeneity in turn contain what I call important retaliating minorities. These 
are able to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically (Hungarians in 
Romania threatening withdrawal of their crucial governmental support at the 
prospect of Moldova’s retrieval), demographically (non-Malays in Malaysia 
protesting against any retrieval of Thai Malays), and/or economically (like 
Moldova’s Dniester-Russians who seceded with their economically important 
territory in 1990 fearing union with Romania). While such hindrances are not 
decisive in themselves, they may add to the considerable adversity irredentas 
typically face.
10 Neuberger (1991:104) equally observes these variations and has attempted a differentiated 
typology of retrieving states along the axis of domestic ethnic pluralism. Horowitz (1991:17) in 
contrast reasons in binary terms, i.e. parent states with domestic minorities are likely to be 
unattractive to transborder kin and also unable to retrieve.
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Irredentist actors: the transborder minority
The transborder group is ethnically kindred11 to the mainland population. In 
other words, ethno-national affinity is a defining feature of irredentism. “Non­
ethnic" irredentas (Neuberger 1991:103; Yagcioglu 1999) are, as Horowitz 
(1991:11) agrees, consequently a contradiction in terms. Ethnic ties between 
parent state and those cut off crucially underpin an irredenta, they make sense 
of it. The two actors may well have "sub-group cleavages" as Horowitz calls 
them (1985:285), such as clans (as in the Somali or Albanian cases) or 
different religious denominations (e.g. Muslim and Christian Palestinians). But 
internal differences such as tribe, religion or dialect are no automatic 
impediments to irredentism. These are irrelevant as long as there is a shared 
set of exclusive ascriptive features based on which that ethno-national group 
defines itself. As I will show in chapter 6, it is rifts in this component that 
contribute to the unmaking of an irredenta.
Let us return to the transborder community. In most cases it will form a 
demographic and / or political minority within an ethnically different or multi­
ethnic, state. There are a few exceptions to this, i.e. cases of a kindred group 
that in fact occupies its own sovereign state. Invariably, however, their 
separation into this distinct state has been imposed externally and will be 
resented to some degree. The mainland is still regarded as "true" parent state, 
hence the definitional term "foreign state" still applies. There are only a 
handful, but nevertheless interesting, examples for this: interwar Austria, the 
GDR, Greek Cyprus and post-Soviet Moldova. For matters of convenience I 
will refer to the transborder group throughout as "minority" and generally 
theorise for the classical minority setting.
Territory: communal homelands as 'map image’
A third definitional feature has to do with the transborder community's territory. 
Hence also the double-barrelled synonym I use for irredentism: ethno-territorial 
retrieval. The reason why irredentists cannot be satisfied with simple 
population transfers is because that area is part of the entire group's ancestral
11 I characterise all cases as ethnic groups, since “there is no objective reason to call a few 
hundred thousand Basques a nation, and the ten million Ibos, who possess a well-defined 
territory, a language and a culture, a tribe" (Neuberger 1986:23).
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homeland. An irredenta’s underlying notion is always one of remedying a 
subjectively unnatural or illegitimate division of the group and, by implication, 
of this communal territory as one of its central markers. Irredentists are by 
definition “homeland groups” (Esman 1994:14), which means that the 
ancestral area forms integral part of its collective identity. It is inseparable from 
the rationale and emotional appeal of the entire project. Examples of the 
Hungarian obsession with Transylvania spring to mind, the importance of 
Jerusalem to Palestinians, or the Serbian passion for Kosovo. Transborder kin 
should therefore not be referred to as “diasporic”, since the term implies a 
dispersed group settling away from or beyond, its homeland.12 Irredentists 
invariably define themselves as natives, so to say as “first nations”, in their 
territory.13 They feel endowed with a superior right to ‘their’ ancestral soil. As 
chapter 4 will show (and thereby disprove Horowitz), they will consequently 
want to retrieve of it as much as possible, whether or not they inhabit all of it or 
share it with other groups. Only where this directly conflicts with recovering 
kindred, i.e. usually under duress (like when Nazi Germany set the conditions 
for Hungary’s retrieval of Transylvania in 1940) will parent states prioritise 
people over land.
Confusingly, the unit ethno-territorial retrieval seeks to recreate is quite often 
reified. When has there ever existed the unified Hellenic state Greek 
irredentists desired to restore? What ethnic Italian entity had to be re-created 
by retrieving South Tyrol, the Veneto and Fiume? This is especially true for 
non-European cases. There, irredentist demands and rationales often build on 
colonial -  that is artificial and arbitrary - arrangements and couch them in 
ethnic terms. This usually mixes with homeland references of pre-colonial 
history.14 Neuberger (1986:30) also points out that homelands, as well as the
12 Walker Connor (1986:16) correctly insists on the appropriate use of the term:”(...) the 
working definition of a diaspora might well be 'that segment of a people living outside the 
homeland’” (emphasis added).
13 Naturally, this claim is emphatically contradicted by the respective host country. Romanians 
for instance maintain that it was them, and not Hungarians, who first settled Transylvania. 
Djibouti's Afars are similarly at pains to prove that the local lise Somalis moved well after them 
into that area.
14 After all, the memory of historic states, such as the Kongo Kingdom or the Pashtun tribal 
confederacies, is alive. Indeed, irredentism in the Third World often represents a desire to 
return to the status quo ante. Yet my point is that ethno-territorial retrieval in these settings 
should not be automatically equated with a total and principled opposition to any colonial 
arrangement.
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mother states in post-colonial irredentas, are very much based on “the notion 
that colonial political units (like Djibouti) and administrative entities (e.g. 
Kenya’s Northern Frontier District) are indivisible units for self-determination”. 
Examples are Somali irredentism, the Libyan irredenta towards northern Chad 
(citing the 1935 French-ltalian Treaty of Rome), or Ewe desires to re-create 
German Togoland because it mostly coincides with their homeland.
While this collective 'map image' and its notions of entitlement are highly 
subjective, the political will generated by this territorial marker of identity is very 
real. Retrieval is about regaining "completeness". The lacking unit can range 
from a mere city (Fiume) or administrative entity (the Kenyan Northern Frontier 
District), to an entire historic region (Transylvania or Kashmir) or a statelet 
(Northern Ireland), or even, as mentioned, an entire sovereign state.15 To 
repeat, what these rather diverse units have in common is their perception as 
national territory, “as part of an ethno-cultural homeland, as part of a historic 
state, or as integral part of one geographic whole” (Neuberger 1991:97; see 
also Connor 1986:16-18; Carment and James 1995:84). As long as this 'map 
image' of the homeland is integral to a group's ethnic kinship, irredentism is the 
commonsensical answer. Chapter 6 will amongst others demonstrate that 
when this nexus is broken, when ethno-national identity comes to de-prioritise 
territory in favour of cultural and / or civic aspects, we have a causal 
contribution to irredentist inconsistency.
Requisite definitional features: bilateral desire for retrieval 
Beyond the two actors, our definition clears several misunderstandings about 
irredentism and thus provides a conclusive, all-encompassing description. 
Firstly, it stipulates a two-actor approach. Just like genocide must conceptually 
consist of a group of perpetrators on the one hand, and of a separate group of 
victims on the other, there must be two distinct parties actively involved here. It 
is the consensual wish for retrieval, i.e. within both the parent state and the 
transborder community, that qualifies as an irredenta. Everything else 
deserves distinct labelling. A state's unilateral policies to incorporate a
15 Judging by area size, one could categorise large-, medium- and small-scale irredentas. 
Saideman and Ayres (1999; 2000) see size as crucial determinant of irredentism, an argument 
which is challenged by the very diversity of these cases.
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disinterested or even reluctant population with its territory remains nothing else 
but annexationism, a simple act of expansion, even if that group is ethnically 
kindred. Hence the relevant criterion is not whether the rationale or discourse 
of a revisionist state is irredentist, but whether its brethren reciprocate the 
pursuit of retrieval. Examples of such annexationist attempts disguised - and 
hence mistaken - as irredentas would be Saddam Hussein's 1991 invasion of 
Kuwait on the grounds of recovering Iraq's 19th province, and China’s 
aspirations towards Taiwan.16 No wonder then that many studies erroneously 
reduce irredentism to mere state expansion clothed in nationalist rhetoric or, 
even worse, to a type of diversionary war (see below). Recognising the 
consent of both parties sorts irredentism from these policies.
In contrast, the purely one-sided wish of a transborder ethnic group for 
retrieval poses greater problems for judgement. It certainly does not count as 
genuine irredenta, because it fails to satisfy the criteria of simultaneity and 
reciprocity. However, unlike the single-handed attempts by some states, this 
pursuit has no other ambition but the one it professes. The ulterior motive is 
incorporation on the basis of transborder ethnic affinity. Moreover, it cannot 
impose itself on the other party because it is pursued by the weaker player in 
the game. Such “orphaned irredentas” (to take up the family imagery these 
movements employ) do exist and represent a curious territorial exit strategy. 
They can either arise without a parent state’s encouragement (see the 
irredentist Crimean and Kazakh Russians ignored by their parent state), or 
persist after the mainland has unilaterally abandoned retrieval (arguably 
among them are the enosist Greeks of Cyprus or the Somalis in Ethiopia). 
Lacking parent state support, such minority demands eventually convert into 
other territorially defined responses, such as autonomy seeking movements or 
secessionism.17
The bilateral criterion is important to understand decision-making, but does not 
imply equality between the irredentist actors. The relationship is inevitably
16 Even Chazan’s informed volume on irredentas accepts rhetoric as actual fact when it 
defines retrieval as “attempts by existing states to annex adjacent lands and the people who 
inhabit them in the name of historical, cultural, religious, linguistic or geographical affinity" 
(1991:139, emphasis added).
7See Horowitz (1991) on the relative infrequency of irredentas versus secessions and for the 
elasticity of ethno-territorial claims (1985:231-2).
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skewed in favour of the more powerful party, namely the retrieving state. Only 
the parent state has the capacity to actually achieve an irredentist project, 
thanks to its military and financial resources, its bargaining power in 
international relations, and its capacity to act as a sovereign unit on its own 
behalf18 - a crucial attribute lacking in the transborder minority. This inherent 
imbalance also explains the dominance of unilateral, parent state-focused 
definitions of irredentism (e.g. Neuberger 1991, Landau 1991, Ben-lsrael 1991, 
Saideman 1996). Connor (1980:162-3) cautions that such one-sided analysis 
leads to mistaken conclusions: “analysts tend to perceive such movements 
[irredentas] as being artificially induced, since they receive their major impetus 
from governments across the border.” He reminds that "government appeals to 
ethno-political yearnings require a popular desire, no matter how incipient, (...) 
governments can act as a successful catalyst of ethno-nationalism only when 
the necessary ingredients are present." Hence to omit minority choices (as 
opposed to capacities) means overlooking half of the input in an irredentist 
process.
At the opposite extreme, there are approaches that posit irredentism as the 
product of a triadic or even four-dimensional, relationship (Brubaker 1993; 
Suhrke 1970; Suhrke and Noble 1977). My fundamental disagreement with 
these models in turn is their untidy distinction between actors (i.e. those who 
pursue retrieval) and the independent variables that influence their decisions. 
The latter may well be agents in their own right (states, regional or 
international bodies etc.), but they remain external-structural determinants to 
the activity of the parent state and its transborder kindred. Thus the host state 
for example, often included as player, can only figure as (important) part of the 
shaping environment in an irredenta.
Requisite definitional features: simultaneous irredentism
The requirement of simultaneity follows from the logic of irredentism as a
consensual project. If both actors do not yet or no longer pursue retrieval at the
18 This is the main reason why I do not consider the foreign policies of Hungary's national 
communist regime. My case study deliberately leaves a 50 year gap between 1944 and 1989, 
since Budapest was during this time little more than a German, and later Soviet satellite, 
unable to make independent (and therefore representative) policy choices.
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same time, we are again dealing with either an orphaned irredenta or an 
annexationist project. Simultaneity also highlights the dynamic character of 
irredentism, the parallel activism of both players over the same stretch of time. 
Retrieval is a process, not an event or sudden crisis, it can have a life span of 
over a century before it is either achieved or abandoned.
This brings us to a related problem in our definition. When does retrieval start 
and end? And who initiates it? To start with, the rise and demise of an 
irredenta can only be approximated since it is a process, not an event. Still, the 
above definition does provide a time frame of sorts. As soon as both actors 
pursue the same goal of retrieval simultaneously, an irredenta is born. This 
may come along in a gradual build-up process (as in the case of the two 
Germanies), or be dramatically triggered by events such as a partition 
(Kashmir, Ireland, Hungary), imperial breakdown (see Nagorno-Karabach, 
Moldova), unilateral secession (Krajina, Republika Srpska), and de­
colonisation (e.g. Somali territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti). In order to 
pinpoint starting dates concretely, I have usually taken a key moment in each 
case, one in which irredentist feeling or activity was first externalised by both 
actors in an unmistakeable manner. An irredenta formally ends, when either or 
both of the two parties abandons the project, or when it has been 
accomplished. As a rule, if abandonment occurs, it often comes from the 
parent state. Minorities rarely if ever, give up first, although a possible future 
case might be Nagorno-Karabach, which seems to flirt with independence 
instead of retrieval. Interestingly, abandonment by the parent state does not 
stop minority irredentism immediately. As mentioned above, there exist 
numerous examples of “orphaned irredentas” persevering quite undeterred for 
years, even decades, in their struggle for reincorporation.
Despite these relatively clear start and end points, the timing of irredentas 
remains problematic however, for reality frequently forbids such tidy 
compartmentalisation. This is because retrieval does not have a life cycle as 
such, and, although there arguably are discernible stages, there is no linear 
progression to those either. Instead, irredentas experience ups and downs and 
proceed at changing paces, yet ultimately in a cumulative way. After growing
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bilateral activism in the early 1920s, the Austro-German pursuit to retrieve 
South Tyrol for instance paused with the so-called Devil’s Pact of 1939, which 
ostensibly settled the irredentist antagonism between the Axis partners. Yet 
the project gathered momentum again once Mussolini’s fall became imminent, 
and was accomplished within weeks of the latter’s arrest in 1943. Hence, my 
stringent definition of irredentism allows for certain latency periods in order to 
accommodate its dynamic character.19 Alternatively, one would have to refer to 
each occurrence as new, separate irredenta (e.g. the South Tyrolean irredenta 
of 1920, of 1943 and so on) which would be analytically inconvenient and 
empirically wrong. These fluctuations may be strategic (as in the case above), 
or due to minor / temporary changes in the very factors that are, once they 
transform more decisively, also responsible for irredentist inconsistency. The 
“irredentist inconsistency" of my study means a definite and broadly endorsed 
discontinuation of irredentism in either or both players. In contrast to their 
former agendas, they now regard existing border arrangements as permanent, 
if not always legitimate, and no longer seek to revise them. The bi-lateral 
abandonment of retrieval by Germany and the Alsatians after 1945 (see 
Gutmann 1991) and contemporary Magyar choices in Eastern Europe both 
represent good examples.
The related question of which side casts the initial impulse for retrieval is hard 
to answer, there seems to be no pattern. Connor (1980:163) notes in the same 
vein that “governments may take the initiative in raising an irredentist claim, 
but most unionising movements originate in ethnic groups on either side of the 
border, and those groups then press for governmental support.” It should be 
noted here that the two parties’ decisions are not necessarily independent of 
each other, as Horowitz maintains (1985:286).
19 Rather than drawing a binary picture of terminated and ongoing irredentas, it is useful to 
introduce the notion of a latent irredenta. This applies where neither actor has formally 
renounced irredentist politics, and/or where retrieval still appears to form the ultimate or ideal 
goal for both parent state and transborder kindred. In other words, latency is also given when 
both actors still regard their division by state borders as temporary.
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1.3 Filling in the gaps: the characteristics of ethno-territorial retrieval
(based on Dataset 1)
The next step on from our definition is to collate all cases that qualify in order 
to find and describe general features. As of now, there is still no adequate 
dataset on retrieval (see also next chapter).20 The problem is that of 
recognition: due to erroneous or lacking definitions, most irredentas are simply 
not labelled and analysed as such. The German reunification has not been 
thought of as a successful irredenta, despite presenting a good example. The 
Irish Republican movement has rarely been referred to as irredentism. 
Somalia’s protracted conflicts with neighbouring states that contain significant 
numbers of its ethnic kin have simply been tagged as post-colonial wars. 
Conversely, an example like Zionism is mistakenly cited as “classic case of 
irredentism” (Ben-lsrael 1991:33-4), although it involves overwhelmingly 
diasporic communities. With a workable concept now in place, we can 
however draw all genuine cases under one logical heading and summarise 
their features.
The Descriptive Dataset, below (see Dataset Manual 1 for codebook and value 
label views), has attempted to do so. Dataset 1 collects all cases 
chronologically on the basis of our working definition, recording their various 
attributes into a global collation on conventional (type 1) irredentism which 
spans the period from the first assertion of the national principle in 1789 until 
present. A few caveats are necessary beforehand. Despite best efforts, the 
present compilation of 55 conventional irredentas is unlikely to be complete.21 
The statistical population size is small, the last wave of irredentism is recent 
and still ongoing, hence we have to infer and generalise with reserve. The set 
also includes a few anomalies. There is for instance the case of Cyprus, which 
counts as conventional irredenta although it does not quite conform to the 
classical situation outlined above. Cyprus, consisting since 1974 of two
20 Saideman and Ayres' studies of irredentism (1999; 2000) are based on Gurr's general 
Minorities at Risk dataset. Moore and Davis (1998) have statistically analysed transnational 
ties and state foreign policy, but their compilation includes all kinds of relationships from mere 
patronage down to irredentism.
On the basis of the above definition, I have also found 14 unificationist irredentas which 
make up a separate dataset for future research.
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political units, is not adjacent to the parent state (Greece) and it is not claimed 
by a rival state -  Turkey never tried to retrieve the island, neither in part nor as 
a whole (Landau 1995:195). But because of the consensual and simultaneous 
wish of Cypriot and mainland Greeks for “enosis" (union) under the Megali 
(Greater Greece) idea, the case qualifies.22 Another exceptional case is that of 
Austria, figuring as both retriever and retrieved. From 1920 onwards it was an 
irredentist state itself when it lost South Tyrol, whilst being simultaneously 
subject to the Nazi German irredenta which sought the nineteenth century 
Greater German Solution (GrofJdeutsche Losung). Also, for the sake of a 
larger population size and the associated degrees of freedom in statistical 
testing, we also do not differentiate between the classical retrieval of minorities 
from a host state, and consensual unifications of kindred countries with a 
mainland (e.g. Nazi Germany and Austria, West-Germany and GDR, Romania 
and Moldova). Finally, also included are cases where irredentism co-exists 
with other variants of self-determination, like secession (e.g. Kashmir).
1.3.1 The global incidence of irredentism overtime and space 
Geographical distribution
The goal of irredentism is to unite a group and its ancestral grounds within a 
political entity that its own kin controls, and these two prerequisites limit its 
geographical occurrence. Retrieval is definitionally contingent on the concept 
of the state, or more accurately, on that of the nation state (Neuberger 
1991:104). Ernest Gellner (1983:4) reminds us that nationalism - which 
provides retrieval with its rationale - is "parasitic" on the concept of the state. 
Hence nationalism, and irredentism with it, "only emerges in milieux in which 
the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted."
Secondly, irredentism presupposes an ancestral territory (see above), which 
accounts for its complete absence in the Americas23 and Australia. Small
22 This project was successfully opposed by the British mandate power and Turkey, until 
Athens officially abandoned the irredenta under these pressures, forcing its kin to accept 
independence in 1958 instead of incorporation. Enosist factions in both mainland and Cypriot 
Greek politics exist until today, but the idea is not longer governmentally endorsed.
23 Bolivian claims against Chile over the Litoral de Atacama-province, annexed in 1904, do not 
qualify as irredenta. Although the claims are still upheld - there is a national commemoration
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native populations aside, they are overwhelmingly made up of diasporic 
communities who, by definition lack, the crucial attachment to a communal 
area. Being immigrant societies, such settings also pre-empt the core 
aspiration of retrieval, for none can function as parent state, as a political entity 
where one ethnic group is dominant. So while the concept of the state is well 
established here, it has preceded - indeed generated - the nation, rather than 
vice versa. Irredentism's problem, the problem of nation-state incongruence, 
hence does not even arise.
For these reasons, conventional irredentism still proves to be an 
overwhelmingly European phenomenon. Of the 55 identifiable cases, 45 are 
European -  an impressive 16 of which occurred in Western Europe, a region 
allegedly free of the ethno-nationalism. It is mainly the period of de­
colonisation which has provided the few non-European exceptions to this rule: 
I have found 5 African, 4 Asian and only 1 Middle Eastern irredenta. One may 
speak of irredentist waves which, as corollaries to the waves of modern state 
formation, progressively expanded from the European birthplace to other parts 
of the world.24
Global spread in clusters
Judging from the dataset, the occurrence of retrieval may be organised into 
four successive waves in world history (Chazan 1991:142-143)25 Since 
irredentism strives for the creation or completion of parent states, these 
periods are linked to the four waves of modern state creation that for instance 
O’Leary (1998:61) suggests.26 As such, irredentist surges have been spawned
day and a tenth star on the national flag to symbolise the lost area - the local population there 
has not voiced a desire for retrieval. In other words, the case does not fulfil the criterion of 
bilateralism. The 1836 Texan defection from Mexico and its subsequent entry into the United 
States in 1845 is not an irredenta either, because the union was not based on ethnic affinity.
24 Irredentism has no domino effects because it is contingent on a certain set of factors that 
condition its occurrence or demise. Demonstration effects, however, are possible, as my 
model will argue: the existence and/or proximity of successful irredentas shapes both actors’ 
decisions on retrieval (Horowitz 1985: 279 argues the same for secessions). One such 
instance are the successful German irredentas for interwar Magyars.
25 Chazan’s phases (1991:142-3) are only roughly outlined. Based on the collation of 
irredentas, I have modified their timing somewhat, re-labelled them, and finally linked them to 
the context of modern state formation.
26 There are several alternative chronologies, most notably Charles Tilly’s sociological account 
(1975:632-8). This distinguishes only three phases and dates them from a much earlier point 
onwards (1500-1700, 1650-1800, 1800-1950).
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by either revolutions (1789 and 1989-90), and / or imperial collapse (1919, 
1989-90), and / or World Wars (1919, 1940). They represent brief anomalies in 
the Westphalian status quo consensus that has governed modern international 
relations.
Rather than variations in success rates or -frequency, our irredentist waves 
consequently describe thematic groups. Each wave unites cases which arose 
among similar circumstances (e.g. imperial disintegration following WW1) and 
thus base themselves on the same contemporary paradigm (Wilson's Fourteen 
Points). A closer look reveals that cases cluster at certain junctures of each 
wave. This means that we can differentiate alternating active and latent sub­
periods (see chapter 5). Active periods are brief and normally situated at the 
start and / or end of a wave. Still marked by the major international upsets 
described above, they represent brief windows of opportunity for irredentism. 
Latent periods in turn seem to be the default mode, mirroring the traditionally 
restrictive inter-state consensus against self-determination and border 
changes. Confusingly, such periods are not expressly prohibitive. Often, the 
international system ostensibly upholds a permissive attitude (e.g. by extolling 
self-determination in the UN Charter), whilst in fact acting restrictively, 
frequently with an area bias.27 The dataset shows irredentism as stagnant or 
gestating mainly during restrictive phases. Active-permissive phases in 
contrast witnessed virulent and / or successful, retrieval.
Coming to our thematic waves then, the first, which I call ‘‘Native", saw the birth 
of the irredentist concept. Interestingly, a label for retrieval emerges only about 
halfway through this period, drawn from the Risorgimento’s cry for Italia 
irredenta, a redeemed Italy. The Native Wave was made possible by the 
philosophical changes of the French Revolution, which introduced the national 
principle. Irredentas are thus inherently modern phenomena, corollaries to a 
type of political project that did not exist before 1789. They are certainly not 
“an age-long phenomenon” in world history (Ben-lsrael 1991:31-2)28 The First 
Wave “centred on the delineation of the boundaries of core European states...”
27 For instance, the Anti-Colonial phase saw an overall tolerant stance towards border revision 
only in Africa and Asia, whilst maintaining a firm status quo attitude towards it in Europe.
28 Ben-lsrael (ibid.) understands irredentism as an “archetypal force” of atavistic territory- 
marking that nationalism merely provided with a modern rationale and mode of self- 
expression.
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(Chazan 1991:142) and was therefore particularly a period of unificationist 
irredentism in both Western and Eastern Europe -  the cases of Italy, 
Germany, Greece and Romania spring to mind. Conversely, because this time 
of nation state creation was still relatively poor in parent states only 22, mostly 
short-lived, cases date from that period. Starting somewhere in the early 
1820s, it lasted through the whole of the nineteenth century, during which it 
intensified, until the peace treaties of the First World War (1918/1920), which 
sealed the making of this order.
The revisionism that the latter provoked, together with imperial collapse and 
the international acceptance of ethnic boundary drawing, thematically unites 
the second, “Wilsonian”, wave of irredentism. This stretches from about 1919 
until 1939. Sandwiched between the World Wars, this comparatively brief era 
of only two decades was very prolific, generating 16 cases. It is unsurprisingly 
the one most associated with irredentist movements, displaying powerful 
examples such as the German and Hungarian ones, and marking the onset of 
the Irish pursuit of retrieval.
The following Third Wave is associated with the prolonged process of 
decolonisation. It occupies most of the twentieth century (1940-1988), and 
mainly centres on the Third World (the two exceptions are Japan and West 
Germany). Practically repeating the scenario of European state formation from 
a century ago, it displays a high tide of unificationist irredentism -  see for 
instance the Somali, Bakongo, Pashtun, Baluchi, or Afar examples. In the few 
cases where these unificationist irredentas were achieved (Somalia), or where 
an ethnic group already possessed a parent state (Japan, Malaysia or via prior 
partition as with West Germany and Pakistan), this period also generated 
seven cases of conventional irredentism. A brief word of clarification is 
necessary here about the character of this irredentist period: it is not part of 
anti-colonialism, but distinct from and successive to, it. As Neuberger 
(1986:10) brilliantly distinguishes, “anti-colonial self-determination is, from a 
post-colonial perspective, statist and conservative, while ethnic and 
secessionist self-determination is revisionist and wants to tear down the 
current state system.” As a rule, the ethnically diverse states created by
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arbitrary colonial partition were, upon independence, themselves challenged 
by component groups (like the Somalis) or by ethnically homogeneous sub­
units (e.g. the Northern Chad).
The current Fourth Irredentist Wave is still ongoing, and thus has to be judged 
carefully. Because it was sparked off by the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989/90) 
and the end of the bi-polar freeze of the inter-state system, I call it the wave of 
the “New World Order”. The Fourth Wave has so far produced nine cases. 
Thematically, it seems to take up the unaccomplished cases of the Wilsonian 
Wave (e.g. Armenia, Serbia) and once again centres on Europe. Irredentism 
has thus practically returned after a brief excursion into the Third World during 
the second half of the twentieth century. The reasons relate back to my above 
discussion of actors and irredentist sub-types. Conventional irredentas are 
necessarily more rare in formerly colonial settings, because arbitrary border 
drawing resulted in very few parent states, i.e. ethnically majoritarian or titular 
units. Where this was nonetheless the case (like in Swaziland), or where this 
arose due to independence (Pakistan, Somalia), ethno-territorial retrieval was 
indeed sometimes attempted. In most cases, however, communal groups 
remain scattered among several host states and thus strive since de­
colonisation for parent state establishment in unificationist movements. Since 
conventional irredentas normally follow the successful creation of nation-states 
(see above), we may hence expect their future increase in the Third World.
Against the trend
As a final observation, these waves of occurrence do not mirror general 
findings on communal conflict in the literature. The latter almost unanimously 
describe a linear increase of ethnically defined antagonism over time (see for 
instance Connor 1972:327-32). Notably, there is no parallel with data from 
T.R. Gurr’s Minorities At Risk project. His quantification of mobilised communal 
groups all over the world shows a sustained rise in ethnic conflict over the 
twentieth century, globally as well as on each continent (Gurr 1994:98, 350-2). 
Why irredentism does not seem to “go with the flow” is at this point difficult to 
explain and once again calls for future research.
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1.3.2 Success and failure: how did irredentism fare over two centuries?
The criteria for irredentist success on the other hand, can be quite diverse and, 
depending on which ones are employed, may render markedly different 
outcomes.29 Given that this thesis argues against liberal normative, materialist 
explanations of irredentas, it is important to conceive of success as broadly as 
possible in order to avoid reification or charges of research bias. We can thus 
define success in terms of immediate, short-term results: has an irredenta 
achieved its goal at any point in time, however brief and disadvantageous that 
victory might have been? The rates of temporary success are reasonable: less 
than half of all finished or ongoing cases have proven a complete failure (i.e. 
23 out of 53 recorded outcomes). At first glance then, irredentism appears to 
stand a better than 50 per cent chance. If, however, we apply stricter criteria of 
success, the picture looks less positive. Durability is the first - what percentage 
of irredentist gains was able to sustain themselves until today? Since this is an 
ex post assessment, we have to look here at terminated cases only. No less 
than 23 out of the 42 completed irredentas fail this criterion, meaning that in 
the long term most have lost again what they retrieved. There are only 19 
rather exceptional success stories, and all but one of these successful 
irredentas are European. The tally gets even worse if we analyse the extent of 
these successes. Some irredentas achieve a part of their goals and then either 
content themselves (like the Serb designs for Sandjak of Novi Pazar/Raska 
and Danish aspirations for Schleswig), or continue to pursue unification with 
the remainder (an example is Greece’s quest for the whole of Epirus). Once 
again, I adopted a generous approach, counting even minimal or partial gains 
as victory, as long as they were lasting (see above). However, of the 19 
winners above, only 11 retrieved all they set out for.30 The remaining 8 united 
only a part of their homelands and kin. This means a rather meagre global 
success rate of 26 per cent (11 out of 42 terminated cases).
29 Ambrosio (2002:22-24) has conceived of success / irredentist outcomes in an even more 
differentiated continuum, from “full withdrawal of claims” up to “actual annexation”.
30 They are: Greece (Aegean Macedonia, Ionian Islands, Crete); France (Alsace); Romania 
(Transylvania); Italy (South Tyrol); Denmark (South Schleswig); Poland (Gdansk); Germany 
(Saarland and the former GDR), and Japan (Ryukyu-Okinawa). Although it is true that some of 
these cases suffered temporary setbacks (brief interruptions of sovereignty over their 
territories due to exchange irredentas), they ultimately managed to retain these retrieved units 
permanently.
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In short, even when success is broadly conceived, irredentism proves only just 
worthwhile. If at all, retrieval seems only viable as a short-term strategy. In the 
long term, and with a view to its declared goals (complete retrieval), it displays 
a story of dismal failure, making for a poor instrument of self-determination. 
Like secession -  the other territorial exit strategy -  it also creates more 
problems than it resolves. This is because its explicit win-lose mentality will 
engender pre-emptive measures by host states. These are always repressive, 
and sometimes even genocidal. If successful, it may lead to counter­
challenges in the form of exchange irredentas, forced restitution, population 
transfers, or secessionism by stranded minorities. The different reasons for 
failure also show that irredentist conflicts are very difficult to resolve. More than 
half of all projects are forcibly ended by external coercion and great power 
interference. Secondly, these figures severely challenge suggestions that 
conventional irredentism is calculating or rational, in that it is attempted again 
and again in spite of its sorry long-term record. Horowitz’s carefully deliberating 
groups would only need to open a few history books of the past two centuries 
in order to see for themselves that retrieval does not pay off. Still, there are 
globally no less than nine -  possibly even more -  conventional irredentas that 
are of recent birth and ardently pursued.
The category of failed cases is also interesting, because it provides information 
about how irredentist activity ends - as distinct from what ends the actual 
desire for retrieval, which is the ultimate subject of this work. Failures are 
remarkably heterogeneous. There are first of all projects that have been 
abandoned by the parent states (“orphaned irredentas”), mostly via official 
governmental renouncement towards the host state. Examples are Malaysia’s 
public abandonment in 1948, or Somalia’s gestures in 1978, 1981 and 1988 
towards Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. These account for merely 3 
cases out of the total of 23 terminated irredentas. In short: parent states rarely 
"just let go". Neither do minorities for that matter. Following Horowitz’ tenets 
(1991) there also ought to be irredentas that were traded by transborder kin for 
the more self-interested option of secessionism. There is, however, only one 
such 'converted' irredenta. In the case concerned, that of the Thai Malays, 
desires for local autonomy crucially followed the abandonment of irredentist
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projects, i.e. it was not causal. Thirdly, we can identify irredentas that were 
abandoned bilaterally, like the Swazi example, or that of the Chadian Muslims 
and Libya. These add up to a mere three. Conversely, by far the largest 
number of irredentist failures are down to “coerced termination.” These 
irredentas - 16 in total - were cut short by the external factor of a World War, 
and the subsequent imposition or occupation by victorious Great Powers (one 
may think here of the aftermath of interwar German and Hungarian irredentas 
or Greece’s forced return of Asia Minor in 1923). This reveals irredentism as 
tenacious ethno-national movement which is routinely suppressed.
Finally, a brief word on the average life span of irredentism. Of our 55 cases, 
there are 42 terminated irredentas, i.e. meaning these have clearly left behind 
both active and any latent periods. As explained above, an irredenta ends if 
either or both actors abandon the project, or if it has been accomplished. 
Accordingly, I define a conventional irredenta as failure if it has ended and 
never achieved even a temporary incorporation of the population and territory 
it sought to retrieve31 -  obvious examples would be here the Kenyan Somali or 
Greek Cypriot cases. Terminated cases ranged from merely 5 to an impressive 
125 years. Given that campaigns lasted 36.70 years on average, it is again 
clear that irredentists do not give up easily.
31 “Incorporation” denotes here a scenario where the population and territory become both 
legally and actually part of the parent state. The criteria can be illustrated in two examples. 
Although Somalia briefly managed to occupy almost 90 per cent of the Ogaden in the war 
against Ethiopia, that territory had at no point become part of Somalia. This is because the 
host state was neither defeated (it actually won the conflict), nor was there any legal 
arrangement (such as an inter-state treaty, a UN resolution, international recognition, or 
international arbitration) endorsing Somali occupation. Interwar Hungary in contrast, achieved 
her two irredentas via the Vienna Arbitrations of 1938 (Southern Slovakia) and 1940 (Northern 
Transylvania) in which the respective host countries signed their rights away, albeit under 
pressure. Although Budapest used normatively reprehensible means (coercive diplomacy) and 
the victories proved short-lived, these two cases of retrieval do represent examples of actual 
incorporation.
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1.3.3 Irredentist strategies and counter-strategies
Two centuries of irredentism display a set of trademark instruments and of 
combinations in which these are used. My point here is that both actors pursue 
retrieval in several, well observable ways over and apart from violence. The 
study of these characteristics has often been neglected in favour of - far fewer 
- spectacular confrontations. Secondly, we need to note that although striving 
for the same goal, actors' strategies diverge because of their difference in 
leverage. The parent state can afford a range of activities, while its transborder 
brethren risks a standardised set of repressive measures by its host state.
Parent state methods
Mainland irredentism typically translates into expansionist military and foreign 
policy concepts, antagonistic parent-host state relations (including full-scale 
war), campaigning at home and abroad for border adjustments, and the 
prominence of irredentist questions in domestic politics. It is accompanied by 
the disproportionate use of state resources (budgetary, military etc.), the 
existence of irredentist governmental bodies or ministries, biased curricula in 
state schools, and constitutionally enshrined commitments to, or symbols of, 
retrieval. The latter sometimes entails the extension of citizenship to 
transborder ethnic kin, thus equating civic and political loyalties with shared 
ethnicity. A final characteristic is the overall positive attitude of parent state 
public opinion, manifesting some kind of popular mandate for irredentism. Here 
components include significant electoral approval of irredentist party platforms, 
the success of single-issue interest groups, private initiatives, and of popular 
rallies. Further revealing is supportive or complacent domestic media coverage 
on the politics of retrieval, which often advertises the plight of minorities.
Minority strategies
Transborder minority irredentism in contrast has to be more subdued, since it 
risks host state retaliation. One universal feature is subordination to the parent 
state, in terms of identity (as mere enclave or periphery incapable of 
autonomous survival) and, consequently, political action. The more this 
relationship between local leaders and the parent state government is skewed
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into receiving and executing the latter's orders, the stronger that community's 
political allegiance and thus wish, for retrieval. In sum: the measure of how 
much the transborder group lends itself as instrument to mainland irredentist 
policies describes the degree of its own determination. As I will show in 
chapter 6, this is based on the causal link between group identity and political 
allegiances that co-determines irredentism. Generally, minority irredentism 
manifests itself in abstentionism (i.e. the refusal of consent and thus of 
legitimacy to the host state) and / or self-segregation as community. Minority 
party platforms will not be explicitly irredentist, but use proxy notions of 
external self-determination, group solidarity, autonomy, etc. Further typical are 
industrial action, sabotage, protest rallies, and various forms of civil 
disobedience. More rarely, these groups form alliances (electoral and 
occasionally military) with other disaffected minorities in their bid to challenge 
the much more powerful centre.32 Although the parties involved agree on their 
strategies and the usefulness of pooling efforts, these associations prove 
usually short-lived. This is because they are instrumental and ultimately aim for 
diverging goals. Sometimes, irredentist minorities also engage in violent 
uprisings (see below).
Joint strategies: the use of violence
There are multiple combinations of these strategies, and yet irredentism is 
often crudely reduced to, or equated with, a violent crisis. Some irredentas are 
indeed ready to employ violence, often early in their existence, whereas others 
never take this step. Some develop an armed minority militia from the outset 
(e.g. like in Northern Ireland, in Cyprus until 1958 or in Kashmir), supported by 
the parent state to varying degrees, and sometimes joined by the latter's 
military when the moment appears most favourable (as Armenia did in 
Nagorno-Karabach or Somalia in the Ogaden). In other cases, the parent state 
(e.g. rump Yugoslavia) and its kin (Krajina Serbs) join forces from the outset in 
order to conduct an integrated military campaign for maximum success. Other 
minorities take in comparison long to adopt armed activism (as in Cyprus), or
32 There are several examples for this: since 1947, the Baluchis and Pashtuns in Pakistan 
have been co-operating with one another as well as with autonomist Sindhis in order to 
achieve their respective unificationist irredentas. Somali irredentists allied themselves with 
Oromo secessionists in Ethiopia in the 1970s. Hungarians in both interwar Transylvania and 
Czechoslovakia joined forces with local German communities.
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permanently confine themselves to token actions like riots (Okinawa, interwar 
South Tyrol) or assassinations. Finally, and this will figure as secondary factor 
in chapter 5, many irredentas seek for powerful patron states. These provide 
military aid (as the Soviet Union’s help to Somalia) or military-diplomatic 
leverage for the irredentist project (see Nazi Germany’s backing for Hungarian 
claims, and colonial British encouragement for the Thai Malays). In sum, there 
seems to be no gradual and linear build-up that makes violence the kind of 
ultimate or last resort comparative evidence of communal strife normally 
proves it to be.33 This paradox ties in with my earlier observation that there 
seems to be no pattern of stages within irredentist processes.
Other joint strategies
Remaining with shared policies, irredentas use more subtle means. The resort 
to intergovernmental negotiations (like Swaziland’s 1982 attempt to retrieve its 
co-ethnics from South Africa in a proposed land-deal) is more an exception 
than the rule. However, many movements try hard to move within the bounds 
of legality. One may just recall Hungary’s 'settlement' with Romania in the 
Second Vienna 'Arbitration' of 1940, conducted under the auspices of Nazi 
Germany. Such ostensibly non-coercive approaches are often reinforced with 
appeals to the inter-state community. These divert the focus away from the 
parent state’s claim, with its pejorative connotations of balkanisation and ethnic 
warfare, and emphasise the more respectable demand for minority self- 
determination (see below). What form of self-determination that minority group 
then opts for -  autonomy, independent statehood or irredentist unification -  will 
then have to be accepted. Hence Germany’s demands at Munich in 1938 were 
irredentist in character, yet that term was never explicitly used (see Ben-lsrael 
1991:31). Somalia, Pakistan, Armenia and Hungary have amongst others all 
pursued this strategy together with their respective ethnic brethren, either in 
combination with, or as a substitute for, state directed irredentist policies.
Countering irredentism: host state strategies against irredentist minorities 
Let us also look briefly at the other side of the fence. The way host states 
counter irredentas is remarkably standardised. As a rule, the instruments
33 See for instance Gurr’s observation (1994:365) that “ethno-political conflict usually begins 
with limited protests and clashes that only gradually escalate into sustained violence."
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employed to preserve territorial integrity are repressive and retaliatory in 
character, rather than accommodative. Irredentist minorities are delivered to 
their host state’s measures as an “internal affair” under the latter’s sovereignty, 
which in turn reinforces their disaffection, as I will argue in chapter 5. 
Conversely, as chapter 7 will demonstrate, pluralist-consociational 
democracies are able to pre-empt or assuage minority defection.
Most host states are, however, not accommodative and typically use two 
tactics: the de-legitimisation of irredentas and, secondly, hegemonic control 
(McGarry and O’Leary 1993).34 To start with, host states go to great lengths to 
alter the ethnic demography of an irredentist region so that majoritarian 
justifications for defection become invalid. This territorial control can be 
achieved by “cosmetic” means - by administrative redistricting (like in Northern 
Ireland, most notoriously in Derry, to manufacture local Protestant majorities), 
and / or manipulated censi (e.g. interwar Romania’s handling of figures in 
Transylvania). More profoundly, control is sought via forced resettlement 
programs, what John McGarry (1998) calls “demographic engineering’’.35 This 
state-directed movement of ethnic groups is “used to create ‘demographic 
facts’ on the ground which undercut the claims of competitors, strengthens 
one’s own claims, and present accomplished facts at negotiations” (McGarry 
1998:627). Interwar Poland sought to pre-empt a German irredenta in East 
Prussia by moving Polish refugees from Russia and Ukraine into the contested 
“Corridor” areas immediately after 1918. Re-settling ethnic Italians and 
providing generous financial incentives for further settlers, were part of 
Mussolini’s notorious Italianita policies in South Tyrol against local German 
irredentists. The same measures were used against Magyars in Ceaugescu’s 
Romania, and recently by Belgrade in Kosovo, where Bosnian Serb refugees 
were meant to colonise ethnically 'cleansed' Albanian areas.
34 McGarry and O'Leary (1993:23-6) define control as co-optive or coercive system of ethnic 
domination. It makes an overtly violent ethnic challenge to the state order either unthinkable, 
or unworkable for the subordinated minority. In the present application, the conflict would be 
about territorial self-determination, both internal (autonomy) and external (retrieval).
35 McGarry explicitly describes the use of demographic engineering for cases “when 
sovereignty over a minority region is disputed -  the irredentist threat” (1998:627).
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Often corollary to these territorial tactics is electoral control. This can take 
several forms: gerrymandering, vote rigging and, very importantly, the 
manipulation of plebiscitarian choices. The gerrymandering of voting districts 
prevents a clear expression of popular sovereignty and of an irredentist 
mandate in elections and referenda. Northern Ireland serves once more as 
sorry example of this instrument, coupled with the manipulation of suffrage and 
the introduction of plurality rule. Vote rigging and interference into the process 
of ballot casting was a regular device against the irredentist Magyar minority in 
interwar Romania. Offering impossible choices in a referendum in turn applies 
specifically to de-colonisation, where plebiscites were commonly used, 
seemingly in order to honour popular sovereignty. Yet potentially irredentist 
voters were simply not offered the option for (re)union, but could only chose 
between continued colonial rule and independence in a new state they did not 
wished to be part of. This is true for cases like the Pakistani Pashtuns during 
the partition of India, the Cypriot Greeks in 195836, or the Somalis of Djibouti in 
1977. Direct democracy was thus cynically misused in order to prevent an act 
of self-determination. In short, instead of sorting out competing ethno-national 
aspirations, such referenda served to preserve reified state units created by 
the departing colonial powers.
Centralisation and the revocation of autonomy are yet another tactic to contain 
irredentist activity. India’s progressive infringement on the federal division of 
powers in the last two decades was arguably as much in response to Kashmiri 
irredentism, as a help to further fuel the latter. Belgrade’s withdrawal of 
Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 was not only part of a Serb nationalist agenda, but 
also reactive to the increasingly assertive Albanian irredentist currents that had 
developed since the mid-1980s. Kenya abandoned its colonially imposed 
federal constitution in 1964 only one year after independence in order to tackle 
the irredentist Somali shiftas (guerrillas) in its Northern Frontier District.
The establishment of economic domination frequently accompanies these 
measures of territorial control. The land reforms and new legislation in interwar 
Romania and Czechoslovakia deliberately undermined the livelihood of their
36 For instance, a plebiscite organised by the Greek Cypriot Bishop Makarios in January 1950 
showed a 95,7 per cent desire of that community for enosis, i.e. retrieval by the Greek state.
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respective Magyar minorities lest they should have the means/leverage to 
challenge the recent incorporation of Transylvania and the Felvidek. Under 
General Zia’s regime, Islamabad employed a strategy of targeted under­
investment towards mainly Baluchi areas in order to foster a Punjabi 
ascendancy that would keep Baluchi irredentism at bay. Northern Ireland’s 
Nationalists endured discrimination in state social services as well as in both 
public and private employment (e.g. via clientelist labour markets and systems 
of ethnic patronage). Interwar Italy finally rendered its recalcitrant Sudtiroler 
minority economically dependent on Rome, so that “by the mid-1930s, car, 
machine, and steel industries had established, on government orders, branch 
factories and offices in the Bolzano area” (Eyck in Montville 1991:221).
Given this array of powerful instruments, the resort to coercive measures to 
thwart minority irredentism is relatively rare. Still, there are notable examples 
where a host state felt so threatened that it employed ethnically skewed 
policing and paramilitary units (Spain's Basque region), or even its regular 
armed forces (India, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, Northern Ireland).
Repression is finally often complemented with a less tangible, but powerful 
instrument: forced assimilation. To undermine a group’s ethno-national 
identity, the very foundation of irredentism, means tackling the threat at its 
root. The usual methods are well known: linguistic repression, biased 
schooling, banning minority culture and its national symbols etc. For irredentist 
cases, these may also extend to the re-writing of history in order to deny or 
challenge the claim to ancestral territory that underpins retrieval. When it came 
to the de-colonisation of Djibouti for instance, both the French administration 
and the Afar ethnic group sought to hinder the irredentist Somali community. 
Hence both portrayed local Somalis as recent arrivals that furthermore lacked 
any attachment to the territory because of their life as pastoralist nomads. 
Using the theory of Greco-Dacian continuity, the Romanian state persistently 
characterised Transylvanian Hungarians as “usurpers” and “settlers” who 
came to that region long after Proto-Romanians allegedly had. It followed that 
the Magyar inter-war irredenta there had an inferior, even illegitimate, claim to 
that land. In addition, many host states -  like Romania, Great Britain, France,
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Kenya, India or Thailand - preventatively refuse to recognise their minorities as 
nations. This denies them legal protection as such groups as well as the 
corollary right to self-determination that would in turn justify irredentist or 
secessionist, defection.37
Host state tactics versus irredentist minorities can thus be summed up as 
undermining the legitimacy of the irredentist project statistically, politically and 
ideologically, preventing or falsifying the expression of popular sovereignty in 
the irredentist group, and employing economic and military repression. 
Moreover, when dealing with an irredenta a host state faces twin challenges. 
Like in a secessionist case, one is from within, posed by what the centre 
regards as disloyal periphery. Yet at the same time, and much worse than in a 
mere separatist struggle, host states also have to tackle the external threat 
posed by the minority’s parent state. Domestic communal conflict thus links 
with antagonism at inter-state level -  the very feature that made irredentism 
the co-author of two World Wars (Midlarsky 1992).
Countering irredentism: host states tackling the retrieving state 
Host states often defend themselves against parent states irredentism by 
forming a regional alliance or ad hoc (military) co-operation with other 
threatened states (Weiner 1991:671-2). Examples of such anti-irredentist 
alliances are the interwar Little Entente against revisionist Hungary and 
Germany, or the Kenyan-Ethiopian Pact of 1964 (renewed in 1980 and 1987) 
to counter Somalia’s prolonged efforts for retrieval. In 1974, Pakistani and 
Iranian forces briefly worked together in order to crush Baluchi irredentists, 
while the mid-1990s saw periods of Bosnian-Croat military collaboration 
against the Serbian irredenta in the Krajina. Another tactic is occasional 
counter-irredentism, i.e. retaliating in "a "two-can-play-this game technique” 
(Connor 1980:169). Both Ethiopia and the partly Afar state of Djibouti 
reciprocated claims onto irredentist Somalia, stating that the latter was in fact a 
lost territory of theirs, rather than vice versa. The same is true for Moldova
37 Occasionally, there are also host governments who retro-actively “de-nationalise” a minority 
in order to deny its right to territorial defection. One of the most notorious cases is that of the 
Ibo, whose status was lowered to that of a 'tribe' by the Nigerian Government in order to 
outlaw the attempted Biafran secession of 1967.
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versus Romania, or India versus Pakistan. Clearly, this strategy serves once 
more to de-legitimise irredentist desires by confusing or relativising them. 
Finally, the most common instruments employed by host states are those of 
conventional diplomacy, ranging from complaints to international bodies and 
the inter-state community in general (see for instance interwar Poland’s and 
Czechoslovakia’s appeals) over rare attempts for inter-governmental solution 
(e.g. the United Kingdom versus the Irish Republic), down to military threat and 
war (India versus Pakistan in 1947 and 1965, Ethiopia versus Somalia in 1964 
and 1977, or Azerbaijan versus Armenia intermittently since 1988).
1.4 What irredentism is consequently not, and why
Concept building and -analysis entail amongst others the use of negative 
definitions. Relations and possible confusion with other phenomena need to be 
described and eliminated, based on what I have so far established - namely 
what irredentism indeed is. The following will thus briefly rectify some 
erroneous categorisations.
1.4.1 Irredentism versus state-expansion38
Firstly, we need to address the issue of state expansion, a policy so often 
mistaken for and justified as, irredentism. We have already distinguished 
retrieval from mere annexationism. But how is one to explain instances of 
genuine irredentism that simply “overdo” it? To start with, I have explained 
above that ethnic homelands can stretch beyond the settlement areas of the 
transborder minority. Interwar Hungarian demands initially referred to the 
whole of Transylvania, including stretches that were almost homogeneously 
Romanian, but which were regarded by both local and mainland Magyars as 
indispensable communal territory. For this very same reason, the Greek
38 This is particularly widespread among scholars of international relations (e.g. Mayall 1990 
and 1994; Carment and James 1995; Kegley and Wittkopf 1999) and historians (Ben-lsrael 
1991). They only pay attention to the frequently irredentist rhetoric of annexationist states and 
consequently label such border disputes as 'irredenta'. Thus Von Hippel (1993) for instance, 
cites cases like the Falkland dispute or the Syrian invasion of Lebanon as irredentas.
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concept of “enosis" naturally meant the retrieval of the entire isle of Cyprus, 
notwithstanding the local Turkish community. Furthermore, since irredentism 
always translates into antagonistic parent-host state relations, retrieval 
becomes a geopolitical issue, on top of the ethnic dimension. Kashmir for 
example, only partially Muslim, forms the strategic border region between two 
hostile states and is thus very salient to Pakistan not least for that reason. 
Italian aspirations for the whole of South Tyrol instead of merely the Italian- 
settled Trentino, surely involved the fact that it would provide that country with 
a formidable natural frontier, the Alps. In short, retrieval is not conducted 
behind a Rawlesian veil of ignorance. Once a leadership undertakes such a 
risky enterprise39 it will do so with an eye on maximum rewards -  so to say 
under the premise “ if it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing properly.” The point is 
that irredentism can be opportunistic, but that does not make it a sham. Ethnic 
contiguity sometimes does not constitute irredentism’s sole motive reason, but 
it is always the most important one.
1.4.2 Retrieval as mere diversionary war
It is similarly misleading to brand the phenomenon as a type of diversionary 
war. This is usually the interpretation of elite-persuasion theorists (e.g. 
Roudometof 1996 or Saideman 1998). As I will discuss in chapter 7, retrieval is 
not completely devoid of this component -  this is why irredentas hardly occur 
in liberal democratic contexts.40 Interwar Hungary, or indeed Serbia and 
Somalia - the cases Saideman cites -  serve as good evidence. In all these 
instances, under-performing or weak institutions were legitimised by 
nationalism (Snyder and Mansfield 2000a, b). However, each time this 
instrumental use would have been impossible without the mainland 
populations' enthusiastic support and the transborder minorities' response.
39 The 'riskyness' of irredentism derives not only from external problems like war, economic 
sacrifice, international sanctions, etc., but a failed project often entails the fall of the regime 
that pursued it. Examples are the case of Somalia’s Siad Barre or that of the unsuccessful 
Greek junta in 1974 (see Landau 1990).
40 There are three notable exceptions to this rule: Japan, the Irish Republic and West Germany 
count as irredentist parent states, yet they also qualify as democracies. Interestingly however, 
the Irish state’s irredentism decreased dramatically after the patriarchal De Valera years, i.e. 
in the period where Ireland is generally seen to have de facto matured into a liberal 
democracy.
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Connor (1980:162-3) quite rightly reminds that “appeals to ethno-political 
yearnings require a popular desire, no matter how incipient, (...) governments 
can act as a successful catalyst of ethno-nationalism only when the necessary 
ingredients are present." In addition, how can this approach account for a case 
like Gabriele d’Annunzio’s famous raid on Fiume in 1919, a moment when 
mainland irredentists took matters into their own hands -  in defiance of their 
own government and of the Paris Peace Conference? Finally, the suggestion 
is untenable because irredentism is shaped by several, interacting factors.
1.4.3 Retrieval versus diaspora politics
Next, irredentism must also be clearly distinguished from the realm of diasporic 
politics, i.e. the triangular relation between a minority and its parent and host 
state. Ethno-territorial retrieval is not an integral part or extreme form of 
diasporic politics. One crucial difference consists in the fact that the host state 
is not a mere onlooker here, an external variable affecting an ethnic dyad, but 
that it is an actively involved, equal partner. Secondly and more essentially, 
diasporic politics aim at finding solutions within the framework of the status quo 
whereas irredentism seeks to alter it. Thirdly, irredentists live on their 
homelands which diasporic groups by definition do not (see Connor 1979).
1.4.4 Irredentism and other forms of self-determination
Irredentism is commonly mistaken for other territorial strategies communal 
groups pursue, such as secession and movements for autonomy. Even T.R. 
Gurr categorises irredentist cases as either of these two in his taxonomy 
(1993:296-7). Minority irredentism is often confounded with separatism under 
the blunt criterion that it involves territorial defection. What happens afterwards 
-  reunion, as opposed to independence -  is overlooked. Autonomy envisages 
merely internal self-determination, i.e. a solution within the host state. 
Secessions on the other hand, are similar in that they involve defection, yet 
with the goal of founding a separate, independent state. Confusingly, however,
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minority irredentism can convert into either of these options. My study will 
show that this is a side effect of a change in causal variables. As a variation, 
irredentas and secessions can occur in the same setting, like in Kashmir, 
Southern Thailand, Moldova. This has led to erroneous conclusions about a 
conceptual “overlap” (von Hippel 1993:2,10), and even to the belief that “... the 
two are sufficiently similar to permit a discussion in irredentist terms” (Suhrke 
1970:187), or vice versa. Following Horowitz (1991), I argue in contrast that 
the two not only have different goals, but that they are also determined by 
different causal factors.
1.5 Making sense of it all
Irredentism denotes the bilateral attempt of self-aware communities for political 
and territorial unification. Central to both is the translation of ethno-national 
identity into politics. It is based on and restricted by, the nature, strength and 
endurance of group affinity which commands rule by and reunification with, 
one's own.
1.5.1 Categorising retrieval
Irredentism is the translation of shared group identity into politics. It naturally 
commands self-determination, i.e. it rejects rule by ethnic strangers, and 
thereby pursues the nationalist principle - congruence of that group and its 
homeland territory with one state. Both ideational elements of retrieval follow 
directly from the politicisation of ethnicity.
On nationalism
Irredentism is a sub-type or phase of nationalism as a sizeable part of the 
literature recognises.41 Nationalism provides irredentist politics with the 
rationale (as distinct from motivation) and vocabulary for its conduct. How are 
we to imagine for instance the retrieval of Fiume, without the arduous rhetoric
41 See for instance Yagcioglu (1996), von Hippel (1993, 1994), Kitromilides (1990), or Landau 
(1995).
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of Gabriele D’Annunzio’s writings, the emotional mass gatherings in the name 
of a unified Italy, and finally, the march of several thousand under the writer’s 
personal leadership, seizing the city without any bloodshed? Non-European 
irredentas like Somalia's, or projects with religiously defined ethnicity like the 
Thai-Muslim irredenta or the Kashmiri case, are no exceptions.42 Also, the 
terminology of “redemption," reminiscent of biblical language, invests the 
targeted territories with the religiosity and holiness nationalism lends to the 
fatherland. The speech and symbolism of retrieval are equally indicative. The 
recurring organic and family metaphors of irredentist discourse use nationalist 
language -  one remembers here the frequently painted image of a “maimed” 
body or talk of lost “brothers” and “sisters." Emblems such as the royal 
Hungarian one with the now lost Transylvanian rivers in it, and flags like 
Somalia's, depicting five stars for all the regions to be retrieved, fulfil the same 
purpose visually. In short: irredentism is expressed in the language of 
nationalism, relies on nationalist fervour and, most importantly, is made 
possible by the nation-state formula.
Self-rule
Irredentism is, secondly, an act of self-determination. The problem here is that 
“people confuse self-determination and independence” (Neuberger 1986:61), 
and thus see retrieval as something different, lesser (and less justifiable) or 
even as “anachronistic” (von Hippel 1993:11). Yet ethno-territorial retrieval 
does "very well mean self-determination, as long as it reflects the authentic will 
of the population” (Neuberger 1986:63). Having said that, one still feels that 
this particular act of self-determination is somehow qualitatively different from 
secession. This is because the different stress on its constituent components. 
Cassese’s (1995) distinction of external versus internal self-determination 
helps us to understand this. The ordinary exit strategy of secessionism is only 
concerned with external self-determination, that is “to be free from foreign 
interference which affects the international status of that state” (Cassese in 
Kolodner 1994:196). The importance is here to achieve a titular state of one’s
42 Ethnic ties are mostly defined in religious terms by Muslims in Kashmir and Jammu. 
Pakistanis, more specifically Punjabis, add a historical-racial dimension to the issue, for they 
identify Kashmir to be their ancestral homeland and local resident kin as kindred communal 
group.
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own, to become a sovereign actor within inter-state relations. Irredentism, in 
contrast, already possesses independent statehood. The pressing issue here 
is that it is incomplete: sovereign self-rule does not cover the entire group and 
the entirety of its ancestral grounds. Consequently, one must ‘redeem’ such 
kin and homelands from rule by others. Minority irredentism emphasises in 
addition the internal aspects of self-determination, i.e. the “control over 
everyday political, economic, social and cultural conditions” (Kolodner 
1994:204) which minorities feel the host state denies. Defecting to a state that 
is ‘owned’ (defined and controlled) by the group does away with this problem. 
Hence for instance the fact that cross-border kindred often retains or acquires 
the citizenship of its parent state in advance (one may cite here for instance 
the Moldovans, Karabach-Armenians or Thai Malays). For them, there is no 
need to found a state, but only to “remedy” the incongruence posed by 
international borders.
1.5.2 The dangers of irredentism
Donald Horowitz remarks that “ethnic conflict is intractable, partly because it is 
highly conducive to zero-sum outcomes” (1991:115), and irredentism is indeed 
the very epitome of this win-lose mentality. The absoluteness of defeat or 
victory comes from the fact that rivalry over population and territory is fought 
on two different, yet interlocking, levels. For one, it is two ethnic groups -  the 
majority nation and the minority -  opposing one another in what usually 
translates as a conflict between centre and periphery. This is no different in 
secessions, which generally turn out to be savage and bitter enough. Yet there 
is, in addition to the internal war within the host country, an antagonism at 
inter-state level over a disputed population and ancestral territory. This is why 
retrieval is more likely to escalate (Horowitz 1985:288). Midlarsky posits that, 
while secessions only cause regional military conflicts, irredentas have co­
authored one, perhaps even two, World Wars (1992:173).
Not only are there multiple levels to irredentist conflicts, but also more than 
one issue dimension. Frequently adding to the emotionally charged character
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about kindred blood and soil are more sober geopolitical considerations, like in 
Kashmir, South Tyrol or Cyprus. The contested territory becomes thus 
disproportionately important: it contains ethnic kin, it is a homeland and it is a 
strategic area. Hence also the numerous cases of “exchange of irredenta” 
between two rival countries (Reichman and Golan 1991:61), as in Kosovo, 
South Tyrol, Transylvania or Silesia. They represent geographic “hot spots” of 
irredentism that prove sheer endless cause for trouble. Given these 
intermeshed components of conflict, it is unsurprising that situations of retrieval 
are difficult to resolve. As we have seen above, it takes a major change in 
inter-state relations or direct external intervention in order to suppress (as 
distinct from ending) them. In short then, irredentas are more intractable and 
devastating than most other situations of ethnic conflict.
This destructive potential is amongst others also the reason for irredentism’s 
bad reputation. Interestingly, retrieval was viewed already in the nineteenth 
century as the prerogative of anarchist troublemakers, hence its “pejorative 
connotation, probably imprinted on it by bomb throwing in Trieste” (Ben Israel 
1991:31). What is more, while secessions can be portrayed as a noble cause 
in that they involve the birth of a new nation state, retrieval smacks of inter­
state sabotage, minority disloyalty, and of undermining territorial sovereignty. 
Irredentists also apply double standards. Parent states actively pursuing 
retrieval, such as Romania, Pakistan or Serbia, have been or are 
simultaneously targets of irredentist challenges, which they in turn denounce, 
de-legitimise and repress. Defectionist minorities are no different in this 
respect. During the early 1990s, Kosovar Albanians for instance were very 
uncomfortable with the prospect of a further increase in the Serb majority in 
Yugoslavia via retrieval, whilst they themselves began to flirt with both 
secession and irredentism. Adding to all this finally, is irredentism's 
uncomfortably particularist rationale. Arguably, this is what spoiled 
international sympathy for groups like the Sudeten Germans or the Felvidek 
Magyars. Being acts of self-determination, the irredentist understanding of 
“freedom” is not one of democratic but of national self-government, i.e. of 
being ruled by fellow ethnic kin for better or for worse, whether elected or not.
70
2. Comparative Hypothesis Testing Of Irredentist
Variables
“This sense of order-in-complexity is very strong in 
comparative social science because it is not difficult to make 
sense of an individual case (...). The challenge comes in trying 
to make sense of the diversity across cases in a way that 
unites similarities and differences in a single, coherent 
framework. ”
Charles Ragin (1987:19)
2.1 Introduction
The definitional mapping of irredentism above necessitated the collation of a 
dataset recording all of its characteristics (Dataset 1). In keeping with the dual 
purpose of this thesis, i.e. to define and explain retrieval, this chapter now 
moves beyond the descriptive by also quantifying and testing irredentism’s 
causal variables. This aims to strengthen the external validity of my model 
whilst also making it more transparent to non-expert scrutiny. Large-scale 
findings furthermore prepare the ground for my Hungarian case study, which 
will examine each of the tested variables in depth (chapters 3-7). Finally, by 
adopting what Ragin (1987:69) terms “the combined comparative approach", 
my thesis not least challenges rational explanatory approaches like Horowitz’s 
with their very own methods.
Although necessarily modest because it deals with descriptive data, this 
chapter hence aims to complement, support and illustrate my theory of 
irredentism. It uses a separate dataset (Dataset 2), composed of the 
population of Dataset 1, and tests across these the causal factors that 
Horowitz (1985;1991) and myself respectively present. Horowitz never 
explicitly claims universality when theorising about irredentism. Nevertheless,
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both sources speak in general terms, citing illustrative cases from across a 
wide time span and from all three continents where irredentism occurs. Most 
significantly, he formulates conclusions without concession to contextual 
specifics or outlier cases, thus signalling that he assumes his variables to hold 
independently of time or place. This provides reason enough to probe his 
model in the same general terms it was conceived. Comparative hypothesis 
testing will demonstrate that Horowitz’ three variables alone fail to explain the 
majority of irredentas, while the addition of mine increases generalisability and 
explanatory power. In short, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a 
preliminary overview about how useful each suggested variable is.
2.2. How not to do it -  earlier attempts to statistically test irredentist 
factors
As the preceding chapter explained, irredentism has hardly been quantified in 
its own right. In fact, even statistical research on territorial disputes more 
generally is sparse as Huth’s overview (1996:13) observes.1 Carment and 
James (1995) are amongst the few to have specifically examined border 
conflicts with an ethnic connotation, although these were borrowed from a 
wider dataset and wrongly grouped together as “irredentas”. In a similar vein, 
Moore and Davis (1998) assess communal boundary disputes with the help of 
the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB). Saideman and Ayres’ work 
(2000) however is exceptional in that it explicitly treats ethno-territorial retrieval 
and its causes, even though simultaneously juxtaposing secessionism. Given 
the similarity of their dataset in terms of focus it merits a closer look, not least 
in order to argue the value and necessity of my own work.
Saideman and Avres’ quantitative investigation of irredentist causes 
In "Determining the Sources of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities At 
Risk Data" Saideman and Ayres (2000) address two interrelated questions.
1 Paul K. Huth’s (1996:72-85) work on territorial disputes in general also includes a quantified 
section on irredentism. Based on carefully assembled own data, his approach focuses 
however on the factors affecting the probability of disputing territory, hence he is treating 
irredentism merely as an independent variable.
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Primarily, they seek to understand “under what conditions will an ethnic group 
unite with their ethnic kin elsewhere” and, to a lesser degree, why some 
groups seek reunion while others pursue independent statehood instead. Their 
puzzle is the variation across cases and space, instead of time and space, but 
we share the focus on irredentism’s causal variables. Five alternative factors 
are considered and re-formulated into 15 hypotheses: the nature of the group 
itself; the group's kin; contagion processes; ethnic security dilemmas and the 
end of the Cold War. Deriving these hypotheses from relevant research, the 
Yugoslav case, as well as from their own previous work, they argue that 
irredentism and secession are alternative choices largely driven by the same 
factors and differentiated by only a few. Based on their quantitative findings, 
the authors present as determinants the relative size of the population and 
territory to be retrieved, the dominance or separatist behaviour of its kin in a 
neighbouring state, and potential economic decline in the host state. Political, 
ethnic and economic discrimination, the intensity of inter-ethnic differentiation, 
as well as the regime type in the host state are also tested for and found to be 
of little or no statistical importance. According to Saideman and Ayres, the 
choice between the alternatives of secession and irredentism is decided by a 
group’s political and geographical situation within a region.
Shortcomings
So what is ‘wrong’ with their study? To start with, Saideman and Ayres 
undertake a summary treatment for what my definitional chapter has 
demonstrated to be two very distinct phenomena. Departing from the premise 
that both irredentism and secession are territorial defections, they examine 
their causal determinants in one single study. The conflation of the very 
differing goals, desires - and we may extrapolate, causes - which fuel these 
two exit strategies is questionable. Furthermore, such definitional imprecision 
leads to tautological hypotheses. For instance, because they omit defining 
parent states the authors test whether “groups whose kin dominates a nearby 
state will be more likely to be irredentist” (hypothesis 6a). The consequence 
are self-confirming results that add to these problems. Finally, Saideman and 
Ayres’ approach to understanding retrieval bears exactly the marks of 
instrumentalism I disagree with. Rationalised hypotheses abound, such as
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suggestions about regional contagion processes of ethnic conflict as cause 
(hypotheses 7 and 8), or lower likelihood of defectionism from a wealthy state 
(hypothesis 11). Once again, all of these propositions are tested on irredentists 
and secessionists indiscriminately.
These problems are further compounded by key aspects of methodology and 
data usage. To start with, one may question the use of logistic regression - an 
inferential statistical method - when working with overwhelmingly descriptive 
data. By that I mean data stemming from social science concepts that are 
difficult to measure (e.g. the level of minority-majority ethnic differentiation), 
and whose quantifiable indicators - which yield the values used for inference - 
often fit them imperfectly. Such generosity is bound to produce outcomes of 
compromised validity.
Secondly, the use of a ready-made dataset is questionable when exploring 
such hitherto uncharted territory. Instead of collating original research tailored 
to their inquiry (and based on consistent definitions), Saideman and Ayres test 
their 15 hypotheses against of T.R. Gurr’s Minorities at Risk (MAR) datasets 
(Phases 1 and 3). Regardless of MAR’s own merits and imperfections this 
poses problems of adequacy, simply because they were not specifically 
designed to investigate irredentism, nor even territorial exit strategies more 
generally. Gurr collects and categorises ethnic groups according to ‘rebellion’, 
i.e. the nature, extent and purpose of their violent behaviour. Some irredentist 
groups do indeed resort to violence, but, as I have shown above (section 
1.3.3), the majority does not. In other words, the use of force is by no means a 
definitional marker which would ensure that all irredentas are detected and 
consequently included, into a dataset. In short, although Gurr’s and Saideman 
and Ayres’ data categories (i.e. the units of observation) partially overlap, they 
are not congruent.
One can hence question whether Saideman and Ayres are able to generalise 
authoritatively from their findings. Phases 1 and 3 of Gurr’s dataset represent 
respectively the 1980s and 1990s -  merely two decades within more than two 
centuries of irredentist activity. As I have proposed in chapter 1, ethno-
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territorial retrieval experienced four distinct global waves since 1789. By only 
analysing what I have labelled the “Post-Colonial” wave (1949-88), or more 
precisely its last quarter, and a part of the current “New World Order” wave 
(1988- ), findings are hardly representative. To the contrary, they may be 
actually distorted. It is not even arguable that these few cases are in fact a 
deliberately chosen subset. This would have required either random sampling 
from the entire period of irredentist occurrences (i.e. from the early nineteenth 
century until today), or the choice of two time-periods and their cases in the 
interquartile range. To do so would demand the collation of original data, 
simply because Gurr’s does not pre-date the 1950s.
Founding an inquiry upon borrowed statistics also reinforces an inherent 
problem of quantitative analysis which Ragin (1987:vii-xi) repeatedly points to, 
namely that of having to gear hypotheses to the possibilities and limitations of 
the quantitative method. An investigation is even further limited if the 
parameters are constrained by the dataset’s content itself, because someone 
else collated it with entirely different questions in mind. Were I to use Gurr’s 
material, I would be unable for instance to test for the presence or absence of 
irredentist protector powers because such details are simply not recorded. This 
rather loose fit between the logic of data quantification on the one hand and its 
use on the other, affects both variables and units of analysis. Is the unit of 
analysis Gurr means - the ethnic group as collective social actor - identical with 
the way Saideman and Ayres understand it?
To summarise then, Saideman and Ayres’ examination achieves a lot but is 
flawed by using borrowed data. Failure to introduce operational definitions as 
well as the wholesale adoption of cases collated on entirely different criteria, 
translate into erroneous sampling and distorted, often counter-intuitive 
conclusions. These are furthermore founded on biased assumptions about the 
calculative rationality in irredentists. For all these reasons, Saideman and 
Ayres’ work cannot serve as alternative to or basis for, this present inquiry. 
While sharing many of the same methodological challenges, it tries to remedy 
them via original research but also respects the limits they set.
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2.3 Dataset 2: limitations and methodology
I will explain below how the complexity of this task has constrained my choices 
in methodology. For one, there were the difficulties associated with quantifying, 
accurately recording, and not least finding data for irredentas stretching over 
more than two centuries. Furthermore, inferential methods are precluded 
because I use descriptive data and because my population size is very sm all. 
As a consequence, I have devised testing as a simple, but reliable exercise 
which will be able to furnish some preliminary insights into the usefulness of 
individual variables.
2.3.1 Problems of quantification and how they are dealt with
The novelty of my research -  as first to analyse retrieval based on largely self­
compiled data -  is simultaneously its weakness. Before presenting and testing 
irredentist factors in my own dataset, some explanation is hence necessary 
about the statistical problems of both units and variables, and about how they 
have been treated. Dataset Manual 2 (below) provides furthermore a detailed 
account of coding, indicators and value labels for each variable.
The unit of observation
First off a brief word about the comparability of cases. This thesis has defined 
a macro-social unit -  the irredenta -  which can be recognised by a clear set of 
actors and behaviours. It treats irredentism not as abstraction, but as workable 
concept of a real-life phenomenon. For this reason, as well as due to the 
systematic comparative illustration of my model within a case study, problems 
of context-dependency are set aside.
Measurement problems and data availability
To start with, the quantification of the social science concepts that compose 
my variables poses continuing problems, since many do not exist in 
measurable form. In order to still test them statistically, it was hence necessary 
to select indicators -  that is “observable evidence of an abstract concept
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permitting classification” (Champney 1995:5). In some cases this was easy, 
e.g. fleshing out Horowitz’s variable on relative host and parent state country 
prestige with economic indicators and diplomatic status. Where necessary 
variables have been adapted to the methods employed, e.g. by conversion into 
binary mode in order to be able to then collapse them into combined factors 
(see Dataset Manual 2, Appendix). Sometimes this was hampered by limited 
data availability, which means that some variables were weakened by missing 
data or low reliability.
Alternatively, I was able to adopt indicators and corresponding measurement 
from widely recognised databases, most notably the Polity IV Dataset’s values 
on extent and type of democracy in the host and parent states. Following 
Huth’s example (1996), such borrowed values have then been re-coded into a 
dummy variable in order to make it fit with my general coding (Polity IV already 
includes this).
For one variable finally, the fit between concept and indicators (validity) was 
too difficult to achieve. My third irredentist factor about changes in the nature 
and cohesion of ethno-national identification across a group, is hence missing 
from this statistical analysis. Because of its inherent context dependency for 
each case (both historically and sociologically), it posed the problem of 
specifying indicators and relevant observations. Furthermore, standardised 
data availability on these criteria is extremely limited (particularly for less 
recent irredentas) and would have required an amount of research 
disproportionate to its use here. Consequently, I am only able to argue and 
test its hypothesis2 in my Hungarian empirical study below (see chapter 6).
Capturing factor changes and variation over time
A second major problem was the need to respect variance over time within my 
independent variables, resulting from the fact that irredentism mostly develops 
and exists over long periods of time. The challenge was for individual values to 
summarise a particular aspect during an irredenta’s entire life span, including 
possible variation over that time. This would have required for each single 
value the year-by-year collection of data, or alternatively interquartile range
2 This would be Hypothesis 10: Shifts within ethno-national identity decrease the likelihood of 
irredentism. See chapter 6 for how change in a group’s collective identity away from ethnic- 
exclusive characteristics undermines the cohesion irredentism builds on.
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recording of the first and third quarter of an irredentist period, and the 
subsequent calculation of means. Instead, the problem has been tackled by 
simply rendering values substantive instead of chronological, meaning that I 
consistently selected the category that applied for the longest time or that was 
most representative of an actor. Thus for instance in the Greek Cypriot 
irredenta the variable for parent state regime reads “anocracy”, because for 
the overwhelming part of this case’s 126 year long duration Greece’s political 
system displayed anocratic features.
Internal variation
Unlike my first dataset, which merely described irredentism’s group 
characteristics, here it was crucial to create variation within the dependent 
variable (conduct of an irredenta). I have therefore introduced a distinction in 
my cases in order to create variation within the dependent variable. The 
dataset’s population thus falls into two categories, differentiated according to 
whether or not irredentist inconsistency has occurred (see variable 2, Dataset 
Manual 2, Appendix). All factors have thus been tested against this dependent 
variable.
Briefly put, the difficulties associated with measurement, categorisation and 
quantification have been met with awareness. As I have tried to show above, 
they have been treated in a consistent manner: solved or avoided where 
possible, and acknowledged in their limitations where inevitable.
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2.3.2 The methods employed
The choice of methodology in this chapter is determined by the data used -  
with regard to its levels of measurement (mostly nominal and ordinal), its 
nature (descriptive, as opposed to inferential), and the dimension of testing 
(multivariate). As mentioned, problems both with the gathered data’s validity 
and reliability unfortunately do not allow for complex statistical operations or 
inferential methods. Furthermore, as Ragin (1987:10) warns, “the greater the 
theoretical and empirical specificity, the smaller the number of cases relevant 
to the investigation.” I have chosen not only a narrow definition of ethno- 
territorial retrieval, but have also differentiated it into subtypes (see chapter 1), 
of which only one is treated here. This effectively means that methodology is 
further restricted by the small size of the statistical population. It threatened 
degrees of freedom problems if the number of variables exceeded the number 
of cases.
Comparative Hypothesis Testing
Given the simple descriptive data at our disposal, there is a solid way by which 
to put my argument into practice. Simple hypothesis testing, a non-parametric 
method, gives us an idea about how relevant individual factors are in broad 
application across irredentist cases. By testing each variable’s significance 
across all irredentas we learn its relative statistical significance, i.e. whether 
and to which degree it improves an explanation. Each of our proposed causal 
factors translates as a hypothesis (factor X affects whether or not irredentism 
is pursued) which is tested against the opposite assumption, the null 
hypothesis (factor X makes no difference / expected frequencies will equal 
observed frequencies). The resulting probability-value indicates whether we 
can reject this null-hypothesis of independence between the two variables at a 
specified significance level (five per cent). At this most basic of levels we can 
thus see whether a hypothesis is comparatively important or not. Such a test 
also furnishes a Proportional Reduction in Error (PRE) measure, i.e. a 
summary of just how much association there is between the dependent 
variable (occurrence of irredentism) and any particular variable.
79
2.4 Which factors help explain irredentas? Comparative hypothesis 
testing (chi-square test for independence)
Chi-square tests are the simplest way of assessing the strength of an 
explanation. Unlike in the case study below (where each chapter deals with 
one variable) Horowitz’s and my own factors are disaggregated into their 
component hypotheses. These are tested individually on an equal basis in 
order to obtain a differentiated evaluation of their explanatory power (see 
Dataset Manual 2 for coding and indicators). Furthermore, whereas his model 
does not apply all variables to both irredentist actors, mine does, because I 
have defined irredentism’s as something that is bilaterally pursued. Where 
applicable I will therefore additionally test them as combined variables. 
Conversely, those factors that are by their nature relevant to only one actor 
(like intra-group cleavages for the parent state or prestige-benefit for the 
minority) have been examined separately in keeping with their logic.
2.4.1 Breakdown of variables into component tenets
Hypothesis 1: Ethnoterritorial homogeneity of both irredentist actors 
determines whether they decide for retrieval.
Horowitz (1985:284-285) convincingly reasons on the importance of ethnic and 
territorial homogeneity in both irredentist actors. For the parent state, the 
transborder territory should be ethnically as homogeneous as possible in order 
to avoid incorporating recalcitrant minorities. Transborder kindred ought to be 
compact (minimally scattered) and border-near on this homeland, so as to 
enable 'neat' boundary drawing. Horowitz’s also assumes for calculative 
behaviour in the minority group. He mentions that it may be unwilling to be 
retrieved if a substantial part of the community risks being left behind due to 
unfavourable geographical distribution (1985:286). Furthermore, the minority 
for its part, is also likely assess how predominant its own ethnic group is in the 
parent state. Thus the more homogeneous the latter is, the better (1985:285). 
After all, for them the very sense of an irredenta is to join a political unit that 
their own kin controls. By the same token Horowitz points out that the parent
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state will also be more free to conduct retrieval the less ethnic strangers it 
contains. This is because “such schemes threaten to alter domestic ethnic 
balances, groups disadvantaged by them will oppose them.” (1985:284)
A note of distinction is necessary here. In contrast to Horowitz I hold a parent 
state by definition to be one in which an ethnic group is demographically 
and/or politically dominant, and therefore at least factually capable of 
irredentism without decisive domestic opposition by worried minorities (see 
section 1.2.2). Because of this narrower conceptualisation, I evolve Horowitz’s 
variable by linking political control to the leverage enjoyed by domestic groups, 
rather than to their mere presence (see section 4.2). I hence distinguish 
between situations of genuine and qualified homogeneity - i.e. charting 
variations in the degree of political freedom even such a dominant ethnic group 
has. Parent states marked by qualified homogeneity contain what I call 
‘important retaliating minorities’. These are able to apply anti-irredentist 
leverage either politically, demographically and/or economically.
Hypothesis 2: The existence of sub-group cleavages deters a parent state 
from retrieval
Horowitz (1985:285) also proposes that the presence of cleavages between 
parent state and transborder kindred will hamper the parent state’s readiness 
for retrieval. These rifts may be religious, tribal, ideological, or along other 
divisive lines. He is not clear about whether such cleavages generally 
compromise the will for retrieval, or only if parent state elites see them as 
threatening the domestic political, religious or tribal balance. When probed on 
this point in conversation he stressed the latter criterion, yet the relevant 
passage (1985:285) is formulated quite broadly: “...examples show once again 
that seemingly cohesive groups are not as solidary as they look from afar -  
and that sub-group cleavages have a prominent bearing on irredentist 
decisions.”
This is not necessarily contradictory, for it can be argued that the retrieval of 
kindred with distinct features is in itself bound to have domestic repercussions 
of some sort. This may be it because it alters the composition of an electorate 
or political clientele, the clout of a particular tribal subgroup, or the domestic 
religious balance, etc. Then again, such an impact surely cannot be always
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gauged beforehand: parent state leaders may simply lack information in the 
first place to evaluate what they might face. This, besides, would represent a 
typical rational actors problem. Continuing then in a Horowitzian vein of risk 
and benefit calculation, one could consequently assume that any distinct trait 
in the transborder minority should deter parent state elites from irredentism. 
Whether in its wider or narrower sense, this notion deserves testing.3
Hypothesis 3: Irredentism depends on whether it materially benefits the actors 
involved
No doubt ethno-territorial retrieval means for both parties to risk a lot -  
militarily, diplomatically, politically, and even concerning national psychology. 
With regard to the mainland, Horowitz (1985:286) duly remarks: “given the 
significant risks and dubious rewards of irredentism, states that ardently 
pursue strategies of retrieval probably have some specially compelling reasons 
to do so.” The presumption is that irredentism must literally “pay off” for the 
parent state.
Consistency once again requires applying this originally parent state -centred 
factor to the minority as well. After all, its risks are arguably even greater than 
the parent state’s for they are existential - ranging from forced assimilation 
over expulsion down to genocidal retaliation by the host state. Hence, if 
reincorporation is rationally chosen, it must be profitable. This means the 
minority ought to accede to a wealthier state where its material situation and 
life-chances will discernibly improve.4
Hypothesis 4: Minority considerations of relative country prestige.
According to Horowitz, transborder ethnic kin decisions on irredentism are also 
influenced by the a host state’s standing in the world. Without detailing what 
“prestige” exactly denotes, he sees it as an “aggravating factor” (1985:286). 
Accordingly, this test will examine whether retrieval was more readily endorsed
3 Horowitz (1990:17) subsequently also mentions the emotional impact of cleavages, i.e. the 
parent state’s possible rejection of what they see as “rustics who lived too long under an alien 
regime." However, this point has more to do with my own factor about identity shifts (chapter 6) 
than with strong, definable traits like dissenting ideology, or with ascriptive features like a 
different religion or tribal allegiance. In consequence, this more emotive component of the 
cleavage-hypothesis -  little stressed even in the original text -  is not taken into consideration.
4 Horowitz (1985:286) hints at this when remarking “it is generally more attractive to be 
retrieved by a rich rather than a poor state", but does not expand this point.
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where it entailed a benefit in prestige, which I take to mean joining a parent 
state with a superior diplomatic and / or economic status within the inter-state 
system.
Hypothesis 5: Both actors are more inclined to pursue irredentism if their elites 
are affected by particularised affinity
Horowitz advances another, interesting factor which I have named 
‘particularised affinity’. Judging by his examples (1985:286-287) and my own 
research across cases, particularised affinity denotes some intimate personal 
connection of parent state elites with the territory to be retrieved. This acts in 
addition to the general ethnic bond on which irredentism is founded. It means 
leaders may have been born, raised or schooled there, their families may 
originate from that area, they have or had property there, they belong to the 
particular subgroup that inhabits the area etc. ‘Elites’ include politicians and 
office holders, individuals involved in policy-making and -implementation 
(lobbyists, expert advisers, upper echelon bureaucrats), and, to a lesser 
extent, opinion-makers (eminent personalities of public life such as journalists 
and editors, writers, artists etc.).
Once more this factor should be applied to minority elites, too. I would suggest 
personal salience matters here for the same reasons, i.e. it enhances 
irredentist proclivities because retrieval is also biographically / individually 
important. Thus minority elites may have been born, raised and / or schooled 
in the mainland, their families may originate from the parent state, they have or 
had property there, they belong to the particular subgroup that inhabits it, etc. 
The term ‘elites’ describes in this case persons in the minority’s political 
leadership (higher ranking politicians, civil rights activists, heads of any 
minority militia), and, here equally importantly (whereas only second-ranking in 
the parent state), those individuals who personify and are seen to defend the 
group’s cultural-linguistic identity: writers, actors and other artists, journalists 
and editors, philosophers etc.
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Hypothesis 6: Leadership interests in the minority adversely affect its 
readiness for irredentism
In Horowitz’s view, the irredentist desires of minority elites are minimised by 
the fact that reincorporation simultaneously means merged leadership pools, 
and thus a reduction of their own role / status (1990:16).5 Parallel then to the 
parent state leaders’ fears of tipped domestic balances, this is the minority’s 
self-interest factor.
Hypothesis 7: Irredentism is less likely when both actors are in a democratic 
setting
"...Discontented, territorially compact, transborder ethnic groups ... with the 
potential to be retrieved, find retrieval by the putative irredentist state 
undesirable. This may be because that state is poorer o r ... more authoritarian 
than the state in which they are now encapsulated." (Horowitz 1990:16, 
emphasis added). This side-remark draws our attention to the potential factor 
of regime type in the host and parent states respectively, which Horowitz 
however, amongst others a keen scholar of democratic theory, never exploits. 
My model in turn maintains that democracy matters in irredentist choices, yet it 
does so differently for each actor. Concerning the parent state, irredentism is 
practically incompatible with substantive democracy and (successful) 
democratisation. The civic nationalism and correlate pluralism its institutions 
engender minimise the potential for ethnopolitics. In contrast, compromised 
institutions due to incomplete democratisation (anocracy) allow for ethno- 
nationalism. Because in this scenario the state is not defined by strong, 
efficient institutions it exists in function of an ethnically defined polity, and this 
informs leaders and their policies. In short, irredentism is very likely in 
anocratic settings and unlikely in substantive democracies.
Minority irredentism conversely is affected by the specific political and 
institutional setting within the host state. Non-democratic systems and many 
types of democracy provoke disaffection by denying minorities self- 
government and collective institutional recognition. Conversely, democracies 
that practice partial or full consociationalism can remedy or prevent 
irredentism. This is because power-sharing responds to the twin desires that
5 Gellner (1983:135-6) interestingly argues the same point when explaining why two or more 
parts of a group are not driven to (re)unite.
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drive retrieval. Consociation means a group can acquire political control over 
itself and its territory as well as attain collective equality for its distinct national 
aspirations without having to defect. To generalise then, here is a high 
propensity for defection from a host state where these conditions are not, or 
only minimally, satisfied. Conversely, the more pluralist and specifically 
consociational elements it contains, the more it secures its minority's loyalties.
Hypothesis 8: Actors are more likely to decide against irredentism if the inter­
state system is negatively disposed towards retrieval 
and
Hypothesis 9: The existence of a patron power positively influences actors' 
decisions on irredentism
I further propose that a parent state will assess whether and how much room 
for manoeuvre there is internationally. Irredentist movements are greatly aided 
by the proximity of other irredentas, i.e. by an international context where 
border changes based on ethnic criteria and the preference for mono-ethnic 
states are either tolerated, or even explicitly acknowledged. The interwar 
period, marked by Wilsonian ideas of self-determination and the instrumentally 
used German irredenta, embodied such a context. Conversely, in an era like 
today, where the opposite is true, ethnic retrieval faces bleak prospects and 
may be refrained from for this reason.
Minorities will equally assess the international acceptance of border changes. 
Their criteria differ however from those of the mainland. Firstly, they also 
assess windows of opportunity in international attitudes, primarily via 
demonstration or deterrent effects from other, nearby irredentas. If the latter 
are permissive, minorities’ will intensify their irredentist activity. Secondly, 
irredentist minorities will mirror their parent state’s behaviour: the more 
compliant it is, the more they will be and vice versa. Because they see 
themselves as enclaves they behave in function of this fact, sometimes to the 
point where they act as instruments of parent state politics (see section 1.3.3 
and chapter 6). Finally, the international attitude towards the legitimacy of 
minority national aspirations matters too: is it denied and suppressed, or 
endorsed, even if only within the limits of sovereign state boundaries? In other 
words, are minority rights issues “internationalised” (Kymlicka 2002)? Such
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supportive attitudes can be enshrined in international treaties, agreements, 
regimes, and depend on levels of enforcement. International denial of the 
validity of minority nationalism means inefficient or absent scrutiny. This in turn 
will make a group feel delivered to its host state's policies. Generally, 
irredentist conduct will radicalise in such situations, especially when coupled 
with a phase of systemic permissiveness like in the 1930s. Conversely, the 
more minority aspirations are upheld externally the less aggressive minority 
behaviour will be.
2.4.2 Relative Statistical Significance of Factors: Outcomes
Ethno-territorial homogeneity (Hypothesis 1)
Let us look at the statistical outcomes (see Appendix for encoding and 
indicators). Starting with Horowitz’s variables, the factor of parent state 
heterogeneity (PSHOM) has turned out to be insignificant. However, let us 
remember that Horowitz’s original argument of parent state ethnic 
homogeneity is an integral definitional trait (see chapter 1) rather than an 
intervening factor. I hence had to differentiate it in order to make it applicable, 
converting it into qualified homogeneity - i.e. whether there are any important 
domestic minorities which may impede the mainland’s conduct of irredentism. 
Consequently, this outcome means rather that my own reinterpretation is fairly 
irrelevant, or at best useful for particular case studies where extreme variation 
helps to account for irredentist inconsistency.
Interestingly, the ethno-territorial homogeneity of the transborder kindred group 
(MINHOM) also proves statistically insignificant. The probability of non­
association between this variable and the occurrence of irredentism is actually 
quite high (0.170 -  well above the 0.05 threshold). This is an important finding: 
like Horowitz, many studies assume that territorial and demographic feasibility 
matter to parent states (e.g. Suhrke 1975; Saideman 1999; Saideman and 
Ayres 2000). As a consequence of these results, the combined variable of both 
actors’ ethno-territorial features (COMBHOM) is also insignificant, with even 
higher probability values for non-association.
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Material benefit to either irredentist actor or both (Hypothesis 3)
Even more remarkably, the tests have shown that overall neither actor seems 
to be concerned with the material benefits of reincorporation. Both parent state 
(PSECON) and minority (MINECON) have tested soundly insignificant on this, 
and so has their combined variable (COMBECON). This seems to align well 
with the many examples of economically self-destructive, near-idiotic attempts 
at retrieval. Admittedly however, this variable is weakened by missing data, 
which cautions about these results. It is also possible that the indicators used 
here (key economic and human resource data) did not fully capture material 
advantages. In some instance these may be defined in terms of a strategic / 
geopolitical gain for the parent state, but then again Horowitz never suggests 
this. Furthermore, arguably any increase in territory represents a net gain to a 
state. Minorities in turn bear little sign of profit-seeking in their defection to 
often poorer kindred states. Even within the limits of this test it looks as if 
irredentist groups do not use their sense of business -  on either side of the 
border.
Self-interested considerations in both actors’ elites impede irredentism 
(Hypotheses 2 and 6)
A further argument of Horowitz’s is not supported by large-scale testing: that of 
leadership interests in the parent state (CLEAVAGES) and the transborder 
minority (MINSELF). Having collated and tested these variables separately, it 
becomes evident that their common denominator -  the fear of losing power 
due to merged leadership pools and shifting domestic political/religious/tribal 
balances -  does not sway potential irredentists from their pursuit. Minority self- 
interest, indicated by simultaneous attempts for alternative solutions in order to 
preserve local power bases (e.g. autonomy-negotiations with the host state, 
secessionist attempts), simply does not appear decisive. However, due to 
Horowitz’s vagueness about what counts as sub-group cleavages, I have 
construed this factor in the widest possible sense. I have assumed that any 
major cleavage between parent state and minority could act as a deterrent, 
because it will affect internal ratios in some way (see above). This generalised 
theory can now be rejected. With it we can also discard more specified 
versions, because they would be a subset of the above, i.e. instances where
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these differences clearly will threaten current balances of power in the parent 
state. This subset would furthermore have to display a dramatic (and unlikely) 
drop in the probability value for the null hypothesis in order to offset that of its 
overall population, which is a sound 0.339 and thus well beyond the critical 
level 0.05. All in all then, in the light of such evidence a conceding side remark 
by Horowitz (1990:17) gains new value: “of course leadership interests are not 
always overriding. Leaders may be, and sometimes are, overruled by an 
avalanche of ethnic mass sentiment.”
The parent and host state's prestige matter to the minority (Hypothesis 4)
Given the so far unsupported rational choice premise in irredentism, the result 
of the PRESTIGE variable is remarkable. It proves significant, and at 0.002 
quite soundly so. This is matched by a moderate measure of association at 
0.402 (the latter indicates on a scale from 0 to 1 the strength of connection 
between this variable and our dependent factor IRREDENTISM YES/NO). The 
strength of this finding is however relativised by a low proportional reduction in 
error (PRE) value of 11.1 per cent -  meaning that the inclusion of this factor 
improves our prediction about irredentism by only that much. At present I have 
no real explanation for this outcome. Why would a minority care for the 
prestige of a parent state if it ends rule by ethnic strangers? Why, conversely, 
would host state prestige matter if a minority has no share in it because of 
discrimination or repressive policies? Given its counter-intuitive results, this 
variable needs future re-testing within a bigger set of cases. Because of its 
PRE weakness I will however not explore it further in this thesis.
Personal ties of the leadership towards the respective other actor matter 
(Hypothesis 5)
Particularised affinity in contrast is not only intuitively convincing but 
statistically supported for both actors separately (PSAFF and MINAFF) as well 
as in combination (COMBAFF). Whether tested in differentiated or binary form 
mainland affinity (PSAFF) for instance vindicates Horowitz beautifully by 
displaying strong measures of association (0.877 and 0.791 -  both close to 1) 
and very good PRE values (69.0 and 73.9 per cent respectively). It is 
noticeable that this factor seems somewhat less important for the minority’s
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part (the p-value is with 0.044 quite close to the borderline to 0.05), and thus 
also yields less impressive association (0.351 -  weak to moderate association) 
and predictive value (a PRE of 16.7 per cent). The combined variable of both 
actors’ affinities is nevertheless remarkable, showing both strong connection to 
the dependent variable (0.826) and a considerable improvement in predicting 
ethnic group decisions (63.2 per cent). I would however add a note of caution, 
since there is a likely interaction with democracy here (see also chapter 7). 
This is because non-democratic regime types are clearly more conducive to 
the translation of particularistic / personal motivations than others -  especially 
the less politics is based on civic appeals, and the more leaders are free of 
institutional review and accountability.
International attitudes and patronage influence irredentist decisions 
(Hypotheses 8 and 9)
Turning to my own variables now, we tested the suggestion that irredentists 
act if they can take advantage of diplomatic windows of opportunity. The first of 
these was the existence of a patron power, which has rendered an insignificant 
probability value at 0.477. This means that the occurrence of irredentism does 
not necessarily depend on backing by a stronger power (or conversely parent 
state irredentism does not hinge on that country being so powerful that it can 
act as its own patron). I had secondly suggested international permissiveness 
as possible factor. Here testing has produced a probability value that is just 
about significant (0.043). Irredentas obviously use international laxity as 
windows of opportunity, but do these determine their occurrence? The PRE 
value clarifies this question: since it is only 26.1 per cent, our ability to predict 
the incidence of irredentism is only moderately higher than without taking this 
factor into account. These results tie in with what I have argued from anecdotal 
evidence in the previous chapter: irredentists will modulate their timing and 
methods, but overall embark on their risky business regardless of external help 
or approval (see chapter 5).
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Democracy in host and parent state respectively shapes minority and mainland 
irredentism (Hypothesis 7)
The final chi-square test probes the last of my own suggested variables: the 
regime type situations of both the transborder minority and its parent state. 
Both are strongly supported by the results, they are significant (comfortably 
below the p-value with 0.03 and 0.01 respectively). This means that, first of all, 
the majority of irredentist parent states is indeed anocratic (i.e. experiencing 
stalled or as yet incomplete, democratisation). The politicisation of ethnicity 
seems obviously harder in stable autocratic systems, or conversely within 
established democracies. Chapter 7 will build on this observation by arguing 
that anocracies have features uniquely conducive to ethnopolitics. Secondly, 
the outcomes show that irredentist minorities routinely occur in environments 
that do not accommodate their demands as groups. This may be either 
because the host state is not democratic, or because the particular type of 
democracy is antagonising. It may be ethnically biased (explicitly in Ethnic 
States, covertly as in Republican-Liberal democracies), or not recognise 
collective identities such as ethnicity and thus alienate groups via civic 
integrationism (Civic-Individualist systems). Testing of the combined variable 
(COMGOV) has however produced a slightly less convincing probability value 
(0.42 -  weak association), which points to the fact that another variable may 
be involved even if there is an ideal pairing in terms of regime type. I argue 
that this variable is identity, i.e. the very gist that anocratic / non- 
accommodative systems than allow to be politicised for irredentism.
2.5 Conclusion: what explains irredentism so far?
Chi-square testing has provided good, and in some cases even strong, support 
for my arguments. The broad picture across two centuries and 55 cases 
demonstrates that parent states and their ethnic brethren do not primarily 
engage in cost-benefit calculations when deciding about ethno-territorial 
retrieval. Geographic and demographic feasibility do not seem to matter very 
much. Significantly, material advantage appears irrelevant to either irredentist 
actor, and so do the existence of tribal, religious or political cleavages, and
90
associated elite interests which Horowitz cites. Rationality within irredentism -  
at least in the way it is conceived by Horowitz - is hence a secondary issue at 
best. This applies even when looking at the ‘common sense’ factors I have 
proposed myself: inter-state attitudes and the existence of external patronage. 
The relevance of Horowitz’s country-prestige variable stands as remarkable 
exception here, especially because it contradicts other results: why would a 
minority care about international standing (both economic and diplomatic) 
whilst, as the tests have shown, simultaneously disregarding the foreign 
political or material impact that may arise from defection? Admittedly, future 
testing with more cases is necessary here to see whether this peculiarity holds 
as well as to confirm the very consistent results of other variables.
For now then, Horowitz’s propositions enjoy the benefit of the doubt at least 
statistically. Simultaneously, this quantified comparison has also established 
credibility for my proposed model. When ethnic actors decide on whether 
irredentism, with all its risks and shaky record of success, is “worth it”, they 
must reason in different categories to those suggested by Donald Horowitz. 
But reason they do. I argue that it is democracy and its specific constraints and 
opportunities for each irredentist actor, that plays an important part (see 
chapter 7). This furthermore combines with the statistically untestable but 
empirically crucial, factor of intra-group cohesion (see chapter 6). World 
political opportunities -  be they general (international consensus towards 
irredentism) or specific (irredentist patron power) -  are not decisive, but weigh 
in as strong reinforcing factor (see chapter 5).
Multivariate statistical analysis can however only achieve so much in terms of 
arguing its case. Shortcomings typically associated with the method’s 
requirements such as breaking down cases into variables, simplifying 
assumptions about causes and their interactions, or observing average effects 
rather than individual variation6, call for the complementary empirical approach 
which respects complexity and historical specificity. Hence the following 
chapters will examine each variable in detail via the case study of Hungarian 
irredentism’s inconsistency.
6 The problem of assuming for average or equivalent effects across all cases (i.e. disrespect 
for context-dependency) is due to parameter setting in order to specify relevant observations. 
It can normally be solved by splitting the statistical population into sub-samples, which is 
however impossible here due to the very small population size.
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3. Much Pain. Little Gain: The Political Economy
of Irredentism
“(...) Defining ethno-national conflicts in terms of economic 
inequality is a bit like defining them in terms of oxygen: where 
you find the one, you can be reasonably certain of finding the 
other. Yet while no analyst, to my knowledge, has blamed the 
presence of oxygen for ethnic conflict, several have been 
prepared to blame economic discrepancies between groups. ”
Walker Connor (2001:115)
3.1 Introduction: materialism, rationality and ethno-nationalism
Ethno-national movements are routinely interpreted as driven by resource 
competition, self-interested elites and / or economic deprivation. Early works 
such as Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), Rabushka and Shepsle’s 
Politics in Plural Societies (1972) and Vandenberghe's Ethnic Phenomenon 
(1981) established this as a standard approach within the nascent field of 
ethnicity and nationalism studies. Subsequent research has further elaborated 
on the idea of ethnic collectives as kindred interest groups (e.g. Breton and 
Galeotti 1995; Hardin 1995; Fearon and Laitin 1996). More recently, this 
approach has focused on explaining specifically ethno-territorial movements. 
Nafziger and Richter's comparison of Biafra and Bangladesh (1976), Meadwell 
(1991), Hechter (1992) and Berkowitz (1997) have all offered materialist 
accounts of secessionism. Irredentism, overlooked as "lesser" phenomenon, 
has received scant yet similar treatment, notably from Carment and James 
(1995) and Saideman (1998;1999)1.
1 In a later, quantitative study Saideman and Ayres ironically find no causal link between 
economic differentials on the one hand and irredentas and secessions on the other 
(2000:1131, 1136).
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3.1.1 Horowitz’s model and the political economy of irredentism
Donald Horowitz’s theory of irredentism (1985; 1991) proposes economic 
interest as one of the main motives for the costly project of retrieval. With 
regard to the parent state Horowitz (1985:286) observes: “given the significant 
risks and dubious rewards of irredentism, states that ardently pursue strategies 
of retrieval probably have some specially compelling reasons to do so.” The 
presumption is that irredentism must literally ‘pay off in order for the parent 
state to risk it. He is less clear about the minority, yet remarks in passing that 
“it is generally more attractive to be retrieved by a rich rather than a poor 
neighbour” (ibid.), without however expanding on this point.
A few adjustments are necessary in order to test Horowitz’s suggestions. 
Firstly, for reasons of consistency I need to apply this mainly parent state - 
centred factor to the minority as well. After all, it faces arguably even greater 
risks than the parent state for they are existential - ranging from forced 
assimilation over expulsion down to genocidal retaliation by the host state. 
Hence, reincorporation must be profitable for the minority, too -  meaning it 
ought to accede to a wealthier state where its material situation and life- 
chances will discernibly improve. Second, because Horowitz provides only 
rudimentary pointers these need fleshing out. It is for instance not clear 
whether he suggests irredentism as driven by opportunism, or conversely by 
need (relative economic deprivation). In order to keep with the most favourable 
interpretation I will adopt the broadest reading and examine both. Since this 
thesis is a comparative exercise, my emphasis will however lie on the 
deprivation argument. Furthermore, we are given no indicators for this 
variable. Is the parent state swayed by natural resources in the coveted region, 
highly skilled labour, additional tax revenue, important industries or trade and 
infrastructure? Similarly, is it a stronger national economy and better job 
opportunities that attract a minority, or rather regional development, more 
generous welfare provision, and redistributive policies? In fact, it is arguable 
that minorities expect material improvement independently of all the above, 
simply from the fact that they (re)join a kindred state, i.e. one that does not 
discriminate against them. Conversely, some host states may be so wealthy
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that minorities are better off staying, despite (perceived or real) discrimination. 
My analysis will hence take into account macro-economic indicators as well as 
making a more specific appraisal. Whether both actors actually have access to 
such sophisticated information is deliberately set aside for the (unlikely) sake 
of argument. Finally and most importantly, is this rationality rooted in objective 
economic givens, or is it enough if an actor merely believes retrieval will bring 
advantage? In order to cover the latter point I will hence also look actors’ 
subjective takes on irredentism’s differential payoffs.
3.1.2 The (poor) economic rationale of irredentism
Irredentists are not primarily concerned with the material advantages their 
project confers. Such an approach portrays ethnopolitics as substitute or 
secondary struggle for more primary problems like economic differentials or 
retardation, incomplete or ongoing modernisation, or indeed as elite 
opportunism (see also McGarry 1995:127-9; Connor 1994 and 2001). "In line 
with this view, the real problem was held to be that some people felt left behind 
in the process of modernisation, and once a certain level of economic 
development was achieved and accessible to all citizens, people would stop 
mobilising on the basis of ethnocultural affiliation" (Kymlicka 2000:206). As a 
mere by-product of some other, deeper problem, ethnic mobilisation is implied 
to be temporary and fading once ‘objective’ factors have changed. Secondly, 
this assumes a free market of ideas, i.e. that ethnic groups and their elites 
have an open choice between materialist and cultural bases for ethno- 
nationalism. This further premises that self-interested elites persuade their 
political clientele of a particular course of action. Both are core doctrines of 
liberal orthodoxy, and are rather normative. Obvious questions arise however, 
not least why ethnicity still seems to trump most, sometimes even all, other 
mobilising factors in that marketplace - especially when it flies in the face of 
material advantage. Explaining ethnopolitics in terms of material interests 
dismisses the salience of ethnicity and ignores its power to mobilise groups.
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This chapter will argue two points. Firstly, I will show that despite appearances 
Hungary’s interwar irredenta made overall little material sense. This is contrary 
to generally held views in Hungarian historiography. Comparison with today’s 
economic situation reveals furthermore an insufficient change in conditions in 
order to explain both actors’ contemporary renouncement of irredentism. In 
fact, today the parent state has roughly about as little to gain and the minorities 
have as much to gain from retrieval, as they respectively did eight decades 
ago. This in turn leads to my second argument: nationalism drove economics, 
not vice versa. Even though interwar Budapest frequently invoked an 
economic rationale for the project, irredentist planning and conduct were a 
function of ethno-nationalism. Although economically discriminated against, 
Magyar minorities were most frustrated about forced assimilation and political 
repression within their host states. The material problems from their situation 
only further fuelled the defectionism which these other factors had created. In 
short, Horowitz and those arguing for materialist explanations tie group 
rationality to the wrong criteria. Rather than looking at the endogenous factors 
really important to irredentists -  identity, self-rule - such approaches root 
behaviour in external circumstances.
3.2 Hungary’s considerations then and now
Much of the Hungarian literature on Trianon and its consequences centres 
around the economic ruin inflicted by partition. The irredentas are therefore 
generally considered as profitable, which in turn would support Horowitz's 
theory. I will argue against this commonly held view in Magyar historiography. 
While it is true that the 1920 peace treaty was explicitly designed to make 
Hungary economically dependent on - and thus docile towards - its neighbours 
(Zeidler 2001:22-24), subsequent interwar developments reduced the material 
necessity to retrieve the severed populations and their territories. Among these 
developments were the country's rapid recovery to pre-WW 1 levels, but also 
its increasing need for modernisation, specifically in terms of social and rural 
reform. In fact the truncation, much as it was traumatic, turned out to be useful. 
Hungarian governments were aware of this, yet continued to raise the material
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aspect for diplomatic and ideological reasons. My point here is that, despite 
some of its rhetoric, Budapest's prime motive for retrieval was not economic.
3.2.1 Parent state irredentism between the wars: a discussion in general 
comparative terms
Prior to examining the economic merits and drawbacks of Hungary’s interwar 
irredenta the case offers some general points which do not fit with materialist 
explanations. This is regardless of whether we test irredentism as driven by 
economic opportunism or hardship.
In terms of opportunity, a state that pursues retrieval mainly for economic 
reasons will likely concentrate on wealthy territories, whilst abandoning or de- 
prioritising less profitable ones. At the very least, such a parent state can be 
expected to cherry-pick upon re-annexation, i.e. to recover only affluent areas 
within a coveted territory. Most irredentist cases militate against both 
suggestions. Of the five areas Somalia sought to retrieve it prioritised the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia, one of the poorest, but symbolically most 
important. Nineteenth century Greece and Risorgimento Italy respectively 
recovered kindred regions indiscriminately, whether it was the rich Veneto and 
(temporarily) Smyrna, or poorer parts such as Lazio and the Ionian Islands. 
Hungary’s case is no exception here. The only partitioned territories interwar 
Hungary renounced of happened to be wealthy ones. Premier Bethlen 
withdrew Budapest’s claims over the now Austrian Burgenland and over 
Croatia, which was part Magyar inhabited in the north and a millennial vassal 
territory of the Kingdom (Romsics 1991:189). Furthermore, the mainland’s 
demands for the remaining territories were in no way selective: both the 
Voyvodina and Transylvania contained poor stretches (the latter more so than 
the former), and Karpatalja (Ruthenia) was in fact so deprived that 
contemporaries referred to it as “land of the poor” or “starvation area” (Szarka 
1998:23). The Felvidek stands alone as reasonably prosperous territory 
coveted by Hungary.
If one argues from the viewpoint of relative economic deprivation, then poor 
states are presumably more inclined to irredentism than affluent ones.
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Although criteria of wealth vary according to regional and historical context, a 
cursory survey of the descriptive dataset shows a roughly even distribution 
between downright poor irredentist states (like Somalia, Libya or Afghanistan) 
and medium to well-off ones such as Japan, West Germany, Italy, Denmark or 
Sweden. There is moreover an impressive number of cases where parent 
states claimed regions that would have lost their wealth upon retrieval 
(Northern Ireland, Okinawa Ryukyu, Nagorno-Karabach) or that were simply 
poorer to start with (e.g. the GDR or Moldova).
Thirdly, if economic duress spawns or reinforces parent state irredentism, then 
periods of growth and affluence must conversely dampen it down. The impact 
of the world economic crisis from 1929 onwards provides a good testing case 
here. Its effects hit East Central Europe later that year. Irredentist elements 
within Hungarian foreign policy should have spiked during that time, but in fact 
do not align. They crucially preceded those years (with the onset of Bethlen’s 
“active foreign policy" in 1927), experienced a lull precisely because of the 
domestic difficulties caused by the crisis (1929-32), and then picked up 
because of changes in domestic and international parameters (see sections
5.2.1 and 7.2.1).
Looking finally at irredentism’s domestic pay-offs, it may be perhaps revealing 
which stratum within the parent state most supports the project. Much has 
been made of the fact that those who personified Hungary’s irredenta -  
aristocratic statesmen like Bethlen, Teleki, Horthy or Apponyi - all had lost vast 
landed estates in the partitioned territories. Especially communist 
historiography liked to link irredentism to this leadership’s half-hearted rural 
reform, thus portraying retrieval as stopgap solution to aristocratic 
encroachment on land (see e.g. Juhasz 1988). There is however little mileage 
in both suggestions. Firstly, irredentism was never tied to resolving the 
problem of mass landlessness, but was rather held up as panacea for the 
nation’s general woes (loss of status and empire, national humiliation etc., see 
below). Analyses of interwar foreign policy and biographical studies 
furthermore do not support this interpretation (see e.g. Pritz 1982, 1985; 
Romsics 1991,1998; Fulop and Sipos 1998; Zeidler2001; Bardi 2004b). While 
the irredenta certainly was instrumentalised for other, domestic agendas (see 
section 7.2.1) this was not one of them. Secondly, Hungary’s irredentist
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constituency comprised all classes, party affiliations, occupational and 
generational groups (L. Nagy 1987; Balogh in Borsody 1988:55). Particular 
societal centres of irredentism were conservative institutions like the army 
(Lorman 2005) and the Catholic Church (Zeidler 2001:166). They can be 
argued -  at a stretch -  to benefit from an expanding Hungary. Yet retrieval 
was generally “the strongest legitimate factor creating a national consensus” 
within interwar Hungary (ibid.:188), and hence cannot be singled out as the 
profit-generating project of a particular domestic group.
3.2.2 Ideology over figures: the comparative dis/advantaqes of interwar 
retrieval
The case for irredentism: economic impact of partition
Considering the sheer devastation Trianon had brought on, one could 
commonsensically assume for Hungarian revisionism to be preoccupied with 
economic recovery. Already prior to 1920, the country's de facto truncation, 
war, partial occupation and imperial collapse had brought on catastrophic 
conditions (see Berend 1969:172-3). The peace treaty now deprived Hungary 
of the rich agricultural areas which had generated its main source of income: 
the Csallokoz region within the Felvidek, Transylvania proper, as well as the 
south-eastern Banat and Bacska regions. Hungary's revenue from agricultural 
export, its former economic backbone, was thus broken. Partition also brought 
a loss of markets, which had had a complementary function within the 
domestic division of labour. "New international borders separated Hungary's 
industrial base from its sources of raw materials and its former markets for 
agricultural and industrial products. Its new circumstances forced Hungary to 
become a trading nation. Hungary lost 84 per cent of its timber resources, 43 
per cent of its arable land and 83 per cent of its iron ore. Because most of the 
country's pre-war industry was concentrated near Budapest, Hungary retained 
about 51 per cent of its industrial population, 56 per cent of its industry, 82 per 
cent of its heavy industry, and 70 per cent of its banks" (Burant 1989). As a 
consequence, "there was (...) a marked disproportion between its resources of 
raw materials and its manufacturing capacity". "In other ways too the internal
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economic balance was seriously upset: for instance only 11 per cent of the iron 
ore and 15 per cent of the timber was left within the new boundaries" (Berend 
1969:170). Both these facts meant the start of a "vicious circle" that made the 
country dependent on foreign trade. "For the economy to function, and for 
industry to be put on its feet, foreign currency and raw materials were 
essential, but these could be secured only by the export of agricultural 
produce. This again was impossible; the place of these missing agricultural 
products should have been taken by competitively-priced manufactured goods, 
but to produce these was impossible without importing raw materials" (Berend 
1969:173-4). As a by-product the country also experienced problems of 
internal capital accumulation, forcing it to resort to foreign loans.
Hungary's was further crippled by Trianon's devastation of its infrastructure, 
which had hitherto functioned in a complementary way. Eminent here was the 
case of Hungary’s railway system. Arranged in a radial grid which centred on 
Budapest, it was purposefully truncated by partition, leaving only 42 per cent 
behind (Berend and Csato 2001:148). Most of Hungary’s few urban centres (a 
meagre 16.7 per cent) ended up either outside of the new borders, or 
conversely atrophied because their tributary regions had now been cut off. 
Such newly peripheral areas also experienced population flight towards 
Hungary’s remaining industrial areas (Kovacs 1989:79-83). The two single 
greatest sources of damage in this respect were the respective loss of 
Transylvania and Southern Slovakia.
To summarise, the Hungarian Kingdom had been within the confines of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, a self-sufficient entity that sustained its economy 
and the wider region with exports of its vast agricultural surplus. With its 
internal division of labour and its complementary markets and infrastructure, it 
was praised as perfect organic unit. Geographic-economic arguments were 
thus amongst the strongest raised against Trianon (Zeidler 2001:53-54). An 
endless stream of interwar publications, both governmental and private, sought 
to illustrate the damage and unviability caused by truncation (see e.g. Buday 
1921; Laky 1923; Fenyo 1929). In short, judging by purely its losses, interwar 
Hungary would indeed have had enough reason to pursue an economically 
motivated irredenta.
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The case against irredentism: modernisation and changing world economic 
conditions
The problem though is that the material logic does not withstand closer 
inspection. Within a decade after partition it became obvious that for all the talk 
about truncation and historically organic units, the rump of Hungary was 
performing rather well. Agricultural output had recovered to pre-1914 levels 
already by 1925, while industrial production regenerated to former standards 
by 1928 (Zeidler 2001:48). Granted, economic growth was both slow 
(amounting to not quite 30 per cent over twenty years), and uneven (with 
agricultural stagnation and little expansion in heavy industry). Yet it 
nevertheless proved the truncated mainland viable against all predictions -  
and against revisionist propaganda. More importantly, the onset of competitive 
overseas production turned the recent past of "natural" or "complementary" 
regional markets into a nostalgia. Berend (1969:178) describes how 
protectionism had shrunk intra-regional trade by the late 1920's to 10 to 15 per 
cent of the successor countries' pre-war exchange. No irredenta could have 
remedied the fact that Hungarian goods - both agricultural and industrial -  
were now unable to keep up with cheap grains and production methods from 
the West. In one word then: by the second half of the 1930s, i.e. when the 
irredenta began to seem achievable, there no longer was a strict economic 
need or logic for Hungary to retrieve its former territories.
I would like to take this argument a step further. In purely economic terms, 
truncation turned out to be a necessary and even moderately beneficial, 
downsizing. Trianon, for all its misery and injustice, ultimately rejuvenated the 
national economy by forcing its interwar modernisation and industrialisation, 
precisely in order to compensate for lost resources and initial lack of domestic 
employment. The very fact of partition meant that Hungary "gained in industrial 
strength, for within its new boundaries, which enclosed about a third of its 
former territory, there remained about 55 per cent of its industry and 41 per 
cent of its population" (Berend 1969:170). Thus for instance the country 
retained 80 to 90 per cent of its printing and engineering plants (ibid.). While 
before the war around two thirds of the population had earned their living from 
agriculture that proportion now sunk to just half of all employed. This initial
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head start in modernisation was partly consolidated during the interwar period. 
The need to remedy the above-mentioned gap between domestic resources 
and manufacturing capacity drove development further. For instance, 
Hungary's hitherto sorely underdeveloped consumer goods and light industries 
now rapidly expanded.2 Hungary’s traditional dependence on Austrian and 
Czech industries sharply decreased (Berend and Csato 2001:146). Admittedly, 
this process of shifting economic gears was painful: the domestic decline of 
former stronghold sectors like grain production and food processing often 
entailed unemployment and local problems. Budapest’s neo-corporatist 
governments proved furthermore unwilling to comprehensively reform and 
adapt the country. More abstractly, these developments traumatised Magyar 
nationalism even further by contrasting its rural, retrogressive self-image with 
an increasingly modernised reality.
Albeit brutally, partition also reduced the already vast extent of socio-economic 
problems interwar Hungarian governments had to tackle. These included the 
desperate - and ultimately unsuccessful - struggle for land reform, social and 
educational welfare to counteract deprivation (illiteracy, infant mortality, public 
health deficits, poverty) and the need to redress infrastructural and 
urbanisation backlogs (see Janos 1982:149 ff.; Berend and Csato 2001:151- 
154).
Finally, within the international context of falling agricultural prices and cheap 
imports (due to increasing primary sector mechanisation and larger scale 
production in North America), Trianon pre-emptively shed Hungary of what 
would have soon become increasingly unprofitable, burdensome areas. The 
decline of associated industries like that of the mainland's giant milling sector, 
would have been magnified even further. Berend (1969:176) rightly reminds 
that "the economic unity of the empire rested on the integration of backward 
agrarian regions with others that had attained a standard of industrial 
development comparable to that of West Europe." At the onset of an
2 Particularly striking is the rapid development of Hungary's previously minimal textile industry. 
"In comparison with pre-war standards, production in the Hungarian textile industry had 
doubled by 1925, trebled by 1929, and by the end of the thirties had reached four times the 
pre-war figure; the import of textiles, which in 1913 accounted for 70 per cent of total home 
consumption, now covered only 2-3 per cent" (Berend 1969: 179).
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increasingly competitive and industrialised era which soon experienced the 
hitherto greatest crisis within capitalism, Hungary had been forcibly rid of those 
largely rural regions and left with a more modern, workable core (Berend and 
Csato 2001:146-9).
Ideology over figures: interwar political thought and the economics of retrieval 
The question is therefore whether and to what extent policy-makers were 
aware of this, and secondly, why economic arguments still figured prominently. 
The profitability of irredentism was to a considerable extent merely a 
discourse, rather than actually important. Budapest’s three concrete irredentist 
plans3 reveal hardly any concern with economic criteria. Instead, they focused 
on what was crucial to irredentists: to retrieve the maximum possible amount of 
transborder kindred and ancestral territories, of the Crownlands of St. Stephen 
(see section 4.4). Prime minister Bethlen’s and Teleki’s designs both faithfully 
mirrored this theme and cited the retrieval of ethnic Magyar areas as core but 
minimum, demand (see also section 5.2.1). The only exception was Premier 
Gombos' plan of 1934, with its emphasis on material and geo-strategic 
aspects. Of all designs however it was also the most irrelevant because it was 
never adopted: unpopular with the cabinet and the wider political 
establishment precisely for dropping the Crownlands notion, it died with its 
maker in 1936 (Zeidler 2001:150-5).
Conversely, Hungarian governments did worry whether they could actually 
afford retrieval. Several studies describe Budapest’s grave concerns about re­
integrating the Felvidek community, which had been used to much higher 
social standards and services within Czechoslovakia (Hamori 2001:569-574; 
see also Puski in Bekeny and Danyi 2000:111). This spawned a costly special 
program in the wake of re-annexation (1938) which had to be repeated upon 
the return of impoverished Northern Transylvania in 1940 (Puski ibid.:117).
3 Interwar Hungary refused to specify its irredentist designs until the 1930s. Concrete maps 
were mainly circulated by academics, journalists, and the Revisionist League, with varying and 
ambiguous levels of official endorsement. Only three politicians presented precise plans - 
either as heads of government (Gombos) or as retired statesmen in publications and lectures 
(Teleki and Bethlen). These also were exactly the personalities who singularly summed up 
interwar Magyar politics most - both in terms of impact and representation (see section 7.2.1). 
For these reasons they are selected here as solidly revealing of irredentist policy-making.
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So if the economics of it all mattered in fact little, why was there such a 
pronounced emphasis on this aspect? For one, the irredenta was part of 
continued imperial thinking and served as panacea in Hungarian domestic 
politics. Imperial resurrection was seen to remedy all of Hungary’s problems -  
not least its myriad socio-economic ones. Trianon had been the ‘cause’ for all 
the nation’s woes, hence regaining everything it had cut off would 
automatically mean national salvation. State and group interests fused, 
retrieval replaced reform as solution. This view was promoted by politicians as 
well as enthusiastically endorsed by the population (see section 7.2.1). 
Ambrosio (2002:18) notes that irredentist states typically extol the “remedial 
nature” of retrieval, based on “the belief that (...) the interests and rights of the 
nation as a whole are not (and likely cannot) be satisfied unless all members of 
the nation dwell within the same polity.” Glenny (1996:15-26) observes in the 
same vein: “most nationalisms are based on the assumption that a state which 
encompasses all members of one nation can overcome all major social and 
economic evils.” No wonder then that material arguments were quoted by 
those least experienced in this field, but most fervently irredentist. Thus Count 
Teleki, twice prime minister and an academic, was a life-long proponent of the 
empire’s re-establishment. Considered as the architect of Hungarian 
irredentism, he seamlessly integrated Magyar national desires with macro- 
economic and ethnographic reasoning for retrieval. Count Bethlen, the founder 
of Hungary’s “active foreign policy”, argued along the same lines (see below). 
Prime minister Imredy, a banker and trained economist, in turn suspended his 
managerial judgement when it came to the irredentist achievements during his 
term (Ormos 1998:186). In contrast, where economic sense conflicted with 
irredentism, the latter won. Zeidler (2001:77) thus describes how Budapest 
actually rejected a customs union which Austria and Czechoslovakia proposed 
to alleviate the 1929 crisis, precisely because it worried a successful solution 
by economic means alone would jeopardise its case for irredentism. In short, 
because retrieval was seen as panacea -  a feature common in irredentas -  
economic arguments were made to fit the project, not vice versa.
Secondly, the economic discourse was not least for foreign consumption (see 
section 5.2.1). By the early 1920s, successive interwar Hungarian 
governments had understood that their emotive (and sometimes downright
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arrogant) irredentist reasoning proved counter-productive abroad. 
Furthermore, it had become obvious that the Great Powers applied Wilsonian 
principles of national self-determination very selectively. Hence it made little 
sense to keep demanding them for Hungarian minorities and their own right to 
nation-state congruence. Instead, the economic case for border revision was 
thought of as more dry-eyed and therefore persuasive, to the outside world. A 
whole string of academic institutes and faculties were founded in order to 
produce research which would support this. Good examples for its use were 
former premier Teleki’s international lectures on Hungary’s ‘unviability’ as 
truncated country, or prime minister Bethlen’s so-called 'economic propaganda' 
between 1923 and 1927 (Kovacs 1994:88).
In short, the economic side of Hungarian irredentism was part discourse, part 
tailored to what actually mattered: ethno-national completeness. Material 
interests within parent state irredentism, as far as they objectively existed, 
were a means to a nationalist ends as well as to support a strategic-pragmatic 
switch in irredentist diplomacy.
3.2.3 Is retrieval really any less profitable today?
To make a counterfactual for the contemporary period is not difficult: Hungary 
is economically more advanced than its post-communist neighbours Romania 
and Slovakia. Retrieving today’s Felvidek and Transylvania would thus be an 
obvious and unaffordable mistake. Therefore, rather than belabouring this 
point, the following section will draw a few parallels to the interwar period, thus 
showing that the problems retrieval would create today were in fact already 
existent at the time. The point is that objective economic criteria and the costs 
associated with retrieval have not changed enough to account for Hungary’s 
inconsistent irredenta.
How profitable were the retrievals of 1938 and 1940 respectively?
The retrieval of the two regions both posed economic difficulties, yet in 
opposite ways. By the 1930s, the Felvidek had a considerably different socio­
economic situation from that in mainland Hungary. Czechoslovakia’s generous
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social policies and successful economic redistribution had created a local 
society and economy very different from Hungary’s. Retrieving the region 
would and then really did mean, cutting it off from its investors, its markets, its 
higher wages and employment (see for instance Zeidler 2001:227; Hamori 
2001:574). The Hungarian government worried in advance whether it could 
literally afford such a differently run entity and commissioned internal reports 
on the matter (Hamori 2001:572-4). The outcome was a large-scale social 
programme in order to bridge the transition on retrieval. Entitled “Hungarians 
for Hungarians”, it was one of the most costly campaigns for interwar Hungary 
-  one that the state could furthermore not afford. Budapest’s coffers had 
already been emptied by premier Daranyi’s ambitious public investment 
(“Gyor“) programme from earlier that year. As a result, mainland Hungarians 
were asked to donate -  and matched the governments meagre 1.5 million with 
a staggering 6 880 750 Pengos (Hamori 2001: 577-583).
The recovery of Northern Transylvania in 1940 brought the opposite problem, 
namely of having to compensate for local underdevelopment. “It complicated 
matters that it was Transylvania’s economically more backward, poorer areas 
which were returned. [The government] tried to counter this beyond its powers 
by organising social aid campaigns, infrastructural investments and with 
supporting Hungarian cultural institutions” (Puski in Bekeny and Danyi 
2000:117, emphasis mine). By now operating in the context of a wartime 
economy, Budapest was even less able to finance these areas. National 
emergency budgets were furthermore depleted from heavy flooding in the 
previous winter. To rely again on public donations seemed an obvious, if risky, 
way out. The responsible government commissioner thus confidently declared 
that “I expect from these collections (...) at least as much of a result as from 
the ‘Hungarians for Hungarians’ movement.” He was mistaken -  contributions 
were much lower this time, amounting to merely 218 100 Pengos, one thirtieth 
of the previous campaign (Hamori 2001:621-222).
The point here is that Budapest’s behaviour does not suggest rational 
calculations. In both cases the government knew the costly challenges 
reintegration would pose, knew it could not finance them, but still went ahead 
relying on uncertain sources.
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The burden repeated
In terms of improving Hungary's economy, retrieval would not bring any 
appreciable benefits today either. Minority Magyar regions are both lagging 
behind not only Hungary but also their respective host states.
For starters, they do so in terms of per capita income (as I will show below, see 
section 3.3.3,). Should they be retrieved today, both minority populations 
would also present a demographic and labour force liability, rather than an 
asset. Minority unemployment continues to be well above mainland average 
(see section 3.3.3). Presumably, this in itself does not pose a lasting problem 
because the dynamic Hungarian labour market would absorb these 
unemployed. For example, the region of Northern Hungary is currently 
experiencing such rapid economic growth that it actually suffers from labour 
shortages. As a result, it is already employing considerable numbers of ethnic 
Hungarians from adjacent Slovakia who commute across the border. Similarly, 
several tens of thousands of ethnic Magyars work in mainland Hungary under 
the terms of the Status Law (Lampl in Fabri 2003; HTMH 2005a and 2005b). 
Such examples are however not generalisable. A look at minority Magyars' 
professional distribution across economic sectors and at their educational lags 
(below) shows that there would be a considerable mismatch between people's 
skills and available jobs.
For starters, both transborder communities fare badly in their levels of higher 
education relative both to their host societies and to the Hungarian mainland 
population. Higher and university education levels are low compared to the 
mainland’s 12.0 per cent (KSH 2002d:table 1.1), with only 3.6 and 5.3 per cent 
among Romanian and Slovak Hungarians respectively. Figures for mid-level 
schooling show similar disparities. Secondly, both communities are ageing, 
with exceptionally high rates of retirees (Felvidek Magyars 20.6 per cent in 
1991, Transylvania 19.7 in 1992, Varga 1998:table 32; Lanstyak 2000:55). 
Given that mainland Hungary is already battling with the demographic and 
social costs of a shrinking and ageing population, this figure would be a 
burdensome addition. Thirdly, adding to these are crass disparities in income 
and employment (see below). Finally, a breakdown in terms of occupational 
sectors highlights once more the minorities’ problematic underdevelopment in 
relation to the mainland. Around a quarter of Magyars in both transborder
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communities still gain their living from agriculture (Lanstyak 2000:55-6; HTMH 
1999a), compared to a mere 6.2 per cent in Hungary as of 2002 (KSH 2002c). 
The reasons for these discrepancies lie in late and incomplete industrialisation 
as well as in the targeted underdevelopment both regions have suffered in 
their respective host states.
In short, retrieval today would require Hungary to undertake an enormous 
exercise of socio-economic redistribution quite like the one it faced in the late 
1930s. Given the similarly unfavourable balance sheet in both time periods, it 
is clear that here the differentials in profitability cannot explain the mainland’s 
inconsistent irredentism.
3.3 Economic considerations of minority Magyars
The inconsistent irredentism of transborder Hungarians in turn is similarly at 
odds with interpretations of relative deprivation or, conversely, of opportunism. 
Firstly I will illustrate that persistent material discrimination within their host 
states provided both Felvidek and Erdely Magyars with as much reason to 
defect in the interwar period as it arguably does today. Following partition their 
local ascendancy was dismantled, after World War II they endured collective 
reprisals for pursuing irredentism, and today their life chances and home 
regions are still below national host state averages. Furthermore, minority 
desires for retrieval in the interwar period display little genuine evidence of 
economic motives. Thirdly, it is commonly assumed that minorities are always 
better off joining their parent state, not least because this removes prejudicial 
treatment. I will show that, at least for the case of the Felvidek Magyars, this is 
not true. Acceding their poorer kindred state indeed promised freedom from 
discrimination, but more fundamentally meant trading in Czechoslovakia’s 
higher standards of life and welfare provision from which they also benefited.
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3.3.1 Interwar minority irredentism: a discussion in general terms
Before launching into a detailed analysis of the Magyar case it is worth probing 
the political economy of minority irredentism first in general terms. As 
mentioned above, two strands of argumentation are possible here: economic 
deprivation and opportunism.
Starting with the first, interwar Europe had several minority areas economically 
similar to Transylvania and the Felvidek that showed no signs of defectionism. 
Belgian Flanders and Scotland come to mind as counter-examples for 
Transylvania. All three had important industrial centres with large rural 
backdrops and were governed by ethnically different dominant groups. Mainly 
agricultural Southern Slovakia in turn compares with Wales or Slovenia, both 
of them non-defectionist entities. Comparative studies have furthermore shown 
that socio-economic disadvantage without the cohesion of a threatened ethno- 
national identity translates either into social protest, or resignation and crime 
(e.g. Gurr 1970; 1994; 2000).
Following the logic of relative economic deprivation, a minority will be more 
keen to defect if it is subject to - or believes itself the subject of - discriminatory 
policies by the host state. I will show below that this was indeed the case for 
Hungarians in both Romania and Czechoslovakia. Yet it will also become clear 
that a switch back to Hungary did not hold much material promise for either 
community. Furthermore, some groups still enjoy better life chances in states 
that do discriminate against them -  Felvidek Magyars and Estonia’s Russian 
community are both cases in point. Finally, this argument fails to explain 
irredentist alienation from the state amongst economically advantaged groups. 
There have been enough instances where irredentist minorities acted against 
their own material interests (e.g. nineteenth century Ottoman Greeks, 
Romanians within Austria-Hungary, Kenyan Somalis, or Okinawan Japanese). 
As above, there is also the question of an irredentist constituency within the 
minority. The answer at first appears to support a materialist agenda: the strata 
within these Magyar communities that had lost most from partition were also 
those that most supported the irredentist project. Zeidler (2001:202-6) 
describes that the middle classes were the strongest supporters of irredentism 
within the minorities. Intellectuals and workers (agrarian as well as industrial)
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were somewhat less involved. Hungarian Social Democrats in the Felvidek, 
though representing only a small faction, even denounced the return to a 
“feudal Hungary” where land reform was impossible (Hamori 2001:574). While 
this would then neatly fit elite-persuasion arguments about nationalism, Nodia 
(2000:172) points out that such reasoning actually reifies itself: “the self 
interest of the seller cannot explain the success of a political program because 
all sellers are self-interested. Occasionally, a dishonest salesman may sell 
damaged goods to a naive consumer, but the extraordinary and continuing 
popularity of nationalism during the last two centuries does not allow us to take 
consumer fraud seriously as an explanatory variable.”
Finally, if relative deprivation were to chiefly motivate irredentist minorities, 
then their drive for defection would surely increase in times of economic 
hardship, and conversely abate with improvement. Like above we can probe 
this for the period between 1929 and 1932, when the world economic crisis 
made its effects felt in the region. If irredentism is about remedying material 
grievances, then the desire for retrieval should have been at its most intense 
during this time. The late 1920s and early 1930s however were exactly the 
high time of alternative, non-irredentist voices within the minorities (see section
6.2.1). Both communities had produced small but vocal liberal factions, 
respectively called Transylvanianism and New Faced Magyars. These rejected 
retrieval, and saw the post-partition fate as opportunity for internal social 
reform and co-operation with the majority nations. In turn, efforts by the host 
state to ‘buy off irredentism remained ineffective. Czechoslovakia’s late 
attempts at (amongst others) economic co-optation4 in 1937-38 proved 
fruitless towards its already radicalised Magyar minority. Instead, the 
intensification of minority disaffection and activism directly mirrored 
developments in host state politics and at international level (see section 5.3.1 
and 7.3.1 below).
To interpret Horowitz’s variable as opportunistic irredentism is not convincing 
either. The idea that transborder Magyars wanted retrieval because it 'paid' 
ignores the suppression and discrimination that both host states inflicted on 
them precisely on the suspicion of their disloyalty (see below and section
4 For instance, from September 1938 onwards Prague accorded to Hungarian areas 
considerable municipal and regional funds, as well as higher unemployment benefits for 
Magyars in Komarom city.
109
7.3.1). This assumes that groups hold out for years, even decades as in this 
case, for an ultimate material reward while accepting in the meantime misery 
for exactly that stance.
3.3.2 Comparative dis/advantages in the interwar period
The case for economic irredentism: large scale and institutionalised socio­
economic discrimination
After 1920, both host countries dismantled the material assets of local 
Magyars in order to establish economic control5 in the newly gained territories. 
In the first instance this was achieved by openly discriminatory land reforms. 
Romania’s 1921 reform benefited the majority nation at the expense of 
Hungarians because it "was carried out much more strictly in Transylvania 
than in the Regat [pre-1920 Romania], even though 40 per cent of the land in 
the latter belonged to large landowners, while the proportion in Transylvania 
was only 10.8 per cent" (lllyes 1982:90). Whereas land seizures in the Regat 
had fixed ceilings, no such limits were prescribed or kept in Magyar inhabited 
regions. Moreover, compensation for expropriated lands in Transylvania was 
set at the prices of 1913, whereas those for the Regat were fixed at the more 
valuable rates of 1917. As a consequence, the payouts covered merely 1 to 2 
per cent of the real value. Even this was not paid out in cash, as in other parts 
of the country, but converted into government bonds which effectively meant 
no reimbursement. The blow to private Magyar property was compounded by 
the expropriation of Magyar churches, which had by then become vital cultural 
centres for the community. Romania thus seized an astonishing 95 per cent of 
all Catholic assets in Transylvania and 45 per cent of Protestant property 
(Sebess 1921; Dioszegi 1990:35; Zeidler 2001:196).
Czechoslovakia’s two agrarian reforms of 1919-20 were equally discriminatory 
and devastating. These allowed agricultural labourers (overwhelmingly ethnic 
Slovaks) to seize up to two thirds of land from their former landlords (mostly
5
"Control" (Lustick 1979) has been described as institutionalised ethnic dominance or 
exclusionary domination model within an ethnically diverse state. It is compatible with formal 
liberal democracy (like in Czechoslovakia) 1990), and contingent on the dominant group's 
capacity to manipulate the institutions and/or leadership of the subordinate group.
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ethnic Hungarians). The authorities in turn confiscated Magyar properties at 
three times the national average. Compensation payments covered only 50 to 
60 per cent of actual asset worth. Ethnic Czechs and especially Slovaks, many 
of them new settlers in the Felvidek, received proportionally twice as much 
land during redistributions as Hungarians. This meant that out of 600 000 
expropriated acres, Magyars received (or leased) back a meagre 35 000 
(Szarka 1998:21-23; Zeidler 2001:196). These measures were closely 
connected to Prague’s policy of colonisation (see section 4.3.1), which further 
affected the minority’s livelihood. For instance, between 1918 and 1921 alone 
"70 000 members of the Slovak League, civil servants and investors moved to 
the territory” (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:61-2). These new settlers were 
to fill the posts of ethnic Hungarians who had been made redundant (see 
below).
These measures hit both communities hard and sharply reduced their means 
of economic sustenance. Local Magyars respectively set up extensive co­
operative networks in order to protect themselves (credit unions, retail 
societies, farming and consumer associations etc.) and achieved moderate 
success until in Romania these were prohibited, too (Szarka 1998:23; Hunyadi 
2000, 2002; Gaucsik 2003). Life chances were further unequal because of 
discriminatory taxation, commercial and labour legislation. Romanian fiscal 
policy thus routinely taxed Transylvania at higher rates, with revenues 
exceeding those from the rest of the country by 205 million Lei for the period 
1924-1926. A law for the "protection of national labour" prescribed that a 
minimum of 75 per cent of staff and 60 per cent of management within any 
commercial, economic or industrial enterprise had to be ethnic Romanian. The 
Industry Act of 1936 finally abolished minority chambers of commerce and 
expropriated their assets to state-run chambers of commerce (lllyes ibid.:92-3). 
Magyars in Czechoslovakia had disproportionately low shares in civil service 
posts and public procurement (Hoensch 1967: 20-1). Hungarian civil servants 
and teachers suffered mass redundancy due to discriminatory requirements 
they could or would not fulfil: compulsory Czech and Romanian language 
examinations and -  only for Magyars - an oath of allegiance to the host state 
(lllyes 1982:91; Mocsy 1995:248, 254).
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To sum up then, both minorities indeed suffered discriminatory treatment by 
their host states and would have had objective material reasons to seek 
retrieval.
The case against economic irredentism: external vs. internal discourse and the 
contrast between Czechoslovak social state and feudal Hungary 
This seemingly clear-cut case for material motives acquires however cracks if 
we look at the discrepancies in minority discourse about it. Minority irredentism 
is more covert and careful, but revealing in the nature and respective priorities 
of its grievances. Interwar publications by both communities give a good idea 
about these. Foreign language material -  mainly complaints to the League of 
Nations -  indeed prevailingly centred on expropriations. As I will however 
show in section 5.3.1, this was in line with the more veiled, ‘technical’ 
arguments against Trianon during the 1920s. In contrast, publications in 
Hungarian -  i.e. those meant for their own and mainland consumption -  
differed from this emphasis. The main themes transborder Magyar authors 
presented were those of native language schooling (Balazs 1929; Jancso 
1935; Jocsik 1939), restrictions on culture and media (Olay 1930; Berey 1940), 
their political struggle against repression (Berey 1941) and global surveys 
about their fate (Jancso 1927; Borsody 1938 and 1939; Jocsik 1940). For 
instance, Fazekas’ (1993) authoritative compilation of interwar Felvidek 
writings contains only one article (Hantos 1938) about economic deprivation. 
Similarly, interwar Magyar party programs do not particularly emphasise this 
point beyond decrying the summary expropriations (Bardi 1997a, 2000b; 
Popely 1990; Angyal 2000a, 2000b). Instead, they concentrate in their 
demands on self-rule (autonomy -  with a view to eventually defect) and 
identity preservation (e.g. native language schooling) -  the very points that I 
posit as central to irredentists. While this is no conclusive proof against the 
existence of any economic agenda, it tells a good deal about its low priority.
As for Czechoslovakia’s Hungarians, there was also an arguable dilemma 
about retrieval. By the 1930s the Felvidek had a very different socio-economic 
situation from mainland Hungary’s. Although minority Magyars had been 
crudely downsized in their means of sustenance (see above), they also
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benefited from the liberal social provisions of their host state -  examples 
Included unemployment insurance, strong trade unions, social housing, health 
care and restrictions on child labour. Unemployment figures were even for 
middle class Hungarians considerably lower than in the mainland (Hamori 
2001:570-1). In contrast, Hungary offered a scenario of stalled social reform 
and rural misery, which was furthermore stuck in feudal structures: “the system 
of great estates [had] essentially remained intact, so that 526 families still held 
more than 30 per cent of the land in a country in 1930” (Berend and Csato 
2001:152). Both Prague and Budapest were aware that this would directly pit 
ethno-nationalism against socio-economic advantage, and engaged in a 
veritable propaganda war from the mid-1930s onwards in order to sway the 
minority’s mind. The Hungarian government commissioned internal reports on 
the matter and also sought to ‘polish’ its bad social image (Hamori 2001:572- 
4). It needn’t have worried. When retrieval became reality in November 1938, 
the community unanimously welcomed it.
3.3.3 Comparative dis/advantaqes today
Continued discrimination and detrimental historic legacies 
In the contemporary period, both communities contend with detrimental, 
institutionalised economic legacies and with their cumulative damage from the 
last eight decades. These make minority Magyars actually “worse off today 
than in interwar times period, both compared to Hungary and within their own 
host states. In a Horowitzian logic this should again drive them to defectionism 
- which it does not.
Slovakia’s 520 000 Hungarians (9.7 per cent of its population) are still 
hampered in their economic development by discriminatory legislation. The 
Benes Decrees6 were a post-war retaliatory measure against Czechoslovakia’s 
irredentist Sudetengerman and Magyar minorities. Issued between 1945 and 
1948, they form a collection of 89 edicts, laws, decrees and statutes in order to
6 The generic name describes presidential and constitutional edicts by Edvard Benes as well 
as regular laws and statutes, governmental decrees issued by Prague and Decrees of the 
Bratislava-based Slovak National Council.
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implement the government’s punitive Kosice program of April 1945. This 
consisted of deportations, internments, trials in ‘people’s courts’, revocations of 
citizenship, and forced labour. The measures also legitimised the expulsion of 
some 2.5 million ethnic Germans and 130 000 Hungarians. From an economic 
point of view they were nothing short of devastating due to the large-scale 
confiscation of property. A total of 570 000 acres of fertile land was seized 
from ethnic Hungarians without compensation. Expropriations further included 
businesses, factories, private homes, mines, stock holdings, as well as bank 
accounts and deposits. The few remaining Hungarian owned businesses and 
farms faced compulsory appointment of government managers, which 
amounted to de facto expropriation (Vancouver Society 2001:4; Vlgh 1998).
All but two Decrees continue to be valid until this day in Czechoslovakia’s 
successor states. Slovakia has repeatedly refused to repeal the remaining 87, 
declaring them as ‘dormant’. Tellingly, the government has stated that “we do 
not wish yet another wave of claims for restitution, nor the reinterpretation of 
Europe’s post-war order.”7 This means that post-communist privatisations, 
restitutions, compensations, and with them the life chances of entire 
communities in Slovakia, are ethnically skewed.8 The Decrees’ legal 
discrimination prevents ethnic Magyars from recovering their assets and from 
seeking material compensation.9 In an internal report the Hungarian 
government has found that “until today these Decrees put the Magyar 
community living in Slovakia at a disadvantage” (HTMH 2002:1). This 
furthermore compounds earlier socio-economic damage to the community. 
Already targeted in the aftermath of partition, when its local ascendancy was 
dismantled by administrative and land reforms (see above), the Decrees took 
what was left, or what four years of Hungarian rule had restored. So the 
cumulative effect of two waves of agricultural confiscations makes this group
7 Slovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Jan Figel as quoted in the Slovak daily SME on 
27.02.2002 (SME Editorial 2002).
8 The 1991 Act on Re-Privatisation allows exclusively the restitution of properties seized after 
February 25 1948, i.e. after the Decrees had been implemented. But even Magyar assets 
nationalised subsequent to that date are still of "unsettled" legal status. For example, in the 
majority Hungarian Csallokoz area of the Felvidek the legal status of 80 per cent of land was 
still "unsettled" in 1999.
9 Czech and Slovak courts have so far ruled against all Magyar and Sudeten German claims. 
The exceptional victory in the Rudolf Dreithaler case (1997) against the Czech government 
failed to set a precedent.
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even worse off today in comparison to interwar times. According to Horowitz’s 
logic, such institutionalised economic disadvantage and the cumulatively 
worsened socio-economic situation, should make this group irredentist.
Until recently Romanian Hungarians struggled with similar problems. Here the 
issue was specifically about properties that had been seized from the 
community between 1945 and 1953 -  assets such as agricultural co­
operatives, communal lands and forests, assembly buildings, etc. The fact that 
only individuals could demand the return of properties put Romania’s 1.5 
million Hungarians at a considerable disadvantage during the whole first 
decade of post-communist restitution and re-privatisation. Despite repeated 
demands and legal challenges, the problem was not addressed until 2001, 
following pressure on the government by the RMDSZ, the Magyar party in 
constructive opposition. The resulting decree finally recognised communal 
property as form of ownership which was eligible for restitution. As a result, 
more than 120 hectares of lands and forests were handed back in 2002 alone 
in the Transylvanian counties of Hargita, Kovaszna and Maros (HTMH 2002a). 
The issue of church property -  vital because most Magyar language schools 
are run by denominations -  was only settled in 2002-03.
Unfavourable comparisons: how much better off are minorities today? 
Discrimination aside, there remains the question of opportunity. In other words, 
the differential between host and parent state may be such today that it can 
explain the absence of irredentism. Two levels of analysis are necessary here: 
cross-national, i.e. global, macro-economic comparisons between the two 
countries, and internal, i.e. verifying whether equalities or differences between 
host and parent state actually apply to the minority and its region.
When examining macro-level data it is not immediately clear whether Magyars 
would have reason for economic irredentism, i.e. whether defection to 
mainland Hungary would pay off. After a period of lagging behind, Hungary’s 
rapid growth in the late 1990s, both host countries have recently caught up. 
Macro-economic indicators yield overall favourable comparisons: only the 
Romanian and Hungarian GDP per capita rates diverge significantly (2 920
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US$ versus 8 270 US$), but not their annual inflation figures (9.3 per cent 
versus 7.2 per cent) nor their respective unemployment rates (6.2 per cent 
versus 5.9 per cent). Growth figures have recently turned to Romania’s 
advantage (8.0 against Hungary’s 3.9 per cent). At first look, the Slovak 
economy yields a similarly positive incentive to stay: its annual GDP per capita 
approaches Hungary’s at around 6 480 US$, real growth is at 5.5 per cent and 
the annual inflation is merely 3.5 per cent. Unemployment, however, is still at 
17.4 per cent (Hungarian Central Statistical Office; Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic; World Bank 2005; all figures as of December 2004).
Yet what of the micro-level, do ethnic actually Hungarians benefit from recent 
improvements in the Slovak and Romanian economies? In other words, is their 
specific situation within the host states also part of this levelling with Hungary’s 
success? The Slovak case first. Out of the Felvidek’s four counties, three 
consistently show much higher unemployment than the 17.4 per cent national 
average (at 20.3, 26.6 and 25.2 per cent for Nyitra, Besztercebanya and Kassa 
counties respectively). This is not surprising in view of lower education levels 
amongst the minority, e.g. the 5.3 per cent of ethnic Magyars with a college 
diploma or university degree is half of the Slovak rate of 10.4 per cent. Slovak 
per capita earnings in 2004 had grown a healthy 10.2 per cent compared to 
the previous year. Yet except for the region around Kassa, majority Hungarian 
areas do not reach this national average (15 825 Slovak crowns). In fact, their 
earnings are lower even within their own counties. Furthermore, there still is a 
marked shortage of private capital in Hungarian regions. The recent inflow of 
monies stems from governmental and EU sources, and hence only benefits 
local authorities. That in turn has only been facilitated by Magyars’ securing 
key ministries like agriculture and regional development (see section 7.3.2). 
Finally, the main economic indicators of the three Felvidek counties above are 
all without exception below those of the national average. It hence appears 
that the recent Slovak economic miracle benefits mainly the majority nation 
(Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic; HTMH 2005b; Ivan 1997; Lelkes 
2003).
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Matters are no better in Romania. In both my interviews with leading 
Romanian Magyar politicians there was unanimity that their community’s 
current economic situation within their host states was worse compared to 
interwar times (Interviews 1 and 2). While Transylvania as a whole 
approximates national economic indicators, there are pronounced differences 
within the region. The most successful county, Kolozs, is among those with the 
lowest percentage of ethnic Hungarians and second only to the Bucharest 
region (Csako in Fabri 2003:27). Unemployment figures in majority-Magyar 
counties are 5 to 8 per cent above the national average. In 1999, roughly a 
decade into post-communism, the ratio of ethnic Magyars in the management 
of state owned companies in Transylvania was vastly disproportionate. For 
instance, in the city of Nagyvarad which is to 33.2 per cent Hungarian, only 5 
out of 96 state owned companies had Magyars in leading positions (HTMH 
1999a). Privatisation, too, was ethnically skewed until the RMDSZ’ 
participation in government forced a change in the late 1990s. Until then, 
"Hungarians [were] an exception in privatisation committees" (Tokes 1995). 
Given that Transylvania as a whole is Romania’s most wealthy and advanced 
region, these figures are all the more indicative of continued discrimination
In sum, opportunistic irredentism would appear to make little sense with 
Romania and especially Slovakia rapidly nearing Hungary’s standards. 
Present and future EU integration (Romania is set to join in 2007) promise to 
further narrow existing gaps. Yet while their host countries by now reach 
Hungary’s wealth, ethnic Magyars largely do not share that prosperity because 
of continued material disadvantage within their respective national economies. 
Sociological research shows that both communities are aware of this situation 
and that they have a bleak outlook on their material future (Csako in Fabri 
2003). So although there is a good theoretical case for irredentism as 
favourable opening, it is not seen as such. Once more economic facts do not 
coincide with minority politics.
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3.4 Conclusion: retrieval does not (necessarily) pay
I have shown above that the changes in economic criteria for both ethnic 
actors are insufficient to explain their change in behaviour. For Hungary, 
irredentism did not pay off in the interwar period. Despite established beliefs 
and sentiment, the retrieval of both regions was costly, rather than profitable. 
Budapest knew this in advance, as well as the fact that it could not afford these 
costs. Modernisation, regional protectionism, and changes in the world 
economy first of all meant that the Hungarian Kingdom’s complementary 
market, as well as its wealth from agriculture could not be resurrected. As for 
the coveted territories, the Felvidek was wealthier and socially more advanced 
than the mainland. Although mainly agricultural, it had secure markets within 
Czechoslovakia which recovery cut off. This in turn meant an expensive 
reintegration program upon its return. Re-annexed Northern Transylvania in 
contrast, had rural deprivation problems that would compound those in the 
parent state. Given the mainland’s neo-corporatist reluctance to reform, this 
meant further magnifying the country’s socio-economic stalemate. Today’s 
situation looks similar: this time both Erdely and the Felvidek are poorer than 
the mainland. Hungary would have to nurse both areas up to its standards, 
and would gain very little from the minority labour force.
As for the minorities in turn, I have tried to demonstrate that they have been in 
both time periods comparatively disadvantaged within their host states. While 
Transylvania was and is richer than the rest of Romania, local Hungarians are 
consistently underprivileged. The Felvidek community was targeted in its 
means of sustenance in interwar times and today still lags behind national 
averages. Both minorities are furthermore worse off today because of 
cumulative expropriations and resulting adverse conditions. In other words, 
according to theories of economic deprivation they would have to be just as 
irredentist now. Finally, if retrieval is opportunistic, then at least Magyars in 
interwar Czechoslovakia acted squarely against their interests. They opted for 
irredentism despite faring better in their discriminatory, but socially advanced 
host state.
My explanation for these discrepancies was that economic factors, where they 
are cited, follow irredentist imperatives, and not the other way round. For all
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their rhetoric, interwar Hungarian governments ultimately did not plan with an 
eye on profitability. The ‘economic propaganda’ of the 1920s was just that: 
convincing foreign powers with more technical arguments after nationalist ones 
had failed. Minority Hungarians in turn were principally incensed by political 
deprivation and threats to their identity. The different emphases in their foreign 
and Hungarian language publications show that they, too, invoked economic 
maltreatment mainly strategically, namely for external consumption.
Retrieval is not pursued because it pays. In this case and in general, material 
reasoning -  if it is employed -  is made to fit the project, rather than vice versa. 
That fit may be sometimes close, but like in this example, it is often rather 
tenuous. Neither are economic grievances the driving force behind irredentism. 
"Claims of economic injustice (real or imaginary) can act as a catalyst or 
exacerbator, and are often to be found in ethno-national propaganda”, Connor 
explains. “But this acknowledgement of a catalytic role for economic forces is 
quite removed from a perception of economic deprivation as a necessary 
precondition of ethno-national tensions. Economic differentials are but one of 
several possible catalysts" (2001:121). For Hungarian irredentism they were 
not even the main one.
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4. Irredentism is not a Question of Feasibility:
Ethno-Terrltorial Homogeneity
“If a profound correlation and spiritual connection exists 
between people and country, then it certainly exists between 
our people and our country! Of course I am referring to the 
thousand-year-old country, the land wreathed by the 
mountains in a semi circle... it is the vessel in which this 
Hungarian blood was mixed and the palette for the colours of 
our culture. ”
“This „territory of the sacred crown”, unified and unchangeable 
for a thousand years. ...Hungary is like a living body, which 
cannot be hacked at or extended...its severed parts have 
sooner or later knitted back together...the Hungarian has 
always been able to look upon this unified and complete piece 
of land as his own and no other. This thousand-year-old legal 
state o f affairs is a greater and truer reality in his eyes than the 
changing situations created by the chance operations of 
politics.”
Gyula Szekfu (1939:54-55; 69)
4.1 Introduction
Irredentism is first and foremost concerned with translating shared identity into 
a shared political-territorial unit. Creating or restoring nation-state congruence 
has two notional components. For one, "redeeming" transborder kindred and 
ancestral lands implies self-determination, riddance from rule by ethnic 
strangers. At the same time, uniting the missing parts of population and 
territory within the parent state is seen as remedying the tatter's previous 
truncation.
Rarely, however, are the textbook givens in place on the ground. Firstly, more 
often than not irredentist regions are significantly mixed in their ethnic 
composition. In addition, their territory may extend beyond kindred settlement 
areas because it is instead subjectively defined by history and notions of 
ancestral homelands. Both scenarios are conflict-laden, for they entail the
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problem of also retrieving ethnically unrelated, and therefore normally hostile, 
groups. Equally difficult is the geographically dispersed distribution of a kindred 
minority. This situation may lead to merely partial retrieval, resulting in 
stranded hostage communities. The reality of parent states is similarly 
complex. Although by definition under the demographic and/or political 
dominance of one group, titular states frequently include minorities of their 
own. These in turn may view an irredentist project as inimical to their own 
interests, and thus mount internal opposition.
In short, the local realities of retrieval may be so complicated as to threaten the 
actual project. To what extent then is the condition of ethnic and territorial 
homogeneity within the two actors decisive? Does variance in this factor help 
explain the irredentist inconsistency we witness in a case like Hungary's?
4.1.2 A look at theory
Throughout this thesis I demonstrate that retrieval is primarily conditioned by 
factors endogenous to the two ethnic actors concerned. Of all the Horowitzian 
arguments that seek to establish a calculative rationale for irredentist politics 
(economic factors, leadership interests, gains in prestige), that of ethno- 
territorial homogeneity is the sole with direct relevance to this premise. This is 
because it seems to affect the very essence of an irredentist project: realising 
perfect nation-state congruence. Questions of feasibility, risk and profit, as this 
thesis demonstrates, matter little to irredentists. Yet this does not mean they 
are 'irrational', rather that their assessments focus on different criteria. This 
may be one of them. Anything that detracts from or undermines, their core goal 
- namely uniting a cohesive group and its ancestral grounds under one roof - 
could weigh critically. Examining therefore whether or how this factor 
influences irredentas is not only plausible, but vital.
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Horowitz's model, in consensus with the wider literature1, treats this as 
commonsensical variable. It posits that the 'structural bias’ for or against an 
irredenta significantly depends on the degree to which the retrieving state and 
its claimed brethren are homogeneous in terms of constituency and space 
(1985:284-5). He is however somewhat contradictory about the degree to 
which this is an anterior calculation. So while he asserts that these concerns 
decide whether "putative irredentists will (...) become irredentists in action" 
(ibid.), he later seems to perceive it as ex post problem: "when irredentism 
gets going, it usually involves ethnic cleansing, so as to eliminate troublesome 
minorities in the region to be retrieved" (2003:10).
Concerning parent state calculations, the claimed territory should be ethnically 
as homogeneous as possible in order to avoid reincorporating recalcitrant 
other minorities. The geographic distribution of local kin ought to be ideally 
compact and border-near, so as to enable 'neat' boundary drawing. In addition, 
there is an equally important internal aspect. The mainland will be more free to 
conduct retrieval the less ethnic strangers it contains. Since the 
(re)incorporation of populations inevitably entails a shift in the domestic ethnic 
balance, thereby upsetting inter-group distributions of power, it is likely to be 
opposed by those whom it affects detrimentally (Horowitz 1985:284). A multi­
ethnic parent state thus runs the risk of having its irredentist designs thwarted 
by other groups. Consequently, "it is tempting to say that irredentism is the 
prerogative of homogeneous states" Horowitz concludes (1985:282)
The transborder minority, for its part, is also invested with a cost-benefit 
rationale. It is likely to assess how predominant its own ethnic group is in the 
parent state -  the more homogeneous, the better (ibid.:285). After all, for them 
the very sense of an irredenta is to join a political unit that their own kin 
controls. Willingness to be retrieved might further depend on whether a 
substantial part of their community may be left behind in stranded enclaves, in 
case their settlement structure is unfavourably dispersed (ibid.:286).
1 Research on irredentism and ethno-territorial movements in general broadly agrees on both 
the importance of this variable, and almost concomitantly, on the fact that it must determine 
ethnic actors' decision-making along the lines of cost-benefit calculations. See for instance 
Meadwell (1991); Hechter (1992); Van Evera (1994:17-20), or Saideman (1999).
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4.1.3 Argument and method
This chapter will empirically test Horowitz's predictions for both the Felvidek 
and Transylvania in a cross-time comparison. It will demonstrate a mismatch 
or at best partial overlap, between theory and irredentist politics, thus 
disproving its suggested rationale of calculated risks and payoffs. It will go on 
to explain why questions of demographic-geographical feasibility are in fact not 
very relevant to retrieval -  both generally, and in the Magyar case. Instead of 
evaluating external, physical conditions, mainland and minority consider 
territory primarily via two components. Firstly, a ‘map image' of their 
homelands, which often stretches further than kindred settlements and thus 
automatically contains other groups. This is acceptable to irredentists because 
they prioritise national completeness over homogeneity. Secondly, it is the 
changing prominence of this ancestral territory within a group’s ethnicity, rather 
than its physical conditions, which justifies or ends projects. Within these 
parameters finally, irredentism takes what is at that moment obtainable. Driven 
by ideology and opportunism rather than structural givens, irredentists seize on 
whatever brings them a step closer to their goal.
4.2 Ethno-territorial homogeneity within interwar and contemporary 
Hungary
As noted above (see sections 1.2.2 and 2.4.1), this particular variable needs 
stretching because of inherent conceptual differences. In contrast to Horowitz I 
hold a parent state by definition to be one in which an ethnic group is 
demographically and/or politically dominant. This being ‘owned’ by a titular 
group is what makes it a parent state. It also enables that state to conduct 
irredentism without decisive opposition from any domestic minorities, which 
may well be present, but subordinated. Because of this narrower 
conceptualisation, I evolve Horowitz’s variable by linking political control to the 
leverage of potentially dissenting domestic groups rather than their mere 
presence. Equating political control with perfect homogeneity is simply too 
crude a measure and would simultaneously disqualify a good many successful
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irredentist states. Also, domestic minorities are not in and by themselves a 
hindrance unless they are equipped with some sort of power. I hence refine 
Horowitz’s variable by distinguishing between genuine and qualified 
homogeneity (section 1.2.2). This differentiates a titular group’s political 
freedom of action versus domestic minorities. Parent states of qualified 
homogeneity contain what I term important retaliating minorities who are able 
to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically, demographically and/or 
economically. Genuine homogeneity on the other hand describes parent states 
where the titular group exercises perfect control over national politics. Here 
minorities either lack leverage, or really just do not exist. The below 
examination of the Hungarian parent state will be conducted alongside these 
evolved criteria.
Should this first Horowitzian tenet hold, we would expect to find a demographic 
and / or political weakening in the titular group's dominance versus potentially 
objecting minorities2 within the parent state. The stark contrast between 
Budapest's interwar irredentism and post-communist renouncement, ought to 
be causally mirrored by domestic changes in Hungary’s ethnic and territorial 
composition. In short, our cross-time comparison would need to describe 
initially favourable conditions for retrieval, which contrast with contemporary 
hindrances. In line with our extension of Horowitz’s variable, the following four 
indicators will be used to detect causal changes over time: shifts in the ratios 
of Hungary's ethnic demography, avenues of political opposition available to its 
minorities, and lastly, their power to use economic resources or geographical 
situation as anti-irredentist leverage. In examining these factors, I will show 
that that this variable does not square with realities. Hungary's ethno-territorial 
homogeneity, and therefore its internal freedom to act as irredentist parent 
state, has in fact remained unchanged and even partly improved.
2 It should be noted that there is no evidence of any opposition, active or latent, by domestic 
minorities to interwar Hungary's irredenta. Horowitz's projections are applied hypothetically.
4.2.1 Demographic control
Looking first at the parent state's ethnic demography, interwar conditions were 
certainly ideal. Magyar demographic dominance in post-Trianon Hungary was 
overwhelming. This is because the very partition that had caused the irredenta 
had simultaneously created an ethnically very homogenised rump state. Thus 
the titular nation accounted for some 92.1 per cent (Jakabffy 1994:43; Lokkos 
2000:372), while the minority population hovered around 7 per cent (ibid). Due 
to assimilation this small percentage kept decreasing further during the 1920s 
and 30s (Szarka 1996/4-5).3 In addition, it was quite diverse in composition, 
consisting of seven recognised groups (Lokkos 2000:372) - a fact that would 
have further hampered any collective action.
Non-irredentist, contemporary Hungary has retained these textbook parent 
state conditions. In fact, the country's minority population has further 
decreased. This is partly due to the wartime genocide of Hungary's Jewish and 
Romany communities.4 In addition, the effects of post-war emigration (Bugajski 
1994:401), minority assimilation (Szarka 1996:5-6), the expulsion of half a 
million ethnic Germans (Fejos 1996:3)5, and a population exchange with
3 All Hungary-related data stems from the censi of the Central Statistical Office. Of the three 
Hungarian population counts in the interwar period - 1920, 1930 and 1941 - I use that of 
December 1930. This is because it recorded a by then stabilised national demography, i.e. 
after refugee flows had ebbed down and post-1920 border settlements like Sopron had been 
completed, but also because it was the last census before the first successful irredenta of 
1938 (retrieval of the Felvidek). Post-communist Hungary has so far conducted two censi - 
1990 and 2001, of which I am using the latter. Comparing 1930 and 2001 statistics entails 
however the problem of their differential data gathering. Before 1941, Hungarian statisticians 
recorded ethno-national belonging exclusively via the criterion of native tongue. Since then, 
self-declaration has been added as more accurate indicator. Figures between these two 
categories diverge radically, with the linguistic category always outnumbering self-professed 
identity. While aware of this discrepancy, data availability compels me to use these two 
different methods when comparing across time. As a related fact, pre-1945 censi discriminated 
Hungary's Jews as "racial" minority, supporting their anti-Semitic bias via the fact they also 
spoke Yiddish and/or German. Once we count their numbers from the 1930 census correctly, 
namely as part of the titular Hungarian nation, we arrive at an even lower minority percentage 
for interwar Hungary.
4 Hungary's Jewish community suffered a murderous reduction from 825 000 to 250 000 
during the war, and diminished by another 170 000 due to post-war emigration (Bugajski 
1994:401; Fejos 1996:3). The 2001 census, now recording it as denominational group, lists a 
mere 12 871 individuals or 0.12 per cent (Central Statistical Office 2001 b:2). The Hungarian 
Roma community in contrast has recovered. It has become Hungary's single largest minority at 
1.86 per cent (Central Statistical Office 2001 a:3), with a projected further growth to reach one 
tenth of the national population by 2035 (Kurdi 2001:3).
5 The country's ethnic Germans, formerly its most significant and organised minority, suffered 
the same post-war expulsion as in Poland and Czechoslovakia (Szarka 1996:5). This reduced 
their share from 5.5 per cent in 1930 to 0.61 in 2001 (Central Statistical Office 2001a:3).
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Czechoslovakia6, caused Hungary's minority figures to drop to a mere 3.08 per 
cent by 2001 (Central Statistical Office 2001 a:3). Furthermore, this very small 
percentage is today even more atomised than formerly, being now composed 
of 13 recognised minority groups (Central Statistical Office 2001a:1). And the 
Roma, as single largest community amongst them, are themselves in turn 
highly differentiated (Kurdi 2001:3-4). For all these reasons, any putative 
opposition to irredentism would be no obstacle.
4.2.2 Hungary's territorial homogeneity
Sheer numbers are however not the only bargaining chip for potentially 
dissenting groups: they may possess leverage by virtue of their geographical 
location or distribution. This was however not the case for interwar Hungary. 
Drawing on the 1930 census, Jakabffy (1994:43-44) expressly notes that 
"...the minority nationalities do not form a coherent bulk of population". 
Examining the country's four largest minorities - Germans (5.5 per cent), 
Slovaks (1.2 per cent), Croatians and Romanians (0.5 and 0.4 per cent) - he 
goes on to describe their largely "disjointed" distribution in what were 
furthermore majority Magyar populated regions (ibid.). Ronai's work, based on 
the same data, cartographically confirms the above for each group at the 
national level (1945:115-147) as well as highlighting the dispersal of non- 
Magyars by region (ibid.:105-113). This means that no single or combined 
minority population was settled compactly or homogeneously enough7 to 
potentially threaten Budapest with a territorial withdrawal of allegiance, such as 
autonomy or even secession.
This fact still holds true in post-communist Hungary. Both the last census 
(Central Statistical Office 2001a:10) as well as recent research (Kurdi 2001)
6 The forced population exchange of 1947-49 between Hungary and Czechoslovakia reduced 
the Slovak minority from being the second largest at 1.2 per cent in 1930 (Jakabffy 1994:43), 
to a current percentage of 0.17 (Central Statistical Office 2001 a:3).
7 To some extent, ethnic Germans were an exception here. They clustered in three separate 
areas of Hungary: around Budapest, in the Great Hungarian Plain to the west, and around 
Pecs in the south-west. These areas were however small and still majority Magyar, with the 
minority’s growth furthermore offset by both assimilatory and migratory changes (Szarka 
1996:5-6).
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show that today no single minority exceeds the 10 per cent mark within any 
region. Even counting a combined tally only yields a maximum of 7.11 per 
cent, this for the region of Northern Hungary (CSO:ibid.). Few groups are 
furthermore compactly settled. Most minorities are widely dispersed, and those 
that do cluster - Croatians, Germans, Romanians, Serbs - are exactly the 
smallest minorities. Given that minorities never reached critical mass and / or 
control at any point in time, it follows that territorial concentration also cannot 
figure as causal for Budapest's policy change on irredentism.
4.2.3 Economic pressure by retaliating minorities
So far I have compared fairly visible indicators, which proved invalid. There are 
however more subtle means of pressure potentially dissenting minorities can 
apply. The first of these regards economic power - i.e. leverage via ownership 
of capital, assets, and industries or via the provision of key services (e.g. 
dominance in banking, finance etc.).
With regards to the minorities of post-Trianon Hungary, it makes sense to 
examine in this respect the two largest single communities, since all others 
were simply negligible in size. The country's ethnic Germans were with nearly 
half a million individuals (5.5 per cent) by far the most significant group, 
followed by a Slovak population of 1.2 per cent. Szarka (1996: 6-8) analyses 
the evolving occupational structure of both minorities in the interwar period and 
concludes that "(...) in comparing census data of 1920 and 1930 we can 
observe [in both groups] the preservation of a mainly agrarian character, in the 
case of ethnic Slovaks even a strengthening." Let us remember here that 
Hungary's rural population, to which these minorities overwhelmingly 
belonged, suffered exceptionally low life standards, incomes and educational 
conditions. So great was the extent of rural underdevelopment and 
disadvantage, that land reform, or rather its numerous aborted attempts, 
remained the most salient domestic issue all through the Horthy era. Granted, 
"(...) within both the agricultural population and the industrial labour force 
those belonging to the two minorities had an above national ratio of self- 
employed, land- or factory owners" (ibid). However, at the same time their level
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of employment was much lower than that of ethnic Magyars. Apart from the 
fact that there is no historical record of opposition to retrieval amongst these 
minorities, they would clearly not have had the economic means to enforce it.
In contemporary Hungary once again no single group stands out as endowed 
with significant material leverage. A brief look at the two largest communities - 
Roma and ethnic Germans (1.86 and 0.61 per cent respectively) illustrates this 
point well. Hungary's gypsy population is in fact notoriously d/sadvantaged in 
terms of socio-economic status as well as life chances. Despite governmental 
efforts, "...members of the Roma community continue[d] to suffer from 
widespread discrimination in education, employment, the criminal justice 
system and access to public services, health in particular" (EU Commission 
2002:31). Contrastingly, Hungary's ethnic German community is doing well. 
Increasingly urbanised since 1945, it has departed from its traditional 
occupational background in industry and agriculture and acquired mainly 
intellectual, middle-class professions (Kurdi 2001:10-12). During post­
communism it has experienced an additional boost in status, thanks to its 
mastery of German, an advantageous language (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is a 
very small group, and not endowed with any special material bargaining chip it 
could use in a hypothetical challenge versus Budapest.
4.2.4 Political leverage from domestic minorities
In terms of demography, territory and economics then, both time periods 
display no "important retaliating minorities" to speak of. Yet even otherwise 
insignificant groups may be able to apply anti-irredentist leverage through 
political institutions.
Once again there is no evidence of domestic minority opposition to Hungary’s 
single-minded irredentist drive. In any case, the realities of the authoritarian 
Horthy-era (see also chapter 7) would have pre-empted political avenues. To 
start with, ethnically based parties did not exist. Neither the constitution nor 
electoral laws facilitated such representation, e.g. by adjusting the country's
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PR system with lowered electoral thresholds, weighted voting, autonomies, or 
mutual vetoes. The reason lay with Budapest's continued, albeit more covert, 
assimilationist policies (Szarka 1996:4-7; Gratz 2001:198-99), which the 
country's political spectrum consensually supported (Tilkovszky 1998:51-54).
Then there were the conditions that prevented political challenges in general. 
Suffrage was severely restricted. Only in the capital and major cities were 
elections conducted in secrecy. The bi-cameral parliament was largely hostage 
to a conservative and nationalist unelected upper house. Executive 
dominance, together with a severe curtailing of parliament's powers, 
characterised interwar Magyar politics (see Foldes and Hubai 1999:260-63). 
For all these reasons, direct political pressure - electoral retaliation, lobbying, 
parliamentary input etc. - was impossible for any hypothetical anti-irredentist 
minorities.
Given these institutional impediments, we need alternatively to look for 
potential extra-parliamentary channels they could have used. Once again it 
makes sense to focus on the only two demographically significant groups of 
the period - Germans and Slovaks. The latter can be disregarded here, since it 
was largely splintered and apolitical - indeed purposefully kept so by both local 
and government officials, by being organised merely in cultural associations 
(Tilkovszky 1998:47). Ethnic Germans in contrast were institutionally unified 
and vocal. Their Hungarian German Cultural Association, founded in 1924, 
was despite its name an organ of political interest representation. As 
Volksdeutsche they were well conscious of their leverage as "either bridge or 
dividing gap between Hungary and Germany" (Gratz 2001:196), the country 
Budapest desperately courted as irredentist ally. Yet instead of pushing 
against Budapest's revisionist plans, they effectively functioned as Nazi 
Germany's internal pressure group in shaping it (ibid.: 199-203). They did so 
whilst simultaneously extracting domestic advantages for their own community. 
Funded and instructed by Berlin, the Association's role in the late 1930s was to 
ensure that Hungary's foreign policy in general and irredenta in particular,
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complied with Nazi plans for the region (Ormos 1998:215).8 Prime Minister 
Imredy for instance was reproached in 1938 for failing to maximise the 
Felvidek's retrieval by having responded inadequately to the German minority's 
demands, which Berlin had orchestrated (Tilkovsky 1998:73). Thus the only 
political minority input inter-war Hungarian governments experienced was 
bullying by proxy on howto conduct retrieval, instead of blocking it.
What of the contemporary situation then? Within post-communist Hungary’s 
democratic framework presumably even a small or disparate group of 
dissenters has the potential to affect national policy-making. Yet as of early 
2004, the country has still no guaranteed parliamentary representation for its 
minorities. The Roma, today's single largest minority group, feel notoriously 
disenfranchised in national politics, not least due to their above-mentioned 
socio-economic disadvantage. Although the constitution codifies both the 
“representation of the national and ethnic minorities living within the territory of 
the country” and their right to “collective participation in public life” (Article 68, 
paragraphs 2 and 3), these measures operate so far only at the level of local / 
municipal autonomies set up in 1995. Hungary's Law on the Rights of National 
and Ethnic Minorities (Law 1993:LXXVII), celebrated as landmark, similarly 
obliges the government to resolve the question of minority representation. 
More than a decade later concrete results are however still outstanding, 
because successive bills suggesting specially lowered electoral thresholds fail 
to pass parliament. Thus "Hungary has a well-developed institutional 
framework protecting the interests of its minorities and promoting their cultural 
and educational autonomy” (EU Commission 2002:30). Yet it continues to lack 
electoral-institutional adjustments to enable parliamentary representation on 
an ethnic basis (OSCE-ODIHR 2002:6-7), and with it minority enfranchisement 
in national politics. Tilkovszky (1998:197-8), in a comparative analysis of 
Hungary's twentieth century policies on this issue, concludes that it is 
essentially due to a mixture of indifference, genuine incomprehension as well
8 This was not at all a selfless exercise. Ormos (ibid.) mentions that parts of the community 
expected to be rewarded by Berlin for their service by being put in charge of Hungary once the 
latter would have been occupied by German troops. Tilkovszky (1998:69-76) gives a detailed 
account of this triangulation between the German minority, Budapest and Berlin, relating how 
the aspirations of the former two were ultimately played off against each other by Nazi 
Germany.
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as continued assimilationist attitudes within mainland Magyar society. The 
double imperatives of safeguarding ethnic pluralism and improving minorities' 
life chances have, within the panoply of post-communist problems, not been 
understood or accepted as priorities (ibid.). The bottom line remains therefore 
that policies in present-day Hungary, including the renouncement of retrieval, 
continue to be unaffected by the political input of domestic minorities.
4.2.5 Summary
In order to apply and test Horowitz's first tenet, this examination had to evolve 
and differentiate it. It therefore looked for variations within mainland 
homogeneity in several key aspects, rather than for its mere existence.
Neither criterion in which this section has examined Hungary's domestic 
minorities shows empirical changes that would explain the abandonment of 
retrieval. The mainland displays during both periods an ideal-typical scenario 
of titular group dominance, free to conduct ethnopolitics without retaliating 
domestic groups. Interwar Hungary was an example of perfect (as opposed to 
qualified) homogeneity. Its ethnic and territorial givens guaranteed unfettered 
internal freedom to pursue irredentism. No single minority group would have 
been capable to successfully challenge the mainland's irredenta. Even a 
hypothetical concerted effort by all domestic non-Magyars is more than likely 
to have faced resounding defeat. Small in size, diverse in composition, and 
devoid of significant alternative bargaining chips - legislative, economic or 
geographical - their opposition or consent simply was immaterial. Non­
irredentist, contemporary Hungary has retained all the above ideal-typical 
conditions and continues to display complete titular group dominance. If 
anything, Budapest possess today an even more perfect degree of manoeuvre 
within domestic politics. All of this suggests that Horowitz's point, expanded 
here to cover all possible aspects, is simply not useful. If nothing else, this 
finding now increases the burden of proof on the second part of his variable.
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4.3 Ethno-territorial homogeneity of the areas to be retrieved:
Transylvania's and Felvidek's suitability for retrieval then versus now
The next task then is to examine the two irredentist areas individually9 and 
compare their "suitability" for retrieval across time. Once again, if Horowitzian 
tenets are to explain the contemporary abandonment of Hungarian 
irredentism, one would expect a worsening in local conditions. Extrapolating 
from his model, this section will explore three key indicators. Firstly, how 
border-near were and are these Magyar populations within both host 
countries? Secondly, how compact or dispersed were Magyar settlements in 
Transylvania and Felvidek then, as opposed to now? Finally, how ethnically 
mixed were and are their settlements? It will become clear that such structural 
givens do not determine retrieval. The cross-time comparison of both 
Transylvanian and Felvidek realities pointedly underlines that "irredentism is 
hardly ever an automatic sequel to a situation of proximity and ethnic 
percentages" (Ben-lsrael 1991:33).
4.3.1 The Magyar minority in the Felvidek: good feasibility improved
Given the contemporary absence of irredentism, today's situation ought to 
have worsened in most of these Horowitzian factors. Yet paradoxically, local 
criteria display an overall improved ‘structural bias’ for a hypothetical irredenta. 
As will become evident, the area's ethnic and territorial make-up has not only 
preserved those features advantageous to retrieval, but also largely shed 
those that caused (moderate) difficulties in the interwar period.
Border proximity
The human geography of Felvidek Magyars has remained unchanged in this 
first criterion. Their settlements were and continue to be, directly adjacent to 
Hungary's northern border, occupying a parallel strip of some 25-50 kilometres
9 Unless stated otherwise this section quotes throughout data from the territories retrieved by 
Hungary in 1938 (Felvidek/Southern Slovakia) and 1940, and not the respectively much larger 
areas they were part of and which Hungary had lost in 1920 (i.e. Slovakia as a whole with 
Ruthenia, and historic Transylvania, which included the B&nscig / Banat and Partium).
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width within Czechoslovakia's and now Slovakia's, south. This theoretically 
convenient situation for retrieval has remained precisely the same when 
comparing the interwar and post-communist periods (see maps 2.2 and 2.4- 
2.6). In other words, the Magyar community continues to concentrate "in South 
Slovakia along the 550-kilometer long Slovak-Hungarian state border, on an 
unbroken linguistic territory totalling 9,000 square kilometres." The single 
difference lies in its size, because "this is an area of about 2,000 square 
kilometres less than in 1918" (HTMH 2005a). While these givens perfectly 
rationalise the minority’s retrieval in 1938 along Horowitzian tenets, they fail to 
explain why Magyars do not capitalise on the same feasibility today.
Group compactness and spatial spread
In view of such constant and ideal border closeness, it may be variation within 
the minority's concentration that has since made the difference.
In 1938, the year which saw the Felvidek's retrieval, a local Magyar writer 
proudly remarked that "the local Hungarian community is in terms of settlement 
in an advantageous position, for more than 90 per cent of our bulk lives in 
closed unity" (Varga in Borsody 1938:36). Indeed, of all Hungarian minorities in 
the Carpathian basin their situation was the singularly most compact, making 
the First Vienna Award Budapest's only irredenta to largely mirror ethnic fault 
lines (see maps 2.2. and 2.3).
Closer scrutiny however reveals some problems within the Felvidek’s 
seemingly ideal conditions. The minority's geographical compactness was 
namely undermined by interwar Czechoslovakia’s text-book demographic 
engineering (McGarry 1998).10 Its large-scale colonisation programme 
systematically undermined the very ethnic and territorial coherence of Magyar 
Felvidek areas that made them attractive for recovery. This ought to have 
deterred Hungarian plans for several reasons.
10 Czechoslovakia’s President Thomas Masaryk opined: "we have to take account of the fact 
that not a single Hungarian will abandon his faith in the recovery and retrieval of Slovakia. It is 
exactly for this reason that Slovakisation must occur in a planned and incremental manner" 
(Popely 2001:80).
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Firstly, it laterally disrupted the hitherto coherently Magyar strip of settlements 
along the border into three large disjointed areas (Arato 1977:65; Revay in 
Fazekas 1993:38-39). By 1930, the linking settlements around 
Balassagyarmat and south-east of Kassa respectively had disappeared. 
Secondly, progressive Czechoslovak colonisation also blurred the ethnic 
border that divided Slovakia mid-way (Revay 1938 in Fazekas 1993:36-9; 
Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:61-2). It specifically targeted northern Felvidek 
towns (see below), which, as hitherto Hungarian strongholds, had demarcated 
the community.
Thirdly, by the late 1930s this process had furthermore transformed nearby 
ethnic Magyar settlements into outlying island areas (see maps 2.1 and 2.2). 
This so-called Northern Diaspora represented 6 per cent Felvidek kindred, i.e. 
around 70 000 people (ibid.:64; G. Kovacs 1989). Their solitary and exposed 
situation in the midst of densely Slovak settled areas made them simply 
ineligible for border adjustment. At retrieval in 1938 Hungary indeed recovered 
94 percent of the minority, i.e. 728 904 Magyars (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 
1998:64), but had to leave these people behind. We know from contemporary 
sources that this was a painful compromise for both ethnic actors -  which 
however failed to deter them. It was foreseeable that Tiso's newly independent 
Slovakia would retaliate against any hostage Magyar minority, as it indeed did 
(Szarka 1998:39-41). For Budapest's irredentist government - the self-anointed 
defender of transborder kin - this bore the risk of moral-political 
embarrassment. Furthermore, there was severe domestic criticism that 
accepting purely ethnic boundaries signed away the rights to Hungary’s 
historic crownlands, territories regarded as Magyar homeland. For the Felvidek 
Hungarians in turn, leaving behind trapped members was dilemmatic. To 
openly accept it risked internal disunity, yet to reject it meant endangering the 
irredenta itself. Furthermore, it meant yet another traumatising partition, this 
time right within their midst (Duka Zolyomi 1942 in Fazekas 1993).
Finally, unless retrieval occurred by force (something Budapest was very 
reluctant about), there would be further tradeoffs. It was for instance clear that 
no rump Czechoslovak or new Slovak state would be prepared to cede the 
Slovak capital Bratislava / Pozsony. This meant an additional loss of 26 974
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Magyars (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:58), who were otherwise contiguous 
with the community's bulk. Other towns also promised to involve a hard and 
possibly fruitless haggle (see Szarka 1998:36). Especially the town of Nyitra 
with several ten thousand Hungarian inhabitants would be hard to secure, 
because it stretched as Magyar peninsula far into Slovak ethnic territory. All of 
these factors implied that Magyar decision-makers on both sides of the border 
had to accept in advance leaving behind further stranded Hungarians. In the 
event, under the 1938 First Vienna Award the hitherto contiguous Magyar 
communities of Bratislava / Pozsony and Nyitra indeed remained with 
Slovakia, causing the number of stranded kindred to double. So while interwar 
conditions for irredentism were overall good, feasibility was compromised and 
worsening without however affecting the bilateral will for retrieval.
The contemporary Magyar abandonment of irredentism stands in stark 
contrast to an advantageous, even improved, minority concentration. Like in 
interwar times, there is once again minimal dispersal (see maps 2.4-2.6). 
Today, "the overwhelming majority (92.2 per cent) of the Hungarian population 
lives ... on an unbroken linguistic territory" (HTMH 2005a; Lanstyak 2000:51 
quotes 91.8 per cent for 1991). Admittedly, an interruption to their settlement 
strip (south-east of Kassa) has survived into contemporary times. Yet this may 
be less of a real obstacle than subject to Slovak census methodology: 
according to the Government Office for Transborder Hungarians (HTMH 
2005a) this lateral gap in Magyar demography only shows up in statistics 
based on nationality, but not in those based on language use (HTMH 2005a).
While the contiguity of Magyar settlement areas has remained constant, they 
cover less territory today. Their spatial spread has decreased from around 11 
000 km2 in 1918 (HTMH 2005a) and 9913 km2 in 1930 (Varga 1938 in 
Fazekas 1993:43) to merely 9 000 km2 in 2003 (HTMH 2005a). Having molten 
down to a regional and demographic core since 1945, the transborder group is 
now more compact (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:69-76). While worrying for 
the community’s survival, this represents an advantageous development for a 
hypothetical irredenta in several respects.
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Firstly, due to postwar expulsions, colonisation, and sustained assimilation, 
both the share and overall number of Magyars in Southern Slovakia's towns 
have drastically fallen. The nowadays predominantly rural and small-town 
dwelling character of the minority (Gyurgyik 1993:16; Kocsis and Hodosi- 
Kocsis 1998:69; Lanstyak 2000:52-3; HTMH 2005a) therefore largely pre­
empts the former risk of losing kin in symbolic or contested urban settings. 
Thus for instance even the Magyars of Bratislava-Pozsony have decreased 
significantly, numbering today only 20 312 (Lanstyak 2000:52) and thus are 
today a smaller group to lose. Moreover, the few majority Slovak towns that do 
have significant Hungarian populations (e.g. Pozsony-Bratislava, Nyitra, 
Kassa, Nagykurtos) are without exception directly adjacent to the main 
Hungarian inhabited region (Lanstyak 2000:47).
Secondly, the reduction has also eliminated the dilemma of leaving behind 
enclaves. The Northern Diaspora has disappeared (Csaky 1996:6) - although 
there is a slow increase in other isolated smatterings since the 1970s 
(Gyurgyik 1994:19; Lanstyak 2000:52). Furthermore, even the few existing 
islands are not inherently problematic. The largest, east and south-east of 
Nyitra, are "gradually decreasing because of development in the vicinity of 
Nyitra, Slovak immigration, and linguistic assimilation (ibid.:75). Leaving 
behind these declining enclaves would presumably cause a lesser sense of 
loss than the interwar abandonment of fully functioning Magyar islands did. 
Clearly, the compactness-argument also fails to account for variation in 
Magyar irredentist behaviour. While the latter has changed, the spread of 
Felvidek Hungarians has evolved from already good to optimal retrievability.
Reticent others, or transborder group homogeneity
The homogeneity of Felvidek Magyar areas, i.e. their share of hostile ethnic 
strangers, may be a more useful factor.
Under Horowitzian criteria, the interwar minority's inter-mixing with other 
groups was not favourable to reunion. This feature was furthermore rapidly 
worsening due to Prague's demographic engineering (see also above). 
Felvidek cities, traditionally Hungarian and crucially determining the region's 
national character, formed a particular target for these policies. Within merely
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twenty years the urban Magyar population suffered dramatic reductions, like in 
Kassa (from 66.5 per cent to 14.3), Galanta (83.1 to 33.5 per cent) or Leva 
(the percentage declining from 88.9 to 38.9).11 Rural areas in turn were seen 
to with blanket colonisation: "70 000 members of the Slovak League12, civil 
servants and investors moved to the territory (...) between 1918 and 1921", 
while a further "69 colonies (...) were established in the Hungarian ethnic 
territory between 1919-1929" (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:61-2). The 
effect was a drastic decrease in the number of homogeneous and majority 
Magyar settlements, which dropped by 115 and 43 respectively within the 
decade following Trianon (Revay 1938 in Fazekas 1993:34-37; Varga 1938 in 
Fazekas 1993:43). The resulting loss of 540 km2 of Hungarian settled territory 
caused an alarmed minority writer to warn that "the ground is slipping from 
under our feet" (Varga 1938:ibid.). According to Horowitz’s variable these 
developments ought to have deterred Hungary most. They meant that ethnic 
kin no longer formed a clearly distinct unit in terms of composition. Exactly 
where to draw a border without including Slovaks, which area to target for 
retrieval, became increasingly difficult to see.
The influx of settlers into Magyar settlements meant that retrieval would 
include potentially reticent Slovaks. Their nature should have mattered to a 
hypothetically calculative Budapest. For the most part these were colonists 
who literally owed their livelihoods to Prague's nationalising agenda, and at the 
clear expense of local Hungarians. Due to lacking and often skewed 
information (see below) Hungary was however not in a position to clearly 
ascertain just how large their share would be. Consecutive interwar censi 
described ever-increasing tallies of Slovaks and Czechs, surging from pre­
independence (1910) percentages of 57.9 and 0.0 to 68.4 and 3.7 per cent 
respectively by 1930 (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:56). Though 
propagandistically exaggerated, and summarising Slovakia as a whole (rather 
than specifically for the Felvidek region), these figures were not encouraging. 
Granted, some non-Magyars could be expected to leave at the prospect of
11 These figures respectively stem from the Hungarian census of 1910 and the Czechoslovak 
national census of 1930. All data is calculated for the present administrative territory of the 
mentioned territories / cities and can be found in Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis (1998:58-9). 
Lokkos (2000:149-151 ;293-301 ;361) goes into even more detail, recording demographic 
changes county by county.
12 The Slovenska Liga was a private, yet government-sponsored nationalist association which 
pursued its declared goal of the area’s “re-Slovakisation" (see also section 7.3.1).
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border revision, and indeed did (ibid.:64). Then again, given that the 1920 
partition had transformed Hungary into an ethnically near-homogeneous state 
(see above), arguably the incorporation of any different group represented an 
undesired side effect in this logic.
As a result of assimilation and statistical manipulation, minority figures had 
furthermore decreased from a pre-war level of 30.2 per cent (1910) to a mere 
17.6 per cent by 1930 (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:56;61). Together with 
the rise in hostile settlers, a dwindling Felvidek community implied increasing 
ethnic diversity in the tetter's settlement area, and the spectre of 
reincorporating reticent populations. Had the Hungarian parent state 
approached retrieval on the basis of Horowitz's stated criteria, it would have 
had to at least carefully assess this risk. Yet at the period Budapest was not 
really able to verify demographic figures for itself. Although its own information 
gathering about transborder kindred was prolific (Bardi 1997a; Torok 2001:60), 
it was mostly qualitative as well as repeatedly inaccurate (Hamori 2001: 573- 
5), and varied across minorities (Angyal 2000c: 166-7). This in turn meant that 
Hungary had to ultimately rely on skewed host state censi.13 In other words, 
mainland politicians faced unquantified risks in a crucial criterion, but chose to 
act notwithstanding. This either indicates that interwar decision-making 
focused on other factors, or that it was simply not calculative about questions 
of ethno-territorial homogeneity.
Eventual reincorporation in November 1938 under the First Vienna Award 
indeed brought 15.6 per cent of other nationalities in the reverted territory. 
These were mainly Slovaks, with between 11.9 (Jakabffy 1942:47) and 13.2 
per cent (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:64). Budapest knew well that this 
was a politically mobilised group which, as the willing subject of anti-Magyar 
policies, might not acquiesce to being reincorporated into Hungary. Instead of
13 Bcirdi (1997a; 2004a:62-3) explains how the mainland considered it partly as ‘technical’ 
intelligence for the purpose of immediate assistance to transborder kindred but also as 
‘strategic’ information which would support ethnically based (and thus internationally 
acceptable) irredentist demands. Information gathering included socio-economic data and the 
communities' internal political attitudes. Demographic statistics and their development however 
were difficult to gauge from abroad, not least due to initial bilateral refugee flows and 
subsequent demographic engineering in the host states. Indicative of this problem is the fact 
that both times soon after retrieval Hungary conducted censi in the Felvidek (15 December 
1938, after six weeks) and Transylvania respectively (31 January 1941, four months later).
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being deterred however, Hungary chose upon re-annexation to co-opt these 
individuals by extending citizenship (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:64, 
footnote 72) and ensuring a favourable redistribution of lands.14
Today’s situation contrasts with interwar diversity. Retaliatory expulsions and 
resettlements under the unlawful Benes Decrees (1945-8), but also forced 
assimilation during communism15, have downsized the remaining Felvidek 
Magyars into a remarkably homogeneous territorial-demographic core. The 
community is today 520 000 strong and makes up 9.7 per cent of Slovakia’s 
population (Slovak census of 2001). As an unintended and historically ironic 
result, their current situation is less ethnically intermixed and therefore 
theoretically more retrievable, than in the interwar years. Post-communist 
statistics reveal that an impressive "77.2 per cent of Slovak Hungarians still 
live in numerical majority" within their settlement area. Indeed, "in this respect 
[they] rank first, ahead of all other transborder Magyar communities" (Lanstyak 
2000:51). Hungarians make up at least 10 per cent in any of the 523 Felvidek 
settlements where their language is spoken. In 272 of these they form 80 per 
cent, and in another 150 they still have majority of over 50 per cent. Prior to 
the ethnically biased administrative redistricting of 1996, half of the ten 
southern Slovak districts were to 40 per cent or more Hungarian (HTMH 
2005a;). In short, today’s minority lives with a minimum of ethnic intermixing.
A potential problem in terms of diversity is the community's dwindling size. At 
present it is only slightly smaller than in the interwar era, having decreased by 
roughly 120 000 individuals to a tally of 608 221 (HTMH 2005a). Yet it is 
further shrinking. A considerable and growing part of this decrease it is due to 
inter-marriage (Gyurgyik 1994:17). While "at the beginning of the 1930s hardly 
10 per cent of marriages were mixed (...), their share had reached 30 per cent 
by the beginning of the 1990s" (Lanstyak 2000:73). Unlike assimilation, this
14 Hamori (2001:610, footnote 248) points to the little-known, but here crucial, fact that 
governmental re-distribution of land after the 1938 reincorporation was in terms of nationality 
(but not class) pointedly even handed. It did not "reward" the retrieved Felvidek Magyars for 
their irredentist loyalty (see also Szarka 1998:39). In fact they were actually at a slight 
disadvantage, receiving 42.7 per cent of reassigned land in contrast to the 43.43 per cent 
handed out to local Slovaks.
15 Policies to forcefully homogenise the region were pursued throughout communist rule and 
still enjoy continuity. For instance Husak's "normalisation" backlash after the 1968 Prague 
Spring was used to abrogate Magyar schooling and language rights, cultural organisations and 
hitherto tacitly tolerated cultural representation (Szarka 1998:58-60 ).
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development causes ethnic intermixing and thus impacts directly on group 
homogeneity and with it retrievability. Then again this is a long-term concern, 
and mainly affects geographical fringe areas of the Magyar community rather 
than its main settlement bulk (ibid.).
A detailed look at this factor has shown its limited use. Changes in local 
conditions already during the interwar years as well as between the compared 
time periods both disproved predictions. By contrasting the developments of 
the 1920s and 30s with the contemporary Felvidek situation it has become 
clear that interwar Hungary pursued irredentism under moderately good but 
uncertain conditions, while conversely not acting on what is today a much 
improved ‘structural bias’ in this factor.
4.3.2 The Transylvanian Magyar minority: a ‘structural bias’ from bad to 
worse
The much larger Magyar community in Transylvania displayed pre-existing 
disadvantages, such as a historically multi-ethnic region and dispersed Magyar 
settlement patterns. Like its ethnic kindred in Southern Slovakia, it was also 
manipulated in terms demography and territory in order to pre-empt 
irredentism. Speaking in Horowitzian criteria, conditions were - and today 
continue to be - so unfavourable that the very occurrence of an irredenta in the 
first place is difficult to explain. So while the improved ‘structural bias’ in 
today's Felvidek renders paradoxical the absence of a contemporary irredenta, 
lasting adverse conditions in Transylvania conversely beg the question why 
the interwar campaign ever existed at all.
Border proximity
Interwar retrieval of Transylvanian Magyars faced a decisive problem: here the 
main part of the community was located far away from the Hungarian border. 
The retrieval of Transylvanian kindred would not be feasible with a simple 
boundary shift. Instead, it would have to establish either an untenably 
meandering boundary or leave behind trapped kindred. According to the
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Romanian census of 1930, Transylvania's Hungarians only made up 26.7 per 
cent of the region's total population (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:113). The 
sizeable community that this nevertheless was - totalling at 1 353 288 - settled 
however mainly away from the mainland. In fact, less than half of all Magyars 
in Romania (i.e. 608 603 individuals in 1930) lived in the seven counties that 
were directly adjacent to or near, the border (ibid.:116).16 The community's 
majority stretched eastwards in a large crescent into central Transylvania and 
the Szeklerland. Their distribution thus lay well beyond comfortable reach and 
defied the construction of defendable boundaries (see map 3.1).
If anything, this awkward situation has since worsened. To start with, the 
overall percentage of Magyars in Transylvania has shrunk further, standing at 
only 19.3 per cent in 1992 (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:113; Hungarians in 
Romania as a whole make up 6.7 per cent of the population). Critically, it is 
exactly the border near settlements that are hard hit by this decrease. This is 
furthermore an ongoing trend: the percentage of Magyars settling near the 
border has further diminished not only in comparison to the interwar years, but 
even during the last, post-communist decade (compare maps 3.3 to 3.6). 
Thus, the same seven Transylvanian counties quoted above accounted in 
1992 for only 35.19 per cent of the transborder community (or 571 901 out of 
1624 959). Ten years on the figure has dropped to just under a quarter, i.e. to 
24.84 per cent, or 355 799 out of the total, further reduced population of 1 431 
807 (Romanian National Office of Statistics 1992; 2002).17 The community's 
bulk continues to live in central and eastern Transylvanian counties, with the 
heaviest concentrations (i.e. 45.2 per cent as of 1992) in the remote 
Szeklerland of eastern Transylvania (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:127).
Looking at this first indicator, a worsening in the ‘structural bias' has indeed 
taken place over time. Then again, given the discouraging scenario already 
back in the 1930s, it is hard to see how the irredentist enterprise ‘made sense'
16 These counties are not part of historic Transylvania proper, but the Romanian-annexed 
territories of the Hungarian kingdom that were subsequently referred to and seen as, part of 
"Erdely" / "Transylvania" together with the actual historic regions further East. They are the 
counties of the historic Partium area (Maramaros, Szatmar, Szilagy, Bihar, Arad) and of the 
Bansag / Banat region (Temes and Krassb-Szoreny).
17 The Hungarian Government Office for Transborder Magyars (HTMH 2005b) quotes a 
somewhat higher figure of 28 per cent.
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in the first place. So far then, this indicates either that border proximity does 
not figure prominently in calculations, or indeed that retrieval is not chiefly 
guided by feasibility.
Group compactness and spatial spread
The difficulty of reincorporating a minority that stretched so far inland into the 
host state was aggravated by the fact that its settlements did not cohere. 
Magyars were dispersed into roughly four areas which, like in the Felvidek, 
were increasingly separated from each other in the course of deliberate 
interwar settlement policies. Border-near towns as well as -counties were 
particularly targeted. So were strategic connecting areas in counties Arad, 
Bihar and Szatmar, in order to disjoint Hungarian settlement stretches (Varga 
1994:29-32; compare maps 1.2 and 3.1). This erosion was to some extent 
balanced by the fact that Magyars clustered in four large islands: in the 
Szeklerland (i.e. the eastern counties of Maros, Kovaszna and Hargita), in the 
north western county of Szilagy, along the border, and in the Kalotaszeg 
region west of Kolozsvar. Still, in between there were vast areas of scattered 
enclaves, especially in central Transylvania (counties Kolozs, Feher and 
Beszterce-Naszod) and in the south, the so-called Banat region (counties 
Temes and Krasso-Szoreny). Together, these made up almost a third of the 
community in 1930 (439 012 out of 1 480 721, or 29.64 per cent) (Kocsis and 
Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:116). It was thus clear from the outset that the transborder 
community would have to be split in case of retrieval, and this is indeed what 
happened in 1940: 450 000 Hungarians, a whole third of the minority, 
remained in Southern Transylvania with Romania.
Erdely's division into a retrieved North and "trapped" South was neither a 
desirable nor rational compromise for Magyar irredentists -  to the contrary. 
The repercussions for remaining kindred would be predictably worse than in 
Slovakia. Unlike Tiso's puppet state, controlled by Berlin and ironically owing 
its very existence to German and Hungarian irredentas, the Romania of 
Antonescu's Iron Guards had no reason for self-restraint. And indeed, 
retaliation against remaining Hungarians was harsh (Dioszegi and Siile 
1990:45 ff.). Given the numbers and severity, and not least Transylvania's
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identity as integral region, partition could be expected to present a grave 
setback to Teleki's government. Budapest was well aware of these dangers yet 
still pushed for and then accepted, the Second Vienna Award.
For Transylvania's Hungarians in turn, any dismemberment of their historic 
region and community was deeply divisive and hence remained anathema, 
even more than among their Felvidek brethren (see above). This was due to 
the community's historic character and more cohesive sense of self, one not 
created by Trianon's arbitrariness. And still, there was solid and tacit support 
for irredentism (Bardi 1997:43-35; Zeidler 2001:199-200). Transylvanian 
Magyars thus conceived of retrieval rather loosely, as some sort of all- 
embracing rescue by the mainland, very much in the sense of a miraculous, 
biblical, redemption (ibid.). In short, despite the predictable and agonising 
sacrifice involved, the majority of local Hungarians held out for the mainland to 
intervene.18
Today, the Transylvanian minority’s unfavourable distribution differs little from 
that of interwar times. In terms of irredentist feasibility the picture has remained 
bleak, even counting the few changes that have occurred since. The group’s 
spatial spread has at least kept within the territory. Despite the Ceausescu 
era’s demographic engineering, Transylvania still contains 98.8 per cent of all 
Romanian Hungarians (Varga 2002:7-8). In other words, while ethnic 
Romanian migration has flooded into the region, the minority itself has not 
been dislocated beyond it into the host country. Hungarians continue to live in 
the same four main areas within Transylvania, covering about 103 000 square 
kilometres of settlement territory (HTMH 2005b). They still pose the problem of 
a geographically disjointed community which would be very difficult retrieve. 
For one, more than a third of the minority (37 per cent) continue to live 
compactly in the Szeklerland, the remote and cut off Magyar enclave in 
Transylvania’s east. Their proportion has actually increased from the interwar 
figure and continues to rise even during post-communism: 538 681 (1930) 
versus 668 462 (2002) (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:116; Romanian 
National Office of Statistics 2002). The single largest and most concentrated 
part of the minority is thus simultaneously also the most unreachable (compare
18 See for instance Pomogats (2001:188-189) for contemporary reactions to Transylvania’s 
partition. Although decrying the kin left behind even liberal intellectuals welcomed retrieval.
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maps 3.3-3.6). Secondly, unlike in the Felvidek, shrinking minority numbers 
have not significantly ‘tidied’ geographical concentrations. Only the 
strategically awkward enclaves in central and southern Transylvania have 
decreased considerably. Especially islands in the south have almost 
disappeared, dropping from nearly 10 per cent of the interwar community to a 
mere 4.4 per cent in 1992 (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:116, 127). 
Furthermore, another 35 to 37 per cent (HTMH 2005b) of the minority still 
cluster in the same, largely disjointed patches following the Romanian- 
Hungarian border, with especially big gaps between the large communities of 
Bihar, Arad and Temes counties. Finally, a further 16-18 per cent of Magyar 
areas stretch into central Transylvania, where once again we see non­
contiguous settlements in Beszterce-Naszod, Feher and Hunyad counties. 
Overall then, geographical dispersal still prevents a redrawing of feasible 
boundaries, which in turn does not explain why group behaviour has changed.
Reticent others, or transborder group homogeneity
The interwar community's dispersal meant that the territories harboured 
considerable swathes inhabited by ethnic Romanians (see map 3.1 .)■ From the 
outset it was hence clear that any irredenta had to reckon with retrieving these, 
as well as other local groups. In a Horowitzian vein, this in itself should have 
acted as a powerful brake on the irredentist drive of Hungarian elites - which it 
did not.
Transylvania was historically an ethnically mixed region, something that parent 
state leaders were fully aware of when planning (see section 4.4, below). Even 
the frequently invoked pre-partition percentages19 showed that only one 
county was to more than 90 per cent ethnically homogeneous (Udvarhely 
county with 95 per cent Magyar inhabitants, subsequently re-districted by 
Bucharest). In terms of administrative regions with 75 to 90 per cent 
homogeneity, Transylvania mustered four Romanian and two Hungarian ones 
respectively. The rest were ethnically diverse, although communities tended to
19 Figures here stem from the last census before partition, conducted in 1910, and often taken 
as comparative point of reference in interwar times when making sense of biased host state 
data.
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mingle only to a limited extent, following in some parts an urban (Hungarian) 
versus rural (mostly Romanian) divide (Dioszegi and Sule 1990:18).
By the 1930s, figures were even more daunting: of the five and a half million 
Transylvanians, 58.3 per cent (3 234 157) declared themselves as Romanians 
and merely 26.7 per cent (1 480 721 individuals) were Magyars (Kocsis and 
Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:113). This ratio, although exaggerated by skewed 
statistics, furthermore resulted from an ongoing and worsening trend. 
Bucharest's demographic engineering had re-settled around 400 000 
Romanians into the region (Dioszegi and Sule 1990:17). As a result, both 
urban and, to a lesser extent, rural Magyar areas were modified in their ethnic 
make-up. Of the formerly twenty eight major Transylvanian cities which were to 
50 per cent or more Hungarian, only nineteen had remained by 1930. The 
town-dwelling thirty per cent of Magyars was furthermore surrounded by 
majority Romanian counties (ibid.:18). Thus cut off from the larger community 
backdrop, their forced assimilation accelerated, and with it the Romanian 
domination of cities. Urban Magyar life, which had hitherto crucially defined the 
region's national character, was thus irrefutably diluted. The majority nation’s 
rural takeover, mainly facilitated by an ethnically targeted land reform, 
complemented this change in ethnic balance. This was especially true in 
Southern Transylvania (resettling for instance abandoned Saxon villages) and 
in western border counties Szatmar and Bihar (Varga 1994:29-31; Kocsis and 
Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:115). In sum, by 1930 -  a decade before retrieval - the 
proportion of Magyars in what would become annexed Northern Transylvania 
had already dropped from a 1910 figure of 51.4 per cent to merely 38 per cent 
(ibid.:116; compare also maps 1.2 and 3.1).
Like with the Felvidek, parent state irredentist planning did consider ethnically 
foreign populations (see section 4.4, below). It was clear that the Romanian 
settlers would have meant and then did mean, a large trapped minority. Since 
their livelihoods were directly linked to the Romanian nationalising project, they 
could be expected to be particularly hostile. In addition, they came mostly from 
the Regat (i.e. core Romania beyond the Carpathians), and were thus 
unfamiliar with Hungarian and less educated than their Transylvanian kindred.
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The final outcome did not reflect any such concerns. Northern Transylvania, 
ceded to Hungary in 1940, represented just under half of the region (see map 
3.2). It contained a total population of some 2.2 million of whom only 51.4 per 
cent (1 123 216) were Hungarians and, incredibly, 42.1 per cent (or 920 206) 
Romanians.20 Conversely, a good third of the minority (around 400 000 
Magyars) was left behind in Southern Transylvania with Romania. The fact that 
Budapest actually ended up retrieving almost even numbers of kin and ethnic 
strangers does not convince of this as carefully weighted irredentist factor.
Today, "the ethnic picture of Transylvania has become simpler and less 
diverse at the expense of the national minorities and in favour of the 
Romanians" (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:125)21 To some extent this 
means simplified conditions for any hypothetical retrieval. Though 
geographically disjointed, about three quarters of contemporary Magyar areas 
are characterised by moderate or even minimal intermixing (Varga 1994:38-45, 
see also maps 3.3 and 3.6). So while Transylvania overall has become even 
more ethnically Romanian since the interwar period, surviving Hungarian areas 
within it have preserved or slightly increased their homogeneity. As of 1992, 28 
per cent of the minority lived in localities that were to 90 per cent or more 
Magyar (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:127). These settlements concentrate 
in eastern Transylvania, the Szekely / Szekler area. In the majority Hungarian 
counties (particularly Hargita and Kovaszna) the Romanian population does 
not surpass 12 to 15 per cent, in and around the town of Szekelyudvarhely it 
is even around 2 per cent (HTMH 2005b). Another 56.9 per cent of Magyars 
inhabit settlements where they form the absolute majority (ibid.:127), in what 
are however ethnically mixed counties. These lie in central Transylvania 
(counties Kolozs, Maros and Szeben) and its north-western, border-near parts 
(Szatmar, Szilagy and Bihar counties). Really extensive ethnic intermixing only
20 The considerable contrast to population data from only a decade before (see paragraph 
above) was due to several reasons. Firstly, the Romanian national census of 1930 was 
skewed, re-categorising Jews, Gypsies and others who professed a Hungarian identity, 
thereby artificially shrinking minority numbers. Secondly there were large exchange flows of 
refugees upon partition in 1940 which altered figures (see Jakabffy 1942;Zeidler 2001:217-18).
21 Even this statement needs to be modified somewhat in the light of the since published 2002 
census. Whilst in the 1992 census 5.7 million Transylvanians declared themselves 
Romanians, it was now only 5 393 552 individuals who did so. While this still does not 
counterbalance the dramatic drop of Magyars by 193 152 persons within the same decade, it 
has somewhat limited the discrepancy between ratios.
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applies to less than a fifth of the community (or 18 to 20 per cent according to 
HTMH 2005b), which lives mainly in the south (counties Krasso-Szoreny, 
Temes, Arad, Hunyad).
The 19 majority Magyar towns of 1930 have reduced to 14 in the post­
communist era, nine of which are situated in the remote Szeklerland. Inter­
ethnic ratios have been further distorted by Magyar emigration and 
demographic engineering during Romania's nationalist communism, which 
increased Transylvania’s ethnic Romanians by an additional 1 million (Hodosi- 
Kocsis 1998:120-4; Varga 1994:38-49). Hence "former Hungarian cultural 
centres ... have become populated by a majority of Romanians by now, while 
in Marosvasarhely, which was almost purely Hungarian, half of the population 
are Romanians" (HTMH 2005b). This demographic trend continues today, with 
urban centres losing Magyar populations to either emigration or, curiously, to 
the surrounding countryside (Varga 2002:8-9). The shrinkage of especially 
town dwelling Magyars (dipping by a further 1.9 per cent even between the two 
censi of 1992 and 2002; ibid.) may mean in the long term an increase in ethnic 
intermixing. Overall however, while this community is sadly shrinking (by nearly 
190 600 even over the last decade), it does so in a to retrieval advantageous 
way by melting into an ever more homogeneous core. In this respect at least, 
irredentism today would actually find a mildly more feasible set of structural 
circumstances.
4.3.3 Summary
A strange picture emerges. Evidence in Horowitz's key criteria on the ground 
does not match up with the political choices of our two actors - the Hungarian 
parent state and its respective transborder communities. In fact, prediction and 
historical reality are most often diametrically opposed.
Although the interwar Felvidek's set up was favourable enough to explain 
retrieval, it was compromised by worsening demographic conditions. 
Throughout the 1920s and '30s, but especially by the time Hungary was about
147
to reincorporate the area, systematic "Czechoslovakisation" had partly 
undermined Horowitzian criteria for recovery. Prague's colonisation policy 
achieved its three foremost goals: the dilution of homogeneously Hungarian 
inhabited areas (especially along the neat ethnic border internally dividing 
Slovakia), laterally disjointing the hitherto cohesive Magyar strip, and 
downsizing its percentages both statistically and in real terms. Contrary to what 
happened, these changes should have been discouraging according to theory: 
all of them complicated the irredentist project, all of them took increasing effect 
as the period progressed. They also meant that successive parent state 
governments were dealing for nearly two decades with unknown quantities of 
risk - a circumstance likely to dissuade any rational actor.
Comparison with today in turn actually demonstrates an improved feasibility for 
retrieving Slovakia’s Magyars. Border proximity is unchanged and ideal. The 
minority's demography and dispersal have both decreased and thereby 
consolidated advantageously. Former outlier settlements have ceased to exist, 
urban Magyar populations outside of the minority's bulk have decreased. Much 
more than in the interwar period, the risk of abandoning trapped kin and having 
to accept internal partition is thus minimised. Finally, ethnic intermixing within 
the minority-inhabited zone is nowadays lower, both on the regional and 
communal levels. In contrast to the 1920s and 30s, with their massive and 
uncharted influx of settlers, the demographic balance between minority and 
majority has furthermore stabilised and would today pose a calculable problem 
for retrieval.
In the Transylvanian case Horowitz's assertions only partly coincide with 
evidence on the ground. While they potentially account for Hungary's non- 
irredentism today, they do not explain why the interwar irredenta was regarded 
as feasible in the first place. Already at the time of Trianon's signing, the 
criteria of border-proximity, compactness, and homogeneity were so 
unfavourable that they simply fail to rationalise any irredenta. Most Magyars 
lived far away from the Hungarian border, many settlement areas were 
unconnected and some localities -  especially towns -  showed increasing inter­
mixing. Not only were conditions impossible from the outset, but in addition
148
and like in the Felvidek's case above, they partly worsened due to interwar 
Romania's manipulation of Transylvanian Hungarian demography. Given the 
fact that these measures were progressively implemented over the course of 
the 1920s and '30s, mainland and minority determination should have waned 
in the same manner as these policies were unfolding their increasingly 
hindering effects.
As for today, the Transylvanian community's situation in terms of proximity and 
spatial spread has admittedly become even more adverse over the past half 
century. The minority’s spatial distribution has slightly worsened in that an ever 
greater part of its bulk lives in the remote east, far away from the border. Also, 
minority areas are even more disconnected due to post-war Romanian 
settlement policies, thereby cumulatively adding to interwar demographic 
engineering. Arguments about a worsening bias (which would account for 
irredentist inconsistency) thus do apply in these criteria. On the other hand, the 
community’s homogeneity, while far from optimal, has actually slightly 
improved. This once again does not square with predictions.
Comparative historical evidence has demonstrated that a differential benefit 
rationale cannot explain the fluctuating Hungarian irredenta. Secondly, 
evidence here is all the more compelling against Horowitz because it is 
cumulative. Viewed together with the parent state factors above, they 
contradict his projections throughout. Given that feasibility on the ground and 
potential disadvantages hardly mirror group behaviour, one consequently has 
to ask whether they are at all important to irredentists and if so, on what 
alternative premise.
4.4. Magyar nationalism: did or do Hungarians care at all?
The results of this analysis are so far rather counter-intuitive - irredentist 
inconsistency does not seem explicable via change in what one would assume 
to be vital physical conditions. The problem, at its very basic, is once again the 
underlying assumption of irredentists’ cost-benefit calculations (which indeed
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would respect external realities), rather than their ideology (where feasibility 
and homogeneity matter little). At the beginning of this chapter the two had 
seemed potentially reconcilable, exactly because endogenous factors would 
have compromised irredentist ideals. However, once we examine these ideals 
two things emerge instead: one, irredentism strives for congruence of nation 
and state not just in terms of population, but also ancestral territory. Because 
these homelands often contain mixed populations, the idea of homogeneity as 
factor, however commonsensical, was wrong: irredentism seeks not so much 
an exclusive nation-state (i.e. devoid of ethnic strangers) as a complete one. 
Secondly, because territory is an primary ethnic marker which vitally 
determines the extent and ambitions of retrieval, changes in its prominence as 
part of a group’s identity are crucially responsible for the inconsistency of 
irredentism. It is in this point that the Hungarian case has seen considerable 
change.
4.4.1 Map image of Magyar territories and implications for Horowitz* 
variable
Irredentism has a dual concern with ethnic kindred as well as the group’s 
ancestral grounds22 (see e.g. Neuberger 1991:97-8). Evidently the two are not 
always perfectly congruent, which in turn conflicts with Horowitz’s ideas about 
ethno-territorial homogeneity. Chapter 1 (section 1.2.2) has described how 
ethnic homelands exist as 'map image' in the collective identity of a group, 
meaning that they are often not objectively verifiable in their extent. They can 
stretch beyond the transborder minority’s present-day settlement areas and 
will be consequently claimed irrespective of ethnically different inhabitants. 
This is not least true for the Hungarian case. Traditional Magyar homeland 
perceptions have always stretched beyond kindred settlement lines (Haynes 
1995:89; Zeidler 2001:25). They encompass the Crownlands of St. Stephen,
22 Chapter 1 (section 1.4.1) noted that, with regards to territory irredentism also involves some 
secondary concerns. Since it translates into antagonistic parent-host state relations, retrieval 
often involves geo-strategic considerations. These in turn may conflict with homogeneity -  the 
region of Jammu-Kashmir is a case in point. Not least, irredentism is frequently 
instrumentalised within expansionist / imperialist policies, an aspect which also partly fits this 
case study.
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millennial territories of the 896 A.D. state foundation framed by the ‘natural’ 
boundary of the Carpathian mountains. Though much de-prioritised, this view 
still holds true today (Csepeli 1997:194-198). Historic Transylvania for example 
describes a vast area that always had been and still is, only partially peopled 
with ethnic Hungarians yet continues to be regarded as ancestral heartland. 
Similarly, it is the Felvidek as a whole, i.e. including its Slovak-populated 
stretches, which counts as indispensable communal territory to both local and 
mainland Magyars. This entails two important consequences.
4.4.2 First implication: completeness over homogeneity
The first implication is that retrieval is mainly preoccupied with uniting the ideal 
or opportunistically available, maximum of kin and homelands within a state. 
Keeping ethnically different populations out during this process is a secondary 
concern here which occurs, if at all, as afterthought.23 As type of nationalism 
(pursuit of nation-statehood) irredentism does not prioritise the creation of an 
exclusive state unit, i.e. one which contains only one group. Rather, the 
important thing is that this state contain all members of the group -  and that 
the particular group be in control (demographically and / or politically) if there 
are minorities. This does not conflict with the exclusive ethnicity typical of 
irredentist groups (see section 6.1.2): it serves to cement solidarity within the 
group, rather than hostility against others. So as long as the state is ‘owned’ 
(i.e. dominated and defined) by this titular group, minorities are accepted and 
are not seen to detract from the perfection that irredentism tries to (re-)create. 
Here is the basic misconception of Horowitz’s variable and the reason for its 
explanatory weakness above. It assumes for uniform priorities (here: 
homogeneity) across all nationalist projects, secessionist and irredentist, 
whereas they spring from different grievances (creation of a titular state versus 
remedying its demographic and territorial truncation). The fundamental 
rationale of irredentism is about national completeness (rather than necessarily
23 Population expulsions, forced transfers and even genocidal campaigns in order to 
homogenise coveted regions are not the norm for irredentas. If and when they occur these 
measures are taken during (e.g. Serbian Krajina) or, rarer even, after successful retrieval (e.g. 
the 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange following the incorporation of Thrace), but do not 
compromise irredentism in advance.
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exclusivity), the achievement of nation-state congruence (the coincidence of 
communal homelands and kin with state borders) via their ‘redemption’ from 
foreign ethnic rule (self-determination) (see section 1.5.1).
Indeed in some cases and notably here, minorities are purposely factored in 
because they suit the particular historical trajectory of the irredentist group’s 
nationalism. For instance, the imperial and civilising mission-element which 
characterised Magyar nationalism in the late nineteenth century described 
Hungary as ethnically diverse, but Hungarian-led and -defined nation state. 
Other groups were seen as naturally subject to Magyarisation -  assimilation 
into the dominant, “superior” culture. Though subsequently superseded by a 
more exclusive conception of Hungarians identity, this view continued in the 
interwar period. In this way nation-stateness is not diminished or endangered 
as long as there is a clear and non-negotiable hierarchy in domestic group 
relations - the very opposite of a shared, consociational state. This applies 
even if a parent state is already (near) perfectly homogeneous and risks 
diversity by retrieving mixed areas. Post-Trianon Hungary is just one amongst 
many example here.24 In short, it’s about reuniting all members and territories 
in one state and ‘owning’ it. Others are tolerated, even deliberately factored in, 
as long as these conditions hold.
A look at interwar political thought - both governmental and public -  illustrates 
this perfectly. Hungary's ethnic nationalism never meant exclusion of, but 
superiority over, ethnic strangers. The state concept of Saint Stephen 
(Szentistvani ailameszme, see also chapter 6) dominated political thinking for 
the entire interwar period (Romsics 1998:18-20; Gratz 2001:193-196). Broadly 
speaking, instead of classic nation-stateness it envisages a multi-ethnic, but 
titular Magyar state in which Hungarians dominate.25 Not only does it reconcile
24 Other cases include post-Soviet Armenia versus Karabach and its Azeri-populated ‘corridor’, 
the Irish Republic’s designs on the Northern Ireland despite local Unionists, twentieth century 
Greece versus Asia Minor and Cyprus which both included large Turkish populations, etc.
25 There are considerable variations on this theme. At its least liberal, the concept drew heavily 
on the Christian roots of Hungary's foundation and the corollary sacrosanctness of its borders. 
Especially in its late nineteenth century interpretation, it did not envisage inter-ethnic 
egalitarianism within Hungary but conceived of a Magyar civilising mission (domestic and 
regional), based on notions of cultural supremacy. Interwar politicians, endorsed this version, 
especially aristocrats like Counts Bethlen, Andrassy, Klebelsberg and Teleki. In a more 
modern interpretation, first pioneered by Jaszi in 1929 and then Hevesy in 1931, it
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with the notion and reality of domestic ethnic pluralism, but it includes the latter 
by design. Ample evidence documents that interwar Hungarian governments 
were not only unfazed by the potential of retrieving ethnically mixed territories, 
but that this was purposeful. In fact, Romsics (1998:62;117), Szarka (1998:25) 
and Zeidler (2001:145-6) all describe that the patrician elite even hoped to win 
back the Hungarian kingdom's former subject nationalities, confident that 
surely they must have meanwhile recognised the unviability of their 
independent statehoods!26 In short, Hungarian political thought was historically 
adjusted to contain ethnic strangers within state boundaries - albeit never on 
an egalitarian footing.
Contemporary political thought in Hungary and resulting foreign policies 
strongly contrast with these points. Although the St. Stephen notion persists 
today (Haynes 1995:95;98 vs. Schopflin in Borsody 1988:128), it does so in a 
modified, more liberal vein. It has been reinterpreted as exemplary path for the 
return to Europe, or as former foreign minister Jeszensky put it, one that made 
Hungarians "fall in line with the most advanced ideas then prevailing in the 
West" (ibid.: 95). As foreign policy principle, the St. Stephen concept now 
encompasses ideas about regional co-operation rather than aspirations of 
Magyar imperial domination. In domestic terms, it correspondingly envisages 
Hungary as culturally defined, homogeneous nation-state. Ironically, this in 
turn means that today the ethnic inter-mixing of transborder territories would 
actually matter. In a Horowitzian logic, Budapest should therefore take 
advantage of the now partly improved retrieval conditions among its
encompasses notions of communal co-operation and mutual accommodation under the 
auspices of a regional shared fate. Today, the St. Stephen notion is understood as historical 
antecedent of peaceful ethnic pluralism within the Carpathian Basin, as original solution that is 
reaffirmed in Hungary's trajectory towards Euro-Atlantic integration.
26 In contrast, the mainland's right wing resented pre-war Hungary's former nationalities as 
'traitors’ and suspected remaining non-Magyars of further disloyalty (Tilkovszky 1998:51). Yet, 
and this is noteworthy, such attitudes did not result in scrutiny to avoid retrieving ethnic 
strangers within desired territories. Rather, concern centred on how these should be dealt with 
upon reincorporation. Even the Arrow Cross party, for all its talk about racial purity, did not 
show any effort to avoid non-Magyars in its generally little-known plans (Ungvary in Romsics 
1998:117-131). Party chief Szallasi's 1935 publication adhered to the Crownlands concept, 
merging notions of ethnic and wider imperial retrieval into one project about the "united 
ancestral Magyar lands” (ibid.:120). The larger conservative mainstream upheld throughout the 
interwar years the patrician Saint Stephen notion. Since interwar Hungarian cabinets recruited 
themselves exclusively from these two camps (see chapter 7), policy formulation for the two 
irredentas was certainly not cautioned by the prospect of trapped ethnic strangers.
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transborder kindred (greater concentration and thus homogeneity). The reason 
why it does not ties in with the next point.
4.4.3 Second implication: what matters are not the physical changes 
within a territory but rather territory’s changed importance within 
ethnicity
The second consequence of the ‘map image’ namely affects the way in which 
territory is a decisive variable. We have established that structural changes -  
the proximity, distribution and density of kindred -  miss the point because of a 
group’s extended perception of homelands and the resulting need for 
completeness rather than unfettered homogeneity. Crucial instead is how 
important these homelands are within the very identity that irredentism 
politicises. Because territory is a primary ethnic marker which vitally 
determines the scope and ambitions of retrieval, any changes in its 
prominence as part of a group’s identity vitally affect the irredentist project. As 
long as the 'map image' of the homeland is integral to a group's ethnic kinship, 
irredentism is the commonsensical answer. Chapter 6 will demonstrate that 
when this nexus is broken - when ethno-national identity comes to de-prioritise 
territory in favour of cultural and / or civic aspects - we have a causal 
contribution to irredentist inconsistency.
How did this translate into irredentist planning about territory? Exactly because 
Hungarian national identity was inextricably linked to identification with a 
historic state entity (e.g. L. Nagy 1987:14-15) and regional superiority, interwar 
irredentism tacitly or explicitly included the wider goal of its integral restoration 
(Romsics 1998; Ormos 1998:186 ff.; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85; Zeidler 
2001:125-157). This is why Budapest remained pointedly ambiguous about the 
extent of its territorial demands (Romsics 1998; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85-6; 
Zeidler 2001:125-158). It feared both to jeopardise the chance of retrieving 
larger parts of the Magyar homeland, and to incur popular wrath by being seen 
to renounce the Crownlands notion (ibid.). Bethlen emphasised this nexus 
between irredentist mandate and territorialised identity in March 1928: "...We
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cannot accept this as just, and the Hungarian nation would crucify any 
politician who were to sign a second Trianon" (Kovacs 1994:89-90, emphasis 
mine). The mainland government thus only ever endorsed ethnic boundaries 
indirectly, by having the semi-official Hungarian Revisionist League do so in 
April 1929 (Kovacs 1994:85).27 At the same time Budapest retained a ‘dual 
optic’ of ‘optimal’ (read: integral) and ‘minimal’ (ethnically based) demands, 
pragmatically leaving a wide range of scenarios of which it hoped to achieve 
the best.
The fact that Hungary ended up post retrieval in 1941 with a mere 0.8 per cent 
increase in non-Magyars28 hardly confirms Horowitz, simply because this was 
not a planned outcome For one, precise policy lines on this issue varied with 
each interwar government (see below), and this was due to well-calibrated 
opportunism (Ormos 1998:210). Second, Hungary depended so heavily on 
Nazi Germany's patronage that the final irredentist acquisitions were 
significantly shaped by Berlin's interests (Ormos 1998:194 and 223; Zeidler 
2001:126; see also chapter 5). Balogh (1988:60) reminds in this context: 
"Transylvania had such a mixed population that any ethnic claim, on either 
side, was dubious at best. (...) The ethnic composition of these territories, 
although important as far as world opinion at the time went, was not the 
determining factor in their final fate [emphasis mine]."
Of the three concrete irredentist plans presented or intimated by Budapest29 
none were concerned with feasibility or avoiding non-Magyar populations.
27 Kovacs (1994:74-88) details how the Hungarian government's deliberate policy of 
vagueness came under severe pressure in the course of 1929. Lord Rothermere's campaign 
about purely ethnic boundaries, domestic reactions to it, and also the end of Hungary's 
decade-long international isolation, all forced Budapest to take a stance, for which the 
Revisionist League served as smokescreen.
28 After completing the two irredentas (and reincorporating Ruthenia) the country was in 1941 
to 92.9 per cent ethnic Magyar against 92.1 in 1930 (Lokkos 2000:372).
29 Even after the 1927 launch of Hungary's "active foreign policy", the Foreign Ministry was 
instructed to refrain from detailing demands, to the effect of leaving its diplomatic staff in a 
permanent limbo of embarrassing contradictions, denials and retractions. Concrete maps were 
mainly circulated by academics, journalists and the Revisionist League, with varying and 
ambiguous levels of official endorsement. Only three politicians presented precise plans, either 
as heads of government (Gombos) or as elder statesmen via "private" publications and 
lectures (Teleki and Bethlen). It is no coincidence that those who dared to do so were exactly 
the personalities who singularly summed up interwar Magyar politics most - both in terms of 
impact and representation. The two counts stood for Hungary's patrician-oligarchic ruling 
classes, while Gombos was the most visionary and energetic of the rising reactionary-fascist
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None paid particular attention to minority dispersal, and only one appears to 
have taken account of border proximity. Prime minister Gombos' plan of 1934 
emphasised material and geo-strategic aspects. While making sure to include 
all border-near brethren, it omitted the outlier communities in central and 
eastern Transylvania. This in turn meant that out of the 6.7 million total 
retrieved, only 1.7 million would be Magyars and thus would have raised 
Hungary's domestic minorities to a staggering 37 per cent (Zeidler 2001:150- 
5). Although Gombos' plan vindicates Horowitz' predictions about border 
proximity, it does not support those about homogeneity or minority distribution. 
Even this is irrelevant however, for the plan was never actually adopted: 
unpopular with the cabinet and the wider political establishment precisely for 
dropping the Crownlands notion, it died with its maker in 1936. In contrast, the 
remaining two designs - by prime ministers Bethlen and Teleki respectively - 
pursued exactly this theme and cited the retrieval of ethnic Magyar areas as 
core but minimum demand (see also chapter 5).
These views also extended to the transborder minorities and mainland public 
opinion.30 The period’s most popular slogan is revealing - “extra Hungariam 
non est vita -  si est vita, non est ita” (there is no life outside Hungary, if there 
is, it is unlike it). Istvan Milotay, interwar Hungary's most influential and prolific 
political journalist, mirrored his broad readership's attitude by maintaining that 
retrieval of Hungarian inhabited areas was absolutely indispensable, but only 
as mere minimum (Lengyel in Romsics 1998:98;103-4). The Hungarian 
Revisionist League was a semi-official propaganda instrument and pooling 
ground for societal activism. Its president Ferenc Herczeg, declared that "the 
so-called Rothermere-line [demarcating purely ethnic boundaries] is not a 
Hungarian proposal ... the Hungarian nation does not surrender its right to 
territories it held for a thousand years" (Romsics 2001 b:55). The same attitude 
was voiced by influential industrialist Miksa Fenyo, who in a specially authored
figures supported by middle-class electorates (see chapter 7). Of the twenty years between 
Trianon (1920) and the Second Vienna Award (1940) these three incumbents alone cover 
seventeen years of prime ministerial office between them (Teleki 1920-21 and 1939-41; 
Bethlen 1921-31; Gombos 1932-36). For these reasons they are selected here as solidly 
revealing of irredentist policy-making.
30 Interwar minority Hungarians, especially in Transylvania, also continued to share this 
expanded sense of Magyar ancestral homelands. Especially their revanchist middle classes, 
deprived of a millennial ascendancy and hit hard by the change in their fortunes, firmly upheld 
imperial ideas of St. Stephen's Crownlands.
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book stressed that "the revision must be more than the re-annexation of the 
ethnically, exclusively or predominantly Hungarian regions along the frontiers" 
(Fenyo 1929). The plans he and his contemporaries boldly advocated would 
have raised the domestic percentage of non-Magyars from 11.51 to 18 per 
cent (Kovacs 1994:86) - obviously not something viewed as deterrent by either 
mainland society or government.
Chapter 6 will show how today Magyar ethno-national identity no longer 
prioritises adhesion to and membership in, the millennial Hungarian state unit. 
To be sure, communal homelands like Transylvania still hold enormous 
emotional appeal, yet, together with ancestry, these are no longer the principal 
markers of Hungarian identity. This means that the two vital irredentist 
conditions have ceased - shared blood cementing solidarity across borders, 
and the shared ‘map image’ of territories defining the extent of irredentist 
goals. As a result, shared statehood has ceased to be an imperative. Hungary 
no longer sees itself as truncated, former transborder enclaves now feel as 
separate Magyar communities in their own right. Retrieval is consequently no 
longer viewed as commonsensical, nor even desirable. Today, Magyars 
understand themselves as a cultural nation, defined by a common language 
and heritage. The mainland has moved from traditional nationalism 
(congruence of political and communal boundaries), to what Csergo and 
Goldgeier (2001; 2004) call ‘trans-sovereign nationalism’ (creating institutions 
to link the nation across state boundaries) exactly because territoriality has 
been superseded by culture which in turn non-political institutions can easily 
contain. Budapest’s consistent foreign policy principle during post-communism 
has thus been “to change the quality, rather than the location of state borders” 
(Bardi 2004b: 137).
Once again the governmental line is reflected by mainland public opinion. The 
Crownlands are no longer indispensable to Magyar existence and this 
translates accordingly into popular views on foreign policy. Attitudes especially 
towards integral (i.e. non-ethnic) revision are today overwhelmingly negative, 
and the meagre support has slipped further during post-communism (Csepeli 
1997:196-7; Bardi 2004b: 136). Only 5 to 6 per cent of mainland Hungarians
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wish for a (peaceful) redrawing of borders (Tabajdi and Barenyi 1998:71). 
Instead, language and heritage are ranked high as markers (Csepeli: ibid; 
HTMH 2000). Along with indicators of cultural self-definition recent polls have 
furthermore found strong attitudes of civic nationalism in the mainland 
(Shulman 2002:565-578).
4.4.4 Minorities: homogeneity vs. completeness
A final word is necessary regarding minority irredentism. For one, Horowitz 
proposed that the parent state’s homogeneity may be important to them. I 
have shown above that Hungary has remained ideal typical in this respect, 
which in turn does not explain variation in the minority’s readiness to be 
retrieved. More importantly the entire premise of national ‘purity’ as main 
irredentist concern has been refuted.
Secondly, it had also been suggested that transborder minorities may factor in 
their own dispersal when deciding about retrieval. Once again however this 
very commonsensical argument had proven weak in testing above. Yes, the 
possibility of partial retrieval posed a moral dilemma and even risked 
unaffordable internal divisions for Hungarians in interwar Transylvania and the 
Felvidek. Zeidler (2001:201-2) explains how their irredentism remained 
purposely vague because likely scenarios would have "(...) counted on the re- 
annexation of Magyar populated border areas, but renounced the return of (...) 
outlying Hungarian communities." And still, both minorities fervently supported 
and then welcomed retrieval (Bardi 2004b:73;86) -  despite losing, especially in 
Transylvania, substantial parts of their own. While this seemingly contradicts 
the irredentist emphasis on completeness, it actually makes perfect sense for 
two reasons. Chapter 6 will explain how irredentist minorities, amongst them 
interwar Magyar ones, see themselves as mere enclaves, ‘severed’ 
appendages of the parent state that are in an unnatural and precarious 
situation. Loyalty towards and identification with, the mainland triumph all other 
affiliations, not least that towards the ‘artificial’ community of the enclave 
(transborder Hungarians tellingly described themselves at the time as
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‘communities born out of force’). As a consequence, accepting their own 
partition as a price for returning into the national fold was squarely in line with 
priorities. Secondly, such attitudes reflect once more the above mentioned 
opportunism characteristic of irredentists: after all borders, even if still 
unsatisfactory, can always be further revised.
Today's minority attitudes in turn can only be outlined by extrapolation. The 
most helpful indicator are current demands for autonomy within Romania and 
Slovakia respectively. A decade and a half into their post-communist 
existence, Magyar minority organisations have produced a string of autonomy 
proposals: more than ten in Romania (Salat 2004) and at least three in 
Slovakia. Of the three possible forms these can take (personal, local and 
regional autonomy), both Transylvanian and Felvidek Hungarians have 
consistently advocated the regional variant (Rlz 2000:85-6)31. This is indicative 
because it reflects changes in Magyar identity in the importance of community 
and territory. While personal autonomy attributes choice to the minority 
individual alone, and the local option restricts itself to specifically Hungarian 
settlements, the self-governance of a whole area demonstrates the self- 
conscious, regionalised and increasingly civic identity Hungarian minorities 
have developed (see chapter 6).
4.5 Conclusion: ideology over feasibility
Horowitz’s variable, however obvious and logical at first sight, does not hold. 
Detailed investigation of all parent state variables in both time periods firstly 
demonstrates that irredentist inconsistency is not tied to change in the 
stipulated factors. Contemporary Hungary’s domestic minority situation is 
invariably favourable, so the parent state is in this respect as free to conduct 
an irredenta as in the interwar period. Secondly, the “structural bias” within 
areas to be retrieved also does not hold. I have shown that according to
31 Demands for personal autonomy were overall rare and usually in response to specific 
discriminatory measures or legislation by the host state (Riz 2000:ibid.). An example would be 
the Party of Magyar Coalition (MKP)'s 1996 draft proposal on linguistic personal autonomy in 
the wake of the restrictive Slovak language law passed that year.
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Horowitz’s criteria, the Felvidek’s retrieval was actually not without problems. 
Conversely, its recovery would be more justified in the current, significantly 
improved conditions I have described. As for Transylvania, the 1940 retrieval 
of its truncated, ethnically mixed northern part soundly contradicted projections 
about the importance of border proximity, compactness and homogeneity. 
Furthermore, Erdely’s situation today is insufficiently different from these 
dismal conditions to explain the irredentist inconsistency.
I have argued that what matters about territory in irredentism is not structural 
feasibility, but the central nexus with identity. The problem lay with the 
variable’s basic assumption, namely what irredentism wants and that it is 
therefore determined by objective, external factors rather than those internal to 
its actors. This manifested itself in three points. The unitary nation-stateness 
which the variable posits for the mainland is not a necessary prerequisite of 
irredentism. Neither is it an absolute precondition for the parent state’s ability 
to act, nor for the minority to desire retrieval into it. Titular dominance 
(ownership) by the group is enough in both aspects. Secondly, the importance 
of retrieving ethnic homelands is overlooked. The territory envisaged in the 
group’s ‘map image’ must be recovered, regardless of whether it stretches well 
beyond kindred settlements and mostly regardless of whether it is ethnically 
diverse. Finally and consequently, this misinterprets the nation-state 
irredentism seeks to re(create) -  and thus misunderstands the structural 
components that hinder or help it. Retrieval aims for completeness, rather than 
exclusivity. As a result, feasibility and demographic conditions which affect 
nation-state ‘purity’ do not matter much because irredentism’s primary goal is 
the inclusion of a maximum of kindred population and ancestral territory. In this 
pursuit irredentists are chiefly guided by their identity, both with regards to 
territory (its physical extent and prominence as ethnic marker) and groupness 
(mainland preferred over enclave). Whatever brings irredentists closer to these 
goals -  even if imperfectly -  they will pursue.
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5. Taking Cues from the Outside? Irredentism
and International Factors
“Many governments hold transborder causes in more esteem 
than the traditions of international law”
Walker Connor (1980:172)
5.1. Introduction: the international dimension within irredentism studies
Irredentism has been traditionally defined as phenomenon of international 
relations and often analysed exclusively through that prism. However, since 
the latter rarely conceives of ethnic groups as aggregate, sub-state actors, 
irredentism's essential character as ethno-national movement has been largely 
ignored in those studies (Mayall 1978; Midlarsky 19881; Zartman 1992; Von 
Hippel 1993; Katsiyiannis 1996; Carment 1994; Carment and James 1995 and 
1998).
Conversely, among the theories which do treat retrieval in that vein, very few 
include the inter-state environment as variable but see it instead as mere 
backdrop (Neuberger 1986 and 1991; Ben-lsrael 1991; Reichman and Golan 
1991; Brubaker 1996). Sociological and comparative political studies for their 
part, centre almost entirely on domestic factors (Kitromilides 1979 and 1990; 
Andreopoulos 1991; Landau 1990, 1991 and 1995; Yagcioglu 1996; Saideman 
1998 and 1999). Horowitz (1985;1991), whose model serves as baseline here, 
is a good example. He concedes that “the more calculative quality of state 
decisions probably makes deterrence more effective” (1985:287). Ultimately, 
however, the inter-state factor is in his view secondary because "it is (...) the 
domestic rather than the international consequences that constitute the 
principal disincentive to irredentism" (1985:282). As a result, the two
1 In a later work Midlarsky (1992) does consider ethnicity and sees it as irredentism's uniquely 
explosive aspect. He argues that while secessionist challenges have only caused regional 
wars irredentas (i.e. conflicts that involve transborder ethnic ties) are to a considerable 
measure responsible for the outbreak of both World Wars.
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explanatory approaches have so far figured almost in mutual exclusion, each 
failing to deliver comprehensive explanations. Rare exceptions here are 
Suhrke (1975; 1977) and Ambrosio (2002).
5.1.1 International factors and irredentist inconsistency
In chapter 1 I had found that the global proliferation of retrieval corresponded 
to the four bouts of modern state creation (section 1.3.1) as suggested by 
O’Leary (1998:61 ).2 Linking nationalism to modernity and industrialisation, I 
was thus able to organise the historical occurrence of irredentism in parallel, 
grouping it thematically into four successive waves: Native (1789-1918), 
Wilsonian (1919-1940), Anti-Colonial (1941-1988), and New World Order 
(1989-ongoing).3 Closer analysis revealed that each of these periods in turn 
alternated between short, active phases and extended latent ones. The latter 
are sub-periods during which the international system reverts to its default, 
status-quo consensus. Confusingly, such periods are not expressly prohibitive 
about ethnically defined border changes. Often the international system 
ostensibly upholds a permissive attitude (e.g. by extolling self-determination in 
the UN Charter) whilst in fact acting restrictively, often with an area bias.4 It 
was mainly during restrictive phases that irredentas were in stagnant or 
gestation mode. Active-permissive phases in contrast frequently saw them 
thrive and / or accomplish their goals.
This means that irredentist actors mirror fluctuations between active- 
permissive and latent-restrictive phases. They assess and respond to, 
international attitudes and the level of irredentist activity these allow or 
conversely necessitate. While this does not decide the internal want for
2 These are a) the revolutionary period in the Western hemisphere (1789-1825), b) the period 
following World W ar I, c) the phase of Asian and African decolonisation (1946 to the 1980s); 
and d) the years following the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991.
3 Section 1.3.1 (above) explained how irredentism has spread in a progressive global wave, 
proliferating beyond its original European mainstay (waves I and II) onto Africa and Asia in the 
course of the twentieth century (waves III and IV). The diffusion of irredentism has however 
stopped short of immigrant societies - Australia as well as the Americas - primarily because 
the modern state there has distinctly preceded nations in the Gellnerian sense. Additionally, 
their ethnic heterogeneity pre-empts the logic of group cohesion so central to irredentas.
4 For instance, the Anti-Colonial phase displayed tolerance towards border revision only in 
Africa and Asia, whilst maintaining a firm status quo attitude in Europe.
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irredentism5, it suggests that world political factors do modulate its external 
conduct In doing so they interact with or even compound, irredentism’s 
endogenous factors significantly enough to contribute to an overall 
explanation. The question thus remains one of gauging their precise impact 
and explanatory weight.
International restrictiveness / permissiveness matters somewhat differently to 
parent states than to minorities. This chapter hence proposes a set of two, 
linked criteria for each irredentist actor which it will test in the Hungarian case. 
Parent states are affected by international systemic cues and more immediate 
backing from an irredentist patron power. Minorities in turn react to 
demonstration effects from parent state behaviour and neighbouring 
irredentas, as well as to levels of international protection. In the light of the 
evidence, this chapter will argue that the international environment is a useful 
secondary factor in explaining irredentist inconsistency. Ultimately, however, it 
remains subordinate to irredentist actors’ ideology (ethno-nationalism) and to 
the regime type within which they operate. Both in this case and others, 
international givens do not by themselves decide an irredenta, but rather 
reinforce or limit domestic / group-internal imperatives6 and thus significantly 
condition its methods and level of diplomatic activism.
5.2 Irredentist parent states versus the inter-state consensus
The international system variable has two main aspects for irredentist parent 
states. The first and principal instance concerns the international systemic
5 This is in line with Moore and Davis' (1998) statistical findings about ethnic dyads displaying 
comparatively less co-operative behaviour within the inter-state system, i.e. reacting less to its 
environmental influences.
6 Ambrosio (2001) undertakes a very similar examination of the international determinants of 
irredentism, but comes to largely the opposite conclusion. His two-level model restricts itself to 
two variables: the level of international toleration and the level of ethno-territorial nationalism in 
the kin state. He argues th a t"(...) decision makers of potentially irredentist states are caught in 
a nexus of pressures, opportunities, and constraints at the domestic and international levels" 
(ibid.:16). Ambrosio's ‘level of international toleration’-variable differs from mine in several key 
aspects, most prominently because it only treats “forcible annexations of territory” (ibid. 21), as 
which he counts irredentism. Given that this excludes many irredentist cases (amongst them 
all Hungarian ones), and because it also lacks internal differentiation (time period, location), it 
is not used here.
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toleration for ethnically defined border changes. Indicators for a favourable 
phase are: endorsement or even explicit promotion of the mono-ethnic state as 
desirable or ideal, acceptance of revisionist policies and discourses, as well as 
swift and full diplomatic recognition of secessions and irredentas. The more 
geographically close these apply, the better, given that permissiveness is often 
regionally selective. Parent states will intensify irredentist tactics if the inter­
state system is positively disposed towards retrieval. Restrictiveness by 
contrast leads to moderation in irredentist diplomacy, but cannot end the actual 
desire for retrieval.
This first, systemic factor combines with a second, more immediate aspect. A 
parent state's irredentist behaviour is furthermore shaped by the existence of a 
patron power (see e.g. Weiner 1991:670). A patron is an allied state that is 
more powerful7 and either ideologically revisionist, or at least instrumentally 
benevolent. Regional proximity is once again important, exactly because of the 
frequent area bias in permissiveness. Normally such backing is actively 
sought, if necessary even in contradiction to previous policy orientations or at 
the expense of other ties.8 Patronage cannot offset international 
restrictiveness, but it mitigates the latter. Conversely, in more permissive 
phases it further widens the room for manoeuvre. Lacking patronage in turn 
does not deter irredentists, no matter what the international juncture. Several 
givens can be indicators of help: concrete alliances and treaties (e.g. Hungary 
and the Axis Powers), military support in terms of materiel, personnel and / or 
advice (for instance Somalia and the USSR), or diplomatic backing and 
encouragement of the cause by a third party (e.g. late nineteenth / early 
twentieth century Serbia and Tsarist Russia). In some cases of course, the
7 ‘More powerful’ means that such a state is able to successfully assert its foreign policies even 
in the face of external disapproval or coercion.
8 To Myron Weiner (ibid.) irredentist Bulgaria exemplifies this phenomenon. “In the First World 
War, Bulgaria sided with the Central Powers against Russia, with the expectation that a 
German-Austrian victory would lead to its acquisition of Macedonia. The persistence of the 
claim to Macedonia was a decisive factor in Bulgaria’s decision to join with Austria, Hungary 
and Germany in the Second World W ar against Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the 
Allies. To the very end, Bulgaria’s revisionist goals dominated its foreign policy, even when it 
meant becoming a supporter of Germany’s efforts to occupy all of the Balkans militarily. 
Bulgaria had literally cut off its own nose to spite its face. Moreover, Bulgaria’s alliances with 
Germany ran counter to deeply felt historical, religious and cultural associations with Russia, 
thus demonstrating the overwhelming role that irredentist sentiments have played in the choice 
of allies."
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parent state itself is militarily and geo-politically powerful enough to act as its 
own patron (e.g. Nazi Germany). If not, it is likely to seek one where possible. 
The modulating impact of these factors on mainland irredentism can be traced 
in two key areas: the use and content of propaganda and the extent of 
compliance with externally imposed parameters.
5.2.1 Mirroring realities: interwar Hungary and the changing Wilsonian 
environment (1918-40)
Brief but selective permissiveness (1918-21): open irredentist resistance 
The years between 1918 and 1921 saw a genuine preparedness to allow, 
even sometimes encourage, changes in the status quo. As a transition phase 
replete with the uncertainties of post-imperial collapse, it appeared to offer 
room for negotiation. "The five years following World War I namely was the era 
of the peace treaties' creation, coming into force and implementation, the era 
of the building and stabilisation of the new order" (Zeidler 2001:60). Given the 
regional proximity of successful irredentist bids, Hungary had theoretically 
reason to nurture hope: Italy had seized Trieste, Romania annexed 
Bessarabia, and Poland occupied significant Lithuanian and Russian 
territories. Confusingly, however, this apparent window of opportunity was 
selective and biased, for the short-lived permissive order only applied to former 
Great Power allies while, as both Trianon and the other Paris treaties showed, 
it was explicitly designed against the losers of he Great War. Hungary thus 
pointed in vain to the contradiction between its own fate -  the loss of three 
million Magyars - and Wilsonian ideals. Furthermore, international constraints 
on the mainland’s sovereignty remained severe even after partition. In 1921, 
the country was still partially occupied, its position isolated (with Italy blocking 
its acceptance into the League of Nations), whilst its military and fiscal 
capacities were severely reduced and externally monitored. In addition, there 
were debilitating domestic conditions from wartime devastation, partition, triple 
regime change9 and the barely ended civil war.
9 Between 1918 and 1921, Hungary experienced democratic-republican government (October 
1918-March 1919), a communist revolution (March to November 1919), which in turn was 
fought by Christian-conservative forces. These were immediately acknowledged as legitimate
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Budapest was hence receiving mixed messages during this brief first sub­
phase of the Wilsonian wave: punitive national truncation conflicted with 
generally promoted self-determination. The misinterpretation of this ambiguity 
as ‘opportunity’ in turn translated as short spike in mainland irredentist activity. 
While ostensibly bowing to external pressure, Hungary simultaneously 
entertained adventurous schemes10 and sought irredentist patronage in the run 
up to Trianon. The quest was unsuccessful. London was unwilling, while other 
potentially revisionist countries (Germany, the USSR, Bulgaria, Austria, Italy) 
were unavailable, albeit for a panoply of different reasons (Juhasz 1988:61-3; 
Poloskei and Gergely 1997:55-6; Ormos 1998:122-125; Zeidler 2001:71-75). 
Yet given the deceptive international opportunities, this lack of backing did not 
moderate Hungary. Thus Budapest's delegation to the Trianon negotiations 
boldly cited the Magyar claim to the whole of the former kingdom, and with it a 
civilising mission over resident ‘subject’ peoples (Zeidler 2001:29-30). This 
insistence on ascendancy and ancestral territory was commonsensical to 
Hungarians (see section 4.4), yet struck a sour note with the Great Powers and 
successor states: neither did such rhetoric suit the Wilsonian spirit, nor 
Hungary's status as wartime loser. This assertiveness continued even 
following partition in June 1920, for instance in the confrontation with Austria 
over the still occupied Orvidek / Burgenland. Despite its international isolation, 
the mainland insisted on its claim throughout the second half of 1922. 
Eventually, Budapest did concede the region under severe pressure, yet also 
achieved a December plebiscite for Sopron city and its surroundings - which 
promptly voted for irredentist retrieval (see Ormos 1998:94-8 on the Venice 
Agreement).
government by the Great Powers (November 1919). Confirmed by subsequent parliamentary 
elections (January 1920), they consolidated Hungary in the new constitution (February) as 
monarchy under a substitute regent ( Admiral Miklos Horthy).
10 Prime minister Karolyi had declared in 1919 that "the Hungarian government will formally 
protest, but bows before the conference's decision" (Ormos 1998:45). However, the same 
period (1918-20) also saw desperate and unrealistic plans, ranging from a proposed Bavarian- 
Austrian-Hungarian challenge to the peace treaties over retaining the Orvktek / Burgenland, 
down to re-occupying Ruthenia with potential Polish help (see Ormos 1998:84; Zeidler 
2001:61)
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Restrictive consensus vs. beginning patronage (1922-35): muted irredentism
The subsequent period between 1922 and 1935 presented interwar Budapest 
with an increasingly solidified status quo system. Hungary realised that the 
leeway for any action had begun to decrease rapidly from 1921 onwards 
(Zeidler 2001:62-3). That spring the Great Powers ratified Trianon, whilst its 
regional neighbours began to organise into a hostile military alliance, the Little 
Entente. Its members - Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia - were the 
very assimilationist host states Hungary intended to retrieve its Magyar 
minorities from. Hungary’s disarmed and downsized military compared badly to 
their "instantaneous and unconditional" collective defence system. Most 
importantly, the "Little Entente's public opinion scrutinised even the minutest 
revelation within Hungarian foreign policy from which one could conclude a 
revisionist pursuit" (Gergely and Pritz 2000:86-7). Even "in the second half of 
the 1920s the room for movement of Hungarian foreign policy was 
unchangingly limited. Acceptance into the League of Nations and the loan 
[from the latter] counted undoubtedly as diplomatic successes, but also tied 
the government's hands. The country was essentially under the League's 
financial and military supervision" (Poloskei and Gergely 1997:87; see also 
Juhasz 1988:96). Budapest hence now complied with external parameters by 
changing to more a muted, preparatory irredentism unaffected even by 
beginning patronage. This is visible in two connected areas during these 
years: a changed irredentist discourse and diplomacy.
Budapest understood that the new borders were upheld by the Great Powers 
rather than the successor states' own solidity. It thus continued to seek 
diplomatic and military patronage for its goals (Pritz 1995:224-5, 234, 238; 
Gergely and Pritz 1998:86-7; Zeidler 2001:69). However, since Hungary had 
"an ambivalent relationship with the victorious powers", its "overtures towards 
them remained for years without success" (Zeidler ibid.:71, 73). Instead, it 
therefore sought to remedy diplomatic ties, which necessarily entailed 
moderation - precisely in the ultimate interest of irredentist goals. Bethlen had 
declared upon taking office in 1921 that his principal aim was "to widen the 
nation's foreign political horizon." Towards domestic criticism of thus effectively 
giving up on retrieval "the government (...) justified its determination with the
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fact that international political life since the peace treaties took place in the 
League of Nations, and Hungary could only break out of its diplomatic isolation 
if it partook [in it] as independent state and equal member" (Juhasz 1988:80- 
1). Foreign secretary Banffy was even clearer about this so-called "integrative 
manoeuvre": "with targeted and sustained work Hungary can contribute to the 
gradual remodelling of the League's spirit, and could in time use [it] for its own 
goals". This way "the time will come - perhaps faster than we think - when we 
can raise the revisionist question, put it on the agenda within the League of 
Nations" quipped Albert Apponyi, Budapest's representative to the body 
(Zeidler 2001:64-5). The country's readmission to the international community 
was eventually achieved with accession to the League in 1922. Zeidler 
(2001:52) describes this as "the phase of gathering strength, matched by 
relative foreign political passivity."
Parent state behaviour became somewhat bolder after Hungary had secured 
Fascist Italy’s irredentist patronage in April 1927.11 In addition, two major 
international constraints had fallen away: Budapest's fiscal and military 
supervision by the League respectively expired in the summer of 1926 and 
spring 1927. "The Great Power support (...) enabled Hungary to step out of its 
foreign political passivity" (Zeidler 2001:76). Thus, only seven weeks later 
Prime minister Bethlen's keynote speech launched his "active foreign policy". 
Shortly afterwards the Hungarian Revisionist League was founded. Although 
not a governmental body, it was boldly semi-official in that it included along 
influential personalities also members of the Hungarian Upper House (Kovacs 
1994:82).
The mainland was nevertheless well aware that external backing could not 
outweigh the continuing status quo consensus, and behaved accordingly. This 
is for instance illustrated by Hungary's reaction to the 1927 Rothermere 
campaign. Entitled "Justice For Hungary" the Daily Mail's editor had engaged 
in (unsolicited) activism for Trianon's revision along ethnic Magyar borders. 
This crucially occurred three months after securing Mussolini's help. Yet 
Bethlen revealingly stated that "until the international situation allows it I am
11 Private correspondence between Mussolini and Bethlen shows that this "Treaty of Eternal 
Friendship and Arbitration" was meant as far more than its title suggested. Both sides pledged 
mutual consultation and harmonisation in foreign policy.
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not prepared to bring the nation into worldwide embarrassment for the sake of 
overzealous patriots" (Kovacs 1994:87; emphasis mine). So while Trianon's 
"peaceful revision" was now declared as governmental policy, this was done 
only domestically12 and still without any details -  as stipulated by that very 
treaty. Irredentist discourse now also introduced legal reasoning alongside 
economic and technical arguments. This stress on rights and entitlements 
mirrored greater assertiveness, but also implied negotiation and continued 
compliance within imposed norms. This was furthermore self-effacing, even 
defensive. Invoking the twin legal bases for his government’s bid, Bethlen 
argued that "these two provisions of international law13 render (...) accusations 
untenable", and so "engaging with revisionist questions can therefore not be 
labelled irredentist" (Kovacs 1994:88). Patronage therefore "did not mean that 
the Hungarian government slammed - or intended to slam - the door behind 
itself in either London or Paris. To the contrary" (Ormos 1998:127), Hungary 
simultaneously continued to nurture relations with both.
Together with adopting its “integrative manoeuvre”, the parent state also 
changed the way in which it sought to influence and inform international public 
opinion about the Magyar cause. The adjustment resulted from two important 
realisations. For one, the Hungarian government came to understand that its 
insistence along the imperial St. Stephen notion was anachronistic and 
inadvertently counterproductive. It also began to comprehend the 
selectiveness of the Wilsonian permissive consensus.14 Hungary's other main 
argument - the loss of three million ethnic Magyars -  had been palpably 
ignored although it contradicted the very ideals of the period (Juhasz 1988:68; 
Ormos 1998:79-81).
12 It would take until 1930 for Hungary to voice its claim in an international forum, with count 
Apponyi's speech at the League of Nations. This daring move was once again moderated by a 
strongly legalistic and diplomatic tone.
13 Budapest's new legal reasoning based itself on two very general and probably overvalued, 
provisions. Paragraph 19 of the League of Nations' Pact granted the theoretical possibility of 
boundary revision. The same was raised in the Millerand Letter, a conciliatory note by the 
Great Powers which accompanied the Trianon Treaty in 1920. Given that both were at the time 
nearly a decade old, their sudden use by Hungary is all the more indicative.
14 Alternatively, Hungary had encountered zero sum thinking: "If Slovakia was to belong to 
Hungary", Thomas Masaryk reasoned in 1919, "two million Slovaks would find themselves 
under the Magyar yoke. Vice versa comparatively only half a million Hungarians are in 
Slovakia, and those do not live in repression. It is under all circumstances more just that half a 
million should be subordinated to two million" (Szarka 1998:13).
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As a result, Hungary practiced strategic moderation via change to ‘technical’ 
arguments, proxy irredentism, and studied evasiveness on the subject. Firstly, 
in the early 1920s Hungarian politicians switched away from arrogant rhetoric, 
with foreign secretary Teleki admonishing that "our diplomats should be 
characterised by (...) modest self-conduct" (Gergely and Pritz 1998:66). 
Ideological statements of regional superiority, but also the legitimate call for 
ethnic borders, ceded to functional arguments. Instead of emotional and 
ideological appeals, Budapest now cited legal, economic and geographic 
factors to make the irredentist case (Zeidler 2001:52). The line was now 
carefully objective, quoting "scientific" facts and figures about the truncated 
country's alleged unviability. These were produced by a string of newly 
founded research bodies and delivered in former prime minister Teleki’s 
international lectures, or prime minister Bethlen’s new 'economic propaganda' 
between 1923 and 1927 (Kovacs 1994:88). In contrast to domestic discourse, 
Budapest would henceforth no longer justify retrieval for what it demanded - 
namely the recovery of transborder kindred and of the ancestral Magyar 
territories of St. Stephen’s Crown.
Secondly, together with its changed discourse the government now placed the 
irredentist “ball” now into other courts. In line with its legalistic approach (see 
above), Budapest began to highlight Hungarian minority grievances.15 Invoking 
transborder Magyars' right to self-determination it suggested either autonomy 
or referenda as solution, both with an implicit view to eventual reunion (Pritz 
1995:236; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85; Zeidler 2001:140).16 This was 
irredentism by proxy: the innocuous citing of Wilsonian principles avoided 
putting Budapest into a revisionist role and instead placed any irredentist 
initiative on the minority. In this sense, Hungary was seen to merely press for 
the implementation of what were internationally recognised concepts. This
15 Bardi (1995b) describes how Budapest's irredentist sub-ministry specially budgeted for 
printing and dissemination of material that documented Magyar minority grievances for the
League of Nations.
16 Referenda were rare, precisely because many minorities would have immediately voted for 
reunion. Also, the international community’s attitude grew increasingly restrictive and 
geographically selective as the Wilsonian period wore on, opposing referenda on the grounds 
that they set dangerous precedents. A rare exception for Hungary was the plebiscite in the 
Austrian-annexed town of Sopron and its surrounding region in 1921-2 (voting for reunion with 
72.5 and 65 per cent respectively). Autonomy in turn was feared as precursor to eventual 
defection. Indeed, Magyar minorities demanded autonomy not least in the hope of eventual 
retrieval (Csaky 1996:4; Zeidler 2001:202; Bardi 2004b:73-4).
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strategy was repeated with regards to propaganda: more explicit irredentism 
was once again relegated to proxy actors, not least because the peace treaty 
had outlawed outright agitation. Budapest thus reigned in domestic extremism 
and in 1921 placed all private irredentist initiatives under its covert, 
instrumental control (Gergely and Pritz 2000:84; Zeidler 2001: 88-94,126-7).17 
There evolved "between them and official foreign policy essentially a clearly 
discernible division of labour". This "lent an favourable contrast to the 
conciliatory policies pursued by the government in front of the victorious 
powers.” Relegating ‘extremism’ to tightly controlled private groups with a 
"broad societal base" thus "acted advantageously in that it lent official politics a 
greater possibility of manoeuvre" (Pritz 1995:235).
Thirdly, Hungary developed the covert financing and direction of its minorities 
in a preparatory irredentist scheme (Bardi 1995a, 1995b, 2004b; Angyal 
2000c; Torok 2001). Although this secretive process18 had started well prior to 
Trianon, the apparatus came into its own only after 1921-22 - parallel to 
increasing international rigidity. It was specially budgeted for, with mounting 
figures throughout the early twenties. Funding priorities and amounts differed 
between minorities (Angyal 2000c: 146-167), but the goal was the same: to 
sustain (and thus discreetly control) the communities and thereby prepare 
future retrieval (see also section 6.2.2). One of the project’s leading figures, 
Benedek Jancso, summarised this strategy as follows: "they were able to take 
the territory away from us, but once the opportunity arises we can take it back 
under favourable and fortunate circumstances, because it [the territory] will not 
disappear. The homeland is not made up of mountains, valleys, rivers and 
plains, but of those people who live in it. If however the Hungarian community
17 A 1921 prime ministerial survey lists a total of 31 irredentist leagues and associations, 20 
political movements, and ten registered bodies. Their activity first focused on newly separated 
transborder kindred (information gathering, encouragement, refugee help), but also began 
targeting international public opinion. In May 1921 the government dissolved the most extreme 
(i.e. potentially embarrassing) groups, and outlawed any reference to the territorial integrity of 
neighbouring host states. Recognising however their potential value as proxy actors, Budapest 
placed them three months later under an official body headed by Teleki (Zeidler 2001 :ibid.; 
Bardi 1995a).
18 Activities were first channelled via the prime minister's office, with all correspondence having 
to be handed back for destruction. Innocuously named respective offices handled the various 
minorities: the Rakdczi (later Thokoly) Federation for the Felvid§k, the Saint Gell6rt Society for 
the Voivodina, and the now Romanian Banat and the Popular Literary Society (NIT) for 
Transylvania. From 1927 onward these were centralised under the Revisionist League.
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is lost, wholly or in part, on these areas as a result of foreign repressive rule, 
then we will also lose our strongest legal entitlement to these territories" (Bardi 
1995a:8).
Strategic moderation, finally, also meant that Hungary avoided making 
concrete irredentist demands (Pritz 1995:239-240; Hoensch 1967:10-11; 
Balogh 1988:54). To get "onto the territory of dangerous concreteness", as an 
internal memo called it, would automatically narrow Hungary's options. It would 
then be "forced to bargain about the belonging of small territorial strips, and 
then of villages" shuddered Bethlen. Yet if conversely Budapest was to lay 
claim on its entire former realm, "then the Magyar nation would appear as if it 
was again intent on subjugating other nations" (Juhasz 1988:74; Pritz 
1995:236-9; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85). Hence Bethlen practised a "dual 
optic" (kettos optika) which left all options open: it differentiated between 
"minimal" (ethnic) and "optimal" (integral) retrieval. This ambiguity was 
carefully maintained even after Hungary had won Mussolini's backing. In fact, 
the Duce had to wait until 1934 until he received a concrete plan. The point 
here is that imprecision resulted not only from present inter-state 
restrictiveness, but was also maintained because Budapest could not foresee 
the degree and selectivity to which it or potential patrons would support 
Magyar irredentism in the future.
Part of this dilemma lay at home though. Chapter 6 will explain how interwar 
irredentism included imperial Hungary's integral restoration (i.e. beyond 
kindred settlement areas) because Magyar ethnicity tied itself to this ancestral 
territory. As a consequence, leaders could ill afford to voice lesser demands. 
Bethlen described this nexus well in his groundbreaking second irredentist 
speech of March 1928: "We did not (simply) lose provinces. We have been 
partitioned. Ours is not the case of Alsace-Lorraine. Ours is the case of 
Poland. Germany has renounced a province [Alsace], but we cannot renounce 
eternally of a third of our kind. We cannot accept this as just, and the 
Hungarian nation would crucify any politician who were to sign a second 
Trianon" (Kovacs 1994:89-90, emphasis mine). Furthermore, "the desire for 
territorial integrity determined thinking also in the highest echelons" (Zeidler 
2001:146). Indeed, Admiral Horthy publicly rejected ethnic criteria for
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annexation as too moderate (Hoensch 1995:117), and the cabinet disapproved 
of Lord Rothermere's 1927 campaign not least for the same reason.19 So while 
ambiguity kept all foreign political options open, it much more fundamentally 
came from the imperatives of group identity, which demanded the entirety of 
the territory that defined "Hungarianness".
Patronage combines with renewed permissiveness (1935-40): aggressive 
Magyar irredentism
This restraint changed when the Wilsonian era switched back into a more 
permissive international consensus, with the period between 1935 and 1940 
increasingly building a revisionist momentum. Multilateralism was clearly 
ending: the Disarmament Conference had disintegrated in 1934 after two 
years of fruitless negotiation, the previous year Nazi Germany had left the 
palpably powerless League of Nations. Crucially, Hitler's increasingly daring 
recoveries - the Saarland region, Austria, then the Sudeten German areas - 
proved that the inter-state community had once again widened the leeway for 
border changes. Great Power appeasement not only tolerated irredentism, but 
the unravelling of the very order that had caused Hungary’s partition.
Facing these developments, "Hungarian foreign policy (...) precisely 
interpreted [them] ...from the viewpoint of its interests and goals" (Zeidler 
2001:69). Budapest had long understood that the borders dissecting Magyar 
kin and ancestral territory depended on the very Great Power guarantees 
which these changes now eroded. The demonstration effects of successful 
Italian and German irredentas in the region20 combined with direct irredentist 
patronage from both. Although there never was a formal treaty with Nazi 
Germany (Pritz 1982:270), the Hungarian government acted from the mid- 
1930s onwards increasingly with assurances about Berlin's backing. Domestic 
pressures further underlined this window of opportunity. Mainlanders'
19 An internal government directive even instructed diplomatic staff to reject the ‘minimal’ 
border revision proposed by Rothermere (Hoensch 1967:10-11, footnotes; Ranki 1976:559; 
Kovacs 1994:87).
20 Hungarian prime minister Imredy saw these as “examples” for Hungary (Ormos 1998:193), 
while Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu warned: "any yielding of territory would only mean 
the beginning of a process. After the first concession demands for further [ones] would follow, 
and so on. Just like with the war reparations. (...) This process would also be repeated with 
territorial questions" (Pritz 1995:240).
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"everyday irredentism did not really take notice of the realities of world politics” 
but was rather an “inward looking, defiant reaction" (Zeidler 2001:188). Public 
pressure was hence wholly ideological, as Teleki complained.21 It was also 
influential (Pritz 1995:231-3), and became more so because irredentism 
developed exactly at that time into the main area of convergence between 
competing aristocratic and middle class elites (see section 7.2.1).
The convergence of international attitudes and patronage thus caused parent 
state irredentism to become progressively open and assertive. It reached its 
peak after the Munich agreement of September 1938, faithfully in parallel with 
appeasement politics. Confrontation firstly began to translate into Magyar 
irredentist propaganda, both in terms of tactics and content. Hungary 
abandoned all previous discretion in manipulating its transborder kindred, who 
were now openly funded by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Secondly, 
Hungary emulated the return of bilateralism and power politics. Precise 
irredentist plans were now presented, first in Bethlen’s international lectures 
(1933), then by Prime minister Gbmbos (1934). Factual reasoning now turned 
into demands. These were less and less addressed to Western capitals and 
international bodies, but rather directly to individual host states. The tone also 
sharpened: Hungary first called for improvement in the treatment of Hungarian 
minorities (1937), then for immediate autonomy, and finally, citing Axis 
backing, demanded the return of whole areas (1938-40) (see e.g. Roman 
1994). In tandem, Budapest ceased its policy of complying with the Great 
Powers. Most significant here was the rupture with London by refusing to 
condemn the 1935 Abyssinia crisis, sparked off by revisionist ally Mussolini. 
Hungary finally also left the League of Nations in 1939, the very forum via 
which it had hoped to achieve irredentism.
Nazi Germany’s patronage also changed Hungary's irredentist goal-and 
priority setting. Not only was the alliance unequal in need, but Berlin also used 
both the domestic German minority and Budapest’s increasing economic
21 "Our public opinion has gone mad. Get everything back! With any means, through any help, 
no matter at what cost. (...) The Magyar public has lost its mind over all the propaganda and 
patriotic phrases" (Zeidler 2001:57-8).
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dependency as bargaining chips (Berend and Ranki 2002).22 Now the "dual 
optic" came to a watershed choice between territory and fellow Magyars 
because neither Germany nor Italy supported integral retrieval.23 In a wider 
sense this forced a trade-off between sovereignty and external support, 
because the retrieval of both kin and ancestral realm had also meant regaining 
former great power status (Pritz 1995:226). The fact that the two had now 
become alternatives was an agonising dilemma to the government24, while the 
mainland public - encouraged by the Felvidek's (1938) and then 
Subcarpathia's retrieval (1939) - denied or ignored it (Ormos 1998:209; Zeidler 
2001:85). Opportunism eventually prevailed. Hungary took whatever it could 
retrieve, even if incompletely (see also section 4.4). Even count Teleki, a 
veteran defender of the St. Stephen notion, endorsed this upon his return to 
office and applied it to Transylvania's partial retrieval in November 1940 
(Ormos 1998:224). In the interest of securing at least some Magyar territories 
Budapest complied with its "powerful protector", as Bethlen had called Berlin 
(Balogh in Borsody 1988:59).
5.2.2 Uniting domestic and international status quo consensus: Post­
communist Hungary (1989-2005)
International ambiguity and Magyar renouncement of retrieval (1989-1993)
The collapse of the Soviet empire initiated a new irredentist wave, with the 
international consensus reverting to a more permissive stance between 1989
22 Pritz (1982:265-6) describes for instance an early altercation on this issue between Hitler 
and foreign minister Kanya in 1934. The "Fuhrer" made it clear that his support for the Felvidek 
irredenta depended on Budapest's concessions to its domestic German minority. As described 
in section 4.2.4, this group acted not only as leverage but to some extent as agent, for Berlin 
(Tilkovsky 1998:73; Gratz 2001:196-203).
23 "The two Great Powers' foreign political aspirations namely crossed Hungarian designs in 
several instances" (Zeidler 2001:79). Hitler had told Gombos in 1933 that he would only 
support territorial demands towards Czechoslovakia, but no resurrection of St. Stephen's 
realms - a line he adhered to throughout. Mussolini had his own designs in the Balkans and 
thus rejected Hungarian aspirations for retrieving the Voivodina.
24 Historians disagree on this point. Pritz (1982:271) maintains that "also during this period 
they [the government] are not prepared to renounce the restoration of the country's territorial 
integrity as ultimate goal" (Juhasz 1988:69,74 even argues this never wavered). Others in 
contrast believe that leading politicians - Bethlen, Teleki and certainly Gombos - effectively 
accepted realities, yet kept the integral irredenta as ideal and official goal. "The government 
did not publicise its dilemma, but this factor was described clearly in speeches, publications 
and within opposition circles" (Zeidler 2001:82-3; see also Romsics 1998:8-9).
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and 1993. This initial laxness moreover applied specifically to East-Central 
Europe, and was thus ostensibly favourable: it included the swift recognition of 
ex-Soviet and former Yugoslav republics and acceptance of Czechoslovakia’s 
Velvet Divorce. However, not only was this window of opportunity short and 
devoid of patronage, but - like the initial years of the Wilsonian period - it was 
also qualitatively skewed. While it tolerated the self-determination of pre­
existing sub-state units, the inter-state community remained consistently 
hostile to fresh cuts along ethno-territorial criteria. A few examples illustrate 
this well. Croatia's independence in 1991 was quickly welcomed by both 
individual states (Germany, Austria) and the EU, yet Zagreb's subsequent bid 
to retrieve kindred from Bosnia in 1993 was met by an international arms 
embargo. Similarly, Serbian irredentism towards its enclaves in Bosnia 
encountered international sanctions and, eventually, military intervention in 
1995. Greece's belligerence at FYROM's titular use of "Macedonia" in 1991 
met stern warnings from both Brussels and NATO.
Budapest did not pick up on this brief permissive spike. Unlike in the Wilsonian 
period’s initial years, regional developments this time clearly spelt out the rules 
of selectiveness. Neither was there any potential for irredentist patronage. The 
few actively irredentist states in the region25, Croatia and Serb-dominated 
rump Yugoslavia, proved a warning example in their respective failures. 
"Whatever it were to do, Hungary always has to bear in mind the requirements 
of regional and international stability" George Schopflin remarked, "for since 
the outbreak of nationalities conflicts in Yugoslavia the international community 
reacts more sensitively to the eventual dangers of destabilisation that may 
result" (1998:130). The negative demonstration effects in the Balkans were 
thus today’s equivalent of the encouragement provided by interwar German 
irredentas. Furthermore, there was no regional state with a similarly truncated 
nation and / or sufficient independent power bases (military and diplomatic). 
Russia, the sole to vaguely qualify, never embarked on such a policy. Finally 
and most importantly, post-communist Hungary now had both a changed
25 Admittedly, Dataset 1 lists several further contemporary irredentas in the region: Romania 
(versus Moldavia), Belarus (versus Poland and Lithuania) and the Albanian irredentas. Since 
the two former are however low-grade/dormant, while the latter counts simultaneously as Type 
2 (unificationist) irredentism, Serbia and Croatia are taken as only regional Type 1 cases 
where retrieval was actively pursued.
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sense of identity and a domestic political system which both precluded 
irredentism (see chapters 6 and 7). A quickly consolidating democracy barred 
ethno-politics via pluralism, accountability and rival civic-institutional legitimacy. 
In tandem, Magyar identity no longer tied itself to the ancestral grounds which 
the St. Stephen principle tried to recover. Fomented not least by the impact of 
democracy, which promoted an alternative, civic identity, Hungarian ethno- 
nationalism had deterritorialised and become culturally defined. Together with 
resulting minority self-assertion across the borders, this in turn ended the other 
main basis for irredentism: perfect group solidarity. Mainlanders and 
transborder kin today regard each other as related, but separate communities. 
This process has been active since late communism and is still growing 
(Csepeli 1992/97:241-254; HTMH 2000; Shulman 2002). Hungary’s early 
renouncement of retrieval thus not so much bowed to international 
disincentives as married them with pre-existing and developing domestic 
responses on this issue.
Despite some initial slip-ups26, Budapest thus began to elaborate a course 
faithful to these domestic and international givens. The result was the so-called 
"Antall-doctrine” of March 1993: reaching Euro-Atlantic integration, a 
neighbourhood policy based on friendly co-operation, and the (...) national 
policy for transborder Magyar interests" (Rlz 2000:81-2). Arguably, the main 
priority within this policy triangle was for economic and political reinsertion into 
the Western hemisphere via NATO and EU membership. The success of such 
aspirations was in turn crucially contingent on the resolution of any pending 
ethno-territorial concerns and of resulting regional tensions. Hence Hungary 
also started to develop its neighbourhood diplomacy, not least as part of a self­
consciously legalistic ethnic patronage for its kin. "Only this kind of foreign 
policy can cement the country's favourable international judgement" reaffirms 
even the current government's foreign political manifesto (2002:section 9.2).
26 The most notorious of these incidents was premier Antall's 1991 dictum of "feeling as the 
prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians". His rhetorical inclusion of transborder Magyars 
into the mainland's political community alarmed regional neighbours, who took it as thinly 
veiled irredentist announcement. Some contend that the first three years of post-communist 
foreign policy (1990-1993) were deliberately ambiguous on the question of transborder 
Magyars in order to test the waters. In my view, this was more the result of regime change and 
-adjustment. If, however, one was to agree, then such ambivalence would precisely echo the 
brief period of international relaxation.
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Restrictiveness re-established: compliance, integration and ‘virtual nationalism’
(1994-2005)
Following this permissive interlude, the contemporary New World Order wave 
of irredentas has settled back into its default, Westphalian status quo 
consensus. There is marked reluctance to accept any territorially defined 
change in the region.27 Budapest has been consistent in its initial policy and 
responsiveness to outside cues. For instance, during the negotiations for the 
Basic Treaty with Romania in 1995-6, Magyar insistence on collective rights 
and regional autonomy caused both the US and German governments to 
question Hungary's commitment to its non-irredentist policy-line. "After it 
declared its support of autonomy for Hungarian minorities abroad, the Horn 
government was in danger of seeing its progress toward joining NATO 
disappear overnight" and thus reacted quickly to a weak Romanian overture." 
(...) Were it not for the American reaction (...) Hungary would have been more 
hesitant about the Romanian-proposed compromise" (Shafir 1996:30). 
Germany's reprimands on this issue (Zellner and Dunay 1998:240-242) were 
equally hitting home, given especially that country's support for Hungary’s 
early EU accession.
Another, more recent, example is the Hungarian reaction to Brussels' critique 
of the Status (or Preference) Law. Long planned and formulated to aid Magyar 
minorities financially and culturally, its 2001 passing alarmed especially 
Bucharest and Bratislava.28 The latter turned to the European Union, who set
27 The only exception since has been support for and subsequent acceptance of, East Timor's 
independence from Indonesia in 2001.
28 Since the Law legislated on their citizens, the two states accused Budapest of interference 
into their internal affairs. They especially opposed the plan for local Magyar minority parties to 
set up parent state financed and -directed offices on host state soil. These would register 
applicants as ethnic Hungarians, and issue them with a Magyarigazolvany (a certificate of 
benefit entitlement). This was seen as effectively irredentist, because the legislation on 
transborder kindred arguably included the latter into the parent state's polity. In a logical non 
sequitur, Bucharest and Bratislava simultaneously alleged discrimination to their majority 
ethnic citizens. This involved three main Status Law provisions. For one, transborder Magyar 
families would receive modest financial benefits, such as an annual book stipend if they chose 
to school their children in local Hungarian language institutions. Secondly, transborder 
Hungarians were offered free university or vocational education in the mainland, provided they 
then returned to their communities. Finally, the Law granted registered Hungarians each year 
a visa-free, three-month work stint in the mainland. Apart from foreseeable legal complications 
with Hungary's prospective EU accession in May 2004, this denied a labour market advantage 
so eagerly sought by many ethnic Romanians (Chiriac 2001). Given that the Law is based on 
the free choice of ethno-national identity (i.e. open to any person), and strictly tied to non­
immigration to Hungary, allegations of irredentism are unsubstantiated.
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up the Venice Commission to investigate their complaints. Its findings, 
published in spring 2002, admonished Hungary in several respects, and asked 
it to modify the Law accordingly. Though at first reticent due the ongoing 
electoral campaign, the new government eventually agreed to do so. Despite 
considerable domestic disapproval and transborder disappointment, incoming 
premier Medgyessy engaged in bilateral talks with the host states by late 2002, 
and parliament passed the modifications in early 2003.
Such close compliance even on lesser issues is furthermore shared 
throughout Hungarian mainstream politics. Post-communist governments have 
only varied in the ranking of Antall’s three priorities, and in how pro-active or 
reactive they were towards accepted diplomatic parameters (Pritz 2001:74-5; 
Bardi 2004a:68-77). The FIDESZ-led centre-right coalition (1998-2002) under 
Viktor Orban proved the most assertive on the minority question and wanted to 
shape, rather than merely react to, external givens. However, it also shared its 
predecessors’ endorsement of international parameters, not least because of 
its other prioritised goal -  NATO and EU accession. A study at the time thus 
notes that "the guiding principles of the Hungarian Republic's official foreign 
policy have, independently of governmental change, remained essentially 
unaltered" (Rlz 2000:81-2). On a more anecdotal level, all of my interviewees 
from the FIDESZ government repeated this position.29
International restrictiveness and its acceptance are further compounded by the 
immediate regional outside -  an inverse equivalent of interwar patronage. 
While the regional closeness and backing of the interwar Axis reinforced 
eventual permissiveness, the presence of two other desirable alliances nearby 
-  NATO and the EU - acts today as further, albeit positive, constraint. This 
applies in two ways.
Firstly, NATO and the EU are the very organisations dominating Budapest’s 
priority-triangle. Therefore their pre-condition for accession - i.e. to settle 
relations with the host states (see for instance EU Commission 2002:123,136)
29 Interviews with Andras Kiraly of the Prime Minister’s Office, with Karoly Gruber of the HTMH, 
and with Bal£zs Csuday of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (Interviews 6, 7 and 8 respectively). 
See especially the interview with Attila Demko, policy analyst in the Foreign Division of Prime 
Minister Orban’s Office (Interview 4), and his forwarded email (dated 6.03.2002) to Romanian 
journalist lonel Sorin.
179
- mattered. In 1998, the year prior to Hungary's NATO accession, US Defence 
Secretary William Perry thus reminded Hungary that the alliance was “not 
willing to import security problems." Istvan Baba, deputy secretary of state in 
the foreign ministry, thus duly portrayed the 1998 Basic Treaty with Slovakia in 
that very vein: "Slovakia is one neighbouring country whose interests after 
(and during) settling the problematic issues are identical with Hungary's, as 
both countries want to be integrated in the EU, NATO, and other Western 
European organisations" (Zellner and Dunay 1998:318). Apart from its 
incentives, such integration is arguably also an added, and more immediate 
tier of restraint: the common decision-making and legal frameworks of EU and 
NATO had already helped to contain ethno-territorial tensions between two of 
their other members - Greece and Turkey. Now that Hungary has reached 
both NATO membership (1999) and EU accession (2004), it is furthermore 
keen to prove its credentials within both organisations. Tellingly, the present 
government's foreign political manifesto devotes a whole part exclusively to 
linking these strands. Entitled "Democratic Hungary - a reliable partner", it 
describes the essential connections between regime consolidation, regional 
stability, Euro-Atlantic integration, and support for transborder minorities 
(Government of the Republic of Hungary 2002:section 9).
Secondly, rather than as obstacle, EU accession and its correlate abrogation 
of borders, is actually seen as solution to Magyar national truncation. The 
strategy has been dubbed ‘virtual nationalism’ (Csergo and Goldgeier 2001, 
2004) or, for Ireland’s similar case, ‘technocratic anti-partitionism' (Lyne 
1990).30 The mainland has moved from traditional nationalism (congruence of 
political and cultural boundaries), to what Csergo and Goldgeier (2001; 2004) 
call ‘trans-sovereign nationalism' (creating institutions to link the nation across 
state boundaries). This is exactly because territoriality has been superseded 
by culture, which in turn non-political institutions can easily contain. In order to 
reach this goal, the host states must also join, which in turn is yet another 
reason for Hungary’s neighbourhood policy ("this is also why we support our 
neighbouring countries' preparations for integration and accession process" 
explains the current foreign political manifesto; Government of the Republic of
30 See also Keating and McGarry (2001) on this issue.
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Hungary 2002:section 4.1.7). Budapest’s consistent foreign policy principle 
during post-communism has thus been “to change the quality, rather than the 
location of state borders” (Bardi 2004b:137). The current administration sums 
up this strategy as follows: "the government is convinced that a historic 
opportunity is opening for the reunification of the Hungarian nation within the 
European framework. (...) In the long run, the situation of the transborder 
Hungarians can be settled in a lasting and reassuring manner exclusively 
within the framework of European integration" (ibid.: sections 4.1.7. and 
7.1.4.). Unlike in the interwar years, when Budapest waited for an international 
constellation within which border revision was possible, it has today used an 
environment where boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant.
5.2.3 Summary
Demonstration effects, windows of opportunity, and deterrents do not decide a 
mainland’s irredenta, but they do condition the timing and means it chooses. 
The method and openness of interwar Hungary's irredentism clearly correlated 
with the variations in international (non-)permissiveness. Today's inter-state 
environment in turn has even shaped Budapest’s comparatively modest 
overtures (e.g. backing for transborder Magyars' regional autonomy, Status 
Law), to the point where Hungary accepted to disgruntle its ethnic kin in the 
process.
The impact of international systemic givens combines with patronage. When 
the two concur, they reinforce each other (like during the last part of Wilsonian 
period) and intensify irredentist tactics. Contrastingly, when they do not, then 
patronage can only buffer the restrictive effect of international parameters (like 
in the middle years of Wilsonian era). In such phases irredentist parent states 
will test the waters, but remain ultimately compliant. When patronage is 
altogether absent, mainland perceptions of leeway and opportunity are entirely 
decided by external cues, as in second part of the current phase and also 
when they are misread, as at the onset of the Wilsonian period. While such a 
conjuncture cannot end the internal desire for irredentism, it is likely to 
minimise (though not prevent) its foreign political manifestations.
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Finally, with its incentives and deterrents the international factor as a whole is 
able to compound or limit the endogenous factors that principally affect 
irredentism. Phases of international permissiveness and patronage 
compounded an independently existing drive for retrieval, which Hungary’s 
domestic politics furthermore enabled. Conversely, I have demonstrated how 
the pressures and rewards from NATO and the EU cement non-irredentist 
attitudes generated by identity and system political change.
5.3 Minority irredentism and international attitudes
Minorities will equally assess the international acceptance of border changes. 
Their criteria differ however from those of the mainland. Firstly, here, too, 
irredentist activity is modulated by the absence or existence of windows of 
opportunity. For minorities this means demonstration or deterrent effects from 
other, nearby irredentas and from parent state behaviour. Irredentist minorities 
will mirror the mainland’s conduct: the more compliant it is, the more they will 
be and vice versa.31 This is because they see themselves as enclaves and 
part of the same political community (see chapter 6). As a result, they behave 
as a function of this fact, sometimes to the point where they act as instruments 
of parent state politics (see section 1.4.2). Secondly, what also matters is the 
way in which the international system is restrictive. Is it repressive or 
validating? In other words, does it simply deny the legitimacy of minority 
national aspirations or compensate for imposed limits by endorsing them within 
sovereign state boundaries? Even if such support only covers internal (as 
opposed to external) self-determination, the extent to which minority 
nationalism is upheld as legitimate counts. Allardt (1979) for instance 
describes how attitudinal change of post-war Western democracies towards 
minority nationalism contributed to an increasing reformulation of minority 
demands in cultural-linguistic, rather than ethno-territorial terms. Such 
supportive attitudes can be enshrined in international treaties, agreements or 
regimes. Crucial, however, is whether these are “internationalised” (Kymlicka 
2002), i.e. whether how states treat their minorities is seen as a matter of
31 In contradistinction to Horowitz (1985:286) I had already established that mainland and 
minority decisions are not independently variable (section 1.2.2).
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legitimate international concern, monitoring and intervention. These can be 
carried out by international or regional bodies (e.g. the UN, OSCE or EU) or 
indeed by parent states, if this is tolerated (examples would be Denmark or the 
contemporary Irish Republic).32 Essentially, this describes the degree to which 
a group's situation is hostage to a host state's "internal affairs". International 
denial of the validity of minority nationalism means inefficient or absent 
scrutiny. This in turn will make a group feel delivered to its host state's policies. 
Generally, irredentist conduct will radicalise in such situations, especially when 
coupled with a phase of systemic permissiveness, like in the 1930s. 
Conversely, the more minority aspirations are upheld externally, the less 
aggressive minority behaviour will be.
In short, minorities are sensitive to the degree the inter-state environment 
provides a safety net to their existence. It further sharpens or conversely 
mitigates, their responses to regional diplomatic cues.
5.3.1 Fluctuating permissiveness, no internationalisation: Hungarian 
minorities in the interwar period (1918-40)
Brief but selective permissiveness (1918-21): open irredentist resistance 
To transborder Hungarians the beginning of the Wilsonian period also held 
ambiguous external cues. Several nearby irredentas had succeeded (e.g. 
Romania’s and Poland’s), so the international support for self-determination 
was clearly more than lip service. But the way in which Hungary’s partition was 
enforced showed that the international community also upheld what Kymlicka 
(2000) so aptly terms the "myth of ethnocultural neutrality". With regards to 
minorities, as Schopflin (2004:100) explains, "it was simply assumed (...) that 
their consent could be taken granted and ethnicity was disregarded as a factor 
in consent -  in many circles it still is. The long-term, indeed permanent 
membership of a particular state was, in effect, imposed on ethnic minorities 
by fiat. The state order as it emerged after 1918 (...) was declared sacrosanct
32 Suhrke (1975:203) calls this a "pattern of neutralising conflicts" between host and parent 
state, i.e. a legal or diplomatic framework within which the parent state is accepted to 
legitimately act as backup. In her view its presence crucially contributes to mitigating minority 
irredentism, while its absence (i.e. when parent state monitoring is pre-empted or de­
legitimised) has the opposite effect.
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and minorities were left to the care of ethnic majorities, because the ethnic 
quality of majorities was screened out and was assumed to be civic." The 
beneficiaries of Wilsonianism - Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia - were thus hardly tied to responsibilities for their new minorities. 
Although signatories to individual Treaties of Minority Protection in 1919, none 
made moves to ratify and implement these. Some, as in Romania's case, did 
not even recognise them.
Vindicated by the Wilsonian endorsement of national sovereignty, interwar 
host states33 thus declared minorities as strictly internal affairs (e.g. Roman 
1994:100). This in turn bound the parent state's hands to affect their treatment 
through legitimate-diplomatic channels and contributed to the siege mentality 
felt by transborder Hungarians. Bilateral relations between interwar Hungary 
and the two host states were characterised by confrontation (Bardi 2000a:30). 
This in turn brought more retributions against Magyar communities and further 
reinforced their sense of an internationally tolerated hostage situation (see e.g. 
Pritz 1982:85; Szarkal 998:19-20). All of these aspects combined into a sense 
of considerable vulnerability among transborder Magyars, who hence believed 
that the stalemate could only be resolved by external redemption.
Last but not least, there was the mainland’s assertiveness. Budapest had 
mistaken the confusing external signals as opportunity for irredentist action 
(see above). For minority Magyars therefore this period equally generated, or 
rather maintained, a certain sense of defiant hope and activism. At first, they 
reacted with civil disobedience: Felvidek Magyars organised strikes (Hoensch 
1967:14), demonstrations (Szarka 1998:14-15), and refused oaths of 
allegiance to the new Czechoslovak host state (ibid.) Transylvanian 
Hungarians did likewise (lllyes 1982:72). Directly before and following partition, 
they mounted ever more formalised opposition to the Trianon settlement.
33 This even applied to Hungary itself. Thus premier Gombos expressly underlined in a 1934 
letter to Hitler that the domestic German community was an internal matter (Pritz 1982:265).
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Restrictive consensus and apparent international protection (1922-35): muted 
irredentist activity
The demonstration effects of Budapest’s increasing moderation as well as 
apparent systemic support for minorities, brought adjustment among 
transborder Magyars. Parallel to their parent state, both minorities now also 
attempted to work within the givens of the new, imposed order. Their low-key 
irredentism was, however, equally due to the sheer need to survive as ethno- 
national group in what were nationalising states. Romania's and 
Czechoslovakia's assimilationist policies (see section 7.3.1) forced the Magyar 
communities to self-organise and defend their interests. Unlike their mainland 
kin, Transylvanian and Felvidek Hungarians could no longer indulge in 
"revanchist, ineffective fist shaking” and "depressive (...) pseudo-romanticism" 
over Trianon as contemporary historian Szekfu sharply remarked (Zeidler 
2001:191). The same approach thus served both defensive adjustment and a 
more guarded, preparatory irredentism. It consisted of three strategies, which 
not only mirrored Budapest, but which were also financed and instructed by it: 
alliance building, internal consolidation and international lobbying.
Allies meant for transborder Magyars other domestic minorities who faced 
forced assimilation, electoral hindrances and, who nurtured a latently 
revisionist stance. Thus both communities formed electoral alliances with local 
German parties: somewhat earlier in Transylvania (1927, 1932) than in 
Southern Slovakia (1929, 1935).34 Co-operation was also sought on the issue 
of autonomy, most prominently (and unsuccessfully) with secessionist Slovak 
groups, whom Budapest encouraged and financed until 1929 (Szarka 1998:24- 
5; Angyal 2000c: 135; 153-4).
The new guarded course was also characterised by self-organisation (Bardi 
2002). Collective paralysis now ceded to internal structuring of minority life, not 
least under mainland instruction (see sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). And while the 
minority’s bulk remained staunchly conservative (i.e. rejecting their ‘unnatural’ 
situation and expecting eventual retrieval), its former abstentionism now
34 Voting alliances were, however, also formed with liberal host state parties, often with 
Budapest's encouragement. See Miko (1941:274-284), Dioszegi and Siile (1990:39-43), Bardi 
(1997a) and Szarka (1998:24-27).
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changed into political assertiveness towards the host state (as “thorn in its 
side”). Partly this was due to pressure from reformist factions within the 
community, which forced self-renewal and activism in host state politics 
(Szarka 1998:22, 27; Zeidler 2001:199-201; Bardi 1997a, 2004a:73-4). The 
change, however, also resulted from Budapest's strategic promotion and 
financing of minority consolidation in preparation for a more permissive 
international stance (see above).
Finally, minority Magyars also changed their irredentist propaganda. This had 
two reasons. One was Budapest’s new international lobbying (see above), 
which they imitated. The other reason was an increasing impression that multi­
lateralism and the League of Nations really did internationalise and help 
minority grievances. This came from several similar cases in which the League 
had supported irredentist minorities: above all, the Sopron referendum (1922), 
but also the case of the Aaland Islands (1921) as well as the disputes over 
Upper Silesia (1922), and over the Memel region (1923). Magyars 
consequently now switched from nationalist protest to legal reasoning via 
petitions and complaints. Lobbying of individual Western governments took 
second rank to activity in international bodies, especially in the League of 
Nations. Czechoslovak Magyars systematically documented and reported 
abuses between 1923 and 1931 (Vlgh 1993:43; Szarka 1998:22), and the 
Transylvanian community lodged a prolific 34 complaints. From 1925 the latter 
also started to partake in the annual European National Minority Congress, 
while their Felvidek brethren attended both the Interparliamentary and League 
Unions respectively. So focused were both minorities on these initiatives, that 
for instance the Felvidek Magyars had a quasi foreign minister (MP Geza 
Sztillo). A contemporary mainland publication even agonised that such 
minority activism, "risked to forget about its internal tasks, [instead] organising 
all its work, political attitudes towards foreign political powers" (Magyar 
Statisztikai Tarsasag 1938:134).
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Neglect compounds incentives from rising permissiveness: resurgent minority 
irredentism (1935-40)
Between 1935 and 1940 permissive international attitudes reappeared, as 
evidenced most strongly by the successful retrieval of nearby German 
communities. This showed what was now possible and set a precedent that 
must have appeared repeatable. A celebratory publication after the Felvidek's 
successful retrieval revealingly states that the stir among the Sudeten 
Germans caused by Hitler's election "was also not without consequence 
among [Czechoslovak] Hungarians" (Magyar Statisztikai Tarsasag 
Allamtudomanyi Intezete 1938:36-37). The persisting international neglect of 
minorities made irredentism appear as only promising solution. Appeals for 
protection had proven sorely discouraging: by 1930 the League had 
considered exactly three minority Magyar petitions.35 Throughout, minority 
concerns had been either politicised or ignored. International lobbying and 
participation in international forums thus ceased, for instance Transylvanian 
Hungarians stopped attending the European National Minority Congress in 
1937. Having "experimented with petitions to the League mainly in the 
twenties" as Zeidler describes, minority Magyars "practically stopped from the 
mid-1930s. The reason for this was in part the Council's disinterest, partly the 
fact that the 'example setting' Polish Germans had put an end to the petitionist 
movement following the 1934 Polish-German treaty. Hitler had transferred the 
politics of nationalities onto a different level" (2001:66).
Like Budapest, transborder Hungarians also realised that their host states 
were only upheld by the goodwill or interest of those Great Powers who had 
enabled their existence after World War I (see e.g. Szarka 1998:30). Of recent 
historical origin, fraught with internal contradictions, and often repressing a 
multi-ethnic make-up, these host states now proved feeble creations. This in 
turn fuelled secessionist and irredentist hopes within their minorities. As a 
consequence, the Felvidek minority radicalised politically (Szarka 1998:ibid.) 
and took increasing instruction from Budapest. Thus the Hungarian
35 Sheer figures are illustrative here. According to a 1939 summary drawn up by Budapest, the 
League had received 881 complaints until mid-1938. Of these 392 had been rejected on 
grounds of procedural mistakes, 483 were referred to lesser instances, and only 6 were 
actually presented to the Council. Three of these came from Magyar minorities and did not 
receive satisfactory treatment (see Zeidler 2001:38).
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government's directive to pool strength by unifying the two local Magyar parties 
was heeded in June 1936 despite their ideological differences (Zeidler 
2001:201). During the following two years until retrieval in November 1938, 
Felvidek Magyars all but abstained from Czechoslovak politics. Preparing for 
reunion, they now focused on internal consolidation. Prague's increasing 
attempts for co-optation36 were ignored (Szarka 1998:33; Hamori 2001:573). 
What little voting across the ethnic cleavage there had been now ceased 
almost entirely. With the exception of the few so-called ''activists", Magyar 
electoral consolidation, already in the making since the 1935 parliamentary 
vote, peaked in the local elections of May 1938 - two months after the 
demonstration effects of Austria's Anschluss, as Vigh stresses (1993:53-57).
The Transylvanian community reacted similarly, partly because of external 
developments, but also in response to domestic Romanian politics. They too, 
reinforced internal consolidation, aligned increasingly with mainland 
propaganda, and hoped for a rescue (Romsics 1998:162-7, 186). However, 
they were less radical than the Felvidek Hungarians in sealing themselves off. 
This was mainly because they could not afford to. Unlike Prague, the 
Romanian government made no eleventh-hour gestures to its Magyars. Quite 
to the contrary. International events, and in particular the successful Felvidek 
irredenta in 1938, sparked sharpening domestic attacks. Hence this particular 
community's self-harnessing was primarily concerned with warding off host 
state threats. External factors thus compounded its accelerated preparation for 
retrieval. As one of its leaders explained in retrospective, “the Hungarian Party 
took the basic view that the minority question in Romania was unresolvable, 
and that therefore the Magyar community had to hold out - at times with active, 
at other times with passive resistance - until help arrived from outside" (Bardi 
1997a:33).
36 These gestures were political, material and legislative. Newly elected president Edvard 
Benes, known for his anti-Magyar feelings, offered Felvidek Magyar community leader count 
Janos Eszterhazy a ministry without portfolio in September 1936. Prague now also elaborated 
a long-awaited minority statute which, completed in 1938, came too late. From September 
1938 Hungarian areas also received considerable municipal and regional funds, as well as 
higher unemployment benefits for Magyars in Komarom city.
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5.3.2 Post-communist minorities and international relations
Variance in permissiveness -  assertion of internal self-determination (1989-93) 
The onset of post-communism spawned another, New World Order wave of 
irredentas (1989-93). Many of them were close-by and failed resoundingly. 
Finding themselves now in "nationalising states" (Brubaker 1996), transborder 
Hungarians were also keen observers of precedents set by non-irredentist 
minority groups (Interview with Csaba Takacs).37 They were thus clearly aware 
of the limitations that this ostensibly permissive international consensus 
imposed on managing their own situation. Furthermore, Budapest had chosen 
early on a course of compliance and integration, which in itself gave a powerful 
cue. Once again, however, the resulting minority behaviour was also affected 
by domestic politics, namely by host state democratisation.
A good example, albeit by extrapolation, is the change in minority demands for 
autonomy during these years. Given that transborder Hungarians no longer 
pursue irredentism today, we can examine fluctuations in this lesser instance 
of self-determination as good indicator. Autonomy plans presented by both 
minorities fell into the brief permissive interlude of the period between 1989 
and 1993. Slovak Hungarians presented two proposals for territorial autonomy 
- one in summer 1993, the other in February 1994 - while the RMDSZ 
submitted its draft bill to the Romanian parliament in November 1993. 
Conversely, in the following years minority leaders dropped their demands for 
autonomy, thus complying with international restrictiveness despite potentially 
angering their communities (see e.g. Zalatnay in Tabajdi and Barenyi 1998:69- 
70). In addition, Budapest reduced support for their autonomy plans following 
its own bilateral treaties with Romania (1996) and Slovakia (1998), in exact 
response to restrictiveness (Rlz 2000:83-85, see above). Arguably, however, 
the timing also stemmed from response of Magyar elites to domestic 
democratisation. As part of a strategic shift within both minority leaderships, 
their emphasis had switched away from autonomy to allying with local pro­
democracy forces, and to thereby attain governmental participation and co­
37 For instance, during my interview with Transylvanian Hungarian politician Csaba Takacs 
(Interview 1) I was repeatedly referred to similar cases (e.g. that of the Slovenians in Italy) 
which he and the community see as "precedents and testing grounds".
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nation status (see section 7.3.1, and also Bardi 2004a:76). In other words, 
minority leaders were carefully factoring in the international, yet principally 
reacted to democratisation in their host states.
Restrictiveness combines with internationalisation: domestic and European 
integration (1994-2005)
From mid-1993 onwards international attitudes once more reverted to their 
default status quo consensus. Europe was a particular focal point of this 
change, as evidenced by the 1993 EU Stability Pact (which singled out 
Hungary’s minority problem) and, not least, by military action against Serb 
positions around Sarajevo in 1995. Budapest’s avid compliance with these 
policies (e.g. by being the first Central European state to endorse the Stability 
Pact) set a further pointer to minorities, together with its declining support for 
their collective rights from 1994 onwards. EU enlargement into Central and 
Eastern Europe came at this time increasingly into the foreground. The 
restrictive consensus Brussels both represents and enforces affected minority 
behaviour in two ways. Attainment of EU membership speeded up host state 
democratisation in general and domestic accommodation of minorities in 
particular. This was not least a result of close monitoring, even pressure, from 
Brussels and other organisations regarding minority treatment, which became 
a main accession criterion. Secondly, the EU fulfils Magyar aspirations to 
achieve a "reunification" of sorts via borderless European integration (see 
below).
Both Magyar communities recognised that their host states democratised and 
afforded them more equal participation exactly because they strove for EU 
accession. It is for this reason transborder Hungarians soon inextricably linked 
their own fate with the EU accession of their respective host countries. 
Furthermore, once achieved, membership would also entail the Union's 
general legal benefits of minority protection. These connections were made at 
a very early stage. For instance, the RMDSZ third party congress of 1993 
already emphasised that "the Romanian Hungarian community's collective 
incorporation into domestic [i.e. Romanian] society is part of the country's 
integration into European society."
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The change was premised on the twin mechanisms of European integration - 
“socialisation” and “conditionality” (Nodia 2004:2-3). Regarding the first, i.e. 
Europe’s transforming effect on the attitudes and behaviour of political actors, 
minority Hungarians doubted it alone would be enough to help their aspirations 
(see e.g. Duray 2000:198). As for the second, however, it was increasingly 
pushed by active international involvement. The EU namely not only stated its 
Copenhagen criteria for accession, but, together with other organisations, also 
employed them as proverbial carrot and stick throughout the 1990s. In contrast 
to interwar international attitudes, “EU policy tends to favour a security-based 
approach aiming at consensual settlements over the enforcement of 
universal norms” (Brusis 2003:13). A few select instances illustrate this well. 
The start of Slovakia’s accession talks was made conditional on the passing of 
its 1997 language law. Although criticised as insufficient by Felvidek Magyars, 
it enabled official use of Hungarian on a local level and would not have passed 
without external pressure (Hamberger 2004:108). In August 2001, Brussels 
directly intervened into the crisis surrounding Slovakia’s territorial- 
administrative reform. The ethnic Magyar MKP feared deliberate ethnic 
redistricting when their coalition partner SMK suddenly insisted on reducing 
the twelve planned regions down to eight. When the SMK threatened to leave 
the coalition over the issue, Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen pointedly 
underlined the nexus between government stability and the inclusion of 
minorities on the one hand, and Slovakia’s accession on the other. The SMK 
then accepted the original twelve regions plan, which was subsequently 
passed. The recent push in Romania’s minority legislation between 2001 and 
2004 (regarding especially the long-standing issue of property restitutions) 
neatly paralleled the precarious conduct of EU accession talks. Finally, most 
studies agree that host state elites accept the governmental participation of 
minority Magyar parties not least because of associated democracy 
credentials with the EU (see e.g. Bardi and Kantor 2000:161; Blenesi 2004:75; 
Hamberger 2004: 108).
No doubt these interventions have contributed to the improvement of host 
state provisions towards their Magyar minorities, thus crucially reinforcing the 
irredentism-preventing effects of pluralist / inclusive democracy. Some 
maintain that inconsistent application and domestic interests have dampened
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their impact (Hughes and Sasse 2003; Vermeersch 2003). Others, however, 
see them as principally responsible for minority accommodation, down to 
describing the emerging power-sharing practices as “EU-induced 
consociationalism” (Brusis 2003:6; 8-13, see also section 7.3.2). In this vein, 
international restrictiveness and its (dis)incentives have clearly contributed to 
the emergence of pluralist democracy, the very regime type able to prevent or 
assuage minority irredentism.
Such intervention by Brussels and other regional bodies rests not least on a 
changed international view of minority aspirations and host state sovereignty. 
In contrast to the formerly turned blind eye, "something did change after 1989, 
especially as a consequence of the wars in Yugoslavia, as a result of which 
minorities were seen as a potential or actual target of ethnic majorities and, 
therefore, in need of the protection of the European order" (Schopflin 
2004:100). Kymlicka (2002) describes this as the “internationalisation” of 
minority rights issues. This in turn rests on a historically recent re-evaluation of 
minority nationalism by the international community as legitimate, and thus as 
entitled to expression and mobilisation (ibid.; see also Allardt 1979). Today, 
both host states are tied into in the OSCE’s increasingly standardised minority 
protection regime. They are furthermore bound by the first multilateral legally 
binding document on this subject, namely Council of Europe’s 1994 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
As a consequence of their reappraisal, regional bodies now make attempts to 
enforce these norms by using their diplomatic leverage. Although there is so 
far a mixed verdict on the actual impact on the ground (see e.g. Gal 2000), it is 
not least the international community's normative change that helps prevent 
minority radicalism. As another result of the re-think (and here also due to EU 
conditionality), parent states have been able to build legitimate channels of 
involvement. A "pattern of neutralising conflicts" (Suhrke 1975:203) has 
unfolded between Hungary and the respective host states. Deemed to crucially 
mitigate irredentist situations, it consists of institutionalised bilateralism
192
between Budapest, Romania and Slovakia via the two Basic Treaties.38 
Admittedly, this development carried initially a double meaning for transborder 
Magyars. On the one hand, the treaties were suspected as yet another sell-out 
of minority interests.39 On the other, they were also received as guarantee that 
their host countries have - however tentatively - acknowledged Hungary's say 
concerning the minorities. The element of security that this affords is in stark 
contrast to their interwar hostage situation.
Together with these ‘protective’ components, the EU's Eastern enlargement 
matters as avenue to "virtual nationalism" (Csergo and Goldgeier 2001; 2004). 
Tellingly, this was the principle Romanian Hungarian leader Bela Marko 
reiterated in a recent speech in Budapest (Marko 2005). Like for Budapest, the 
prospect of a borderless Europe not only presents an alternative way to 
‘reunite,’ but is in its unique conditions curiously appropriate for the now 
cultural definition of the Hungarian nation. Moreover, the EU’s decentralisation 
and regionalisation effects, and the precedents these created for minorities in 
other countries like Spain, support group aspirations for greater self- 
government. Miklos Duray, leader of the Felvidek community, draws these 
interlocking points together beautifully:
The key question (...) is how the dismembered Hungarian 
nation can be reintegrated without any conflicts over the 
unchangeable Trianon borders. (...) It can be assumed that 
the only possibility is the creation of a new ‘nation structure’.
For this, three fundamental aspects must be taken into 
consideration: state borders, different political environments 
and Hungarianness. This means that borders must be bridged, 
the realities of politically diverse environments must be taken 
into account and Hungarianness must be freed from being 
under the ‘rubble’ of the way of thinking that prevailed during
38 Bilateral Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the 
Romanian and Hungarian Republics, signed 19 March 1995 in Paris. Bilateral Treaty on Good 
Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Slovak and Hungarian 
Republics, signed 16 September 1997 in Bucharest.
39 See Tokes's Open Letter to Prime Minister Gyula Horn (1996) as well as Shafir (1996:32) on 
Felvidek Magyar politicians' Marko and Duray's reactions.
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the post-World War II period and communism. Under such 
conditions, a federalist nation-structure based on local 
governmental authorities can develop, which, on the one hand, 
creates a co-national relation between the Hungarian 
community and the majority nation of a given country, and on 
the other hand, creates a culturally unified Hungarian nation 
consisting of politically independent units. (Duray 2000:200, 
quoted in Bardi 2004a:74).
No statement could outline more clearly the interlocking and reinforcing effects 
of the international factor on the two variables that are principally responsible 
for irredentist inconsistency: democracy and identity change.
5.4 Conclusion: the international as modulating factor
Comparative historical evidence from the two time periods confirms that 
irredentist tactics - as distinct from the actual desire for retrieval - do respond 
to external cues. World political factors modulate the way irredentism is 
conducted. We have seen above how they have shaped the interwar 
irredentism of both the Magyar mainland and its transborder ethnic kin, even to 
the point of mirroring temporary fluctuations. Both parties' irredentist activism 
intensified during the Wilsonian period's two permissive phases, whilst 
displaying more guarded diplomacy in between. Patronage for Hungary and 
international neglect towards minorities respectively emphasised diplomatic 
opportunities. An inverse and less dramatic pattern is discernible today. 
Hungarians on both sides of the borders have overwhelmingly endorsed the 
current restrictive consensus. Yet their strategies and public positions have 
shifted even within this narrow context, by faithfully reflecting the initial 
leniency and subsequent conservatism of the current New World Order-period. 
Both actors are influenced by negative demonstration effects from Yugoslavia 
as well as by the borderless alternative that the EU’s restrictive regional 
system offers. Last but not least, transborder Magyars enjoy and use the 
latter’s leverage against host countries’ nationalising pressures. Their
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response to internationalised scrutiny (or conversely to the de-legitimisation of 
their national aspirations) is corresponds to how patronage or its absence, 
affects parent states. So while permissiveness combined with third party 
backing amounts to a window of opportunity for the mainland, for minorities it 
is external invalidation of their nationalism and precedent cases which build up 
urgency.
The fact that this variable has shaped irredentism (in timing, tactics and even 
somewhat in content) but not decided it (thereby not answering the central 
problem of inconsistency) already indicates its secondary importance. The 
Magyar case shows well the uses and limits of explaining irredentism in terms 
of international relations. The contrasting interwar and contemporary situations 
illustrate how mainland, and to a lesser extent transborder, activism mirror the 
turns and twists of interwar diplomacy. But, as we have seen subsequently, 
both are also heavily influenced by domestic constellations in a two-way 
relationship. The fact that Magyars felt the need to reunite in the first place was 
in turn rooted in a shared identity which rationalised this particular type of 
nationalism. In conclusion, the international factor contributes indirectly to 
explaining irredentism. The more it coincides with the internal factors primarily 
determining retrieval (ethnicity and regime type), the stronger its impact. 
Windows of opportunity do not by themselves make an irredenta and 
deterrents do not prevent it, if the endogenous conditions are not in place.
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6. Identity: Irredentism’s Primary Variable
“Regardless of what happens to Hungary, one thing has to 
remain: the affective unity of all Hungarians. If we cannot save 
the country in its thousand-year old shape from the great 
catastrophe we have to save the nation. Even if their homeland 
is torn apart, Hungarians must remain as one. Hungarian 
culture cannot be ripped to pieces and snatched away from us: 
it remains ours forever. Greed, the thirst for revenge and 
ignorance can do whatever they like with the country, the nation 
shall remain as one and shall be indivisible. No matter what 
they do to us, Hungarians shall hold hands with Hungarians 
across frontiers and artificial dividing lines and shall stick 
together in spirit and in truth. The soul of the eternal Hungarian 
will forever hover above the ruins of old Hungary. ”
Aladar Schopflin, literary critic, 19191
6.1 Introduction: Ethnic identity and its politicisation
Irredentism is the very politicisation of ethno-national identity. Shared, exclusive 
ethnicity makes for intra-group solidarity, infuses retrieval with its rationale 
(national self-determination), and defines its scope (a group’s constituency and 
ancestral territory). Conducted in its name, retrieval seeks to complete or 
restore nation-stateness. Explaining irredentism hence means to include ethnic 
identity and its variation as decisive factor in its own right. Nevertheless, the 
study of ethnicity and nationalism still finds it difficult to treat identity as real or 
independent social fact, primarily because this collides with standard premises 
of individualism, rationality, and materialism.2 This is not least true for the 
sparse literature on irredentism. In most cases it takes ethnic identity for 
granted, i.e. considers it as environmental given (Saideman 1998; Saideman
1 Quoted in Farkas (2001:356-7).
2 On this point see for instance Esman (1994:11), Connor (1996), McGarry (1998), or Kymlicka 
(2001a), who all concur in their critique.
196
and Ayres 1999 and 2000; Reichman and Golan 1991). Some accounts, 
notably those based on international relations theory, omit it to a great degree 
(Ben-lsrael 1991; Carment and James 1995; Von Hippel 1993; Weiner 1971). 
Finally, a few include it as determining variable (Suhrke 1975; Suhrke and 
Noble 1977; Kitromilides 1990; Yagcioglu 1996), stress its instrumentalisation 
by elites (Andreopoulos 1981; Gavrilis 2000), or isolate it as in some way 
influential (Weiner 1991:668; Chazan 1991; Gutman 1991; Neuberger 
1991:105; Landau 1990, 1991 and 1995; Brubaker 1996; Ambrosio 2002:111).
6.1.1 Horowitz’s take on ethnic identity within irredentism
Donald Horowitz's theory of irredentism does not omit the factor of group 
cohesion, but attaches no overwhelming prominence to it either. He briefly 
considers the impact of mainland elite identities (‘particularised affinity'), but 
sees it as essentially conditioned by hierarchical leadership patterns which 
consequently subordinates this to regime type (Horowitz 1985:286-287; see 
chapter 7). It is however indicative that Horowitz assumes a group’s shared 
ethnicity to be insufficient on its own, and that it therefore needs a personalised 
"top up" within the parent state elite. In a second, and for this analysis more 
salient, perspective he addresses the identity variable at the group level of 
irredentist politics. Two lines of reasoning are distinguishable here: for one, a 
caveat about internal cleavages (tribal, religious or political) which limit cohesion 
between mainland and minority, and consequently spoil retrieval. Secondly, he 
generally dismisses shared ethnicity as sufficient cause for irredentism.
Intra-group cleavages
Internal divisions between parent state and transborder kindred, Horowitz 
argues, may work against irredentism. He quite rightly reminds that 
"...seemingly cohesive groups are not as solidary as they look from afar", and 
that so-called "...subgroup cleavages have a prominent bearing on irredentist 
decisions" (1985:285). However, we are not told which these divisive cleavages 
are, or alternatively, how to recognise them. Furthermore, is their impact tied to 
certain criteria, or alternatively to their scale / extent? As already discussed in 
chapter 2, I have derived indicators from the supporting examples provided in
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his text. They respectively list rifts along religious, tribal and ideological-political 
lines.3 Bewilderingly, this means we are talking about both cross-cutting issues 
as well as rival identities. Since my model uses Esman's (1994:14-15) dual 
definition of ethnicity as both essential and externally conditioned, other “real” 
identities and solidarities (political, religious, tribal etc.) pose however no 
challenge. This is because "the more politicised ethnicity becomes, the more it 
dominates other expressions of identity, eclipsing class, occupational, and 
ideological solidarities."
Group identity
In a later work Horowitz returns to the role of identity and its explanatory power 
within cases of irredentism (1991:14-15). He warns against assuming ethnicity 
and kinship as firm, and against apportioning them too much weight when 
making sense of irredentas. ("To define irredentism as an attempt to retrieve 
kindred people across boundaries is to assume that people know each other, 
that kinship and ethnicity are firm"). Rather, "ethnic identity is variable over time 
and over context".4 Kinship is therefore "convertible", and so are in turn a 
group's political demands. "One of the major problems with irredentism" 
Horowitz explains, "is that the ethnic affinity of the core of a putative irredentist 
state may not extend to people at and beyond the periphery, and those are the 
very people who are to be retrieved" (ibid.). While this correctly highlights 
variation within identity as a somehow problematic point for retrieval, he 
dismisses it as fickle, rather than investigating it. I shall argue below that, quite 
to the contrary, herein lies one of the main reasons for irredentist inconsistency.
3 Horowitz's sub-variable of internal cleavages had proven insignificant in statistical testing, 
displaying high probability values for the null hypothesis (see section 2.4.2). This refutation is all 
the more impressive since basic testing in binary mode (existence or lack thereof) revealed that 
a majority of irredentas actually does possess one or more potentially disruptive intra-group 
cleavages (Dataset Manual 1, variable 21 - out of 55 cases 22 possess cleavages, 7 are 
unknown and 26 count as largely homogenous)
4 The assertion itself is not problematic, but the conclusions drawn from it. As explained in the 
introductory chapter, by adopting Esman's definition (1994) my work actually concurs with the 
idea of a continuum between primordial essence and instrumental function of ethnicity. 
However, Horowitz is wrong to take the very involvement of ethnic entrepreneurship as proof 
that group identity is constructed. In fact if anything, its politicisation and use indicate it as 
something that has an authentic basis. Ethnic solidarities are (moderately) flexible not because 
of their feebleness, as Horowitz reasons, but in response to contextual stimuli -  i.e. 
environmental threats and opportunities. In moments of crisis, ethno-national identity will 
override all other, individual and / or less deeply rooted motives.
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6.1.2 Changes in ethnicity affect its politicisation (nationalism)
Retrieval, as I have described above, is the political translation of a group’s 
ethno-national identity. Irredentist groups are invariably groups that (chiefly) 
identify themselves in exclusive terms. Among these criteria are, importantly, 
the ancestral homeland and a clear, narrow membership by descent. These 
define the scope of an irredenta and make for its rationale: to (re)unite what so 
evidently and exclusively belongs together. The more exclusive the definition of 
constituency, the greater the imperative for shared statehood and to be 
governed by one’s own. The political unit that this demands -  a state that 
comprises all of kin and soil -  thus rests on the idea of a community of fate. 
Hence also the family and corporal metaphors retrieval uses. Irredentism, in 
other words, needs to be underpinned by a certain type of group identity: it is an 
expression of ethnic nationalism.
A group’s identity can however acquire different or additional sources, it can 
shift.5 When it changes into a type that lacks or fudges these narrow and 
precise criteria, irredentism no longer makes sense. The new markers of 
groupness generate a different type of nationalism, i.e. a translation of affinity 
into politics which does not demand political (re)union. Which markers are 
these? So far the literature has distinguished a conventional dichotomy between 
“ethnic” and “civic” bases of nationalist mobilisation (Kohn 1967; Plamenatz 
1976; Nairn 1997). This, however, posits false opposites (Smith 1991:13) and 
does not differentiate between ethnic and cultural identification (see e.g. 
Kymlicka 1999, 2001b:244-5; Lecours 2000). Shulman (2002) therefore 
proposes a tripartite model along a continuum of decreasing exclusiveness. 
Group identity and its political expression as nationalism is either ethnic 
(defined by ancestry and race), cultural (religion, language and traditions) or 
civic (marked by state territory, citizenship, consent as well as political ideology, 
institutions and rights). I would expand the ethnic category by one more 
criterion, which characterises all irredentist groups: residence on and 
identification with, ancestral homelands (as distinct from the legally defined 
territory of a civic nation).
5 Several studies have observed such shifts in the bases of group identification and nationalism: 
see for instance Breton (1988), Lecours (2000), and Latouche (2001) for Quebec, Hallik (1996) 
for Estonia, or Sekulic (2004) for Croatia.
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No group will make a full quantum leap to these civic markers which pre-empt 
ethno-territorial movements. When their self-view changes, most will shift one 
level away from exclusiveness, to a national definition mixing citizenship with 
language and heritage. The balance between these two elements depends on 
individual case and juncture. Because they lie along a continuum, they are in 
fact sequential. The decisive first shift therefore is towards a culturally based 
identity, whose anti-irredentist effects subsequent civic components reinforce. 
While cultural nationalism can very well serve as basis for secessions or 
autonomy, it is useless for retrieval. This is because (re)union needs a strongly 
cohesive, positive definition of the group, whereas secession is more defensive, 
identifying itself against a majority and thereby emphasising what it is not. 
..Cultural nationalism” Kymlicka explains, “defines the nation in terms of a 
common culture, and the aim of the nationalist movement is to protect the 
survival of that culture. Examples of cultural nationalism include the Quebecois 
or the Catalans in Spain" -  movements defending their identity against 
linguistically and culturally dominant majorities (2001:243-4). Hence it is the 
shift from primordial to cultural markers that kills irredentism.
How does this work? Group identification based solely or mainly on ethnic 
criteria provides all the requisite ingredients for retrieval. In contrast, a culturally 
anchored self-understanding crucially undercuts the necessary bases for 
irredentism. Firstly, identity is no longer principally tied to blood and soil. While 
ancestry and territory provide irredentist projects with a clearly defined 
constituency and map image, culturally based ethnicity is a looser association. It 
is more voluntaristic. Irredentism cannot restore national completeness where 
the defining traits -  language, heritage, traditions -  are more inclusive and thus 
do not describe absolute solidarities. Secondly, culturally defined groupness 
also allows for diverse but equal versions of group membership. This precludes 
what is essential to irredentist scenarios: the subordination and dependency of 
‘unviable’ enclaves, and their consequent need for ‘redemption’ by their parent 
state. Conversely, it does allow for independent, local alternatives of group 
identity: parent states cease to regard themselves as truncated, transborder 
communities no longer feel as hapless satellites. This leads on to the final point: 
these local variants have now the potential to be politically autonomous from 
each other. Whether or not they will be, and how completely, depends on the
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strength of civic loyalties which a democratic political environment fosters (see 
also sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.2). Ethnically defined groupness generates a 
nationalism that extols political loyalty based on blood ties, on a community of 
fate. Existence in separate states is inconceivable, because the group sees 
itself as kindred political community. In contrast, national definitions based 
partly or even prominently on civic markers (citizenship, state territory and 
institutions) separate political and cultural-communal allegiances into different 
spheres of belonging. Membership is now (also) a question of consent and 
participation. This automatically excludes parts of the group beyond the border. 
Solidarity within the group thus becomes even more tenuous, because it is 
conflicted in its bases (cultural versus civic).6 Above all, this further reinforces 
that fact that identity can no longer command (re-)union of kindred and 
homeland.
Of course, few groups and their states source their identity exclusively from one 
of the three ideal types outlined above. Most are mixtures of ethnic, cultural and 
civic elements, and none -  not even liberal-individualist democracies -  will 
completely lack communal, exclusive components. I argue, however, that 
irredentism is only possible in those who principally emphasise ethnic traits at 
the expense of other characteristics (or even exclusively, because no others 
exist). The above described ‘shift’ towards a mixed cultural-civic identity is not 
an inevitable trajectory. While it occurs in some irredentist groups, thus ending 
their pursuit of national completeness, it does not and will not in others. 
However where it does take place, the move down the continuum is irreversible: 
groups that develop into self-ascriptive collectives will not revert to 
exclusiveness. In other words, once irredentism loses its basis it will not re­
occur.
Identifying the causes for this shift from primordial to cultural and then ethnic 
would go beyond this chapter’s scope, but prior experience of statehood 
appears to matter. The more recent and / or precarious the owning of a titular 
state, the more exclusive group’s self view and tenacious its irredenta. For
6 Although civic and cultural elements provide the standard twin bases of nationalism in 
democracies, they are conflictual in settings where the titular nation is spread over several 
states. This is because political-institutional criteria automatically exclude transborder kin, while 
cultural ones include them.
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instance, Hungary’s often quoted millennial statehood was in fact frequently 
interrupted (via Turkish and later prolonged Austrian rule), and only really 
recovered with internal self-rule after 1867. Conversely, one can exclude 
common normative explanations. Amongst these figure the simple passing of 
time (disproven by the longevity of many irredentas like the Irish, Greek, Serb or 
Italian cases), modernisation, affluence (wealthy, advanced groups are 
irredentist too -  see chapter 3), or some historical-political maturation process 
(refuted by repeated, unsuccessful, and disastrous attempts like Somalia’s, 
Pakistan’s or Bulgaria’s). Similarly untenable is the suggestion of the “ethnicity 
erasing” effects of communism. If anything, the precise opposite applies: exactly 
because communism has created “civic deserts”, many successor states now 
legitimise around an ethnic theme (Brubaker 1996; Schopflin 1996). Greek, 
Serbian, Armenian, Croat and Albanian irredentism are all cases in point. 
Compounding factors, however, exist. These seem to be generational change 
within the group, divergent landmark experiences between mainland and its 
separated enclaves and, above all, the experience of democracy. As for the 
development of civic identities, I will show in chapter 7 how democratic 
governance generates these. For the mainland, strong and effective democratic 
institutions build civic nationalism, thus pre-empting the void of solidarity that 
ethno-politics otherwise fills (Gellner 1983, 1992; Nodia 1994, 2000). 
Consociational democracy, or features thereof, in turn provide transborder 
minorities with a political environment where they can eschew the irredentist 
option. This is not least true for the Hungarians, whose increasingly political- 
institutional self-definition has measurably grown under post-communism and 
continues to do so. In this way, democracy accelerates and cements the shift in 
identity and nationalism that is responsible for irredentist inconsistency.
This case study will demonstrate how Magyar irredentism has ceased due to 
changes in the group’s ethno-national identity. Hungarian ethnicity and 
therefore Hungarian nationalism, have lost their ethnic-exclusive characteristics 
requisite for an irredenta -  among them identification with a homeland and a 
narrow, clear definition of group constituency. Magyarness today is defined by 
cultural-linguistic markers, which cannot translate into irredentism. Furthermore, 
this self-view is increasingly rivalled by civic components in both the Hungarian 
parent state and the transborder communities. National identity is thus
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becoming even more tenuous in its solidarity because it relies on conflicting 
elements. In order to comprehensively present this argument, the following 
chapter will outline changes in Hungarian self-understanding and show how 
these translated into a changed, non-irredentist kind of nationalism. It hence 
contrasts the two time periods in terms of the nature and cohesiveness of 
Magyar ethno-national identity, and shows how this respectively translated into 
very different intra-group relations and national aspirations.
6.2 Magyars between partition and retrieval (1920-1940)
Hungarian identity during the interwar period
Hungarian identity had historically contained all three strands of identification -  
ethnic, cultural and civic. The Hungarian Law of Nationalities of 1868 for 
instance shows a liberal, civic-political conception of the nation7. Yet at the 
same time, assimilation policies pointed to a cultural understanding of 
Hungarianness. Magyarisation thus worked to turn the Kingdom’s “nationalities” 
- Romanians, Slovaks, Croats and Serbs - into Hungarians. Descent, i.e. an 
ethnic definition of the nation, remained important. It was exclusively ethnic 
Hungarians who held political office within the Habsburg Empire’s devolved 
Hungarian government. A Magyar ascendancy largely monopolised land, 
property and middle class professions (civil service, education etc.) even in 
ethnically diverse areas like Transylvania. Unsurprisingly thus, the precise 
content of “Magyarness” was never pinned down: the nation was simply 
equated with a historic state which it owned not exclusively, but as titular and 
dominant group.
The Trianon partition changed this. Group and state no longer coincided. The 
nationalities had proven ‘disloyal’ by pursuing their own statehood. Interwar 
Hungary and the freshly separated minorities thus fell back onto a narrow self- 
definition. For both actors “Magyarness” significantly revolved around what was 
lost, what had to be restored. This meant two things. For one, the recovery of 
the millennial "Crownlands of St. Stephen". Magyars regarded this as their 
ancestral territory, its conquest signifying both their birth and survival as nation.
7 „AII citizens of Hungary (...) form a single nation -  the indivisible unitary Magyar nation -  to 
which all citizens of the country belong, irrespective of nationality/
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The famous credo of the time, taught in every mainland school, was that life 
was not worth living outside this Hungary ("extra Hungariam non est vita, si est, 
non est ita"). Secondly, there was the blood-based community of fate. With the 
state and its institutions destroyed, with non-assimilated compatriots having 
deserted, this was what remained. Hungarians on both sides of the borders felt 
unity in grief, trauma and anger, forming a "community of suffering" (Haynes 
1995:89). Notions of national catastrophe were pervasive (L. Nagy 1987:5; 
Zeidler 2001:10). Culture, history and language were no longer in function of 
statehood, like before, but merely accessory to what now reliably identified a 
Hungarian: ancestry. Crucially then, this was a conception of identity about one, 
indivisible Magyar ethnic group and its homeland. This provided both the 
imperative and the clearly defined identity, necessary to irredentism. Both 
actors’ choice for retrieval was thus in function of this identity.
6.2.1 Minorities by force: dependent enclaves and recalcitrant host state 
citizens
Self-view: “communities by force”
The freshly partitioned Hungarian minorities saw themselves as 
kenyszerkozossegek, or "communities forced together" (Bardi 1997:32 and 
1998:55; Szarka 1998:10). They were arbitrary sub-units of the Magyar group, 
by-products of a partition which had been concerned with very different 
objectives.8 Apart from Transylvania9, they lacked any significant history of 
autonomous thought or political action, not least due to Hungary's centralised
8 Hungary's demographic and territorial dismemberment was quite "(...) decisively tailored by 
great-power interests; the notion of self-determination (...) lent only retrospective justification to 
that” (Zeidler 2001:24).
9 At first glance Transylvania is an exception in both respects. Its liberal, protestant heritage 
made for a political and literary apartness which is often described as "opposite pole" to 
Budapest's Catholic baroque traditions (see e.g. Pomog£ts 2001:126-128; Kibedi Varga 2002:5- 
6). This combined with a proud history as independent principality and subsequent political 
distinctness even within re-unified, nineteenth century Hungary. The community was 
furthermore sizeable, numbering at 1.6 million in 1930 (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:113). 
On the other hand, however, this historic Transylvania was not identical with what Trianon had 
partitioned away, and this in turn severely compromised this prior, distinct identity. The actual 
territory annexed was only partly congruent with the historic one (see Lokkos 2000:31, 41-42) 
and its Magyar population had been drained by a significant exodus of mainly middle class 
refugees towards Hungary (107 035 individuals according to Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 
1998:114, Mocsy 1995:242 even quotes 222 000, i.e. a loss of 13.2 per cent).
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past.10 Largely devoid of prior regional identities, shaken by war, partition, and 
drained by refugee flows, these communities were in the years after Trianon 
weak and disoriented.
Consequence 1: intra-group relations - cohesion means subordination 
Irredentism relies on the notion of an ethno-national core and a periphery. For 
one, this is because the project requires it, requires the weaker party’s 
subordination to the mainland as a willing instrument in pursuit of their common 
goal. Secondly and more crucially, because this underpins irredentism's very 
rationale: the need to reunite, because the centre is incomplete, and because a 
periphery by definition cannot - should not - exist by itself. The key elements 
here are incompleteness for the parent state and inequality and non-viability for 
the minority. This is expressed in the very idea that kin needs ‘redeeming’ from 
the yoke of ethnically foreign government. Irredentist folklore reflects the same 
concept in its metaphors of a body and its lost limbs (see chapter 1). Yet once 
less exclusive markers (culture, language, heritage) become primary, this whole 
logic and its imperative for retrieval is in trouble. This is because culture can be 
independently re-produced, maintained and added to. Identity is no longer 
necessarily or exclusively in function of a putative core. This in turn allows for 
multiple centres within an ethnic group which are equal and capable of 
independent survival. There is no longer a state of national incompleteness. 
Retrieval is in this scenario no longer crucial, nor even desirable.
Forcibly separated from the organic whole of the Hungarian nation, both 
transborder communities viewed themselves as mere Hungarian enclaves, 
something that is typical for irredentist minorities. There was a deep-seated 
insecurity over their capacity to survive on their own, and anxiety over their 
initial disorganisation (see Torok 2001:66; Varga in Fazekas 1993:54 and 
Olvedi in Fazekas 1993:19-20). Their collective identity was defined by and 
ultimately dependent on, the Hungarian parent state. Hungary was the point of 
reference for "Magyarness" and its belonging. Minority Hungarians’ own status
10 While Transylvania could at least salvage some of its former self, Czechoslovakia’s Magyars 
did not benefit from any pre-existing sources of autonomous regional identification. The 
Felvidek had never acquired a historically distinct role within the former Hungarian kingdom, 
and thus remained until 1920 strongly oriented towards the capital Budapest. It was also 
smaller, (608 221 Magyars in 1930), and devoid of a local intellectual tradition like 
Transylvania’s. Not only did this disadvantage the community’s self-galvanisation, but it also 
caused an even stronger sense of truncation and leaderless abandonment (Vigh 1993:66; 
Magyar Statisztikai Tarsasag 1938: 9-16; Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998: 56).
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conversely was something incomplete or lesser because they were citizens of 
other countries.
This self-view as mere enclave translated into subordination to the Hungarian 
parent state. Transborder ties were regarded as lifeline: there was a collective 
expectation of eventual help from Budapest, a deep trust in being saved. Both 
minorities thus submitted to mainland hegemony over their affairs, displaying 
ideal typical irredentist attitudes described in chapter 1. At times this was less 
pronounced in Transylvania, with its independent political traditions.11 For the 
most part, however, minority politics were a mirror image of mainland 
conditions: a patrician-conservative leadership, marginalised peasants and 
workers and negligible left-wing or liberal factions. The respective leaderships 
willingly co-operated with parent state indoctrination through training in 
mainland universities and government co-ordinated study programmes (Palfy 
2001; Torok 2001; Bardi 2004b). In short, it was Hungary who built, shaped and 
determined the minority’s identity, thus ingraining political allegiance and 
emphasizing dependency.
Consequence 2: political behaviour as a function of identity -  nation equals 
polity
The kinship underpinning irredentism is conceived in the narrow, literal sense: it 
describes a (perceived) shared ancestry. This organic understanding of the 
nation prevents transborder communities from socialising into minority 
existence. Enclaves find it unnatural and inconceivable to live (or remain) 
outside their titular state. This means that they do not distinguish between 
communal and civic-political allegiances. Both lie with the mainland alone. 
Furthermore, their subordinate status limits political autonomy from the 
mainland. These factors consequently rule out any accommodation with the 
respective host state. Instead, resistance and self-isolation is a logical, even 
necessary answer. Because (narrowly defined) identity legitimises political 
authority there is little chance of accepting existence outside of a state owned 
by kin.
11 During the mid-1920s there was arguably a temporary autonomy towards the parent state. 
With the latter's hands tied by international restraints, Transylvanian leaders "acted at the end of 
the twenties no longer as figures of the Budapest government, but as representatives confirmed 
in Romanian political elections pursuing not Hungary's but Transylvanian Magyar politics" (Beirdi 
1997a:10-11). Simultaneously the share of Transylvanian university students within mainland 
institutions began to fall and return to Kolozsvar (Palfy 2001).
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The stance of both minorities towards the nationalising Romanian and 
Czechoslovak host state can best be described as "defensive political struggle". 
It was marked by a siege mentality and narrow, sectarian political platforms. 
Famously, the Erdely minority's identification towards its host society was that of 
"thorn in the foreign side" (orlo szu az idegen faban). The Felvidek group took a 
very similar stance, with one of their MPs programmatically declaring to the 
Czechoslovak parliament that their presence "...by no means as 
acknowledgement of this illegal fact [Hungary's partition], but as living and 
permanent protest against this cruelly unjust decision made against us and 
without us...." (Szarka 1998:18).12 Unlike today, there was limited engagement 
with host state politics and little understanding of the crucial connection 
between general democratisation and improving their own fate. Instead, there 
was a staunch denial of realities, a conviction that this untenable situation as 
minority would not last for good. Consequently, Magyar identity had to be 
consolidated, bolstered and preserved, not least against the assimilatory 
pressures of the nationalising Romanian and Czechoslovak host states (see 
section 7.3.1.). The Transylvanian Hungarian party OMP thus "assumed that 
the minority question in Romania was unsolvable, and that therefore the 
Magyars had to hold out, by resisting sometimes actively and at times 
passively, until such time as the solution arrives from the outside" (Bardi 
1997:34-35, emphasis mine).
The exception were small reformist factions in both Erdely and the Felvidek.13 
Revealingly, their new kisebbsegi realizmus, or "minority realism", called for a 
rethink on identity which in turn offered non-irredentist political choices. It 
conceived of Magyarness in cultural, rather than ethnic terms. This enabled the 
distinction of a cultural identity with a titular state (Hungary) from political
12 A contemporary publication similarly contrasted that "while the truncated Hungary was forced 
to sign and ratify the Trianon dictate, the Felvidek Magyars did not acknowledge it for a 
moment" and that this "remained throughout the guiding principle of their politics" (Magyar 
Statisztikai Tarsasag Allamtudomanyi Intezete 1938:31).
13 In the Felvidek, these were the "Hungarians with a New Face" (Ujarcu Magyarok) and an 
association named Sarju (Second Crop), while in Transylvania it consisted of an entire 
intellectual group, with literary circles like the Erdelyi Szepmlves Ceh and numerous 
publications, among them the two journals Hitel (Creed) and Erdelyi Helikon. These 
‘Transylvanianists’ were able to draw on the legacy of a historically autonomous local identity, 
for "the Hungarians of Transylvania have traditionally had a strong identity and consciousness 
of their own which did not automatically identify them with the Hungarian state" (Schopflin 
1988:144, emphasis added). Although articulate, their ideas were "historicised and idealised" 
(Zeidler 2001: 200) and found little popular support.
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allegiance towards it. Secondly, these intellectuals emphasised internal self­
renewal, a separate minority identity, and thus political independence from the 
mainland. A sign of this was their break with mainland patrician politics by 
appealing to new sociological strata like workers, young people, and the hitherto 
marginalised peasantry (e.g. Miko 1932; Popely 1990:97-106). They rejected 
irredentism and Budapest’s hegemonic interference. The so-called 
“Transylvanianists” objected via a considerable literary output, while the 
Felvidek reformers countered with "some measure of self-irony and resignation" 
(Zeidler 2001:192; 203-204).14 Well ahead of their time, these conceptions were 
not endorsed by the two minorities (Balogh in Romsics 1998:156-167; Zeidler 
2001: 199-202; Pomogats 2001:116). However, they foreshadowed the 
subsequent change in minority identity and corollary political behaviour that 
characterise both communities today.
Overall the "rhetoric of national injury stood much closer to and was much 
deeper rooted in, the psychology of the Transylvanian Magyar community", and 
the same was true in the Felvidek (Zeidler 2001:199). Transborder Hungarians 
remained recalcitrant citizens of their host states, precisely in function of their 
self-view. Dusan Kovac (1990:90) summarises this nexus between identity and 
minority irredentism quite clearly. The Felvidek community"(...) did not create a 
positive relation with Czechoslovakia and was closely entwined with the Horthy 
regime's endeavours to liquidate / do away with Czechoslovakia. Just like the 
German parties, the Magyar minority's parties were immediately directed from 
abroad - Hungarians from Budapest, Germans from Berlin. (...) What motivated 
the Hungarian minority's anti-Czechoslovak stance was the refusal to identify 
itself with its minority situation. What this is all about is the (...) problem of the 
minority's identity."
14 For instance, a Felvidek reader's letter protested that "we expect from Budapest neither good 
advice nor unsolicited and romantic national grief (...) they should not constantly lecture us, the 
minority, about our situation and tasks" (ibid., emphasis original).
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6.2.2 The Hungarian parent state: truncated redeemer readying for
national salvation
Self-view: dismembered, “bleeding Hungary”15
Corresponding to the minorities’ self-view as unviable limbs, Hungary saw itself 
as unsustainably truncated. Partition had caused a fervent debate about the 
definition of Hungarianness. It revolved around two contending poles: culture 
and history on the one hand, and racial-biological arguments on the other 
(Haynes 1995: 89-91; Romsics 1998; Farkas 2001; Dow 2002).16 Few 
exceptions apart, the latter conception prevailed among both elites and public 
opinion. It described Magyarness as kinship of shared ancestry, which in turn 
made national and homeland dismemberment unacceptable. This combined 
with the reversal of Hungarian ethnic ascendancy, military defeat, and 
disarmament, temporary occupation by former ‘subject peoples’, economic ruin, 
and not least the shameful acceptance of war guilt and reparations payments 
(Zeidler 2001:42). In short, the sense of absolute solidarity and injustice 
engendered an almost missionary zeal to remedy incompleteness.
Consequence 1: intra-group relations - cohesion means hegemony 
As I have outlined above, the close family-like cohesion of kinship imposes 
respective tasks on both actors. Complementary to the subordination of 
transborder brethren it entails for the parent state the imperative to regain 
completeness via hegemony. The minority and its retrieval becomes a project, 
and secondary aspects of cohesion like culture are put to its use.
Budapest thus strategically promoted and financed minority consolidation in 
preparation for a future irredentism (Bardi 1995a, 1995b, 2004b; Angyal 2000c; 
Torok 2001). The project’s dual goal was to ensure the communities remained 
Hungarian despite forced assimilation, and to thereby preserve the bases for
15 „Verzo Magyarorsz£gK (Bleeding Hungary) was the title of a bestselling volume edited in 1921 
which has become a standard work of Hungarian literature. It comprises articles, poems and 
essays on the irredentist theme by virtually all eminent figures of Magyar literary and political 
life.
16 Examples are the Turanianism debate about Magyar racial origins and Prohaszka’s theory 
(1936) about biologically defined national traits. These were countered by influential political 
thinkers like Mihaly Babits or Gyula Szekfu, who argued for cultural-historic characterisations of 
Magyarness. Both, however, stressed the millennial territory’s importance in determining the 
national collective.
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irredentism. This strategy was specially budgeted for (with mounting figures 
throughout the early twenties) and tightly organised into respective offices.17 
Hungary's financial help enabled minority Magyars to survive materially, 
organisationally, and culturally as kindred communities. Funding priorities and 
amounts differed between minorities (Angyal 2000c: 146-167), but the rationale 
was explicitly strategic. Benedek Jancso, one its chief architects, explained: 
"they were able to take the territory away from us, but once the opportunity 
arises, we can take it back under favourable and fortunate circumstances, 
because it [the territory] will not disappear. The homeland is not made up of 
mountains, valleys, rivers, and plains, but of those people who live in it. If, 
however, the Hungarian community is lost, wholly or in part, on these areas as 
a result of foreign repressive rule, then we will also lose our strongest legal 
entitlement to these territories" (Bardi 1995a:102).
Funding simultaneously allowed the parent state government to discretely retain 
control over transborder Magyars. Because identity became politics, it was not 
only a question of preserving, but also of engineering it. Prime minister Bethlen 
tellingly asserted that the mainland "maintains for itself the right to instruct and 
decide in important political questions" (Szarka 1998:27). Especially towards 
Felvidek Magyars Budapest was interfering and politically directional, not least 
because 50 to 70 per cent of monies were channelled into the minority's party 
apparatus (Angyal 2000c:151-2;160-7). A few examples illustrate this well. For 
instance, Budapest recognised Transylvania’s conservative leadership in the 
so-called Kolozsvar Centre as the only legitimate political representation of the 
Erdely community. Hungarian Premier Bethlen cited the two feuding Felvidek 
party leaders to Budapest in August 1926, like unruly schoolboys (Szarka 
1998:24-27). In 1932, Hungary forced the Felvidek community into changing to 
a more compliant leadership, and then in 1936 overtly pressurised its two main 
parties to unite in anticipation of retrieval (Angyal 2000c:155-164). Financial 
dependency also facilitated covert intelligence gathering and recruitment of 
future minority elites, especially amongst the larger Transylvanian Magyar 
community (Torok 2001:60-5). In sum, shared kinship rationalised Budapest’s 
ability and authority to manipulate its minorities.
17 They were the Rakoczi, later Thokoly, Federation (for the Felvidek), the Saint Gellert Society 
(targeting the Voivodina, and the now Romanian Baneit) and the Popular Literary Society (NIT) 
(for all Romanian territories of Eastern Hungary).
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Consequence 2: waiting for salvation -  irredentist conditionality of parent state 
politics
Much like in the case of the minorities, domestic political behaviour in the 
mainland derives from the imperatives of identity. Ambrosio (2002:18) notes 
that irredentist states typically extol the “remedial nature” of retrieval, based on 
“the belief that (...) the interests and rights of the nation as a whole are not (and 
likely cannot) be satisfied unless all members of the nation dwell within the 
same polity.” Glenny (1996:15-26) observes in the same vein: “most 
nationalisms are based on the assumption that a state which encompasses all 
members of one nation can overcome all major social and economic evils.” 
Since the state is an expression of the organic whole that is the ethno-national 
group, it cannot operate successfully in truncation and needs to make 
completeness its priority.
Interwar Hungarian politics worked as a function of this principle. State policy 
was legitimate, party platforms only likely to muster support, if they served and 
subscribed to irredentism. This conflation of group and state was not least 
enabled by weak political institutions which left ethno-nationalism unrivalled as 
only focus of identity, mobilisation and allegiance (see section 7.2.1). Virtually 
all areas of political life were hence shaped by or even subordinated to, the 
irredentist agenda. Of course this concerned first and foremost foreign policy: 
no single diplomatic move between the wars happened without retrieval in mind 
(see section 5.2.1). Economic planning similarly adjusted to an irredentist 
rationale, rather than vice versa (see section 3.2.2). Zeidler (2001:77) describes 
for instance how Budapest actually rejected a customs union with Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, proposed to alleviate the 1929 crisis, precisely because it 
worried a successful solution by economic means alone would jeopardise its 
case for irredentism. Even lesser policy areas were put in the service of 
retrieval, often with palpable drawbacks. Kovacs (1989:82-4) thus describes 
Budapest’s refusal to re-district and develop truncated counties after 1920 in the 
hope of future retrieval, causing local economies to further atrophy. Finally, 
party statutes across the entire political spectrum (including the communists) 
extolled irredentism, as did public speeches (Gergely et al. 1991; Romsics 
2000; Zeidler 2001:127). The idea was that, because dismemberment had 
caused Hungary’s problems, restoring completeness would equal national 
salvation.
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6.3 Magyars in the post-communist period (1989-2005)
Contemporary Hungarian identity
Hungarian national identity has shifted from ethnic-exclusive to cultural, and 
also increasingly civic, markers. Sociological surveys in both actors show 
furthermore that this is an ongoing and growing development during democratic 
transition and consolidation. Parent state respondents thus show continuously 
declining identification with ancestry and soil since the late 1970s, and an 
increasing equation of Magyar ethnicity with liberal, self-ascriptive criteria in the 
course of the post-communist period. Alongside heritage and language, there is 
a strengthening identification with political and institutional markers such as 
citizenship (Csepeli 1989:43-46, Csepeli 1992/97:241-254; HTMH:2000; 
Shulman 2002:567-578). Similarly, minority Hungarians tie belonging today to 
cultural, and now also civic, criteria ever more emphatically (Gereben 1995; 
Veres 1997; Langman 1997; Lampl 1999; Lanstyak 2000).
As consequence of this changed self-view, Hungarian nationalism and its 
political goals have changed as well. Because cultural markers create a more 
loosely defined unity, Hungarians on both sides of the borders are developing 
into self-conscious communities. In addition, because both mainland Hungary 
and minority host states have undergone successful democratisation, these 
respective Magyar communities have developed separate civic identities and 
thus become politically autonomous from each other. Loyalties exist now also 
towards the respective domestic polities, which makes for some conflict with the 
cultural unity of Hungarians. Unlike in interwar times therefore, “...national 
group-boundaries are objectively unknown, there are only unclear ideas about 
the latter’s scope”. Furthermore, “the ancestral homeland cannot be politically 
and legally delimited as in the [interwar] concept of a Staatsnation, but (...) it is 
rather a living space that one cannot rationally grasp” (Veres 1997:28-30).
Distinct formative experiences during communism and its breakdown 
A brief word is necessary here about the impact of the communist period 
between 1945 and 1989 which separates our two time spans. The fact that 
Soviet domination imposed mutual isolation between parent state and minority 
Magyars and forcibly silenced nationality questions, is often taken as self- 
evident explanation for the abandonment of Hungarian irredentism. As stated
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above I disagree, not least because in other cases (Armenia, Croatia, Serbia) 
communism was unable to tackle irredentism by ideological impact or duration. 
The communist interlude merely compounded the unfolding shift in identity by 
putting both the mainland and the minorities through very different collective 
experiences. These galvanised (rather than caused) the already emerging 
separate Magyar identities which cultural bases had enabled. The parent state 
experienced during this time a ..redefinition of Hungarian identity based in 
particular upon the 1956 revolution". This event above all others ..relocated 
Hungary’s ’traditional values’ within the mainstream of Western liberal history" 
(Haynes 1995:93). Mainland Hungarians view this as the one juncture where 
their country started its “return to Europe”, proving that it differed from “Eastern” 
autocratic-totalitarian strands. Importantly, Romanian and Slovak Hungarians 
were not part of this experience18, but lived in turn through their own crucial 
events. Magyars in post-war Czechoslovakia suffered collective punishment for 
their former irredentist stance under the Benes Decrees, enduring forced 
population exchanges, property and land seizures, deportation, internment, 
forced labour etc. Their lasting impact still affects the community's economic 
situation, created a deep-seated sense of insecurity (Janies 1989; Vlgh 1998) 
as well as a second intellectual braindrain (Szarka 1998a: 51-53). Two decades 
later, parts of their community were actively involved in the 1968 Prague Spring 
and suffered subsequent retaliation under the so-called normalisation 
programme.19 Transylvanian Hungarians, on the other hand, were exposed to 
Romania's national communism, an exception throughout the region. 
Ceaucescu’s policies of forced assimilation (so-called “systematisation”) as well 
as ethnically targeted political persecution (Tofalvi 1994) created something of a 
siege mentality amongst the local Magyar community, a shaping experience in
18 Transylvanian Hungarians, whose excited attention never translated into involvement, felt the 
impact of the 1956 uprising via retaliatory measures (Tdfalvi 1997, 1998b). By alleging that 
Nagy's revolutionary programme demanded Transylvania's retrieval, Romania declared any 
manifestation of solidarity with Budapest as treason (Tofalvi 1998a). Thus the uprising served 
as excuse for increased assimilatory repression, e.g. by abolishing the "Hungarian Autonomous 
Region” and via show trials against ethnic Magyars (Tofalvi 2001). Furthermore, Romania's 
willing role as the place where Nagy and his cabinet were deported to and executed, served to 
establish an example to the local minority.
19 Husak's "normalisation" following the Prague Spring basically reinforced assimilatory 
pressures via political disenfranchisement and cultural repression. It purged high ranking ethnic 
Magyars from the Slovak National Council (notably Rezso Szab6 and Laszlo Dobos) and 
curtailed the tacit ethnic representation that the cultural association CSEMADOK had carved out 
for Magyars. Furthermore, the public use of Hungarian was restricted, while Magyar schools 
and kindergartens were forced to adopt Slovak as first language (Szarka 1998:58-60).
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its own right. The toppling of that regime, sparked off by the ethnic Hungarian 
bishop Laszlo Tokes’ resistance, created a brief moment of civic solidarity with 
Romanian fellow citizens and provided another distinct experience. The political 
system change of 1989 finally, unfolded very differently in the parent state and 
the respective host countries. In fact, the Magyars as nation lived through the 
three different types of anti-communist revolution identified by research: the 
regime collapse in Czechoslovakia, negotiated transition in Hungary and violent 
overthrow in Romania (Friedheim 1993; Ekiert 1991:287).
6.3.1 Minority Hungarians today: assertive towards Hungary, co-nations in 
their host-states
Self-view: from “forced" to “committed communities”
Both communities are "minority building" (Kantor 2001), i.e. they are asserting 
their own brand of Magyarness. The former image of forced separation has 
been replaced by the concept of “committed communities” (Bardi 2004a), of 
self-conscious Magyar collectives. Minority Hungarians display in sociological 
surveys strong regional loyalties and local patriotism, which furthermore trump 
loyalties towards both the parent state and, to a lesser degree, towards the host 
state (see below). In short, they are socialised into their minority situation. This 
means firstly that they see themselves as equal to mainland Hungarians, not as 
occupying some lesser status. At times, the minorities even describe their 
Hungarianness as superior against what they see as a Westernised, distorted 
version in the mainland (see e.g. Langman 1997:119). Secondly, this self- 
assertion has opened up the scope for autonomous minority politics. 
Democratisation in Romania and Slovakia in turn enabled its increasingly 
rewarding conduct, and thus entailed the development of civic allegiances 
towards host state and their own community (see section 7.3.2). Both these 
facts preclude irredentism today.
Consequence 1: intra-group relations - equality and assertion 
The cultural markers in contemporary Hungarian national identity fail to clearly 
define a constituency and boundaries for the irredentist project. Furthermore, 
they do not distinguish a core and a periphery. Consequently, relationships
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between minority and mainland are now on an equal footing, there is no longer 
a pressing need to (re)unite what is no longer viewed as unsustainably 
separated.
Unlike their self-view as enclaves in the interwar period, both communities are 
today secure in their identity. In fact, they feel more confident than mainland 
Hungarians. They are very organised as communities, and are working towards 
being completely self-sustained Magyar societies (Kantor 2001). This includes 
not least their capacity to reproduce their own elite. Contemporary Hungarian 
minorities thus relate to their ethnicity and collective future positively (seeing its 
defence and development as “task”), and stress it over and above all other 
attachments short of family ties. This emphatically positive self-image 
furthermore improves inversely to tense relations with the respective majority 
nation: the more difficult it is to live a Hungarian identity, the more positively it is 
seen and prioritised (Veres 1997:21, 27; Gereben 1995:201-4;1999:14-15, 20). 
Furthermore, being a minority Hungarian no longer means deriving all national 
characteristics from the mainland. Instead, there is an increase in local cultural 
references, e.g. literary and historical figures (Veres 1997:49-51). The Magyar 
language, finally, has become ‘pluricentric’ (Kontra and Saly 1998) -  local 
variations have asserted themselves in what used to be a highly standardised 
idiom. Given that language is the ‘integrator of nations’ (Deutsch 1966), this 
further strengthened a self-conscious minority identity and undermined cross- 
border unity (Lanstyak 1996; 1998). In short, both in terms of language and 
heritage, i.e. in the markers that today co-define Magyarness, the mainland is 
ceasing to act as sole and principal reference point for being Hungarian.
This self-assertion is accompanied by an increased distancing from the 
mainland. Bardi (2000a:5) observes for instance that usage of the term 
anyaorszag (motherland) for Hungary has almost ceased within the minority 
press. Sociological surveys show that attachment to the home region either 
rivals that to Hungary, or actually overtakes it (Veres 1997:29; Lampl 1999:12; 
Lanstyak 2000:62-4). Ties to the mainland are hence perceived pragmatically, 
i.e. as a resource. Both mainland and Transylvanian politicians stressed in my 
interviews how the minorities use their connection to Budapest instrumentally 
(Fuzesi 2001). Hungary’s involvement into minority affairs is now only accepted 
if it serves the communities’ local interests. A case in point would be the 
financial help for the Magyar language universities in the Felvidek and
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Transylvania (opened in 2003 and 2004 respectively). Otherwise, there is 
considerable suspicion towards the mainland, which contrasts sharply with 
interwar attitudes of trust. Hungary's forced neutrality towards its kin during four 
communist decades has engendered a lasting feeling of abandonment, distrust 
and bitterness amongst Magyar minorities. Notwithstanding Cold War realities, 
this circumstance is still viewed as unforgivable abdication of responsibilities, 
even as betrayal. This attitude was outlined by both mainland and 
Transylvanian interviewees (interviews 1,2 and 6-8). In this vein, parts of 
contemporary minority historiography have also reinterpreted interwar 
Hungarian irredentism. Depending on the particular interpretation, the irredenta 
enjoyed no minority backing at all and was either utterly imposed by Budapest, 
or achieved via manipulation (see e.g. Borsody 1988; Popely 1990). Instead, it 
is portrayed as mainland Hungary's cynical, self-interested policy in which 
Transylvanian and Felvidek Magyars played little or no part, but for which they 
endured severe host state retaliation (see above). Resentment and distance 
have further grown with what are seen as present letdowns: the conclusion of 
Basic Treaties with the host states (denounced as sell-out in exchange for 
Hungary’s EU hopes), the Status Law (feared as both internally divisive and as 
engineered population drain -  see Dobos and Apro 2000; Kantor 2002), and its 
subsequent re-negotiation (seen as concession to Brussels’ pressure on 
Budapest). Most disappointing, however, was the Hungarian referendum of 
December 2004, where mainlanders failed to even muster a sufficient turnout to 
vote on dual citizenship for their co-ethnics.
Consequence 2: civic and ethnic belonging distinguished 
I had explained above how an organic understanding of the nation and the 
hierarchy it imposes, limit autonomous political behaviour in minorities. Because 
there is no self-conscious community to speak of, there is little scope for 
independent political goals over and beyond resistance. National membership 
primarily based on culture contrastingly allows transborder communities to 
socialise into minority existence. Whether they can do so, and thereby separate 
civic from communal loyalties, depends on the domestic regime type. I will 
argue in chapter 7 that a host state can decisively influence and even hasten 
this further shift in minority identity by offering consociational features which
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accommodate what actively or formerly irredentist groups covet: self-rule 
(autonomy) and shared rule (co-owning a state).
The development of what I have termed “quasi-consociational practice” in both 
Romania and Slovakia has enabled both Hungarian minorities to become 
committed and integral parts of host state domestic politics (see section 7.3.2). 
Political power, collective recognition as well as an increased measure of 
control over their own affairs at local level, increasingly cater for Magyar 
demands and have thus established stakeholder involvement. In their own 
slogans, Hungarians have thus gone from their former stance as "thorn in the 
foreign side" to "partner nations" (szerzodeses nemzet). Their former 
abstentionism has ceded to an actively sought and by now permanent, pivotal 
role in Slovak and Romanian national politics (see section 7.3.2). As a 
consequence, they have increasingly developed a civic allegiance towards their 
host states (see e.g. Culic 2001). Thus Romania for instance is rated as first 
choice as home country with 47 per cent (Veres 1997:29). This unfolding 
“civicness” is however at a less advanced stage than that in the mainland (see 
below), and is arguably even qualitatively different: it is accompanied by strong 
cultural elements, and by a focus on the minority community and its region 
(Kantor 2001; Lampl 1999:13; Gereben 1997:29/30; Langman 1997:118/119). 
This is for two reasons. Firstly, it is because both Romania and Slovakia 
continue to be nationalising states (Brubaker 1996). Secondly, the minorities 
are still in the process of differentiating themselves from Hungary. Hence the 
building of civic loyalties goes hand in hand with the above-described 
“community-building”. Nevertheless, Hungarians in both countries show high 
approval ratings for the fact that their respective parties have for the last decade 
consistently prioritised participation in Romanian and Slovak politics over the 
task of “community building” (Hamberger 2004:116;122; Bardi and Kantor 
2000:157-8).
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6.3.2 Hungary today: trans-sovereign nationalism
Self-view: between cultural and increasingly civic nationhood 
Because Magyar national identity is no longer based on identification with 
ancestral territory, contemporary Hungary does not see itself as truncated. 
Mainland Hungarians tie nationhood instead to both culture and language on 
the one hand, and on the other, to a growing identification with the political 
institutions of the Hungarian state. This latter component has tangibly increased 
in the course of democratisation (Csepeli 1989:43-46, Csepeli 1992/97:241- 
254; HTMH:2000; Shulman 2002:567-578). In consequence, there is also no 
longer a sense of absolute solidarity transcending boundaries. Hungary does 
maintain a constitutional responsibility towards fellow Hungarians across the 
borders.20 Nevertheless, the general interest and sympathy is now also 
accompanied by apprehension. For instance, mainlanders have voiced 
concerns about being overwhelmed by kindred "guestworkers" due to the 
Status Law (HTMH 2000 survey; Dobos and Apro 2001). Similarly, one of the 
main points of debate in the run up to the referendum on dual citizenship in 
December 2004 concerned the potential cost to tax payers from welcoming 3 
million additional citizens.
Consequence 1: equality and diversity mean an end to hegemony 
Unlike cohesion based on kinship, culturally-based nationhood does not imply a 
hierarchy of actors. In contrast to the pattern of subordination and hegemony, 
shared language and heritage allow for multiple centres of the nation and 
therefore for equality among them. No single unit has a monopoly on 
determining the conditions of collective belonging, though there may be less 
and more significant focal points. Intra-group politics hence change in function 
of this, i.e. irredentism is under these conditions impossible.
The Hungarian parent state of today no longer entertains a national hegemony 
towards the minorities. This is illustrated in its legalistic, institutionalised 
approach on both the collective and individual level. The former was achieved 
by the establishment of the Hungarian Standing Committee (MAERT) in 1996, a 
publicly accountable forum reuniting all regional Magyar minorities and the
20 Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Hungarian constitution stipulates that "the Republic of Hungary 
feels responsible for the fate of those Magyars living outside of its borders and promotes their 
relations with Hungary."
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mainland. It is an open, accountable, framework for exchanges between the 
mainland and the transborder communities, which most importantly functions on 
a multi-lateral, egalitarian basis. The MAERT serves to openly discuss inter- 
Hungarian relations and Budapest’s policy making towards the minorities and 
their host states. Individual relations between the mainland and its transborder 
kin in turn have been formalised within the legal framework of the Status- or 
Preference Law. Although the subject of minority suspicions as another way to 
assert control over them (Dobos and Apro 2000; Interviews 1 and 2), it was not 
only drawn up but is now also implemented, in close co-operation with minority 
organisations. The Hungarian government continues to finance the transborder 
communities, but with several important differences to interwar times. Firstly, 
the allocation and size of resources has become increasingly transparent over 
the course of the post-communist period. Budgeting is subject to parliamentary 
discussion and review as well as to deliberation within the Standing Committee. 
The flow of monies has become more and more de-centralised, with different 
foundations looking after separate funding domains (a good example is the 
Sapientia Foundation for the running of the private Hungarian language 
university in Transylvania). Most importantly, the priorities and rationale are 
entirely different. Bardi’s detailed analysis (2004b:208-238) describes Hungary’s 
priorities as ensuring self-sustaining transborder communities. This 
concentrates on areas like Magyar language education, the erection of a 
network of cultural institutions, and supporting the development of local 
business. In telling contrast to interwar practice, one particular concern is to 
secure independent minority elite reproduction in local Hungarian language 
universities. In short, instead of hegemony in order to restore completeness, 
Budapest envisages today what former Premier Orban described as "multiple 
small Hungarian worlds” (Heti Hirmondo 2001).
Consequence 2: conflicting cultural and civic self-views in the mainland 
Contemporary domestic politics in Hungary reflect the two conflicting bases of 
its national definition. The problem is that the mainland’s political-institutional 
self-view automatically excludes transborder kin, while they are included in its 
cultural-linguistic definition. Hence the unity of the Hungarian nation as a whole 
is ultimately at stake in the long run. Fowler (2004a) describes how this 
conundrum has led to competing elite views on the “national question”.
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Conservative parties, most notably FIDESZ, argue that the Hungarian state in 
its present form does not adequately express and realise the nation’s identity 
and interests. The liberal-socialist camp in turn is against divorcing nationhood 
from citizenship and legal territory. This dilemma translates onto the popular 
level, too. Shulman (2002:567-578) describes palpably contradictory results 
from the International Social Survey Program. Thus, living in Hungary is ranked 
highly by mainland Magyars as criterion for national membership and, to a 
lesser extent, being born there, but at the same time linguistic mastery is rated 
as fundamental. Hungarian post-communist politics is thus replete with attempts 
to synthesise or reconcile these two divergent components. The 1996 Millennial 
Commemorations of Hungary’s foundation were one such example, followed by 
the Status Law (2001), its rewriting (2003), the FIDESZ-instigated referendum 
on dual citizenship (2004), and finally, a governmental Proposal on the 
Constitutional Status of Hungarians Living Abroad (late 2005). Perhaps the best 
summary of this situation is that the mainland has moved from traditional 
nationalism (congruence of political and ethnic boundaries) to what Csergo and 
Goldgeier (2001; 2004) call ‘trans-sovereign nationalism’ (creating institutions to 
link the cultural nation across state boundaries). This is exactly because 
ancestry and territoriality have been superseded by more voluntaristic criteria, 
of which in turn only culture can maintain transborder unity via shared, non­
political institutions (see also Kantor 2005).
6.4 Conclusion: from indivisible Magyar ethnicity to "multiple Hungarian 
universes"
“Ethnicity” Esman writes, cannot be politicised unless an underlying core of 
memories, experience or meaning moves people to collective action” (1994:14). 
When that ‘core’ changes in content, so do the solidarities they engender and 
the political agenda these demand. The ethno-national identity of Hungarians 
has transformed and thereby changed the content and goals of Hungarian 
nationalism. Magyar ethnicity has shifted from ethnic-exclusive characteristics 
(chief among them identification with a homeland) to cultural-linguistic, and 
increasingly, civic markers.
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During the interwar period, Magyar ethno-national identity was principally 
conceived of in ethnic-exclusive terms. As a consequence, allegiance and 
loyalty could only be to the group and to the state it owned. This applied within 
both mainland and minority communities, apart from very few respective 
exceptions. The szentistvani allameszme (state-concept of Hungary's founder 
St. Stephen) was now applied to those of Magyar descent only: they and their 
millennial territory primarily defined being Hungarian. Culture and heritage were 
seen only in function of that, hence Budapest had no qualms about treating the 
transborder Magyars like deviant, manipulable enclaves. Indeed, culture and 
language were systematically used by the mainland government to prepare for 
future retrieval, shape minority leaderships and thereby remotely control these 
communities. The latter in turn remained as unselfconscious enclaves, 
accepting and readily submitting themselves to such treatment. Accordingly, 
they froze in denial of their new situation, remaining politically and culturally 
dependent on Budapest. They saw being "redeemed" as the only conceivable 
solution to their situation. This engendered typical irredentist behaviour in both 
actors. Minorities logically chose defensiveness and self-isolation within the 
host state in anticipation of retrieval. In Hungary itself, all political-societal 
processes were made dependent on the national salvation that reunion would 
bring.
Today, Hungarian identity is defined by heritage and language as well as an 
increasing civic attachment to the different states in which Magyars live. The 
Hungarian nation as cultural unit has more inclusive markers which cannot 
furnish the absolute solidarities and describe the clear territorial extent 
irredentism needs. It is furthermore egalitarian -  transborder minorities are 
alternative, equal Hungarian societies instead of dependent enclaves. Hungary 
in turn is no longer a truncated national centre, but increasingly defined by its 
institutions. The resulting intra-group relations are thus inimical to retrieval: the 
parent state has abandoned national hegemony, its kin is assertive and self- 
conscious as society apart. Both actors are furthermore increasingly tying 
Hungarian national identity to civic criteria, such as citizenship, political 
participation and consent. In Hungary this comes from successful 
democratisation, for Romanian and Slovak Magyars this derives from ongoing 
quasi-consociational integration into their host states. This means that both 
actors have been able to separate their political allegiances from communal
221
belonging. Given that irredentism crucially equates nation and polity, this is a 
further important hindrance to retrieval. Secondly, the respectively emerging 
civic loyalties also mean increasingly conflictual and therefore tenuous, bases to 
the Hungarian national identity. This is especially felt in Hungary proper. Its 
more and more prominent political-institutional criteria of belonging 
automatically exclude the minorities, thus threatening the frequently professed 
cultural cohesion of the Magyar nation.
This chapter has shown that an ethno-national identification based on narrowly 
conceived markers is crucial to irredentism. Shifts within a group’s identity, due 
to changing markers, entail changes in their politicisation, i.e. in the nationalism 
shared identity generates. Cultural and civic bases of group identity, instead of 
ethnic, exclusive ones undermine the very axiom irredentist projects rest on: 
namely that retrieval is necessary because international borders divide what 
organically constitutes one.
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7. Regime type matters: the impact of democracy
“Democracy is a political form suitable only to rich, well-structured 
and highly cultured countries.... In countries where the above 
conditions are absent, democracy may become seriously 
debilitating to national existence, especially in times of national 
crisis, or when the country is faced with social problems of 
considerable magnitude. In such instances, democracy easily 
degenerates into ruthless political conflict, because the complete 
freedom of speech and assembly are potent instruments of 
misleading masses. ”
Prime Minister Bethlen, 19221
7.1 Introduction: regime type and retrieval
The nexus between the pursuit of irredentism and regime type has been 
recognised, although not necessarily treated, by a number of authors. Most tend to 
focus on the parent state, presumably because of its position as stronger player. 
The arguments put forward give a mixed, even contradictory, picture. Connor 
(1980:164-5) for instance observes that "the form of government within a [parent] 
state is a key variable." In his view, democratic polities are more prone to retrieval 
due to their very sensitivity to public opinion. Given the pressure on elected elites 
to act, "democratic governments are less flexible than authoritarian governments 
when they are involved in an irredentist situation." Landau (1990:242-3) conversely 
argues that in democracies irredentism is "left to opposition groups" (mostly 
because they can "afford" controversial platforms), whereas in non-democratic 
regimes it is likely to be governmental policy. This ties in with Weiner's earlier 
observation that democratic governance suffers with the rise of irredentism 
(1971:676). Some, finally, concentrate on regime-dependent variations within
1 In Berend and Csato (2001:149-150).
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minority irredentism. Roudometof (1996) is one of the few to do so, by linking the 
desire for retrieval to declining minority rights.
7.1.1 Donald Horowitz's (sparse) take on regime type and irredentism
Horowitz, otherwise an eager student of democracy's impact on ethnic conflict, 
does not include this potential variable in his analysis of irredentism. Indeed his 
model seems to assume for uniformity across regime types when it comes to 
retrieval. He concedes that "the irredentist decision...is susceptible to all the forces 
and constraints that impinge upon policy decisions in general" (1985:282), yet 
omits that these limitations are exclusive to a particular type of regime. Thus the 
cost-benefit calculations he invests ethnic leaders with, and especially their 
freedom of action, are posited as immune to regime-specific constraints or 
incentives. Irredentist electorates or political clienteles in both the minority and the 
mainland appear likewise untouched by their political environment. In fact, 
democracy only appears as a feature of parent state attractiveness to undecided 
transborder kindred: "...Discontented, territorially compact, transborder ethnic 
groups ... with the potential to be retrieved, find retrieval by the putative irredentist 
state undesirable. This may be because that state is poorer or ... more 
authoritarian than the state in which they are now encapsulated" (1991:16, 
emphasis added). Why a more democratic regime would be attractive is not 
detailed. In short, the theory omits democracy's central importance as determinant 
of irredentist inconsistency.
The possibility of a particular political system affecting the scope for irredentism is 
raised only in conjunction with another factor: the identity of parent state elites. 
Regarding irredentas in Africa and Asia, Horowitz observes: "...though a claim is 
asserted on the basis of ethnic affinity in general, the source of the affinity is more 
particularised. In each case, traditional transborder ethnic affinities can be 
identified, but in each case there is something more: personal links between rulers 
of the irredentist state and the group or the territory to be retrieved. (...) In each 
case, irredentism has been sustained, not merely by ethnicity, but by kinship in a
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more direct and narrow sense" (1985:286-287). Crucially, Horowitz links this factor 
of what I have termed ‘particularised affinity* to the parent state's political system: 
"...each of these irredentist states was governed by a patrimonial regime in a 
traditional society where kinship could operate largely unfettered" (ibid.). In his 
analysis then, regime type is at best a secondary conditioning factor. Let us 
nevertheless take note of Horowitz's implicit assumption that factors specific to a 
certain government may facilitate the conduct of ethno-politics.
7.1.2 Democracy or democratisation and group propensity for irredentism
1 maintain that democracy or democratisation does matter in group decisions for or 
against irredentism. The form of government in the host and parent states 
respectively has a central impact on whether minority and mainland choose 
retrieval. Democracy is, however, differently relevant for each actor in his 
decisions. When situated in a democratic framework, both actors are respectively 
conditioned by its constraints (pluralism, accountability, and the fostering of civic- 
institutional legitimacy within the parent state) and incentives (collective equality 
and some form of internal self-determination for the minority).
7.2 Irredentist parent states, democratisation and democracy
When looking at irredentist parent states in the Dataset 2, two things stand out: 
very few are consolidated democracies, while most of them are in some state of 
regime transition towards democracy. Historically, irredentist surges have followed 
either revolutions (waves I and IV), World War, and / or imperial collapse (waves II 
and III -  see section 1.3.2). In short, they took place in post-authoritarian settings. 
Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995;2002a;2002b) quantitative research suggests a 
systematic connection between democratisation and aggressive foreign policies 
based on nationalism.2 Their theory employs a definition and measure of
2 This emulates one of Van Evera’s Hypotheses on Nationalism and War (1994:32-3), which posits 
the “strength and competence of independent evaluative institutions" as key criterion. In an
225
democratisation that captures causative institutional changes. Building on the 
Polity datasets’ composite index for regime type, they use its three principal criteria 
as main indicators: the extent of the constraints placed on the chief executive as 
well as the openness and competitiveness of political participation and of executive 
recruitment.3
Based on these, two stages of transition are distinguished: one from autocracy to 
anocracy, a volatile intermediate situation where elements of both regime types are 
in evidence, and a second phase shifting to consolidated, peaceful democracy.4 
Mansfield and Snyder observe that states undergoing phase one (partial or 
incomplete democratisation) are more prone than other regime types to engage in 
military disputes.5 Such ‘anocratic’ states are furthermore likely to become involved 
in conflict with regimes of all types. They do so as initiators, rather than as 
temporarily weak targets. This behaviour is confirmed as monadic, or internal, to 
the state in question, which in turn concurs with my model’s basic argument that 
irredentism has primarily endogenous causes.
The reasons for this pattern lie in the institutional vulnerability typically associated 
with early or stalled democratisation. Most post-authoritarian settings are weakly 
institutionalised, which means they cannot cater for broadening political 
participation. Elites hence resort to ideology, and more often than not this is 
nationalism (Snyder 2000). They do so for two reasons. They may try to 
compensate for the absence of legitimacy which institutionally established
international relations theory of irredentism, Carment and James (1995:94) also cite elite 
institutional constraints, albeit only as intervening variable, and not as strictly bound to democracy 
or to a particular type thereof. Executive constraint, executive regulation, and participation 
constraints all mean that "the stronger the state in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the 
better its position to oppose (or alternatively to impose) an extreme ethnic foreign policy." Other 
research conversely suggests that democratisation decreases ethnic conflict, and that it is rather 
established regimes, including established democracies, which are more likely to experience severe 
ethnic conflict (see Saideman et al. 1999).
3 For an explanation of this choice see Mansfield and Snyder (2002a:311-4 and 2002b:535). The 
present study uses the same criteria (see also section 2.4.1 and Dataset Manual 2, Appendix).
4 Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr’s Polity score assumes for the core qualities of democracy and 
autocracy as defining opposite ends of a governance scale that ranges from -10 (fully 
institutionalised autocracy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Rather than a distinct form of 
governance, anocracies are a middling category which mixes these systemic features and thus 
ranges between -5 and +5.
5 Their theory has so far only been applied to one irredentist state, namely Gavrilis’ (2003) analysis 
of late nineteenth century Greece, where it is however combined with variables derived from 
security studies.
226
democratic procedures normally confer. They do so by taking advantage of 
vestigial authoritarian powers and as yet low accountability. Nationalism thus 
serves to close the gap between popular demands and underdeveloped 
institutions. Alternatively or in addition, leaders may feel threatened by rival elites, 
and respond by forging political-corporate coalitions that share the same vested 
interests. In this scenario, nationalism is employed as (lowest) common 
denominator in politics. Nationalism is useful for both situations, because it is “a 
state-building ideology that holds out the promise of either gaining a state for a 
people that lacks one or strengthening the capacity of an existing state to better 
serve the distinctive aims of a people” (Mansfield and Snyder 2000b:531). 
Irredentism, with its core tenet of national union as cure-all, describes this scenario 
well.6
Maturing transitions and established democracies in contrast, display the 
“presence of strong institutions that regulate mass participation. These institutions 
guarantee that the officials making foreign policy will be accountable to the median 
voter, who bears the costs and risks of military conflict” (2002b:530) -  or, in this, 
case, a risky foreign policy such as retrieval.
In order to apply Mansfield and Snyder’s neo-institutionalist theory a few 
modifications are necessary. For one, since not all irredentas involve military 
conflict (see section 1.3.3), this model has to widen their explanation to the more 
general category of external antagonism. The authors partly do so themselves, 
referring to “foreign disputes” (2002b:532) and underlining that “incomplete 
democratic transitions heighten the prospect of various types of military disputes, 
including those short of war (2002b:530, emphasis added; see also 2002a:310). 
Parent state irredentism falls well within this category, being an aggressive foreign 
policy that challenges another state’s sovereignty.
6 Mansfield and Snyder (2000b:531) relate foreign political aggression to nationalism's “...appeals 
[based on] the political exclusion of ethnic or ideological ‘enemies of the nation’.” Irredentist groups 
do define themselves in ethnic-exclusive terms, taking kinship literally as extended family. The 
motivator here is however not xenophobia, but rather solidarity: the //7-clusion of co-ethnics and 
their liberation from rule by ethnic strangers.
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A second, more important, modification concerns the role and nature of 
nationalism. In Snyder and Mansfield’s explanation, nationalism and ethnicity serve 
as mere instruments of elite interests, without any independent motive power or 
rootedness in collective identity. This implies that politicians are not convinced of 
their own nationalist appeals, although the authors concede that they may find 
themselves “trapped by rhetoric” because their supporters and rivals have 
“internalised” what started off as cynical ploy (ibid.:532). In this view, irredentism 
would merely be one type of diversionary war, much like Saideman portrays it 
(Saideman 1998; Saideman and Ayres 1999; Saideman and Ayres 2000). The 
problematic elite persuasion-thesis has already been discussed and criticised 
above (see e.g. introduction and sections 1.4.1-1.4.2). It is hence enough to 
reiterate here that ethno-nationalism is not one amongst many bases of mass 
mobilisation, but commands a power of its own that in crisis trumps all other 
identities, interests, and ideas. Whether or not it is instrumentalised, it is successful 
as political agenda because it fulfils a pre-existing collective need. Hence, while it 
affords some leeway for political (ab)use, it constrains leaders and their interests 
as much their electorates.
Consequently, the theory needs correcting with regards to its uni-directional 
causation. “Imperfectly formed institutions” as Snyder and Mansfield reason, “can 
facilitate elites’ ability to exploit their power in ways that promote a belligerent 
foreign policy” (2002b:534). What of the inverse? Given the autonomous power of 
ethno-nationalism, I argue that such “imperfectly formed institutions” are equally 
unable to limit popular, ‘bottom-up’ pressure for nationalist diplomacy such as 
irredentism. This pressure is furthermore likely to be pronounced exactly during 
times of political transition which see populations draw on the certainties of 
collective belonging. In other words, while Snyder and Mansfield’s dismissive view 
of nationalism considers solely the lack of ‘top down’ institutional constraints, the 
realities of ethno-nationalism require a two-way theory. Popular demands are as 
important as elite supply, and what is more, both can be genuine. To summarise, 
feeble institutions within anocracies mean that elites may as much ‘persuade’ their 
political clienteles of irredentism as they are pressured by the latter, or both.7
7 Regardless of whether irredentism works to their advantage, "political elites may be as 
passionately committed to the unification of the group as the masses" Connor reminds (1980:186),
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In connection with this we also need to readjust the authors’ functionalist 
assumptions on democracy. In Snyder and Mansfield’s view, it is because of 
distortions in this otherwise free marketplace of ideas that nationalism has a 
chance. The democratic peace is ensured because of an effective competition 
between motivational bases (material and cultural), which consolidated democratic 
institutions sustain and channel. Implication: enough information will allow the cost- 
conscious median voter to dryly assess and reject the nationalist option. 
Democracy is thus reduced to merely securing a level playing field, with pluralism 
and accountability unmasking nationalism as self-interested, cynical, and costly. 
This leaves unexplained why nationalism still manages to get a strong democratic 
mandate and to override other political cleavages. The argument implies that the 
‘rational’ enterprise of democracy is incompatible with ‘irrational’ nationalism. In 
fact the opposite is true: democracy (and democratisation) build on nationalism 
because it helps define and unify the self-determining community.8 
Problems arise where “the ethnic flesh of nationalism remains untamed” by 
malfunctioning or stalled democracy. In other words, when there is a “lack of a 
robust political expression for national feeling, (...) when [people] have no political 
or institutional achievements to take pride in” (Nodia 1994:15). In such situations 
nationalism is left as the main or only component to hold together a polity, to fill a 
political vacuum (Gellner 1992). It no longer merely underpins the political 
consensus, but replaces it: the nation principally defines itself via shared culture or, 
as in irredentism’s case, ethnicity. The state is reduced to expressing (here: 
reuniting) this organic entity. The fact that political entrepreneurs use this and are 
able to, is hence only co-responsible. So while Snyder and Mansfield are correct 
about the nexus between institutional underperformance and ethno-nationalism, 
they partly miss out on causation. Institutional efficiency in democracy pre-empts 
nationalist foreign policies like irredentism not just via scrutiny of leaders and the 
pluralism of motivational bases, but because of its transformative impact It
and "even if they are not, governments may have little choice when there are internal pressures for 
annexation."
8 Democratic nationalism, i.e. the cohesion based on shared nationalism within democratic polities, 
is seen to actually ensure the proper functioning of representative institutions and widespread 
participation - see e.g. J.S. Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government (1958 
[1861 ]:230;232-3) or Moore (2001).
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“sublimates” the nationalism of masses and elites “into patriotic esteem for the 
institutions and achievements created by a democratic (not just ethnic) ‘we’ ” 
(Nodia 1994:ibid.). So cohesion is primarily (though not exclusively) characterised 
by consent and participation, rather than by belonging and loyalty to an 
undifferentiated community of descent. Consequently, what makes irredentism and 
democracy nigh irreconcilable is democracy’s creation of an alternative, 
voluntaristic loyalty. Although ethnic and cultural elements usually still figure as 
back up, the nation is significantly defined by institutions. This undercuts two 
fundamental conditions on which retrieval rests, namely group identity based on 
shared kinship and the state’s ownership by and thus subservience to, that group. 
Conversely, irredentism and anocracy are so uniquely suited for each other 
because politics faces mounting participation (unlike in authoritarian systems) but 
cannot yet provide a consensus via institutions (unlike in democracies). 
Nationalism not only fills the gap, as Mansfield and Snyder recognise, but is here 
also unrivalled as galvanising factor and thus inverts the relationship between 
nation and state.
In short, parent state irredentism is practically incompatible9 with substantive 
democracy and (successful) democratisation. The civic nationalism and pluralism 
its institutions engender minimise the potential for ethnopolitics. In contrast, 
compromised institutions due to incomplete democratisation allow for ethno- 
nationalism. Because in this scenario the state is not defined by strong, efficient 
institutions it exists in function of an ethnically defined polity and this informs 
leaders and their policies. As we shall see, interwar Hungary and its domestic 
politics fit this description closely. Conversely, the institutions of consolidated 
democratic systems - as which post-communist Hungary by now counts - severely
9 A few cases in the Dataset form exceptions to this rule: West Germany, Japan and the Irish 
Republic count as consolidated democracies whilst pursuing retrieval (versus the GDR, Okinawa- 
Ryukyu and Northern Ireland respectively). Two explanations are possible: on the one hand, these 
regimes may have been merely “rhetorically” irredentist. On the other, and more plausibly, 
irredentism existed despite democratic politics because the (re-)birth of these states was closely 
associated with national truncation. The irredentist question thus existed as integral part of 
domestic politics, as yet another historically inherited cleavage. In contradistinction to anocracies 
however, it was not the dominant or single generator of the domestic consensus and thus did not 
rule foreign policy.
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limit the conflation of group (ethnic) and state (civic) interest. This is especially 
applicable where the collective identity to be politicised has already transformed 
away from an ‘ethnic’ definition (as with the Magyars) - a trend which democracy 
reinforces, and which international disincentives support.
7.2.1 Interwar Hungary and its irredentism (1920-1940)
After Trianon: the widening and fragmentation of Hungary’s political spectrum 
Together with partition, the end of World War I had brought the end of the Dual 
Monarchy and of its conservative order. After the violent defeat of Bela Kun’s brief 
Soviet government, Hungary’s traditional political class -  its landed aristocracy -  
took control again. However, it faced a widened and uncomfortably fragmented 
political spectrum.
For one, there was an external pressure to democratise. Imposed by the victorious 
Entente, but soon losing its substance, this principle had to be heeded at least 
outwardly (Foldes and Hubai 1999:261-2). Secondly, traditional patterns of 
electioneering were now threatened by the onset of ‘modern’ politics, such as the 
formation of mass parties and the increasing use of the media (Boros and Szabo 
1999:235-6). Even more challenging was the political landscape’s sudden 
diversification. Wartime modernisation had enlarged new social strata: the lower 
middle class and urban industrial workers. There was also the newly enfranchised 
rural population, with its pressing need for agrarian and social reform. Especially 
among these strata, the conservative-patrician leadership still feared the remnants 
of Kun’s supporters. The greatest challenge, however, came from the middle 
classes. This was the stratum most injured by partition, making it irredentism’s 
most loyal constituency within Hungary. Trianon and the chaos of civil war and 
occupation had in their eyes discredited the old order. Their rage over national 
humiliation was enhanced by the personal losses partition brought, such as 
professional dislocation (especially for demobilised officers), separation from 
family, and the loss of properties (Zeidler 2001:49; 161). Their ranks were bolstered 
by the mass of Magyar refugees from the newly separated territories - scores of 
former imperial administrators and military, doctors, lawyers, teachers, university
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faculty, etc., who more than shared these grievances. Vocal and numerous, these 
people in particular further radicalised the already discontented middle class 
(Mocsy 1983 and 1995; Zeidler 2001:204).
Horthvist Hungary as anocracv
The conservative patrician leadership was intent on ‘consolidation’. This was “not 
just system stabilising, but [system] preserving” (Pritz 2000:106). It hence sought to 
co-opt the middle classes, whilst pursuing a divide and rule strategy towards the 
rest (Foldes and Hubai 1999:86; Boros and Szabo 1999:281). Interwar Hungary’s 
newly enfranchised strata were kept at bay via the weakness of its institutions.
For starters, pluralism and the mechanisms of accountability were considerably 
curtailed. Given the fact that elections were constantly rigged (especially in rural 
districts), voters routinely intimidated, and the secrecy of the ballot only kept in 20 
per cent of districts, electoral input was distorted. Electoral laws were soon 
progressively restricted again, throttling suffrage from 29.5 per cent in 1922 to 26.6 
per cent four years later (Foldes and Hubai 1999:260-6; Boros and Szabo 
1999:235-42). These measures minimised support for the two camps that would 
have meant competition in parliament: the Catholic-Monarchist faction on the right, 
and the Smallholders and Social Democrats on the left (Pritz 2000:61).
This was compounded by an already sanitised political landscape. As another 
consequence of Kun’s Soviet experiment, Hungary's surviving leftist spectrum 
provided a feeble challenge after decimation and exile due to the subsequent 
White Terror. Thus opposition from outside of the ruling reactionary parties was 
considerably reduced for the entire interwar period.
Parliament consequently often functioned as rubberstamp. Feudal and corporate 
interests furthermore retained legislative veto powers by manning the country’s 
unelected Upper House. This reinforced their already disproportionate hold over 
the lower chamber, where mandates, rather than being acquired via political 
competition, usually “followed” eminent societal positions (Boros and Szabo 
1999:315-21). This also applied to cabinet members, who were rarely recruited 
from parliament, but acquired mandates only after appointment to their posts. 
Governments and ministries were thus overwhelmingly composed of landed
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aristocrats. Indeed, the first fourteen years between 1919 and 1932 saw an 
uninterrupted succession of three counts as prime ministers. Hungary’s entire 
institutional design as constitutional monarchy embodied this deadlock. Policy 
making, especially in the area of foreign affairs, was correspondingly marked by 
executive dominance. Successive pairings of assertive prime and foreign ministers 
monopolised and personalised the domain, with parliamentary review, critique, and 
modifications figuring at best as cosmetic (Pritz 1995:223-225).
The political freeze was backed up by paternalistic social policies that disabled 
social mobility and reform (Pritz 2000:73-77).1° Together with the pronounced vote 
rigging in rural areas, this kept tight control over Hungary’s destitute agrarian 
population, which at the time accounted for over 50 per cent of the population.
The press finally, historically a ‘fourth estate’ in Hungary, "became subject to a 
series of repressive measures", in part because of its leftist leanings, but mostly "in 
order to prevent the embarrassment of the government in the conduct of foreign 
affairs" (Janos 1982:216). In short then, post-World War I Hungary possessed the 
anocratic institutional features that Mansfield and Snyder describe: low executive 
constraint, exclusive governmental recruitment, and minimal political competition.
Bridging the legitimacy gap, rallying the nation: Magyar retrieval as panacea 
Hungary’s deliberately stalled, underperforming institutions were thus unable to 
forge a civic-political expression to national cohesion. It was nationalism that 
provided in this context both a cohesive glue and legitimising rationale. In mainland 
Hungary, irredentism represented “the strongest legitimate factor to generate a 
national consensus” (Zeidler 2001:188). In a society deeply divided by recent civil 
war and stuck in the apathy of defeat and hardship, retrieval was invoked to unify 
and mobilise the population (ibid.:57;188 ff.). Governments directly used domestic 
irredentist propaganda, but also encouraged private initiatives with a view to 
secure support for themselves (Pritz 2000:84). Virtually all analysts agree that 
interwar Hungarian foreign policy, specifically the question of retrieval, had 
overwhelmingly domestic sources (Juhasz 1988:70-1; Pritz 1995:236; Gergely and
10 The strategy held throughout the period: in 1938, after sixteen failed attempts for land reform, 
over 10.000 square kilometres of arable land was still owned by only 80 magnate families (Hoensch 
1995:131).
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Pritz 1998:106-7; Ormos 1998). In a textbook scenario of Mansfield and Snyder’s 
description, institutional failure thus allowed a regime to legitimise itself via 
nationalism whilst denying its citizens democratic pluralism, social redistribution, 
and modernisation.
A consensus built on nationalism in turn affirmed what irredentism posits 
axiomatically -  the organic unity of group and state interests. The country's 
difficulties were collectively blamed on the "Trianon Diktat", with irredentism thus 
acquiring the value of a national salvation. Retrieval, not reform, was the way out. 
Restoring the Hungarian Kingdom automatically meant restoring the socio-political 
order that had ruled it. Unaccountable actors like the Catholic Church, the army 
and the state bureaucracy contributed their influential support to this idea. 
Hungary’s Catholic hierarchy for instance, repeatedly affirmed that patrician rule, 
Christianity, and territoriality were historically inextricably fused for the Magyar 
nation. Albeit under a modified, now corporatist paradigm, this trend continued with 
the middle class’ accession to government in the 1930s. Official slogans extolled 
“united force for national union” which, in the governmental program’s words, 
required that “the maximum of the nation’s energies be available to the realisation 
of national goals” (Boros and Szabo 1999:263; Pritz 2000:100). The ‘salvation 
principle’ marginalised the few who objected to this subordination of domestic 
politics to the national question. While supportive of retrieval itself, the social 
democrats for instance linked irredentism to the opposite -  further democratisation 
(Romsics 1998:72). Hungary’s communists similarly made it conditional on social 
redistribution.11 Otherwise patriotic voices raised related caveats: influential writers 
like Zsigmond Moricz and Laszlo Nemeth, or liberal politicians like Oszkar Jaszi. 
Unlike Mansfield and Snyder suggest, the main obstacle for these dissenters was 
not the lack of democratic avenues of evaluative debate and policy review. Their 
objections were in fact well publicised, yet found little resonance. Rather, the 
problem was that anocratic institutional weakness could not provide an alternative,
11 Interwar communism, though becoming progressively more status quo oriented, still followed the 
Marxist-Leninist endorsement of national self-determination. Even Kun’s short lived Soviet Republic 
of 1919 upheld this principle, not least to galvanise support.
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civic footing for politics which would have made sense of arguments that 
distinguished societal from national concerns.
Integrating a diverse coalition: elite co-optation via irredentism 
Domestically, irredentism did, quite like Mansfield and Snyder posit, fulfil a coalition 
building role. Politics under the Horthy regime was mainly played out between two 
rival social segments: the old landed nobility and the predominantly middle class 
New Right. Their otherwise very different agendas converged on a "policy of 
turning back to the political situation of pre-war Hungary" (Hoensch 1995:108). 
Irredentism provided in this sense a synthesis between retrogressive corporatist 
politics and revanchist designs for recovering "Greater Hungary". Also, both agreed 
that irredentism pre-required Hungary’s conservative consolidation (Zeidler 
2001:44). Throughout the 1920s, this brought a coalition of sorts on these terms, 
with the middle class right being co-opted as junior partner. The first decade after 
Trianon under the stabilising lead of counts Teleki and Bethlen was thus 
characterised by guarded irredentism abroad (Pritz 1995:226). Domestic 
conservatism translated into Budapest's tentative lobbying of Paris and London, 
careful eroding of Hungary's post-WWI isolation, and its moderation despite 
Mussolini's encouragement. Faithfully reflecting domestic politics, irredentism 
during this period was all preparatory work, diplomatic ambiguity, and accepting 
international restrictions (see section 5.2.1).
The years between 1929 and 1932 changed this domestic balance, and irredentist 
politics with it. With the effects of global economic depression hitting Hungary, the 
destitute agrarian population now mobilised in national politics (Pritz 2000:80). This 
resurrected the hitherto marginalised Smallholders and Christian parties (Boros 
and Szabo 1998:281). The changed internal power ratio ended co-optation and 
increased competition within the right, but did not generate nationalist outbidding 
as in Snyder and Mansfield’s prediction. After the somewhat bolder moves of 1927- 
8 (announcement of revision, treaty with Mussolini), the next four years saw 
domestic stalemate -  the so-called statarium. The governments of counts Bethlen 
and Karolyi became absorbed with increasing domestic problems, such as mass 
strikes. Budapest’s foreign policy was accordingly in stagnation. Rather than elite
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rivalry, it was outright elite change, i.e. the governmental takeover by the middle 
class right, which would re-energise Hungary’s now increasingly aggressive 
irredentism.
The hitherto uninterrupted succession of aristocrat premiers came to an end in 
1932, with Gyula Gombos, a vicar’s son, taking office. This was cemented by the 
seismic shift of the 1935 elections, which ended the nobility’s legislative dominance 
and prompted a clean reversal of roles (Boros and Szabo 1998:260-66). This sea 
change took place throughout Hungary’s institutions, with special consequences 
for irredentism. Associated in the 1920s with defeat and failure to protect 
Hungary’s territorial integrity, the military was in the early 1930s deliberately 
purged of its circumspect and cautious old Austro-Hungarian ranks (Zeidler 
2001:130). It now became replete with young, dissatisfied and radical officers from 
the middle class who came to represent "an independent factor” in foreign policy 
formulation (Fulop and Sipos 1998:98) and saw their principal task as "salvaging 
the country" (Ormos 1998:107). Similarly, the more experienced, careful 
aristocratic staff within the Foreign Ministry retired in these years or were made to. 
Their places were filled with mainly middle-class, assertive individuals (Pritz 
1995:225-7, 235-6), often via clientelism to guarantee their allegiance, or 
"soundness". This changeover in the diplomatic body brought a re-think on 
irredentist goals: whilst their aristocratic predecessors had favoured integral 
revision, this new guard was more opportunistic by accepting retrieval along ethnic 
lines (Romsics 1998:72).
Interwar Hungary’s institutions became more authoritarian and illiberal: etatism, 
technocracy, corporatism (now in turn co-opting the gentry as junior partners) were 
all part of the ‘new politics’ (Ormos 1998:195; Foldes and Hubai 1999:266-9; Pritz 
2000:98-101). Gbmbds' reforms emulated fascism in stressing revolutionary self­
renewal and Mussolini’s ‘sacro egoismo’. This so-called "neo-nationalism" and 
corporatist solidarity, rather than conservative stability, were seen as the way to 
recover transborder kindred and St. Stephen's realm. Budapest’s irredentist foreign 
policy visibly radicalised as a result of the changes in leadership and paradigms. 
On the international stage, Hungary now fully switched to the revisionist camp by
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courting Nazi Germany as irredentist patron, increasingly defying status quo 
powers, openly voicing Magyar claims, and finally, by even leaving the League of 
Nations (see section 5.2.1).
How much of a ploy? Elite convictions and popular pressure
Weak anocratic institutions cannot sublimate nationalism into a civic expression,
and I had argued above that this applies regardless of whether it is the sentiment
of elites or masses. As a consequence therefore, the (ab)use of nationalism and its
encroachment on the state constrains the politics of both the population and its
leaders.
Hungary’s stalled institutions indeed not only faced parochial interests, but the 
ethno-national reflexes of both political incumbents and population. While leaders 
may have found irredentism convenient for their legitimisation, it is equally true that 
they were themselves unable to think but in ‘imperial’ terms. Diaries, 
correspondence, speeches, and essays from across the entire political spectrum 
show that the notion of Hungary accepting its boundaries remained inconceivable 
to politicians and opinion-makers alike (Szinai and Szucs 1965, 1972; Romsics 
1998; Romsics 2000:125-223). To remind of Horowitz’s suggestion about 
particularised affinity, most members of Hungary’s elite had indeed some personal 
connection to the partitioned areas. For instance, regent Horthy and premiers 
Bethlen and Teleki, all had family backgrounds in Transylvania. Prominent 
irredentist politicians like Bajcsy-Zsilinszky had studied there, and leading civil 
servants had recruited themselves from the ranks of minority refugees after 
Trianon (Mocsy 1995). Then again, literally everyone in the country had family ties, 
friendships, memories or life experiences to do with the lost territories (Zeidler 
2001:49). Hence Hungary’s leadership was not exceptional in this respect, nor, I 
would argue, was it therefore exceptionally motivated.12 Rather, its continued 
imperial thought had to do with the fact that the crucial condition for irredentism - 
an ethnically exclusive, rather than culturally or institutionally anchored identity -
12 As a general point, the existence of personalised ties in irredentist elites over and above ethno- 
national ones may be a fact of correlation, rather than causation. In other words, exactly because 
there is a popular drive for retrieval, because politics is defined by kinship, leaders with a credible, 
connected background are supported or elected.
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was still intact (see chapter 6). The elevation of ethnic-emotive logic into 
governmental politics was the order of the day, to the point where “foreign policy 
not only was unable to keep itself independent of these reactions, but was built on 
these very bases” (Zeidler 2001:55-57). Accordingly, both sets of elites conducted 
foreign policy with "diplomatic ignorance, primitive Hungarocentrism" and a "biased 
clutching (...) of national history" (Pritz 1995:235; see also Kovacs 1994:89-90). In 
other words, due to its own nationalism, interwar Hungary’s political class was path 
dependent on irredentism.
Mainland Hungarian society in turn was intensely politicised, Its castrated electoral 
input found expression as well as considerable weight through nationalist activism. 
The “cult of irredentism”, heavily imbued with Catholic religiosity, literally 
encompassed all aspects of society (Zeidler 2001:159-190). Thus governmental 
and church led propaganda (via statues and memorials, place names, public 
holidays, stamps, irredentist prayers, processions and masses as well as extensive 
inculcation in schools) was more than matched by private initiatives. These 
included commemorative and protest marches, many associations and clubs 
(including the semi-official and internationally operating Revisionist League), and a 
prolific irredentist output in popular music, consumer articles and literature -  to the 
point where there existed a veritable irredentist industry. Such zeal also produced 
quirkier aspects, such as a 1931 transatlantic flight by two Magyar pilots to achieve 
‘Justice for Hungary’, or competitions in fashion design and flower shows with an 
irredentist theme.
There are repeated instances of popular opinion outdoing the governmental drive 
for irredentism, even attacking its moderation, like during Rothermere’s 1927 
campaign for ‘Hungary’s Place in the Sun’. As a matter of fact, mainland sentiment 
left leaders with precious little alternative to retrieval. Foreign Minister Kanya 
complained to US envoy Montgomery "that he considered revisionism insanity, but 
that there was nothing he could do about it since the Hungarian people were not 
quite sane on the subject and foreign policy could not be divorced entirely from 
politics" (Hoensch 1967:12). Count Teleki, twice prime minister and one of 
irredentism’s chief ideologues, voiced similar concerns to an aide: ‘our public
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opinion has gone insane. [Take] everything back! No matter how, with whose help, 
no matter at what price. (...) We will die in this, this will push us into war” (Zeidler 
2001:57).
Essentially, "no Hungarian government could survive without seeking 'justice for 
Hungary"' (Balogh 1988:57). Popular pressure for retrieval held irrespective of age 
or class (ibid.:55), and persisted through the entire interwar period. In 
consequence, virtually all interwar party programs contained a commitment to 
irredentism, be it as token lip service or, more frequently, as substantive goal 
(Gergely, Glatz et al. 2003).
So, exactly because they had based their legitimacy on nationalism, both 
traditional and alternative elites in Hungary were ultimately more hostages to than 
in control of, irredentism.13
7.2.2 Hungary in the post-communist period (1989-2005)
Democratisation in Hungary: political diversification and elite competition 
Much like the situation after World War I, the onset of regime change and transition 
in 1989 confronted established elites with a sudden, unsettling diversity of political 
competitors. Within a mere 5 month period -  between September 1988 and 
January 1989 -  Hungarian politics was transformed into a genuine multi-party 
system. Four decades of monopoly government thus ended so to say overnight, 
witnessing simultaneously the re-birth of so-called ‘historic’ parties (Smallholders, 
Liberals, Social Democrats), new movements (FIDESZ, the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum, the Alliance of Free Democrats), and even the disintegration of the 
Communist Party (into the Socialists and the rump party itself). Furthermore, there 
was little space for divide-and-rule tactics: in March 1989 the opposition forced the 
ruling party to accept a dialogue strictly on a multilateral basis.
This time, however, developments did not prompt the interwar stranglehold on 
institutions and use of nationalism by panicked old elites. Unlike then, this
13 This beautifully mirrors Walker Connor’s observation that “governments can act as successful 
catalyst of ethno-nationalism only when the necessary ingredients are present. Once in flower, 
ethno-nationalism is not apt to respond to governmental attempts at curtailment” (1980:163).
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transition was a negotiated one, with multiple built in safeguards and 
compensations for the departing leadership. These both gave it assurance against 
any popular revanchism, and crucially, maximised its chances of surviving as 
dominant, if perhaps not sole political player.
Several aspects of Hungary’s negotiated transition (between March 1989 and 
1990) made this possible (Foldes and Hubai 1999:297-307). For one, although 
regime change set in suddenly, it initiated a gradual process, rather than crisis 
management following catastrophic national events, like after World War I. 
Opposition leaders furthermore firmly committed themselves to keeping transition 
peaceful. One may also add here the presence of Soviet troops as -  perhaps 
merely speculative -  safety belt for Hungary’s ruling party. Interwar elites, in 
contrast, had not enjoyed such guarantees, fearing instead a resurgence of Kun’s 
violent revolution of 1919.
Thirdly, unlike the hiatus caused by the civil war of 1919, the status quo elites of 
1989 enjoyed the unbridled advantages of incumbency. This meant full control of 
administration, security services and the media, electoral prominence (as the ‘safe 
option’), and, last but not least, experience. The ‘Dunagate’ scandal about secret 
service surveillance of opposition leaders in the run up to the first free elections 
exemplifies just how consciously they used this head start. Most importantly, 
however, communist elites managed to set the conditions of democratisation with 
regards to institutional arrangements. Their opposition to a new constitution (in 
favour of merely amending the existing one) prevailed in the Roundtable 
negotiations. This in turn enabled them to pre-empt both a constituent assembly 
(as demanded by the opposition), and influenced subsequent democratic 
legislatures (as of 2006 Hungary still operates on this amended statute). The 
Communists also secured their agenda on the office of the presidency: its scope 
(veto powers over government), its mode of election (direct popular vote), and 
timing (prior to free elections) were all designed to ensure the post to their 
candidate. The semi-presidential layout this would have resulted in was, however, 
defeated in a subsequent referendum14, thus leaving Hungary as parliamentary
14 The popular referendum of November 1989 defeated these provisions, thereby effectively ending 
much of the control on transition the ruling party had until then. Crucially, this only occurred after the
democracy with a largely ceremonial head of state. Finally, negotiations about 
Hungary’s electoral system saw the largest Roundtable parties team up to 
engineer a framework which would maximise their own seat shares (Benoit and 
Schiemann 2001). The adoption of a mixed member PR system, and the 
opposition parties’ compliance with the Communist electoral law, all favoured the 
ruling party, disadvantaging especially the smaller movements that had split from 
its body.
Thus instead of stalling institutions and freezing Hungary into an anocratic state of 
suspended animation, the assurances of the ‘pacted transition’ (Linz) 
simultaneously enabled democratisation to proceed and prevented non-civic forms 
of nationalism from legitimising and determining politics.
Post-communist Hungary’s swift transition to consolidated democracy15 
Democratisation in Hungary proceeded at rapid pace and was already considered 
as ‘consolidating’ in 1990 -  indeed the country’s Polity score on democracy 
reached the +10 high mark in 1991. In contrast to the interwar period, all three of 
Mansfield and Snyder’s criteria materialised in the course of the first post­
communist decade.
Judging by the four elections of the post-communist period, governmental 
recruitment first of all is wide open. Each election saw an exchange of executive 
leadership, and this not just in terms of ideology (conservative-Christian in 1990 
and 1998, socialist in 1994 and 2002), but even in the changing composition of 
parties within governmental coalitions.16 This (now regular) alternation is new and
proverbial point of no return for Communists i.e. after all other concessions had been made and a 
date for the first free elections set.
15 Snyder (2000:195) has previously presented a fine-tuned, but also far less parsimonious, model 
specifically for post-communist states. Their different behaviour stemmed from differences in 
patterns of democratisation, specifically ‘(1) the state’s degree and timing of economic 
development, (2) the degree to which democratisation threatened elite interests, and (3) the nature 
of its political institutions during the transition’ (ibid.: 195). Snyder further lists the presence of 
ethnic-based federal structures, clientelist administrations, the level of urbanisation illiteracy, infant 
mortality, and civic political culture. This thesis remains with the later, generalised, theory published 
with Mansfield.
16 Overall, six parties have acceded government in changing coalition formations. While the 
Socialists chose the Alliance of Free Liberals twice (1994, 2002), the two Christian-conservative 
coalitions saw considerable diversity (1994: Hungarian Democratic Forum, Smallholders, Christian 
Democrats in 1990 versus FIDESZ, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Smallholders in 1998).
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exceptional in modern Hungarian history, which until 1990 had seen only once an 
opposition being voted into office - namely in 1905 (Foldes and Hubai 1999:332). 
Secondly, political competition in contemporary Hungary is generally open -  the 
voting process is untampered with and there is an electoral ombudsman. On the 
other hand, it also displays tendencies of electoral concentration and 
disproportionality which (deliberately) limit parliamentary pluralism. This is due to 
two circumstances. For one, it stems from hurdles in the electoral system 
negotiated in 1989. Intent on keeping smaller or new competitors at bay, outgoing 
and new elites secured a mixed-member system. It involved both a double-ballot 
majority vote and a party list PR system with an initially 4% national threshold, as 
well as strict requirements for the distribution of party support to be eligible for list 
seats on the two-tiered allocation system. This has meant in practice that only 6 
out of Hungary’s 29 or so parties actually gain mandates. Furthermore, the double­
ballot encourages ‘split ticket’ voting, resulting in disproportional outcomes: in 
1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum won 42.5 per cent of parliamentary seats 
with 24.7 per cent of the party list vote, while in 1994 the Socialists won 33 per cent 
of the party list vote, but 54 per cent of the seats. The additionally introduced 
National Compensation List (allocating 58 surplus seats) does little to redress 
these imbalances, or to help smaller parties to secure seats (Foldes and Hubai 
1999:301-4, 345-8).
The other reason concerns Hungary’s electoral threshold. It is high compared to 
the size of its electorate, which numbers at around 7.5 million. Having originally set 
it at 4 per cent on both constituency and national lists in 1990, an electoral reform 
raised it in 1993 to 5 per cent (with joint party lists requiring 10 per cent). This puts 
smaller parties once again at a disadvantage, as it changes both electoral 
behaviour (due to strategic voting) and radically narrows access to the legislature: 
while only 6 parties failed to reach the quorum in 1990, it was 13 in the 1994 
elections). One of these is the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), the sole 
party with an irredentist platform, which managed to overcome the hurdle only 
once, in 1998.
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Executive restraint, finally, is considerable and based on several sources: 
institutional, internal and public. Firstly, Hungary’s interwar executive dominance 
has been replaced by parliamentary strength (in fact, Attila Agh describes the 
current state as ‘overparliamentarised’). Post-communist prime ministers are 
elected by, and directly accountable to, the unicameral legislature. The need to 
form voting blocks and coalitions places further limits on executive autonomy. The 
judiciary finally, is independent from executive influence, but “proved to be weak 
against the government's efforts to use supreme law to satisfy political and 
bureaucratic needs” (Szikinger in Zielonka 2001:418). In this sense then, 
“Hungary's overly strong parliament has become supra-constitutional. (...) The fact 
that eleven modifications to the Basic Law have been adopted since the initial 1989 
amendments reflects the fact that parliament possesses constitutional authority, 
placing political-legislative interests above all other institutions” (ibid.:415). 
Hungary’s executives also face internal checks and balances. Post-communist 
practice has established the presidency as an additional tier of control. Partly 
depending on the particular incumbent, Hungary's heads of state have deliberately 
watched over any resurgence of executive dominance over politics. Arpad Goncz’s 
two terms (1990-2000) were expressly themed on this line (notably preventing the 
use of the military to end a fuel strike in the autumn of 1990), Ferenc Madl (2000- 
05) formulated a milder role as arbiter between government and opposition, but 
new incumbent Laszlo Solyom (2005-10) in turn stated executive restraint as his 
principal goal.
Furthermore, contemporary executive action is not least limited by the autonomy of 
Hungary’s bureaucracy. Specifically, personal and attitudinal continuity in the 
bureaucracy would make the conduct of irredentism very difficult. In this vein, it is 
arguable that the legacy of communism and its doctrinal rejection of ethno- 
nationalism has effectively shaped the Hungarian state into a non-revisionist path- 
dependence. A potential illustration is the experience of the FIDESZ administration 
(1998-2002): more assertive and pro-active on the minority question than all 
previous governments, and with a comfortable majority in the legislature, it
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repeatedly collided with a critical and autonomous state bureaucracy.17 Thus unlike 
in the interwar years, even a potentially irredentist government would at present 
not have the necessary support of, and control over, the wider executive 
apparatus.
Last but not least, Budapest governments are confronted with a vigorous and 
diverse civil society. A good illustration is provided by the public outrage that 
ensued in 1995-96, when the government fired the managers of the state owned 
television channels because of their overly critical coverage.
Today consequently, Hungary’s institutions display the very strength and thus 
potential for engendering civic nationalism that they lacked in interwar times.
No irredentist pressure from below: the mainland Hungarian electorate today 
In addition to these systemic safeguards and the absence of stalling elites, popular 
pressure for irredentism is practically non-existent. Istvan Csurka's Hungarian 
Justice Party MIEP, the only party to openly advocate retrieval18, has been 
relinquished to the margins of Hungarian politics via ever decreasing electoral 
results which fall consistently below the parliamentary threshold. To briefly return to 
Horowitz’s suggestions about particularised affinity, such disinterest may be partly 
due to overall fewer personal ties with the transborder region on the popular level. 
Post-communist Hungary’s leadership, however, still displays significant numbers 
of minority emigres or those linked in other ways (Bardi 2004a:72; 200b:238-244). 
A good example is former foreign minister Martonyi, who is of Transylvanian 
parentage. Yet it is noteworthy that these ‘special features’ are not politically 
relevant in absence of popular demand. While public and media interest in the fate 
of transborder Hungarians is considerable and steadily rising, there is no desire for 
retrieval. In fact, a series of sociological surveys shows that the mainland’s meagre 
support for irredentism has fallen in parallel to progressing democratisation 
(Csepeli 1989:43-46; Csepeli 1992/97: 241-254; Tabajdi and Barenyi 1998:71;
17 For instance, one of my FIDESZ interviewees, Attila Demk6, complained about the “communist” 
bureaucracy’s anti-government stance which risked undermining Orbein’s nationally assertive 
program (Interview 4).
18 Jozsef Torgyan, former leader of the otherwise conservative Independent Smallholder Party 
(FKGP), repeatedly affirmed his commitment to revision. His endorsement in a public speech at 
Trianon’s 80th anniversary (4 June 2000) whilst holding office as minister for agriculture caused a 
scandal, drawing his subsequent resignation and departure from the FKGP.
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Bardi 2004b:136). Furthermore and in tandem, there has been an equation of 
Magyar identity with liberal, self-ascriptive criteria centring around cultural and, 
increasingly, civic-political themes (HTMH:2000; Shulman 2002: 565-578). Finally, 
the most tangible evidence of the separation between polity and nation came with 
the failure of the December 2004 referendum on dual nationality for neighbouring 
kindred. Initiated by a FIDESZ-led coalition of the right wing opposition, it came 
comparatively closest to an attempt at ethnopolitics, at making Magyar nation and 
state congruent. Its rationale was to ensure transborder Hungarians would not be 
cut off following Hungary’s recent EU accession and the Socialist government’s 
‘sell-out’ of the Preference Law. Despite this self-evident logic, and the opportunity 
to punish the unpopular government19, the turnout was so low as to invalidate the 
referendum. Only 37.4 per cent went to the polls, and of these a narrow majority of 
51.5 per cent (around 17 per cent of Hungary’s total population) approved.
As a result, post-communist Hungarian governments have been able to do what 
would have been tantamount to political suicide during the interwar period: to 
pointedly distinguish the interests of the Hungarian state from those of the 
Hungarian nation - and to overall prioritise the former (see e.g. Bardi 2004:15). 
There have been no real exceptions to this line. Antall’s famous dictum of 1990 
about ‘feeling in spirit as the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians’ pointed to a 
different approach, yet never actually went beyond such rhetoric. More substantial 
was the FIDESZ-led administration’s (1998-2002) programmatic announcement of 
a new synthesis: "It is a specific characteristic of Hungarian foreign policy that it 
has to argue a double interest - that of the Magyar state and nation. (...) [It] has to 
serve the national and state interest together, the two are inseparable, and 
especially not opposable to each other. (...) The [present, socialist-led] Hungarian 
government needs to stop considering transborder Hungarians as a burden that 
further drains the country's slight reserves. (...) [They] do not detract, but add to 
Hungary's strength" (Lorincz, Nemeth et al. 1998:325-7). While this appears like 
another conflation of group and state interests, it is in fact an attempt to combine,
19 The national referendum of 4 December 2004 was a double vote, encompassing approval or 
rejection of the government’s plans to privatise the health service. Ironically, the figures here were 
more decisive, with 65 per cent opposing the move.
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rather than trade off, liberal democratic with national principles (see foreign 
secretary Nemeth's essays on this, ibid.:40-2;158-160). Not least, it reflects 
contemporary Hungary’s slightly conflicted self-definition as state of a regionally 
dispersed, cultural nation versus as increasingly politically defined entity (see 
chapter 6). Primacy has therefore ultimately remained with the Hungarian state, as 
a function of which, it is argued, the wider national community will benefit. In the 
words of the electoral program, "a Hungary that is gradually integrating [into the 
EU] and economically strengthening, serves the interests of (...) transborder 
Hungarian minorities" (ibid.:300).20 This prioritisation has been clearest in those 
repeated instances when Budapest traded off care for its transborder brethren 
against Euro-Atlantic integration (see section 5.2.2).
7.2.3 Summary
The contrast across the two time periods in terms of regime type demonstrates well 
which domestic political conditions irredentism needs in order to thrive.
In the interwar period, Hungary’s weak institutions enabled irredentism not only 
because they could not check its instrumental use, but due to their failure to 
channel the ethno-national reflexes of both political elites and population. Precisely 
because institutions were unable to create a civic nationalism, the ethnic variant 
(irredentism) was left as only point of societal consensus. This in turn left unrivalled 
the crucial basis for irredentism: an ethnically exclusive, rather than culturally or 
institutionally anchored, national identity. It made sense of what retrieval posits 
axiomatically, namely the organic unity of group and state interests. Thus over and 
above irredentism’s political expediency, both sets of elites were convinced of, and 
led by, their own nationalist appeals. In other words, the conversion of Magyar 
identity into a self-serving political agenda was only successful because it had 
intrinsic value to both leaders and the masses, i.e. because ethnicity was still
20 Actual policy-making on the ground was conducted accordingly. Firstly, the Orban government's 
Status or Preference Law served at least as many of Budapest's interests as those of minority 
Hungarians - to a point where the latter suspected it as essentially self-serving measure. 
Furthermore, and this speaks for itself, it was exactly under this administration that Hungary 
achieved NATO membership as well as started and completed EU accession negotiations.
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cohesive and tied to exclusive, territorial markers. Mainland Hungarians were 
hence outdoing their own leaders on the irredentist score, thus actually 
constraining their policy choices, instead of being manipulated. Rather than merely 
facilitating an imposed agenda, interwar Hungary’s stalemated institutions 
consequently faced a two-way drive for retrieval both from above and from below, 
which they could not counter.
Post-communist Hungary contrasts sharply with the scenario of eighty years ago. It 
shows the institutional performance and legitimacy of a consolidated democracy. 
Old elites have reacted very differently at the onset of political, diversification and 
participation. Institutions have been able to develop, guaranteeing constraints on 
the executive as well as open and competitive political participation and executive 
recruitment. This means, firstly, that the mechanisms of pluralism and 
accountability are in place which Mansfield and Snyder see as crucial in preventing 
nationalist foreign policies. More importantly, strong institutions preclude ethno- 
nationalism in Hungary because they foster a strengthening civic identity. Group 
identification is no longer principally based on shared, exclusive features (ancestry 
as well as loyalty to and residence on, ancestral homeland). Today, mainland 
Hungarians increasingly display such a civic identification (as well as culturally 
based self-views), exactly in tandem with progressing democratic consolidation. 
Secondly, a Hungary that works does away with the idea that the state merely 
expresses the organic unity of kin and soil and hence cannot truly function without 
it. This is conversely how the country’s truncation had seemed to ‘make sense’ of 
its interwar problems. Finally, and as chapter 5 has shown, these processes are 
reinforced and supported by international constraints and incentives. In this way, 
democracy, changes in ethno-national identity, and external conditioning combine 
in their anti-irredentist effects.
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7.3 Minority irredentism as a function of consociational accommodation in 
the host state
Irredentist minorities are highly disaffected groups. They feel that their twin desires 
are unfulfilled: living in a state defined by their ethno-national identity and for them 
to rule themselves and their territory (self-determination). As a consequence, they 
withdraw or withhold their political consent and loyalty from their host state. 
Instead, their allegiance rests with a state that naturally guarantees their national 
aspirations because it is titular, i.e. it is ‘owned’ by their group. The question is, 
therefore, whether there is a particular institutional framework able to prevent this 
by catering for minority nationalism within a host state.
While host states generally tend to choose repressive measures towards 
irredentas (see section 1.3.3), non-democratic ones do so routinely and with 
minimal success. Comparative research shows that democratic systems in turn 
outperform all other regime types when it comes to accommodating disaffected 
minorities (e.g. Gurr 1993:290-2; Lijphart 2002:39). This is because only 
democracies rest on the twin concerns of consent and legitimacy, which in turn 
require adjustment to minorities. The trouble is that democracy does not 
accommodate in a manner that specifically satisfies irredentist groups. Firstly, most 
of its variants21 do not officially recognise and protect collective identities. Identity, 
however, is the very condition these minorities tie to the legitimacy of institutions 
and governance. Denial or even repression of ethnicity in the name of civic 
integrationism, will thus only exacerbate their grievances. Second, democracy is 
not an impartial framework, despite its longstanding "myth of ethno-cultural 
neutrality" (Kymlicka 2000:183-187). Because democracies routinely rely on 
nationalism to help cohesion (see above), all are to some degree nation-building or 
-maintaining. Even ostensibly value-free, ‘civic’ democracy is "culturally coded" in 
the language, myths and symbols of a particular group -  mostly the dominant 
majority. This is unproblematic in societies where there is a consensus about
21 I use here Smooha's (2002a) fivefold typology of democracy which categorises along to two 
combined criteria: state neutrality and collective recognition towards minorities. The resulting 
continuum lists individual-liberal democracies first, then republican liberal and multicultural regimes 
in the middling range, and consociational and ethnic democracies last.
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national identity, i.e. ethnically homogeneous states or immigrant societies. In bi- or 
multi-national settings conversely, this very consensus is absent. Here minorities 
are further alienated by what they see as exclusiveness and / or assimilationism. 
This can stretch along a continuum described by Smooha (2002a), ranging from 
ethnic democracies, where the bias is explicit and constitutionally enshrined, down 
to republican-liberal and individual-liberal regimes, which marginalise by false 
neutrality or enforced universalism. So democracy as generic regime type is not 
enough to offer a solution. In fact, a wealth of cases shows that it may actually 
aggravate the grievances that fuel irredentist defectionism.22
The satisfaction of minority aspirations within a host state thus depends on a 
particular type of democracy, namely one that offers non-majoritarian/consensual 
features. This is recommended by both the theoretical literature - see Kymlicka's 
(2000) "multi-nation federalism" or Connor's umbrella concept of "political control" - 
as well as in the conclusions of Gurr's empirical survey (2000:290-2; 323). Most 
systematic, and used in this study, is Lijphart's consociational model (1971,1977). 
So far, consociationalism has been used in several latently or active irredentist 
scenarios: South Tyrol, Northern Ireland, post-Dayton Bosnia, Macedonia.23 This 
type of accommodation exactly addresses the source of minority disaffection 
because it offers collective recognition, and thus a measure of equality (power- 
sharing) as well as self-rule of some sort (autonomy). It thus validates national 
aspirations and generates stakeholder involvement within a polity that is not their 
titular state. In doing so, it furthermore recognises collective identities, unlike other 
types of democracy. To generalise for our model, there is a high propensity for
22 Chazan's authoritative compilation observes this in general terms (1991:148-9), and Brubaker 
(1996) equally links minority irredentism to "nationalising" policies in the host state. McGarry and 
O'Leary (2001:189) explain specifically for the Irish Republican case that"(...) it has been the denial 
of the national identity of the minority community, the denial of institutional recognition and equality 
for that national identity, and the denial of their right of national self-determination as a result of a 
poorly conceived partition of the island in the 1920s which has regularly occasioned conflict." 
Kymlicka (2000:188) describes how formerly repressive democracies have learnt their lessons on 
this subject: "when the state attacks the minority’s sense of distinct nationhood, the result is often to 
promote rather than reduce the threat of disloyalty and secessionist movements." Therefore, "in the 
experience of Western democracies, the best way to ensure the loyalty of national minorities has 
been to accept, not attack, their sense of distinct nationality."
23 I exclude Cyprus' failed consociational government after independence in 1960, because here 
power-sharing was instituted for the Turkish minority which had no irredentist desires. Instead, it 
was the Greek majority which pursued union (enosis) with the Greek mainland.
249
defection from a host state where these conditions are not, or only minimally, 
satisfied. Conversely, the more pluralist, and specifically consociational elements it 
contains, the more it secures its minority's loyalties.
The first component of consociational politics addresses the irredentist need to 
define and thus own a state. Within the framework of a host state, this means co- 
ownership via collective equality for a minority’s ethno-national identity, i.e. its 
institutional recognition as equally valid and legitimate. The idea here is a 'shared 
state', which entails far more than is included the shorthand of "power-sharing". It 
means consensual settlement along ethnic lines, instead of enforced ‘universal’ 
(read: majority-biased) norms. Lijphart's three criteria for this are a coalition 
government of group elites (executive power-sharing), veto rights for each party 
involved, and proportionality with regards to political participation, civil service 
posts and public funding. By implication, shared statehood also means that a polity 
does not construct or maintain its national identity against a minority group. This 
requires a change in majority attitudes. Kymlicka (2002:21) stresses here the "de­
securitisation" of domestic politics. This means that the host state ceases to treat 
an actively or formerly irredentist group as a disloyal liability to its security, and 
thus no longer refuses its demands on principle. In short, power-sharing practice 
"involves the right of minorities to demand resources from the state in which they 
live (...) in order to secure their cultural reproduction, access to the material and 
symbolic goods of the state and the capacity to acquire voice" (Schopflin 2004:100- 
1). These elements may be laid down in formal documents and legal-symbolic 
milestones (e.g. constitutional acknowledgement of co-nation status), or merely 
rely on informal and unwritten agreements / understandings among group elites. 
They may furthermore extend to the whole state (sovereign consociation) or only 
the disputed territory (regional consociation).
The second aspect of consociational politics - what Lijphart calls "segmental 
autonomy" - caters for irredentists’ need for self-rule. Autonomy can have two 
facets: territorial or institutional. The first is obviously preferable to a homeland 
group. However, its territorial distribution may impede the devolution of power to a 
single unit which furthermore ought to cover most of its homeland. Host states are
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also usually reluctant about this. They (wrongly)24 suspect this as a precursor to 
defection as well as fear accusations of national sell-out from their own majority. If 
that is the case, inter-ethnic elite co-operation often has to precede any territorial 
arrangement in order to build up trust as well as leverage. As a consequence, 
minorities may have to opt, at least in the beginning, for sectoral sovereignty in the 
management of their affairs. Despite irredentists’ emphasis to self-govern both kin 
and soil, they are amenable to such arrangements. "The desire that the destiny of 
the nation be in the hands of members of the nation should not be simply equated 
with separatism. The essence of the national self-determination imperative is 
choice, not result' (Connor 2001:122; emphasis added). Hence, Connor observes, 
most groups are prepared to settle for something less than defection - in this case 
irredentism - provided there is compensation in terms of a "meaningful autonomy", 
as he puts it (ibid.:124). Because there are political and cultural concerns besides 
territory that are significant for the minority, self-government can cover these 
domains, or indeed be a mix. Frequent manifestations are independent minority 
institutions (e.g. a Hungarian language university in Transylvania), control over vital 
areas to do with identity preservation (such as education), or power over policy 
sectors deemed crucial by the particular group (e.g. agriculture in the case of the 
largely rural Slovak Magyars).
In order to argue this theory for cases of inconsistent minority irredentism, a few 
adjustments are necessary. Given what is important to irredentists -  defining and 
thus ‘owning’ a state, controlling their own kin and territory - consociationalism’s 
aspects of self-rule and political control have greater priority than others. Lijphart 
(1971:10-14) actually makes the same point in general terms. He does not insist 
that all four components (elite coalition, minority veto, proportionality, and 
autonomy) be in place for consociational democracy. Because he distinguishes 
between mass and elite culture within groups, he identifies elite accommodation 
and segmental autonomy as the essential characteristics (ibid.:11). The remaining 
two elements evolve as a consequence. I shall hence analyse the contemporary 
absence of Magyar irredentism primarily on these two principal conditions, together
24 This suspicion is even supported by some theorists (e.g. Nordlinger 1972:32), but has been 
refuted in large scale surveys (see e.g. Gurr 2000).
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with the above-mentioned criterion of ‘desecuritisation’ (shared stateness), which I 
take to be their combined outcome. I will also point to the fact that, in practice, 
these two principal conditions seem to require sequencing or even trade-offs 
between each other. Secondly, exactly because consociational theory is beautifully 
flexible on its main criteria, I argue that their satisfaction is one of degree. So while 
all or most of its four conditions may exist within a host state, these may (as yet) 
only function in certain policy areas, at certain junctures, in particular regions, or 
only towards one select minority. Examples would be Finland’s conduct towards its 
Swedish minority, or, as I will show below, Slovakia’s and Romania’s conduct 
towards local Hungarians. I have termed such scenarios ‘quasi-consociational 
practice’. Finally, consociations need, in Lijphart’s own admission, an external 
threat or pressure in order to last. In my case study such pressure does not exist, 
but I will suggest that there is conversely an external incentive which has the same 
effect: integration into NATO and the EU.
To summarise, minority irredentism is affected by the specific political and 
institutional setting within the host state. Non-democratic systems and many types 
of democracy provoke disaffection by denying minorities self-government and 
collective institutional recognition. Conversely, democracies that practice partial or 
full consociationalism can tackle or prevent irredentism. This is because power- 
sharing responds to the twin desires that drive retrieval. Consociation means a 
group can acquire political control over itself and its territory as well as attain 
collective recognition, even equality, for its distinct national aspirations without 
having to defect. These measures can take advantage of beginning minority 
differentiation from mainland group identity as well as strengthen it (see chapter 6). 
Giving transborder communities a stake in their host state (i.e. by recognising them 
as nation-constituting groups), as well as an outlet for their increasingly 
autonomous politics (by letting them build their own institutions) fosters a civic 
nationalism that rivals politicised bonds based on culture and kinship. In this case 
study, we will see that both interwar Romania and Czechoslovakia adopted 
ethnically exclusive and majoritarian systems towards their Hungarian minorities. 
Their effects were nothing short of radicalising. The same two post-communist host 
states in contrast have, after brief initial periods of relapse, both established what I
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call ‘quasi-consociational practice’. While this practice is conjunctural and 
piecemeal rather than contractual and comprehensive, it has cumulative effects 
which increasingly cater for the twin national demands of local Magyars. Together 
with the changes in Hungarian identity (which it reinforces), this significantly 
contributes to the abandonment of retrieval.
7.3.1 Interwar Magyars: repression, discrimination and forced assimilation
Following partition, Transylvanian and Felvidek Hungarians found themselves in 
two new host states which equally repressed their aspirations, despite differing in 
their institutional setup and subsequent development. Both host states feared 
independent minority organisation and activity, suspecting disloyalty and sedition 
(Zeidler 2001:193-5; 198-9). In fact, Czechoslovakia and Romania regarded their 
own stability and survival as conditional on the neutralisation or elimination of their 
minorities. Notwithstanding their different institutional settings, both thus imposed 
the very pre-emptive restrictions Kymlicka describes for securitised societies.25 
These denied Magyars their identity as well as political control through self-rule 
and share of power. By doing so, Prague’s and Bucharest’s worries became self- 
fulfilling.
Nationalising states: no institutional-constitutional equality and recognition for 
identity
Firstly, despite their markedly different constitutional frameworks, both countries 
had regime types in which the state sides with the majority (Smooha 2002a:426) -  
something that is particularly antagonising to irredentists. Because Czechoslovakia
25 Kymlicka (2002:21) describes a situation as securitised when "relations between states and 
minorities are seen, not as a matter of normal democratic politics to be negotiated and debated, but 
as a matter of state security, in which the state has to limit the normal democratic process in order 
to protect the state. Under conditions of securitisation, minority self-organisation may be legally 
limited (e.g. minority political parties banned), minority leaders may be subject to secret police 
surveillance, the raising of particular sorts of demands may be illegal (e.g. laws against promoting 
secession), and so on. Even if minority demands can be voiced, they will be flatly rejected by the 
larger society and the state. After all, how can groups that are disloyal have any legitimate claims 
against the state? So securitisation of ethnic relations erodes both the democratic space to voice 
minority demands, and the likelihood that those demands will be accepted."
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and Romania were nationalising polities, they denied any institutional recognition, 
let alone equality, to their Hungarian minorities.
Romania was first conceived as democracy, but had by the late 1920s stalled into 
an anocracy, and finally degenerated into dictatorship in 1938. This in itself limited 
its accommodative potential towards local Magyars. More importantly, Romania 
was an ethnic state. Its first constitution of 1923 declared the country as “unified, 
indivisible national state”. It named an ethnically defined titular nation. Various 
provisions spelt out a clear majority bias, such as Article 22 which designated 
Orthodoxy as state religion while Hungarians were mostly Protestant, and in lesser 
numbers, Catholic and Jewish. The subsequent 1938 constitution was even more 
openly discriminatory, stipulating for instance Romanian ethnicity for any member 
of government (Article 67). While it spoke about the universal applicability of 
obligations, the same formula was not used when it came to citizen’s rights (lllyes 
1982:93-4). Such exclusiveness relegated all other identities to a lower rank, and it 
went further by actually invalidating the Magyar community’s national 
distinctness.26 The reasons lay in the recency of Romanian nationalism as well as 
its historical assertion against imperial Magyar rule. Hungarians were merely 
Romanians who had ‘gone astray’ in their identity. As the devastating education 
law of 1924 (see below) put it, “those citizens of Romanian origin who have lost (or 
forgotten) their mother tongue owe it to their children to have them educated in 
exclusively Romanian speaking public or private schools” (article 8; Dioszegi and 
Sule 1990:25). Simultaneously, Romanian authorities scanned Magyar surnames 
for any Romanian ‘origins’ and forced such families to school their children in 
majority institutions (ibid.:29; Zeidler 2001:197). Interwar Romania thus was a 
place where “the state belongs to the majority, not to all of its citizens, and the 
majority uses the state as a means to advance its national interests and goals. (...) 
[It] imposes various controls and restrictions on the minority in order to prevent 
subversion, disorder and instability.” Thus, Smooha continues, “the minority 
encounters the hard problem of potential disloyalty to the state because it can
26 Smooha describes ethnic states as generally non-assimilationist (1990; 2001; 2002a).
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neither be fully equal in nor fully identified with, the state” (2001:25). This is exactly 
what Transylvanian Magyars faced -  and hence decided to leave.
Czechoslovakia, too, was a nationalising state. Typical for a liberal-republican 
democracy, it made inclusion conditional on the acquisition of a titular language 
and culture. This, as I have explained above, is in itself antagonising to minorities, 
because these bases are rarely if ever ethnically neutral. Like in Romania, this 
titular nation was furthermore nascent and thus insecure. These two circumstances 
implicitly spelt confrontation with those groups (Magyar and German) who had 
divergent national identities and wanted those recognised. To founding President 
Masaryk, the Republic and its nascent Czecho-Slovak character had precedence 
over the minorities: “we can’t wait for minorities to tell us what they want, what they 
claim, what they desire. We can’t tailor our concessions according to how 
vociferously they demand advantages” (Vlgh 1993:56). Prague hence soon 
curtailed its generous constitutional liberties for minorities via a series of laws 
tellingly entitled “In Defence of the Republic” (1925, 1936, 1938). Anti-Magyar 
elements were integral to the construction of this new titular nation. The forced 
assimilation in the Felvidek was throughout referred to as ‘re-Slovakisation’, a 
return to the alleged status quo ante that ‘turned’ Hungarians ‘back’ into Slovaks. 
Masaryk advised on this issue: "we have to take account of the fact that not a 
single Hungarian will abandon his faith in the recovery and retrieval of Slovakia. It 
is exactly for this reason that Slovakisation must occur in a planned and 
incremental manner" (Popely 2001:80). Here too, the institutional repression of 
Hungarian identity thus went together with its wholesale invalidation. Amongst 
Hungarians, such treatment first provoked deep-seated distrust towards their host 
state and soon increased internal resistance (Popely 2001:83-4). “This (...) was an 
indispensable component to the [minority’s] politics of grievance (Szarka 1998:22). 
Prague’s behaviour thus exacerbated, if not created, the irredentist disaffection 
within its Hungarian community (Vlgh 1993:57).
Political powerlessness at local and national level
This political systemic refusal to accommodate minorities translated into various 
nationalising policies. For instance, Romania and Czechoslovakia both instituted
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sustained programs weakening the minorities’ economic bases of sustenance (see 
section 3.3.2), which Prague particularly complemented with large scale 
colonisation in the Felvidek (see section 4.3). Two issue areas were particularly 
relevant, because they concerned the core desires of irredentism: political control 
(and correlate self-rule) on the one hand, and national-cultural recognition on the 
other. Discriminatory practices in the former, and forced assimilation pressures 
towards the latter, in turn radicalised already discontent Magyar minorities.
Interwar Romania used a broad array of measures to suppress Magyar 
participation in politics. It banned the first Hungarian party in 1922, after only 16 
months of existence. Its successor, the National Hungarian Party (OMP), survived 
until 1938 when it was also banned. Romania’s majority voting system led to gross 
distortions for minority parties: while the country’s Magyar population hovered 
around 10.87 per cent (in 1930), the OMP was never able to get more than 3 per 
cent of parliamentary seats and just 2.52 per cent of senatorial mandates. This was 
despite its position as sole Magyar party, which furthermore commanded strong 
loyalty and mobilisation among its voters (Bardi 2000b). In addition, elections were 
routinely rigged within Transylvania: Magyar voters were intimidated, their polling 
cards seized and their ballots stolen, Hungarian candidates were disqualified for 
unnamed reasons, local party leaders arrested and Magyar electoral registers lost 
or rewritten (Dioszegi and Sule 1990:39-43; Miko 1941). Journalists and papers 
who tried to report about these and other practices faced legal prosecution and 
multiple prison sentences (Berey 1940.)
The Magyar community’s self-organisation was also undermined by Romania’s 
administrative redistricting of 1925. The new county boundaries were drawn to cut 
through contiguous Hungarian settlement areas (notably in the northern counties of 
Bihar, Szilagy and Szatmar), thus creating local ethnic Romanian majorities in what 
had been overwhelmingly Magyar units (ibid.:37; see also section 4.3). The reform 
simultaneously abolished every form of self-government, based on the 
constitutional principle of state centralisation. Given that Romania’s pre-1920 
territories had already been centrally run, this generally worded law in fact explicitly 
targeted Transylvania (lllyes 1982:192).
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Fearing minority political activity, Prague equally took to electoral engineering 
immediately in 1920: constituencies in Magyar areas of the Felvidek were 
gerrymandered in such a way that Hungarian districts required 40 per cent more 
votes to secure a seat than Slovak ones (Vlgh 1993:45). Czechoslovakia also soon 
curtailed constitutional liberties via a series of laws entitled “In Defence of the 
Republic” -  specifically against its sizeable minorities. The first of these restricted 
in 1923 the freedom of assembly and speech for minorities, and also imposed 
controls over their parties (e.g. requiring party statutes to be submitted for approval 
lest they contain subversive elements). Censorship focused on minority 
publications, with Magyar papers suffering repeated raids, prolonged suspensions, 
or even bans and legal prosecution (Turczel 1992). The Czechoslovak government 
only allowed Magyars disparate organisation into small parties. Even then their 
meetings were frequently forbidden or attendance fined for ‘subversive behaviour’. 
When Hungarians attempted to unite into an umbrella organisation in late 1920 this 
was outlawed on procedural grounds (Popely 2001:84-90).
Independent local organisation was equally undercut -  local government was 
castrated (1921) and self-governing towns were placed under the control of their 
respective districts (1922). Since religious organisations were the backbone of 
Magyar life, all faith-based self-administration was suspended, minority church 
property expropriated on a disproportionate scale, and property rights over 
remaining assets were curtailed (Szarka 1998:20-1). In both interwar Romania and 
Czechoslovakia, ethnic Magyars remained politically disenfranchised and hence 
unable to influence their own fate.
Cultural reproduction and forced assimilation
Political activism aside, Romania and Czechoslovakia regarded the very existence 
of minority nationalism as threat to their respective nation-building efforts and 
reacted in very similar ways. Both hence practiced policies of forced assimilation, 
though once more differing in their methods. Language and minority schooling are 
the most indicative items here.
In Czechoslovakia, matters were again down to discrepancies between ostensibly 
liberal legal provisions and their implementation. While the 1920 language law 
prescribed bilingualism in localities where minorities made up 20 per cent, the use
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of Hungarian was simply banned in qualifying areas (Vlgh 1993:45). Magyar 
language publications were routinely seized, speaking Hungarian in public led to 
being arrested and searched at random (Szarka 1998:16-7). The ethnically biased 
re-districting of 1922 had furthermore ensured that many Felvidek regions no 
longer reached the stipulated threshold for bilingualism, which a 1928 law then 
further raised to 50 per cent. Private nationalist associations like the Slovenska 
Liga (“Slovak League”), Sokol, and Narodna Ochrana (“National Defence”) 
threatened Magyar-speakers and destroyed most local Hungarian signs and 
symbols in one long campaign (Popely 2001:81-85). Given that authorities ignored 
these activities, and that these groups were state-subsidised and -settled in the 
Felvidek, they functioned as agents of official policy exactly like McGarry describes 
(1998:615-16).
In tandem with language repression Magyar education practically ceased to exist. 
Almost seventy-five percent of Hungarian teachers in Czechoslovakia were made 
redundant, which meant not only a loss of employment to the community but the 
de-Magyarisation of their educational institutions (Mocsy 1995:248). Important 
Hungarian high schools in the Felvidek were closed (e.g. in Leva and Rozsnyo) 
and so were the only Magyar law faculty, all Hungarian universities but one, and 
the minority’s vocational colleges (Szarka 1998:21). Prague only funded Slovak- 
language schools and heavily subsidised Slovenska Liga teachers to settle and 
take over (Jocsik 1939; Vigh 1993:79-85). In short, the generous provisions of 
Czechoslovakia’s 1919 law on minority education were simply never applied.
In keeping with its character as ethnic state with an abortive democratisation, 
Romania’s policies were more explicit and worsening. Until 1926, Hungarian 
language commercial signs and notices were forbidden and thereafter had to 
juxtapose more prominent translations (lllyes 1982:91). From 1928 onwards, all 
Magyar names were Romanianised in public records and personal documents, 
authorities rejected names that had no Romanian translation or equivalent. 
Taxation and accounting had to be in Romanian (1928), lawyers could use only 
Romanian in court (1931). Cinemas were allowed to show films exclusively in 
“cultural languages” (i.e. German, English, French) -  not Hungarian. Postal 
services rejected mail addressed in minority languages. Regardless of minority
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percentages, local administration operated solely in the majority language, and 
from 1936 onwards any use of Hungarian could incur an officeholder’s immediate 
suspension (Dioszegi and Sule 1990:21-2; Zeidler 2001:197).
Immediately in 1920, an expert commission had found any minority language 
education to be “incompatible with the Romanian national interest”. The 
subsequent enforcement of a unified, nationalised Romanian school system all but 
did away with Magyar schooling. A 1921 law ended state financing for Hungarian 
denominational schools (vital for the community), but was careful to exempt 
German institutions from that rule. Magyar teachers were deprived of their pension 
rights and made redundant, because they failed the new, compulsory Romanian 
language exam. Ethnic Romanian teachers in turn received a doubled salary and a 
plot of land if they settled in Transylvania. Further mass closures of minority 
institutions followed a 1925 law, because it required an all-Romanian school board 
and prior licensing. Thus already by the mid-1920s, only one in eight Magyar 
children attended a Hungarian primary school, one in seven went to a Hungarian 
high school. By 1933, there was no Magyar kindergarten. There also was no 
Hungarian university, all eight had been converted into Romanian institutions 
(Balazs 1929; Jancso 1935; Dioszegi and Sule 1990:22-32; Zeidler 2001:197-8).
7.3.2 The long and winding road to co-nationhood: Magyars in contemporary 
Romania and Slovakia
The situation today increasingly differs from interwar times. Both host states 
display an organically and selectively evolving consociational pattern -  ‘quasi- 
consociational practice’ as I call it - which has cumulative results. Born out of 
convergent political interests rather than normative conviction, this practice has 
developed over the last decade and looks set to continue. It is not formalised, 
constitutionally enshrined, nor in fact much referred to as "consociational". But this 
in itself is far from detrimental: Lijphart (2002:53-4) in fact argues that informal 
agreements are more flexible and empirically imply a greater level of trust.
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Executive powersharinq27
What Schopflin describes as "capacity to acquire voice" (2004:100) has been no 
easy feat for contemporary Magyar minorities. Executive power-sharing only 
materialised several years into the post-communist transition, thus leaving some 
initial years of political marginalisation not unlike the interwar period. Hamberger 
(2004:105) describes this situation as "double opposition" - both against nationalist 
governments (Meciar’s and lliescu’s) and, due to their ethnicity, even within the 
parliamentary opposition. However, in contradistinction to interwar times, 
Hungarian electoral participation was free of harassment and irregularities. No 
minority parties were banned or raided. Hungarian minorities have been 
consistently represented according to their population size within the legislatures of 
both countries.28 Most importantly, exactly because their identity had decoupled 
from that of the mainland (see chapter 6), local Hungarians immediately reacted to 
this marginalisation by demanding their right as constituent nations 29
With the onset of post-communist consolidation, both polities started to develop 
two political camps, namely "between parties that support radical or extreme forms 
of nationalism, intolerance and authoritarian rule as against those that espouse 
broadly liberal and pluralistic values" (Partos in Agh 1998:204). This forced host 
state elites into compromise with ethnic Magyar parties. In order to tip the balance 
towards reform, they began to recruit Hungarians into their alliance, building on a 
commonality of interest and the understanding that victory would entail host state 
accommodation. Towards the mid-1990s, both the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) and the party of Hungarian Coalition (MKP)30
27 Another (but even according to Lijphart, lesser) area of power-sharing is lagging behind: 
proportionality in civil service. Regarding Romania's civil and iegal service, Schopflin (2004:95) 
notes that, as of 2003, Magyars are still absent from diplomatic positions, higher police and army 
posts. No minority quotas have been introduced.
28 Both host states operate on list PR systems (albeit with closed electoral lists), with 5 per cent 
thresholds. In Romania, national minorities are even guaranteed one seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies independently of reaching this percentage (a 'right to mandate'), but this applies only to 
governmentally recognised groups - which Magyars are. In other respects, however, Romania's 
new electoral law of 2004 still puts national minorities at a disadvantage according to the OSCE 
(2004:6).
29 See e.g. Szarka (2004a:87-91) for the textbook consociational demands put forward in 1992 by 
the then three Slovak Hungarian parties.
30 The MKP was founded in 1998 by uniting the three previously independent Slovak Hungarian 
parties: Egyutteles Politikai Mozgalom (Political Movement Coexistence), Magyar
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thus functioned as opposition partners to the increasingly autocratic rule of 
President lliescu and Premier Meciar respectively. Watershed change came with 
the victory of resulting reformist coalitions in Romania (1996) and Slovakia (1998), 
which included Magyar parties. Premier Ciorbea's coalition (1996-2000) not only 
comprised three ministers from the RMDSZ, but also depended on ethnic 
Hungarian votes in the Romanian assembly. The first post-Meciar government, 
elected in October 1998, equally comprised three Slovak Magyar ministers. Ethnic 
Hungarian parties in both Romania and Slovakia have since become a permanent 
fixture in domestic politics, finding themselves as virtual "kingmakers" in 
successive national elections. Their co-operation has been vital, either within 
government (Romania 1996-2000 and 2004-08; Slovakia 1998-02 and 2002-06), or 
in constructive opposition bound by formal agreement (Romania 2000-04). This 
solidified, enduring ‘co-operation in exchange for accommodation’ has been 
described as one displaying select ‘consociational’ features (Bardi and Kantor 
2000:151 ff.; Brusis 2001; Hamberger 2004; Szarka 2004a:95 ff.), albeit with 
various caveats regarding durability (see e.g. Shvetsova 2002).
Informal veto powers
Although neither Magyar minority party possesses formalised veto powers, I argue 
that both wield a considerable informal veto which grants them leverage. Their 
threat to withdraw from the coalition (or from constructive opposition) is a powerful 
tool. For one, both Romania and Slovakia have been at pains to prove their 
democratic credentials to Western partners, particularly in their endeavour to 
secure EU and NATO accession. Both organisations imposed the central pre­
condition of minority accommodation, and hence the "token Magyar" in government 
became essential. Upon acceding the first coalition in 1998, the Slovak Magyar 
MKP for instance was aware that it could either serve as mere fig leaf, or 
conversely hold solid bargaining power. It made that leverage clear in subsequent 
coalition talks.
Keresztenydemokrata Mozgalom (Hungarian Christian Democrat Movement), and the Magyar 
Polgciri Part (Hungarian Civic Party). This was in order to face the oncoming Slovak elections and 
subsequent coalition talks as one Hungarian block.
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Secondly, Western integration and investments are subject to successful political 
reform and continued stability. Romanian and Slovak politicians, but also public 
opinion, have come to recognise ethnic Magyar parties as reliable and responsible 
coalition partners in an otherwise unstable party landscape (see e.g. Hamberger 
2004:106). They have proven to continuously carry and defend reform programs, 
not least because their own interests are directly intertwined with successful 
democratic consolidation. In fact, they have sometimes done so in opposition to 
their own interests.
Finally, beyond reform programs the very survival of governmental coalitions 
continues to depend on the RMDSZ and MKP respectively. Most analysts regard 
Slovak elite interests as the chief motive for accommodating local Magyars (see 
Hamberger 2004:105; Szarka 2004a:85). Admittedly, veto via withdrawal is a blunt 
instrument and has so far shown mixed results when threatened. Lijphart 
(2002:44), however, stresses just how strong an impulse for co-operation this 
means: "the more usual inclination of parties is to want to be included in cabinets. 
Because the only way for ethnic or any other parties not just to enter but also to 
stay in the cabinet is to reach compromises with their coalition partners, they have 
a very strong incentive to compromise." Elite cooperation thus continues to be 
uneasy, yet it is working.
Political control
Executive power-sharing has secured political control and increasing equality for 
Magyars in several ways. First and foremost, it translated into office holding. 
Hungarian minorities secured what were key posts for their respective situations. 
The Slovak Magyar MKP secured the portfolios of regional development, 
minorities, environment and agriculture (02-06 cycle). It furthermore provides six 
state secretaries, all in important ministries (e.g. foreign affairs, economy, finance, 
education). MKP party chief Bela Bugar is the Slovak parliament’s vice-president. 
The RMDSZ currently holds four governmental portfolios (Public Works and 
Territorial Management, Education, Cultural and European Integration, Commerce 
as well as IT and Telecommunications). At present, no less than eighteen 
Romanian governmental bodies are headed or co-chaired by Hungarians. 
Furthermore, in the current legislative cycle both minority leaders hold the post of
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deputy premier within their host states - RMDSZ president Bela Marko in Romania 
(2004-08), and deputy leader Pal Csaky in Slovakia (2002-06).
Partaking in government also entailed the historic first of having a daily input in 
Romanian and Slovak national legislation. Though short of many announced goals, 
these advances achieved more than at any juncture in the interwar period. 
Crucially for this study, they concerned many of the very grievances that had 
formerly driven Magyars to defection. Legislative input brought some tangible 
benefits for both communities (see also below). These have materialised especially 
after Hungarian parties started to demand advance concessions in exchange for 
their participation, which they initially did not. In terms of securing general rights, 
both minorities have achieved their host countries’ signing and ratification of the 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Romanian Hungarians 
have successfully pushed through the 2002 Anti-discrimination Law. Respective 
constitutional amendments in Romania (2003) and Slovakia (2001) have 
eliminated several enshrined ethnic biases (see below). Both communities have 
made headway on the restitution of seized private, church and communal 
properties via key pieces of legislation. Chief among these were the 1997-98, 2001 
and 2005 laws in Romania regarding property restitution. Slovakia still upholds the 
Benes Decrees, which prevents reclaiming of or compensation for, assets seized 
during collective punishment (see section 3.3.3). However, the MKP achieved in 
2004-5 that anonymous properties be put under the control, and now ownership, of 
local authorities. Since many Felvidek municipalities are Magyar-run (see below), 
this has been seen as significant partial victory.
Governmental participation has also resulted in a governmental institutional 
structure for minority accommodation and collective recognition in Romania (Bardi 
and Kantor 2000:165, 172) and Slovakia (Hamberger 2004:107,110). Romania has 
established a National Anti-Discrimination Council (with a Hungarian president), an 
Ombudsperson for National Minorities in 2001, as well as a Ministry for Minorities 
(subsequently abolished between 2000-04, and then re-appointed in the current 
cycle 02-06). Slovakia has set up a Standing Parliamentary Committee on 
Minorities, and it is headed by an ethnic Hungarian. The country has as yet to
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establish a so-called Bureau for Minorities, something that the MKP has scheduled 
for the 2006 parliamentary agenda, together with cultural funding (see below). 
Blenesi (2004:75) stresses furthermore the value of gathering experiences from 
governmental participation, and of generally raising awareness about the minority’s 
problems.
Analysts agree that this acquisition of political control is a key factor in minority 
Hungarians’ loyalty as host state citizens (see e.g. Szarka 2004a:96). Nandor Bardi 
(2004:76) explains: "beyond concrete results achieved in Romania, Slovakia... 
(attenuating anti-Hungarian feelings, obtaining funds for development, acquiring 
positions in the course of privatisation, reaching compromises on language policy, 
etc.), the most important achievement was that the Hungarian elites, as 
representatives of a political community, became more organically integrated into 
the political life of the respective countries." The link between political power on the 
one hand, and moderation on the other, is clearly traceable: "The other side of this 
process was the behaviour of Hungarian minority political elites in this situation, as 
represented by Hungarian minority parties joining coalition governments or 
granting their support to the governing party" (Bardi 2004:ibid., original emphasis). 
Mainland Hungarian research, however, is sceptical about the consociational 
aspects of Romanian and Slovak politics, exactly because of their opportunistic, 
instrumental nature (Bardi and Kantor 2000, Hamberger 2004). As explained 
above, I take a different view: the absence of a normative compulsion to power- 
share is certainly disappointing, but it is exactly because Magyar cooperation is 
needed - and lastingly so - that the minorities have a power to bargain. 
Furthermore, although many criticise these host state concessions as quick fix, 
token gestures - Schopflin (2000:276) calls them "short-termism" -  this does not 
diminish their cumulative effects. Kymlicka (2002) reminds that this is exactly how 
the profoundly changed Western response towards minority rights evolved.
Self rule: institutional / segmental autonomy
No concrete form of autonomy has been established -  as yet -  in either Romania 
or Slovakia. However, at the time of writing (February 2006), the Romanian 
parliament is discussing a draft Law on National Minorities, which amongst others,
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sets out a national framework for cultural autonomy. The Slovak assembly still has 
to pass a Minority Law, due since 2004. What is instead materialising gradually 
and by piecemeal, sectoral achievements, are two things. For one, segmental 
autonomy in key areas concerning identity. Secondly, a territorial autonomy by 
proxy, i.e. self-administration of majority Magyar areas at local level. Both of these 
developments concern the very self-rule over matters salient to minorities which, if 
absent, fuels defectionism. Though some within the two communities do not see 
segmental autonomy as satisfactory, minority party behaviour reveals its 
prioritisation as pragmatic and widely supported strategy.
Education and Language
After eight decades, minority Hungarians have now in both host states a Magyar- 
language university. Both are the direct outcome of governmental participation: the 
MKP made this a pre-condition for its second time in coalition in 2002, following the 
RMDSZ’ example which had demanded this in exchange for signing the so-called 
‘Protocol’ as party in constructive opposition. The Babes-Bolyai university in 
Transylvania thus opened in September 2003, followed a year on by the Hungarian 
Selye Janos university in the Felvidek town of Komarom. However, the former is 
still surrounded by petty controversy, and both have to be financed by Hungary and 
private donations.
The Slovak minority language Law (1999), and its equivalent in Romania (2001), 
have respectively secured the use of Hungarian in communities and public offices. 
Although tied to what the minorities see as high local thresholds (20 per cent), and 
hampered by administrative re-districting in Slovakia (2000-1), these measures 
have been implemented on a considerable scale. In Romania, there have been 
furthermore significant gains in state funding for Magyar cultural life. The budget for 
the National Office for Minorities increased from 6 billion Lei (1997) to 62.6 (2000), 
the Ministry of Culture widened its financed Hungarian programs from 67 (1997) to 
300 (in 2000), and a proportionate percentage is allocated for the care and 
establishment of Magyar cultural sites (Bardi and Kantor 2000:173). Slovak 
Magyars have presented for debate this year (2006) their legislative proposal for 
proportionate cultural financing.
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In the all-important area of native language education finally, Romanian 
Hungarians have been particularly successful. They have broadened the range of 
recognised Hungarian diploma and also achieved an educational reform on 
curricula. The new education law of 1999 furthermore guarantees native language 
schooling from kindergarten to university. These, however, notably exclude the 
Csango Hungarians outside of Transylvania (Bardi and Kantor 2000:170). In 
Slovakia, one of the first achievements were bi-lingual report cards. An estimated 
98 per cent of Magyar schools are state owned (Szarka 2004:94), but since the 
2004 decentralisation measures schooling has been placed under the authority of 
local governments. This, in turn, provides greater control over education within 
majority Hungarian areas which have control over local government. This indirect 
method, however, does not cover the full 80 or so per cent of minority children who 
attend Hungarian language state schools.
Informal regional self-rule
Given that regional autonomy is still a sensitive issue in both host states (see 
below), Magyar parties have successfully pursued a complex, indirect strategy. 
They have attained informal territorial self-rule by achieving minority representation 
within local self-governments in majority Hungarian areas. This has been 
complemented by their governmental role, which ensured the application or 
creation of facilitating legislation and -  importantly -  an increase in state funding 
for the local level.
This arrangement has solidified, and it is expanding even further. For instance, in 
Romania, the number of Magyar-led municipal sub-prefectures has held steady at 
eight over the past ten years, while Hungarian county prefects went from two 
(1996-02 cycle) to four (2002-06 period). The extent of local self-rule is even more 
pronounced in the Felvidek: there are at present 237 towns run by Hungarian 
mayors, and out of 3607 local authority representatives in Slovakia 2140 are 
Magyar. In Romania, however, this method has had the disadvantage of being 
uneven, since Hungarians in Transylvania are more scattered (see map 3.5). Thus 
areas with smaller minority percentages have been unable join up (Bardi and 
Kantor 2000:162, 165).
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Self-government has been furthermore underpinned with enabling secondary 
legislation. This meant Hungarians achieved in both host states enforcement of the 
breakthrough laws on subsidiarity. In Romania, this concerned legal frameworks 
for management and allocation of municipal funding, for communal properties, for 
concessions and the legal status of roads. In order to make local authorities 
capable of action, this also included laws on local referenda and civil servants 
(Bardi and Kantor 2000:169).
Last but not least, Magyars have secured a considerable allocation in state funds 
for regions. In Slovakia, this was not least due to getting control over the key 
ministries which channel EU regional funds. Contrastingly, a Budapest ministerial 
memo criticises Slovakia’s persistent underinvestment in Magyar-inhabited areas, 
remarking that ethnic Hungarians “are required to be faithful and loyal without 
being able to get the same share, (...) as tax payers from the budget which had 
been accomplished on an equal basis with the Slovaks” (HTMH 2002:1).
Institutional autonomy
Both minorities have achieved the creation of independent or state-funded, 
separate institutional structures in several vital areas (Bardi and Kantor 
2000:165; 173). A few respective examples illustrate the considerable advances in 
this area.
Between 1996 and 2000, the Romanian Ministry for Culture for instance placed all 
120 cultural institutes in Romania under local self-rule, which meant that those in 
Hungarian areas are now headed by ethnic Magyars. The Romanian Ministry for 
Education created a separate Minority Secretariat and an independent Chief 
Executive responsible for Magyar language instruction. These were complemented 
by new chief and special education supervisors for Hungarian language instruction 
in every county. Of Romania’s 12 touristic regions, the three majority Hungarian 
ones were placed under secretaries from that minority. The State Ownership Fund 
(responsible for the privatisation of state owned property) now also has 
proportional shares of Hungarians in all regional and county offices. This was 
particularly important, given that the minority had suffered discrimination in exactly 
this area during the first decade of post-communism (see section 3.3.3).
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In Slovakia, matters are still lagging behind. State television and radio now have an 
independent Hungarian directorate. The Slovak government has furthermore 
pledged in 2001 to progressively institute a minority-run system training teachers 
for Magyar-language state schools.
Shared rule versus self-rule in the Magyar experience: trade-offs or sequential 
conditionality?
The fact that both minorities are increasingly equipped with their own infrastructure 
is seen as perhaps one of the most significant results of minority elite participation 
in government. Yet power-sharing and its informal self-rule results are not viewed 
uniformly as a blessing and solution. There is dissatisfaction in both communities 
because the MKP, and especially the RMDSZ, have increasingly acted as ethnic 
parties, rather than developing independent minority institutions. This has caused a 
rift within both Transylvanian, and to a lesser extent, Felvidek Hungarian politics 
(Aspeslagh in Tabajdi and Bar6nyi 1998:167-169; Bardi and Kantor 2000:7-8). 
Their respective "radical" wings oppose co-nationhood (collective equality via 
power-sharing and primarily segmental self-rule). Instead, they envisage a parallel 
minority society (internal self-determination in which a territorial autonomy would 
generate independent minority institutions). In their view, such a "state within a 
state" (as the RMDSZ's Kolozsvar declaration of 1992 called it) is the safest way to 
guarantee the survival of their communities, because both host states still have 
biased constitutional frameworks (see below). In short, the existing leaderships 
stand accused of having prioritised their own interests at the expense of their 
communities.
This rift is, however, not representative: despite being portrayed in both minority 
and mainland media as widespread internal divisions, these "conflicts primarily 
concern the inner circles of political and cultural elites" (Bardi and Kantor 2000:7). 
Opinion surveys amongst the wider minority Magyar communities confirm this. 
Slovak Hungarians thus consistently approve of their umbrella party's 
governmental role (91 per cent in 2001) and - crucially - link it directly to the what 
they perceive as steady improvement of their affairs (Hamberger 2004:116; 122).
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Romanian Hungarians are more critical of their elites, but still overwhelmingly 
identify with their activities: in 2000 it was 80.6 per cent who saw concrete results 
from the RMDSZ' work, 68.3 per cent thought that their "leaders were frequently 
successful in asserting the Hungarians' interests" (Bardi and Kantor 2000:157-8). 
So, while there is a measure of internal dissent (especially in Transylvania), 
communities support the pragmatic prioritisation of shared-rule elements over self- 
rule.
In sum, both parties have stressed the elite concert aspects of consociationalism 
over and above territorial autonomy and the internal ‘building’ of their respective 
communities. Instead, they have sought to achieve these latter goals in two, 
indirect ways. For one, they have focused on segmental autonomy which, 
secondly, entailed piecemeal reform via governmental participation. In order to do 
this, they have consolidated their leverage by making themselves indispensable 
(read: reliable) political partners. This sequential strategy has occurred to the 
partial dissatisfaction of their respective communities, more so in Transylvania than 
in the Felvidek.
Shared stateness, attitudes and de-securitisation
Kymlicka (2002:20-1) argues that East and Central European countries are still 
securitised. To a certain extent this is true. For instance, the mere term of 
‘autonomy’ engenders such strong associations with secession amongst the 
Romanian public that minority elites resort to alternative wording (Decker 2005:35). 
Most observers agree, however, that Magyar participation in host state 
governments has engendered significant change in majority attitudes as well as 
setting a historic precedent (e.g. Bardi and Kantor 2000:151). Especially in 
Slovakia, the image of Hungarians - at least in political life - has acquired positive 
connotations: the MKP has been the only party to increase its popularity compared 
to the previous governmental cycle (98-2002) and displays even some cross-ethnic 
voting (Csaky 2004:22). Hamberger (2004:105-6; 110) notes for instance that, by 
2002, Magyar participation in government had become “commonsensical”. 
Although fears about its disloyalty still exist, the minority is seen as integral part of 
Slovak domestic politics, and as guarantor of domestic democratisation. MKP
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president Bugar has been rated Slovakia’s second most popular politician in 1999. 
By 2003, the MKP figured as most approved of all governmental parties, even 
amongst supporters of the Slovak parliamentary opposition (ibid.:116,120,123)1 
Similarly, in the last Romanian elections of 2004 the RMDSZ has been the only 
party associated with the governing coalition to escape an electoral backlash. Here 
too, Hungarians are by now viewed as established player in Romanian national 
politics and as consistently advancing political stability and reform. Polls amongst 
both communities furthermore indicate that minority-majority relations are 
bilaterally seen to have improved significantly since governmental participation 
(Bardi and Kantor 2000:164,127; Blenesi 2004:77-80).
Such tangible attitudinal advances have as yet to be translated into constitutional 
amendments. These still bear nationalising features which keep Romania and 
Slovakia ethnically exclusive. The evolving measure of shared stateness in daily 
political practice is thus still contradicted by statute. Some analysts (e.g. Bardi and 
Kantor 2000:180-1; Szarka 2004a:94) consequently see no scope beyond the 
mere ad-hoc “consociational practice” that is currently at work. They deem even 
the basic requirements for institutionalised power-sharing as structurally 
impossible, because both host states and local Magyar communities respectively 
engage in nation-building. I will argue below that, although these hindrances are 
significant, they are neither final, nor absolute.
Firstly, Romania and Slovakia continue to display serious constitutional biases. 
Both still define the polity in ethnically exclusive terms. Romania’s constitution 
declares the country a “national state" (Article 1.1). The Slovak preamble 
differentiates between the “Slovak people” and the “members of national minorities 
and ethnic groups living in the Slovak Republic”. Both designate the titular majority 
language as official idiom: in Romania without further caveat (Article 13), in 
Slovakia (Article 6) relativised with such an “ambiguous formulation” that it could be 
“circumvented ...and not curb nationalist practice” (Szarka 2004a:86-7). Such 
provisions implicitly deny non-majority groups as co-nations who also characterise 
the country. Regarding specifically territorial autonomy, both host states have a 
very limited constitutional scope. Romania, despite its historically distinct areas,
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insists on a centralised system (see constitutional Articles 1.1., 3 and 4.2). 
However, since there is a growing (and cross-ethnic) constituency pressing for 
federalisation, this may well soften over time. Slovakia’s statute in contrast does 
extend the possibility for local government (Articles 64-71), but its particular stress 
on “indivisibility” and “integrity” (Article 3) has so far been used to reject Magyar 
demands for autonomy (Szarka 2004a:ibid.). Then again, both host states’ present 
or impending EU membership (Romania is set to join in 2007) promises to widen 
the scope for regionalism via subsidiarity and devolution, and this is something 
both minorities explicitly count on (Csergo and Goldgeier 2001; 2004).
Secondly, political mobilisation in both host states still resorts at certain junctures 
to securitised discourse. OSCE observers of the 2000 elections in Romania for 
instance, expressed concern over the use of anti-minority discourse by the Greater 
Romania Party, which became the largest opposition party in parliament with 25 
per cent. Hamberger (2004:110) and Szarka (2004a:94) similarly observe that anti- 
Hungarian campaigning still occurs. Then again, this rhetoric is less and less 
successful over time. For instance the Greater Romania Party’s electoral share has 
almost halved in the last elections of 2004 (sliding down to 13 per cent). In 
Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar has been unable to stage a political comeback on such 
platforms, and the above quoted Slovak polls about Hungarians in national politics 
outline a positive trend.
Finally, there is what can be broadly termed the "burden of history". This presents 
unresolved and real impediments to equality for Magyars in both post-communist 
countries. These can be symbolic and attitudinal, like the persisting view of the two 
national histories as conflicting and mutually exclusive. Others have legal and 
economic effects. An example is Slovakia's refusal to abrogate the discriminatory 
Benes decrees, or to at least extend an official apology (see also section 3.3.3). In 
consequence, ethnic Hungarians are still denied compensation for deportations, 
forced labour, internment or the considerable material expropriations. The 
associated collective stigma and discrimination sadly echo interwar 
Czechoslovakia's Defence of the Republic Acts (see above). This amounts to what 
many see as second class citizenship. Transylvanian Magyars, too, are still
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confronted with injurious gestures. The orchestrated anti-Hungarian riots of 19-20 
March 1990 in Marosvasarhely, resulting in three Magyar deaths and many injured, 
have still not been investigated. In fact, former president lliescu recently declared 
the minority as responsible.31 Another good illustration is Romania’s national 
holiday on 1 December, which celebrates Transylvania’s annexation, the very event 
Hungarians regard as catastrophe. Yet there are also signs of change. Both 
Schopflin (2004:96-7) and Bardi (2004:17) describe in this context the first 
manifestations of an accepted, shared history between majority nations and 
Hungarians and underline just how significant this is for the realisation of co­
nationhood. Official Romanian reactions to the Hungarian national day (15 March), 
formerly a tense affair when celebrated by the minority, have transformed 
profoundly. Originally considered as sign of disloyalty and as provocative in its 
historical meaning,32 today Romanian dignitaries habitually either attend or forward 
their well wishes.
7.3.3 Summary: from interwar exclusion towards post-communist co-nations
Democracy itself, as I have explained above, is not a panacea, but rather the pre­
requisite framework in which a minorities can forgo irredentism when presented 
with consensual politics. Interwar Romania and Czechoslovakia did, for differing 
reasons but in very similar ways, not present such an environment. Following 
partition, Transylvanian and Felvidek Hungarians found themselves in two new 
host states which equally denied their aspirations, despite differing in their 
institutional setup and subsequent development. Romania emerged as ethnic 
anocracy, an ethnically defined nation-state with a quickly stalling democratisation. 
Expressly biased against its minorities, it practiced forced assimilation and ensured 
exclusive political control to its titular majority. Czechoslovakia’s republican liberal 
democracy antagonised because it imposed cultural homogeneity in the public
31 The riot was sparked by local Hungarians holding candlelit vigil for native language schooling. 
Eyewitnesses maintain that police watched on as ethnic Romanian rioters were bussed into the city 
from the surrounding region. Iliescu’s remarks came on 25 March 2005, shortly after the 15th 
anniversary of events.
32 The day commemorates the Hungarian revolution of 1848 against Austrian rule which saw 
Magyars and Romanians fight on opposite sides.
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sphere, and a value consensus on the terms of its two dominant (if not equal) 
ethnic groups. Endeavouring to forge a new Czecho-Slovak majority nation, as well 
worried about its substantial minorities, this civic nation-state state soon 
contravened its own liberal constitutional provisions. Smooha (2002a:426) actually 
notes that in both these types the state sides with the majority, something that is 
particularly antagonising to irredentists (see above). Despite their systemic 
differences, Romania and Czechoslovakia indeed shared nationalising policies, 
discriminatory positions and assimilationist pressures which in turn radicalised their 
already discontent Magyar minorities.
The contrast with post-communist Romania and Slovakia is not a stark one. 
Overall, both states are still nationalising polities. But the differences are 
appreciable, and more so as time goes by. Their evolving consociational patterns - 
as distinct from fully formed, deliberately introduced structures - have not 
developed by design. In their make up they are the cumulative outcome of mainly 
ad-hoc co-operation. Nor are they backed by some normatively satisfying 
commitment to inter-ethnic dialogue. Instead, outside pressures, majority elite 
interest, and minority moderation have made for conjunctural advances. 
Concessions by both titular majorities are reluctant, diluted, and come with 
considerable trade-offs to the minority. And yet, these patchy and opportunistic 
manifestations of shared rule are gradually growing and becoming irreversible, 
becoming thus sustainable in their effect. This is not least true for the minority’s 
aspirations for self-rule, which its leaders have realised as contingent on 
governmental participation, and thus took the risk to de-prioritise. In Bardi and 
Kantor’s view, it is the “creation and institutionalisation of consociational politics” 
that matters (2000:186). Pushed by their Hungarian minorities as well as by 
external pressures, both host states have made significant headway towards 
establishing such a framework, thus providing Magyars with at least part of the 
necessary stakeholder involvement and the prospect for more. Whether this will 
ultimately evolve into a sustained political will for accommodation (Bakk, Horvath 
and Salat 2004:159) is yet another matter.
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7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that democracy is able to mitigate and even prevent, 
irredentism. Crucially interacting with, as well as promoting, shifts in group identity 
it has been relevant to parent state and minority in different ways.
Irredentism in the mainland is practically incompatible with substantive democracy 
and (successful) democratisation. Democratic institutions engender civic 
nationalism, accountability and pluralism, which in turn render ethnopolitics all but 
impossible. Although the constraints and deliberative elements which Mansfield 
and Snyder stress within democracy are important, I have emphasised its 
transformative impact on nationalism. It bases cohesion primarily (though not 
exclusively) on consent and participation, rather than tying it to belonging and 
loyalty to a kindred group. Consequently, what makes irredentism and democracy 
nigh irreconcilable is democracy’s creation of an alternative, voluntaristic loyalty. 
Even though ancestry and culture may continue to underpin some of the civic 
consensus, the nation is primarily defined by institutions. This undercuts two 
fundamental conditions on which retrieval rests, namely group identity based on 
shared kinship, and the state’s ownership by and thus subservience to, that group. 
Conversely, the weak institutions typical of stalled or incomplete democratisation 
(anocracies) are ideal for irredentism. This is because there is an increase in 
participation (unlike in authoritarian systems), which, however, lacks a civic 
consensus carried by institutions (unlike in democracies). Cultural, but especially 
ethnic nationalism, not only fills the gap, as Mansfield and Snyder recognise, but 
provides here also an unrivalled focus of cohesion and thus inverts the relationship 
between nation and state. Here the state exists in function of an ethnically defined 
polity, which in turn informs both leaders and their electorates.
Minority irredentism can be addressed by a different aspect of democracy. 
Because irredentist minorities are disaffected groups, their defectionism can be 
addressed by partial or full consociationalism. This is because power-sharing 
responds to the two desires that drive retrieval. Consociation means a group can 
acquire political control over itself and its territory as well as attain collective 
recognition, even equality, for its distinct national aspirations without having to
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defect. Power-sharing thus validates national aspirations and generates 
stakeholder involvement within a polity that is not a minority’s titular state. In doing 
so, it also recognises collective identities, unlike other types of democracy. These 
measures can furthermore take advantage of beginning minority differentiation 
from mainland group identity as well as strengthen it. In contrast, other regime 
types including other types of democracy, alienate irredentist minorities further by 
what they see as exclusiveness - implicit, as in falsely neutral civic systems or 
open, as in republican or ethnic states. Because irredentist groups desire nation­
state congruence (living in a state that they define and own) and self-determination 
(to be governed by their own), even multiculturalist democracies will not do. In 
consequence, neither civic integrationism nor repression -  both methods routinely 
practiced by host states -  will be able dissuade irredentist minorities.
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Conclusion
Nationalist sentiment is deeply offended by violations of the 
nationalist principle of the congruence of state and nation; but 
it is not equally offended by all the various kinds of violation 
of it. It is most acutely offended by ethnic divergence between 
rulers and ruled.
Ernest Gellner (1983:134)
The study and its goals
Having analysed inconsistent irredentism in the Hungarian case, it is time to 
return to the aims and arguments stated at the beginning of this thesis. My 
goal was two-fold: firstly, to determine what irredentism is, which players it 
involves, how it can be recognised, what methods it uses, and also, what it is 
therefore not. The assumption was that ethno-territorial retrieval is a 
conceptual category in its own right, and that it hence needs treatment as 
such.
After establishing this, I secondly tried to explain what makes irredentism work, 
or conversely, what stops it from working. My aim was to build a generalisable 
explanation. Particularly useful for this purpose was the phenomenon of 
“inconsistent irredentism” (Saideman 1998) -  i.e. a situation where retrieval is 
first pursued and then subsequently abandoned, in an outwardly identical 
setting. This would reveal the causal factors which had changed over time. 
Following a survey of the sparse literature on the topic, I adopted Donald 
Horowitz’s (1985; 1991) model as point of theoretical departure. I argued that 
the three variables it puts forward -  elite interests, economic benefit from 
retrieval, and its feasibility with regards to ethno-territorial homogeneity -  have 
a rationalist bias which makes them unable to explain irredentism. The 
assumption here was that ethno-national collectives are not simply kindred 
interest groups. Instead, they are driven by their shared identity and its 
imperatives: nation-state congruence (nationalism) and freedom from foreign 
rule (self-determination). I therefore suggested an alternative set of factors
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which would affect these drivers: a) shifts in group identity and therefore in 
nationalism, b) change towards a regime type, i.e. democracy, which restricts 
the politicisation of this identity and whose institutions rival it as basis of 
nationalism, and finally c) variations in the extent to which the international 
community tolerates irredentism as movement of self-determination.
The variables of both models, formulated (and in part fleshed out) as 
hypotheses, were then tested in two ways. Statistical testing of each 
quantifiable factor across my dataset of irredentas sought to establish a 
preliminary overview of individual explanatory strength. This was followed by 
in-depth, detailed application of these variables to the case of inconsistent 
Hungarian irredentism. The empirical analysis compared factors both across 
time (the interwar versus the contemporary period), and across space (by 
studying two separate irredentas conducted by Hungary). Below I will 
summarise and discuss my findings from both main sections.
Irredentism defined
My first concern was to define and conceptualise irredentism. This question 
imposed itself because to date there still is no ‘irredentism theory’ that relies on 
a sufficiently standardised and workable understanding of what exactly 
retrieval is. Chapter 1 elaborated a formula that distinguished agency from 
structure (i.e. the conditioning environment), differentiated irredentism from 
other ethno-territorial movements (notably from secessionism), and which 
categorised it within the study of nationalism.
Irredentism, in my definition, is the bilateral and simultaneous pursuit by both 
parent state and ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno- 
territorial retrieval across inter-state borders. It is perhaps the most literal 
translation of kinship amongst the phenomena of ethno-nationalism. The 
collective solidarity it rests on endures despite physical and political 
separation, through time, and in defiance of risks and deterrents. Irredentism 
has a standard set-up of actors with standard characteristics: a parent state 
‘owned’ by the titular group (though not necessarily homogenous), and a
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transborder minority settling (part of) what both regard as ancestral grounds. 
These parties relate to each other in a typical pattern. The minority views itself 
as forced enclave, unable and above all unwilling, to survive outside the 
mainland. The latter in turn conceives of itself as ‘redeemer’ of kin and 
communal territory. The glue holding them together is a shared ethno-national 
identity, defined by exclusive characteristics of which group territory (as 
subjective, common ‘map image’) is an important part. This is what retrieval 
politicises, this is what gives the project its rationale.
A survey of cases based on my definition and on the resulting dataset revealed 
a number of interesting features. Ethno-territorial retrieval can experience 
active and latent phases. Furthermore, these can alternate, which means it is a 
non-linear process. The political units irredentism tries to (re)create have often 
never existed historically, or they reify prior colonial or imperial boundaries. 
This, however, does not make them any less desirable, for these (ideal) states 
are demarcated by the group’s ancestral homelands, which they are supposed 
to encompass as completely as possible. Irredentists identify strongly with 
these territories, have a clear and shared idea of their extent, and feel a 
superior entitlement to them. They typically tie their own history, cultural, and 
sometimes even (perceived) biological characteristics to these regions. When 
irredentism faces a head-on choice between kindred people and the lands that 
define the group as a whole, it will likely choose the former -  but only under 
duress.
Irredentist struggles have poor success rates. They are frequently long-lived 
and intractable, yet do not regularly involve large-scale violence. In fact, it is 
the challenged host states who routinely use coercion, and my survey has 
described their array of repressive methods. The destructive potential of 
retrieval -  as arguable cause for both World Wars -  comes therefore rather 
from the multiple levels it involves. It simultaneously pits groups against 
groups, and states against states in a zero-sum game. Like secession, 
irredentism attacks state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and therefore runs 
counter the restrictive consensus of modern international relations. But what 
makes irredentism vastly more unpopular internationally is that it does so to 
the advantage of a neighbouring state. Rather than independence, this 
particular variant of self-determination has national (re)union as goal.
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Domestically, irredentism has the unpalatable side of minority disloyalty, and 
with it the uncomfortable truth that to many, legitimate governance means 
governance by their own kind. Irredentism is what frequently gives minority 
nationalism its bad image.
Finally, the goal of retrieval is ethno-national completeness, both in terms of 
population and homeland. Intrinsic to this is the logic of national solidarity and 
self-rule. Ethnic purity or exclusivity is at best secondary here: the stress on 
shared ancestry in irredentism serves to cement all-important internal 
cohesion, not to select others out. In short, the important thing is that the titular 
state encompass what identity has defined. This also explains irredentism’s 
historical and geographical concentration: ethno-territorial retrieval is 
contingent on modern statehood, self-conscious groups, the existence of 
ethnic homelands, and the ideology of nationalism. As a result, irredentism is a 
modern phenomenon and continues to concentrate in Europe. While it has 
spread in (so far) four themed waves beyond its birthplace to Africa and Asia, it 
eschews diasporic and immigrant societies.
Operating against success ratios, international realities and liberal norms, 
irredentism would seem to thoroughly conform to the stereotype of “irrational” 
nationalism. Alternatively, groups or their leaders must have ulterior reasons to 
pursue it, and drop the project when they no longer do. I have argued that 
neither view is correct. Irredentism does not run riot, neither does it serve as 
means to other ends. It is determined by a clear set of endogenous factors that 
are connected to its motives. When these factors change, groups discontinue 
retrieval.
Irredentism explained: why is retrieval inconsistent?
Irredentism is essentially made possible by a combination of two factors. First, 
it needs an ethnically exclusive, rather than culturally or institutionally 
anchored, group identity. This identity is based on shared (perceived) ancestry 
and a common ‘map image’ of communal homelands. It crucially carries the 
project because it is unitary and thus solidary across boundaries. It clearly
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describes the membership and geographical extent of who and what needs to 
be (re)united via ethno-territorial retrieval.
Second, irredentism requires a political regime that allows or even promotes, 
the politicisation of this identity for each actor. In the parent state’s case, 
stalled or incomplete democratisation (anocracy) does so by failing to provide 
an alternative, civic-political consensus for national politics. With ethnic 
nationalism as principal or even only common denominator, the state is 
reduced to express a nation’s organic unity. Weak institutions furthermore 
cannot check the political entrepreneurship - genuine or instrumental - that 
takes advantage of their failure. Irredentism in transborder minorities in turn is 
promoted by an ethnically-biased or -exclusionary regime within their host 
state. This alienates them by denying two fundamentals: collective recognition 
and thus a measure of equality (’owning’ the state), and desired self- 
determination (here in some compensatory, internal arrangement like 
autonomy).
Finally, international factors compound or conversely mitigate these 
endogenous drivers, and thus modulate the methods and openness of 
irredentism’s conduct. Relative laxity towards retrieval (mainly evidenced by 
regional precedents), patronage and invalidation of minority nationalism 
respectively create windows of opportunity or urgency that shape, but do not 
determine, activism.
Irredentist inconsistency occurs when there is change in one or preferably 
both, of these principal factors. When a group’s ethno-national identity 
becomes culturally and / or institutionally defined rather than rooted in 
exclusive-ascriptive criteria, the crucial basis for irredentism is no longer intact. 
The parent state no longer sees itself as ‘truncated’ or incomplete, the 
transborder minority does not feel as hapless, unviable enclave suspended in 
an unnatural (because separated) situation. A self-view based on criteria other 
than shared kinship no longer conceives of the ethno-national group as 
organic whole, as extended family, that needs to be reunited. Communal 
territory, which described the necessary expanse of the group’s nation-state, 
ceases to be a prominent marker. Instead, the nation is defined by heritage 
and language. These provide a lesser, because more voluntaristic, cohesion
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and solidarity. In addition, where nationalism starts to consist of civic elements, 
membership is based on consent and participation, which in turn excludes 
those on the respective other side of the border.
The political systemic environment can both take advantage of such 
developments as well as further them. Successful democracy in the parent 
state generates civic nationalism, i.e. a rival source of cohesion and 
allegiance. Institutional performance furthermore prevents ethnicity’s 
politicisation because it impedes the fusion of group and state interests. 
Democracy within the host state in turn can assuage or even prevent minority 
irredentism if it extends consociational concessions. This is because it 
responds to those twin desires that fuel minority alienation. Consociational 
practice means a group can acquire political control over itself and its territory, 
as well as attain collective recognition for its distinct national aspirations 
without having to defect. This combines with transformations in group identity 
in a mutually reinforcing mechanism. Weakened affinity with the parent state 
generates minority self-assertion and thus changed desires for self-rule: rather 
than retrieval these will either be secession (if the host state makes no 
allowances) or conversely, autonomy (if it does). Host-states in turn can take 
advantage of this shift by fostering via concessions this distinction between 
civic and cultural loyalties.
International factors can also reinforce these two endogenous developments. 
Clear restrictive signals regarding border changes (exemplified by precedents) 
and lack of powerful backing will modulate, though not stop, mainland 
irredentism. For minorities, domestic solutions like consociational practices and 
legal protection need external monitoring, even pressure, in order to work. In 
this particular case, the external disincentive to irredentism is at the same time 
a positive incentive for alternatives. The Magyar case is a particularly good 
illustration here. The EU is unique in its simultaneous deterrence of irredentism 
whilst supporting and rewarding several replacement aspirations to its 
components: for the minority, consociational rights and regionalism or 
autonomy within the host state (a variant on the self-determination theme), for 
both actors the borderless "reunion" (satisfying the now mainly cultural- 
linguistic identity that they share). What explains discontinuity in an irredenta 
are changes in this triangle of primary and secondary variables.
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What of Horowitz's factors?
My theory adopted Donald Horowitz’s explanation of irredentism as baseline. It 
tested its three explanatory variables both statistically across all collected 
cases, as well as by applying them to the Hungarian example. While all 
suggested factors seemed logical, I found little evidence for their validity either 
across or within cases. My thesis argued that these tenets were flawed 
because of their rationalist bias. It did so by showing that that they were 
secondary to the endogenous variables that are principally responsible for 
irredentism, namely group identity and prevailing regime type.
The feasibility of retrieval: ethno-territorial homogeneity (chapter 4) 
Ethno-territorial homogeneity seemed the most commonsensical of Horowitz’s 
suggested factors -  after all this would directly affect both the feasibility of 
retrieval and the ‘purity’ of its outcome. In order to be easily retrievable, a 
minority ought to be in a border near position, settled with minimal dispersion 
and be minimally intermixed with other groups. However, viewed under this 
criterion many if not most, irredentist projects prove nonsensical, such as 
Ireland’s designs on the majority Protestant six provinces or Armenia's 
endeavour for Nagorno-Karabach, which is deeply embedded in Azerbaijan’s 
heartland. For the Hungarian example the factor was able to explain why the 
interwar Felvidek was retrieved, but conversely could not tell us why it is today 
any less attractive, despite having preserved all its advantageous features: 
local Magyars continue to be border near and their settlements are even less 
dispersed and intermixed than in the interwar period. Transylvania's case in 
turn was very different. Its ethnic and territorial homogeneity scored in both 
time periods so badly on this variable that this factor seemed irrelevant. Only a 
small (and furthermore shrinking) part of local Magyars dwells near the 
Hungarian border, whilst their bulk lives in the remote east of Transylvania. 
Their settlement structure is not and never was, cohesive. As for ethnic 
intermixing finally, their situation shows actually today an improvement over 
interwar conditions, i.e. there is a slight increase in local Hungarian majorities.
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I have shown that this variable, however commonsensical, misses the point. 
This is because irredentism specifically is about national completeness, rather 
than purity. Completeness in turn means not only retrieving kindred people but 
also ancestral soil (often also inhabited by ethnic strangers), because that 
territory is integral to what drives irredentism -  namely that group’s identity. 
The Hungarian example, with its ‘map image’ of St. Stephen’s crownlands 
illustrated this principle well.
Pav-offs from retrieval: the political economy of irredentism (chapter 3)
Horowitz also suggested economic benefit as irredentist motive. Given that 
retrieval involves high risks and sometimes considerable costs (diplomatic, 
military and economic), irredentists may be motivated by pay offs. With very 
few cases in the dataset supporting such claims, the Magyar case has 
confirmed the weakness of a materialistic explanation. Two approaches were 
possible here: opportunity and necessity (deprivation).
As for minorities, there is little evidence in the first place that they desire 
retrieval for these reasons. I have shown that interwar Hungarian minorities 
mainly stressed economic grievances for foreign consumption, as strategic 
adjustment in propaganda. Secondly, I have illustrated in a cross-time 
comparison how both Magyar minorities have had as much reason to defect in 
the interwar period as they arguably have today. This is because of continued 
material discrimination within their host states. Following partition, their local 
ascendancies were crudely dismantled. Today, both minorities would still have 
concrete material incentives to rejoin a comparatively better-off Hungary. 
Although their host states are beginning to reach parity with Hungary, local 
Magyar communities are still worse off because their life chances and home 
regions are still lagging behind national host state averages. They are 
furthermore suffering from cumulative economic damages, such as two waves 
of expropriations. In other words, relative economic deprivation persists and 
has arguably even worsened, without however causing renewed irredentism. 
Finally, even if transborder communities had acted out of opportunity, 
comparisons would have been difficult for them to make. For instance, 
defection from a discriminatory host state does not automatically mean 
improvement, because discrimination may still be offset by the host’s overall
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higher standards and life chances in comparison to the mainland. This was 
arguably the case for interwar Czechoslovakia's Magyars. They chose 
Hungary over a host state that, although in many ways discriminating, offered 
superior social provisions from which even they benefited.
Irredentist parent states in turn invoke material benefits more often, but as I 
have argued, they do so invariably in function of ethno-territorial unity. This is 
also why their economic justifications are based on what turns out to be a 
subjective rationality. As a result, retrieval rarely makes economic sense, and 
Hungary was a good example for this. I have shown that although partition had 
indeed inflicted enormous damage, truncation was more of a nationalist than 
an economic problem. The country not only recovered, but also finally 
modernised because the territorial losses had left it with an industrial core. 
Changes in the regional and world economy meant that retrieval of the lost, 
often rural areas like Northern Transylvania would in fact be a burden. 
Recovering the Felvidek conversely meant reintegrating a region in many ways 
socially more advanced while suddenly depriving it of its revenue and markets. 
Today the burden would be repeated, this time because both Transylvania and 
Southern Slovakia are less developed than the mainland. In short, there is too 
little differential in gain across the two time periods to explain the 
abandonment of Hungary’s irredentism. Furthermore, the country’s interwar 
situation has shown that the overall balance sheet for retrieval was 
resoundingly negative -  exactly because the main motive was ideological. So 
when it comes to irredentism, most states -  like Somalia, Armenia, Serbia and 
not least interwar Hungary -  seem to leave their calculators in the drawer.
Elite interests: particularised affinity, cleavages, and the preservation of 
independent power bases
Finally, Horowitz proposed respective elite interests in the two irredentist 
actors as decisive. My theory did not examine these in detail because it argued 
that these in fact each depend on the primary variables of group identity and 
prevailing regime type. Minority leaders' concerns about having to pool power 
upon reunion and thus to lose influence rely on a scenario where groupness is 
no longer homogenous, i.e. where a transborder community is actually able to 
entertain aspirations of its own. I have argued that this is impossible where a
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minority still conceives of itself as hapless enclave, cut off from but still 
belonging to, the mainland body politic. This in turn is contingent on an ethnic, 
exclusivist self-definition of the group which is unitary and solidary (see 
chapter 6).
As far as mainland elites are concerned, particularised affinity has indeed 
turned out to be an impressively frequent feature of many irredentist states 
(see chapter 2). But it does not in itself explain their policies. In the Hungarian 
case mainland elite affinity has been all but equal in the two time periods while 
generating very different policies. Leaders' personal ties matter only within a 
political system where a) such personal bias goes unchecked or unrivalled and 
b) where nationalism is the main or only basis of societal consensus. Both are 
due to the institutional weakness in anocracies, the single most frequent 
regime type within irredentist parent states (see chapters 2 and 7).
Horowitz finally also suggested the existence of intra-group cleavages as 
factor. These would be political, tribal or religious divisions between minority 
and the mainland, which parent state leaders would see as threatening. I have 
argued that such fault lines only present themselves as impediment to 
irredentism where that group’s solidarity has already shifted onto less 
uncompromising, less exclusive bases. As long as a collective defines itself via 
kinship -  shared descent (blood) and the attachment to ancestral grounds 
(soil) - this cannot be rivalled or upset by other attachments (see chapter 6).
Qualifications
This thesis can only serve as preliminary attempt to explain irredentism. In 
order to build a generalisable theory, it has taken the liberties most works of 
comparative politics take -  stripping away contextual specifics, creating 
categories, and drawing parallels. This, however, also counts as its weakness: 
further application of this explanation to other cases (e.g. non-European or 
nineteenth century) may find too loose a theoretical fit. At the same time, some 
of its arguments will inevitably have been informed by the particulars of its 
empirical example. The Magyar irredenta and its discontinuity is a textbook 
instance, so much so that it contributed to my understanding of the ideal
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typical variables that determine retrieval. In contrast, my mapping of 
irredentism in all its standard characteristics based itself on the largest 
possible survey of cases, but will no doubt have missed important regularities 
as well as exceptions.
In order to test and apply Horowitz’s factors, I had to interpret them, not least 
by deriving indicators that made into them workable variables. Throughout I 
have tried to do so faithfully to his work and with the most favourable reading -  
not least because they have been critiqued as representatives of an entire 
approach to ethnicity and nationalism. In this vein, the reader may dispute my 
particular understanding of democracy, nationalism, and their interaction as 
well as my insistence on the undiminished political realness of a subjective 
category like ethnicity.
The way in which I have chosen to treat my case study may similarly meet 
objections. In large parts of this work theoretical parsimony has forced me to 
treat both ethnic actors as unitary, something that especially today does not 
apply. Transborder Hungarian politics for instance is vibrant and diverse, 
especially recently, with factions materialising among Transylvanian Magyars. 
Similarly, I have concentrated on the tangible, and historically unprecedented, 
advances of Magyar minorities within their host states without hopefully 
downplaying the continuing adversity they face. Furthermore, Trianon and its 
consequences continue to challenge objective research. Given persisting (and 
politically convenient) suspicions in neighbouring countries, some will disagree 
with my premise that the chapter of Magyar irredentism is truly closed. Inside 
Hungary, historiography still categorises this case as revisionism (legitimate, 
peaceful and legalistic), as opposed to an irredenta (aggressive, unlawful). 
Many Hungarian accounts are less critical of the failures in interwar Hungary’s 
democratisation and omit or ignore their pivotal connection with irredentism. 
My argument about the economic folly of Magyar irredentism also runs against 
established views. The mainstay of source material I have used on these 
points is thus a selection of innovative or unorthodox contemporary Hungarian 
research.
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My statistical tests finally have been necessarily modest due to missing data, 
its descriptive nature, difficulties in quantification and, not least, the magnitude 
of the task at hand. I have tried to work within these limitations as well as to 
explain the choices they required. Thus while the quantitative part of this thesis 
leaves room for improvement, it fulfils its original purpose to complement, 
support and illustrate my theory of irredentism.
Expanding irredentism studies - a research agenda
By establishing irredentism as a new field of study, this thesis has tackled one 
main question while raising a whole host of others. My descriptive dataset of 
collated irredentist cases has furnished more information about the nature and 
general features of retrieval than I had opportunity to use in this work. Amongst 
these so far unexploited insights are irredentism’s surprisingly sparse use of 
violence (despite it being able to trigger World Wars), regularities in the extent 
and durability of irredentist successes, and the prominence of particularised 
affinity in both actors’ leaderships. Even more intriguing are the outlier cases 
and exceptions both datasets have uncovered, most notably the few 
democratic irredentist parent states. Furthermore, because my study has only 
focused on one category of retrieval (conventional irredentism), unificationist 
irredentas still remain to be described and explained in an equally systematic 
way. Given how topical some of these movements are right now - one may 
think of the Iraqi Kurdish situation or Spain's continued grappling with ETA - 
this will make for important and rewarding research.
My theory, too, can only be a first attempt, and needs further testing in other 
empirical studies to verify or improve its generalisability. Particularly interesting 
here are those few exceptions where the transborder group occupies its own, 
imposed, state (e.g. the GDR, Greek Cyprus, post-communist Moldova) - what 
amendments do such cases require? Further large scale statistical testing is 
also necessary. This will have to complete what is by no means a finished list 
of irredentist cases. It will also have to improve the quantification of my 
model’s variables and, notably for the key factors of identity and
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consociational-democratic accommodation, solve the problem of how to 
measure them. This may also require compromises in the name of theoretical 
succinctness.
Beyond these model-specific issues, there are the salient themes my study 
has touched upon. Three deserve to be emphasised. First, there is the way 
qualitative changes within ethnicity affect nationalism and thus group 
behaviour -  especially with regards to demands and their accommodation. 
This ties in with the ongoing revision of nationalism typology (Connor 1994; 
Lecours 2000; Nikolas 2000; Kymlicka 2001 a and b; Shulman 2002 and 
2004). Are these shifts in nationalism really irreversible and universally 
hastened by democracy (as I argue), and what other factors bring them about? 
Can we apply this approach beyond irredentist groups? Second is the 
accommodation of minority nationalism within democracies. I have argued that 
consociational features are the most promising avenue here for actively or 
formerly irredentist groups. However, power-sharing arrangements are 
notoriously difficult to implement and maintain. The question arises whether 
other similar, less complex routes exist specifically for irredentist groups -  e.g. 
Kymlicka’s model of Group Differentiated Citizenship within liberal 
democracies (1995). Closely connected to this finally is the theoretical problem 
within consociational practice which the Magyar case has again highlighted. It 
seems Lijphart’s two primary criteria require a trade-off or sequencing between 
each other, despite being posited as equals in his theory (1971:10-14).The 
real-life tension between elite accommodation and self-rule elements of (quasi- 
) consociational scenarios is difficult, not least because these are the very 
features capable of satisfying irredentist desires.
Normative and Practical Implications
At its very basic this study is a contribution to reformed liberal views on 
ethnicity, nationalism and collective rights. It argues against what Nodia 
(1994:4) so aptly terms the “scientistic attitude” of Western social science. 
Despite valuable contributions, this attitude’s central fallacy (and explanatory
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downfall) has been to impose a normative view about ethnic actors, what they 
want and how they must behave. Throughout this work I have tried to 
demonstrate that what we need to engage with is not what we think ought to 
matter (strategic-demographic feasibility, questions of material and political 
advantage), but with what does matter. What is important to irredentists is a 
shared ethno-national identity and a resulting drive to redeem kin and territory 
(self-determination). The fact that these are intangibles does not make them 
and their power any less ‘real’. The fact that they do not fit orthodox liberal 
ideas gives no licence to ignore them or explain them away.
If this study furnishes any prescriptive elements, then this would be one. The 
problem is not to assume rationality, but to do so in a normative way. 
Reasoning within the logic of irredentism requires acceptance of ethnicity as 
genuine and legitimate force of mobilisation. Instead, research has largely 
remained with value laden judgements and the liberal conventions of 
materialism, modernity and individualism. The explanatory factors it habitually 
derives from these - economic determinism, power calculations, political 
retardation, civic inequality, etc. - will only capture part of reality, and the less 
relevant one at that. Horowitz's analysis of irredentism is a prime example 
here. As long as we continue to see ethno-nationalism as outdated or 
substitute struggle which the West has allegedly overcome and which 
modernisation will ‘cure’, we have little chance of explaining and managing its 
expressions.
This normative bias extends well beyond theory into the realm of policymaking. 
Western Europe has recently begun to redress its view of nationalism as 
illiberal or transitory reaction to the pains of modernity. More importantly, its 
repressive responses have given way to a more accommodative stance. EU 
regionalism, autonomy regimes and the adoption of consociational features 
mirror an erosion in the dogmatic rejection of collective rights. Ethnic minority 
or sub-state nationalism is being acknowledged as legitimate. On a wider 
scale, world politics has emulated this paradigm shift and “internationalised” 
minority rights (Kymlicka 2002), most notably with recent interventions in East 
Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo.
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And yet, policy makers still often respond to the contrary. The contemporary 
Hungarian situation is a good example of such persisting contradictions, or 
dare we say it, of such double standards. The recent controversy surrounding 
the Preference (Status) Law and the EU’s criticism betray a continued rejection 
of the legitimacy of ethno-national bonds. While their domestic accommodation 
has become acceptable, Hungary’s case shows that when a state, rather than 
a minority, runs counter to the dominant civic discourse, this continues to be 
viewed as unacceptable. Western democracies will not tolerate divergence, 
notwithstanding their own reliance on particularistic elements to define and 
bind together their polities. Their denial about the role of ethno-national identity 
in politics -  at home and elsewhere -  generates blanket bans. Budapest’s 
legalistic attempt to openly regulate shared ethnicity and its fragmentation was 
a prime example. While the Hungarian case is safe in its alternatives, this 
undifferentiated veto is dangerous. As long as even such moderate, problem­
solving overtures are seen as threat, the doors remain wide open to 
irredentism.
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Map 3.1 Ethnic Hungarians in Romania in 1930
(Source: Ronai 1942 [1993], based on the Romanian census of 1930)
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Map 3.7 Magyar inhabited Romanian counties by name (2002)
(Source: Hungarian Government Office for Transborder Hungarians at
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Dataset Manual 1 (Descriptive Dataset)
■ List of cases - Dataset 1
■ List of variables - Dataset 1
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List of Cases -  Dataset 1
Value Label Case Name
01 Aegean Macedonia -  Greece
02 Epirus -  Greece
03 Ionian Islands -  Greece
04 Cyprus - Greece
05 Thrace -  Greece
06 Veneto -  Italy
07 Rome and Lazio -  Italy
08 Fiume -  Italy
09 South Tyrol -  Italy
10 Trieste -  Italy
11 Southern Schleswig -  Denmark
12 Crete -  Greece
13 Transylvania -  Romania
14 Alsace -  France
15 Bosnian Serb Territories -  Serbia
16 Eastern Rumelia -  Bulgaria
17 Northern Bukovina -  Bulgaria
18 Pirin Macedonia - Bulgarial
19 Sandjak -  Serbia
20 Kosovo - Albania 1
21 Macedonia - Albanial
22 Northern Greece - Albanial
23 Northern Epiros - Greece
24 Aaland Islands -  Sweden
25 Danzig - Poland
26 Lithuania -  Poland
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List of Cases -  Dataset 1 (continued)
Value Label___________ Case Name
27 Alsace - Germany
28 Saarland - Germany
29 Silesia -  Germany
30 South Tyrol - Austria
31 Sudetenland -  Germany
32 Southern Slovakia - Hungary
33 Transylvania -  Hungary
34 Voyvodina (Bacska, Banat) -  Hungary
35 Northern Ireland- Republic of Ireland
36 North Western Frontier Province (Pakistan) -
Afghanistan
37 Kwazulu Natal - Swazi Kingdom
38 Southern Thailand -  Malaysia
39 Austria - Germany
40 Okinawa/Ryukyu -  Japan
41 Kashmir -  Pakistan
42 GDR - Germany (FRG)
43 Djibouti -  Somalia
44 Northern Frontier District (Kenya) -  Somalia
45 Ogaden -  Somalia
46 Northern Chad -  Libya
47 Nagorno Karabach - Armenia
48 Kosovo - Albania2
49 Macedonia - Albania2
50 Northern Greece - Albania2
51 Bosnian Serb Territories -  Serbia 2
52 Krajina - Serbia
53 Moldova - Romania
54 East Jerusalem/Autonomous Territories - Palestine
55 Lithuania - Belarus
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List of variables on the working file Dataset 1
1 CASE Case
Measurement Level: Nominal
Cases were collated on the basis of the definition in chapter 1, above, 
including unusual and outlier cases treated in section 1.2.2. They are 
displayed chronologically (see above for a summary list). Each pursuit counts 
as new observation (case). So for example the Greek irredentas of Cyprus, 
Crete, Aegean Macedonia obviously share the same parent state actor (the 
newly independent Hellenic state), but are separate cases because they 
involve different transborder communities and homeland regions. Names of 
disputed regions are used according to frequency in the literature.
Projects of retrieval that experienced interruptions or latency periods of more 
than ten years are also counted as distinct cases. These irredentas are 
marked numerically as they involve identical actors and goals. Thus for 
instance the respective Albanian-Kosovar irredentas between 1912-1944 
(Kosovo -  Albanial) and 1990-present (Kosovo -  Albania2) are listed 
separately due to the intervening communist period which put irredentism on 
hold.
Similarly, irredentas which have achieved partial success (see section 1.3.2) 
are marked as completed but then re-listed as new case from that date if they 
continued to pursue unification with the remainder. An example is Greece’s 
quest for Epirus, which was successful for the region’s southern part in 
1881/1913 (Treaty of Berlin, then actual incorporation during the Balkan Wars). 
Conversely, the pursuit for union with the Albanian-owned north continued 
throughout the twentieth century into the 1990s and is hence listed as new, 
separate case.
2 REGION Global Region
Measurement Level: Nominal
Continents are subdivided into thematic world regions that cohere culturally 
and / or politically. Some cases cut across these, e.g. Germany, situated in 
Western Europe, trying to retrieve Silesia from Poland, Eastern Europe. Here
309
always the parent state’s category is taken as decisive, because the minority 
seeking retrieval identifies itself with the former and is also seen as its integral 
part.
Value Label
1.00 Western Europe
2.00 Central and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans
3.00 Middle East and North Africa
4.00 Africa (sub-Saharan)
5.00 Asia
3 IRREDWAV Irredentist Wave
Measurement Level: Nominal
As already outlined this thesis divides the global occurrence of irredentism into 
four chronologically successive waves (see sections 1.3.1 and 5.1.1). Each 
wave groups cases that arose among similar circumstances (e.g. imperial 
disintegration following WW1) and which thus display a common justifying 
rationale (for instance Wilson's Fourteen Points). Hence also the stark 
variation in length across periods.
Value Label
1.00 Native (1789-1918)
2.00 Wilsonian (1919-39)
3.00 Post-Colonial (1940-88)
4.00 New World Order (1989- ongoing)
4 START Start Decade of Irredenta
Measurement Level: Scale
Irredentas are processes that generally evolve in a cumulative, though not 
necessarily linear, build-up (see section 1.2.2). Only some display a sudden, 
traceable starting point in history (e.g. a partition like Trianon). Hence where a 
case lacks such a watershed my thesis pinpoints a start decade instead. When
310
doing so, it is safer to focus on parent state politics since minority irredentism 
is more covert due to risks of host state retaliation. In the absence of any 
incisive event I thus date a case from the point in which retrieval clearly 
becomes a legitimate or even defining component of mainland politics. 
Manifestations include revisionist governmental programmes and foreign 
policies, official propaganda, irredentist constitutional provisions (see also 
variable 18), mainstream party platforms and electoral manifestos, speeches, 
as well as representative manifestations of mass culture (e.g. in literature, 
press, consumer goods etc.).
5 END End Date of Irredenta
Measurement Level: Scale
An irredenta formally ends when either of the two parties abandons the project 
(failure -  see below and variable 14), or when it has been accomplished 
lastingly (variable 13). Both these situations can be traced to certain key 
events. ..Accomplishment" (i.e. incorporation) denotes here the fact that the 
population and territory in question have been placed both actually and legally 
under the parent state’s sovereignty. Two contrasting examples illustrate the 
difference. Although Somalia briefly managed to occupy almost 90 per cent of 
Ethiopia’s Ogaden region in September 1977, the case does not count as 
accomplished irredenta: neither was the host state defeated (Ethiopia actually 
won the conflict), nor was there any legal endorsement of military reality (e.g. 
an inter-state treaty, a UN resolution, international recognition or Great Power 
arbitration). Interwar Hungary in contrast achieved its two main irredentas via 
the Vienna Arbitrations of 1940, in which the respective host countries signed 
their rights away, even if under pressure. Regardless of the normatively 
reprehensible means they used (coercive diplomacy), and their short-lived 
nature, these instances count conversely as success. Furthermore, both 
complete and partial recoveries of areas are rated as successes as long as the 
above criteria are fulfilled (e.g. Denmark’s and Serbia’s respective partial 
recoveries of Schleswig and the Sandjak/Raska qualify as successes). 
“Failures” (see also section 1.3.2) can be differentiated according to their 
respective cause into four categories: orphaned, converted, bilaterally
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abandoned and coerced. ‘Orphaned’ irredentas have been unilaterally 
abandoned by parent states. They are mostly characterised by public 
governmental renouncements, often via treaties, towards the host state. 
Unilateral abandonment by the minority in turn usually means irredentism’s 
‘conversion’ into a different territorial exit strategy, such as secession or 
autonomy. Thirdly, some irredentas are abandoned bilaterally. This manifests 
itself in the cessation of co-operation between minority and parent state, the 
termination of mainland support (see below), bilateral public distancing from 
the other party and its cause etc. Finally, there are irredentist failures due to 
“coerced termination.” These were cut short by external factors such as a 
major regional or World War and / or the factual termination of the parent 
state’s foreign political sovereignty (e.g. via Soviet domination).
6 DURATIQ1 Absolute Duration
Measurement Level: Scale
Those cases that have clearly ended (i.e. that are neither ongoing nor latent) 
are measurable in their absolute duration between a starting date or -decade 
and key events that mark a finishing point (see variables 4 and 5, above). 
Some irredentas admittedly experience a hiatus -  e.g. Poland’s pursuit of 
Gdansk from 1918 onwards was interrupted by Nazi German occupation 
(1939-44) and finally succeeded in 1945. In order to be taken into account 
such interruptions have to last 10 years or longer (see variable 1, above). 
Once again these pauses are recorded for the parent state, because it is the 
more powerful player as well as the destination for the irredentist minority. This 
dataset applies two of the three criteria which Polity IV sees as severely 
disrupting a polity (namely ‘foreign interruption’ and ‘anarchy’), because these 
are severe enough to also disrupt state directed irredentism. It uses Polity IV’s 
regime type data for this and subtracts such periods from the overall duration 
of an irredenta.
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7 DU RAT 102 Duration: Absolute and Until 2003
Measurement Level: Scale
Here both terminated as well as ongoing and latent irredentas are measured, 
either from their start date / decade until their respective ending point, or in 
lack of definite termination, relative to the year 2003. Interruptions are again 
taken into account where appropriate.
8 PRECEDT2 Preceded by a Unificationist (Type 2) Irredenta
Measurement Level: Nominal
This lists whether a case was preceded by a unificationist (Type 2) irredenta, 
i.e. whether it follows the initial establishment of a parent state via multiple 
retrieval (see section 1.2.1).
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.0 Missing value
9 STATUS Current Status of Case
Measurement Level: Nominal
All cases are assessed according to their present situation. Ongoing cases are 
recognised on the basis of the indicators for irredentist activity described in 
chapter 1. Terminated irredentas are differentiated into success and failure 
(see variable 5). Resting or latent irredentas, i.e. where activism has subsided 
but there is no ending discernible according to the stated indicators, are 
treated as separate category and not grouped as terminated.
Value Label
1.00 Success
2.00 Failure
3.00 Latent
4.00 Ongoing
99.00 Missing value
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10 OUTCOME Absolute Outcome: Success/Failure
Measurement Level: Nominal
Here only terminated cases are evaluated, since only they can be assessed as 
to their final results. For criteria and indicators of success and failure see 
variable 5, above.
Value Label
0.00 N/A (not applicable)
1.00 Success
2.00 Failure
99.00 Missing value
11 EXTSUCCES Extent of Success
Measurement Level: Nominal
Success is further differentiated, this time according to its demographic and 
territorial extent. All long-term achievements are considered on how 
completely they have been able to recover their transborder territory and 
ethnic kindred. ‘Partial’ success denotes a state in which a lasting recovery 
has gained less than the whole of the minority group and homeland territory, 
thus falling short of announced and / or intended goals. ‘Complete’ retrieval in 
contrast describes the full accomplishment of both these goals.
Value Label
0.00 N/A (not applicable)
1.00 Partial
2.00 Complete
99.00 Missing value
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12 STSUCCES Short Term Success (Durability)
Measurement Level: Nominal
Success can also be differentiated according to durability. The present 
categories examine success in terms of immediate, short-term results: has the 
irredenta achieved its goal at any point in time, even if only briefly and 
illegally? For criteria and indicators of success see variable 5, above.
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
13 LTSUCCES Long Term Success (Durability)
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable examines which of the irredentas that have enjoyed short term 
success under variable 12 were able to subsist, i.e. which cases have proven 
to last until present (year 2003).
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
2.00 Undecided as yet
99.00 Missing value
14 FAILURE Reason for Irredenta's Failure
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable only examines terminated cases of retrieval. A conventional 
irredenta counts as failure if it has ended and never achieved even a 
temporary incorporation of the population and territory it sought to retrieve. 
Failed irredentas are distinguished according to their causes (see variable 5, 
above): unilateral abandonment by the parent state (‘orphaned’ projects - 
1.00), unilateral abandonment by the minority (‘converting’ its desire for
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territorial defection into either secession or demands for autonomy -  2.00), 
bilateral abandonment by both parties (3.00), or coerced termination (4.00) 
due to military defeat, Great Power hegemony or similar.
Value Label
0.00 N/A (not applicable)
1.00 Orphaned
2.00 Converted
3.00 Bilateral
4.00 Coerced
15 INCONSIS Irredentist Inconsistency across Time
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable assesses whether an irredenta displays definite and bilateral 
discontinuity across time. A case qualifies if, once terminated, it has remained 
so until present (year 2003) in an outwardly identical setting. In contrast to their 
previous agendas, parent state and transborder kin now regard existing border 
arrangements as permanent (if not always legitimate) and no longer seek to 
revise them (see section 1.2.2). Temporary fluctuations (such as brief, often 
strategic abatement of irredentist activity) and latency periods (cessations of 
10 years or more without clear renunciation) do not qualify as cases of 
inconsistency.
Value Label
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
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16 MIN VIOL Minority Violence
Measurement Level: Ordinal
This variable measures the extent to which an irredentist minority uses 
violence against its host state in order to achieve retrieval (see section 1.3.3). 
“No violence” refers to the virtual absence of incidents (peaceful pursuit of 
unification), while “occasional riots” labels the unorganised and spontaneous 
occurrence of violence on a minor to medium scale. “Organised militancy” 
describes in contrast the strategic and co-ordinated insurrection of an ethnic 
militia (e.g. IMRO, IRA) in order to achieve retrieval.
Value Label 
0.00 No violence
1.00 Occasional Riots
2.00 Organised Militancy
99.00 Missing value
17 PSTVIOL Parent State Violence
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Now the extent is measured to which an irredentist parent state employs 
violence against a host state and / or its allies in order to retrieve ethnic kin 
and territory (see section 1.3.3). The variable distinguishes in ascending order 
several pairings of strategies and instruments. Coercive behaviour is hence 
measured by type (non-military vs. armed) and level of involvement, i.e. 
whether the mainland acts indirectly (by delegating to the minority), directly (by 
intervening itself) or both (co-operation between mainland and transborder 
kin). Hence non-military support to transborder minority violence (e.g. by 
supplying intelligence or granting cross-border refuge to militiamen) is coded 
as the weakest form of using force, since it is both delegated and not violent in 
itself except for its ulterior motive. Second comes explicitly military aid to the 
minority - training, arms, funding etc., in other words items that incur mainland 
expenditure for that goal. By its nature, this category automatically includes the 
previous category of non-military items. Third is direct military intervention by 
the parent state, independent of local minority militancy. Most powerful, finally,
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is the combined approach of military intervention and support for kindred 
insurgents, due to the cumulative effects of such a strategy. In cases where 
more than one of these combinations was used over time I have recorded the 
strongest.
Value Label
0.00 None
1.00 Non-military support for transborder minority
2.00 Military aid to transborder minority
3.00 Military intervention
4.00 Both military aid and intervention
99.00 Missing value
18 CONSTIT Constitutionally Enshrined Irredentism
Measurement Level: Nominal
This records the existence of a constitutional commitment to retrieval in binary 
mode. Indicators are clauses for the re-joining of territories (West Germany), 
explicit territorial claims (Republic of Ireland), the provision of empty 
parliamentary seats for MPs of missing’ territories (Somalia), the maintenance 
of a constitutional status quo ante to signify the continued belonging of 
territories to the parent state (interwar Hungary’s continuity as kingdom without 
a monarch), etc. (see section 1.3.3).
Value Label
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.0 Missing value
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Dataset Manual 2 (Variable Dataset)
■ List of cases - Dataset 2
■ List of variables - Dataset 2
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List of Cases -  Dataset 2
Value Label____________Case Name
01 Aegean Macedonia -  Greece
02 Epirus -  Greece
03 Ionian Islands -  Greece
04 Cyprus - Greece
05 Thrace -  Greece
06 Veneto -  Italy
07 Rome and Lazio -  Italy
08 Fiume -  Italy
09 South Tyrol -  Italy
10 Trieste-Italy
11 Southern Schleswig -  Denmark
12 Crete-Greece
13 Transylvania -  Romania
14 Alsace -  France
15 Bosnian Serb Territories -  Serbia
16 Eastern Rumelia -  Bulgaria
17 Northern Bukovina -  Bulgaria
18 Pirin Macedonia - Bulgarial
19 Sandjak -  Serbia
20 Kosovo - Albanial
21 Macedonia - Albanial
22 Northern Greece - Albanial
23 Northern Epiros - Greece
24 Aaland Islands -  Sweden
25 Danzig - Poland
26 Lithuania -  Poland
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List of Cases -  Dataset 2 (continued)
Value Label____________Case Name
27 Alsace - Germany
28 Saarland - Germany
29 Silesia -  Germany
30 South Tyrol - Austria
31 Sudetenland -  Germany
32 Southern Slovakia - Hungary
33 Transylvania -  Hungary
34 Voyvodina (Bacska, Banat) -  Hungary
35 Northern Ireland- Republic of Ireland
36 North Western Frontier Province (Pakistan) -
Afghanistan
37 Kwazulu Natal - Swazi Kingdom
38 Southern Thailand -  Malaysia
39 Austria - Germany
40 Okinawa/Ryukyu -  Japan
41 Kashmir -  Pakistan
42 GDR - Germany (FRG)
43 Djibouti -  Somalia
44 Northern Frontier District (Kenya) -  Somalia
45 Ogaden -  Somalia
46 Northern Chad -  Lybia
47 Nagorno Karabach - Armenia
48 Kosovo - Albania2
49 Macedonia - Albania2
50 Northern Greece - Albania2
51 Bosnian Serb Territories -  Serbia 2
52 Krajina - Serbia
53 Moldova - Romania
54 East Jerusalem/Autonomous Territories - Palestine
55 Lithuania - Belarus
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List of variables on the working file Dataset 2
1 CASEID Case
Measurement Level: Nominal
For selection criteria of all 55 chronologically recorded irredentas see section 
1.2.2 and the Descriptive Dataset (variable 1, above).
2 IRRED INCONSIS irredentist inconsistency across Time
Measurement Level: Nominal
The dependent variable against which all factors were tested. For indicators of 
conventional irredentism see variable 15, Datasetl (above).
Value Label
1.00 Yes
2.00 No
99.00 Missing Value
3 PSHOM Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity of Parent State
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Value Label
1.00 Important retaliating minorities
2.00 Ethnically homogenous or nearly
99.00 Missing value
A parent state is by definition one in which an ethnic group is demographically 
and/or politically dominant. It is thus at least factually capable of pursuing an 
irredenta without decisive opposition by its own minorities. These may worry 
that retrieval would upset the domestic ethnic balance at their expense 
(Horowitz 1985:284; Neuberger 1991:106). However, there are still variations 
in the freedom of political action even such a dominant ethnic group has, 
because any present minorities may still pose significant (because leveraged)
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obstacles to retrieval (see sections 1.2.2 and 4.1.3). Value 2.00 describes 
parent states where titular groups exercise perfect control over politics. This 
may be because there really are no minorities or, crucially, because existing 
ones have no veto power. Parent states marked by qualified homogeneity in 
turn contain what I call important retaliating minorities (value 1.00). These are 
able to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically (Hungarians in Romania 
threatening withdrawal of their crucial governmental support at the prospect of 
Moldova’s retrieval), demographically (non-Malays in Malaysia protesting 
against any retrieval of Thai Malays) and/or economically (like Moldova’s 
Dniester-Russians who seceded with their economically important territory in 
1990 fearing union with Romania). Threats of minority violence are not taken 
into account because they are normally ineffectual versus much stronger 
states. While such hindrances are not decisive in themselves, they may add to 
the considerable adversity irredentas typically face.
4 MINHOM Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity of Minority
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable assesses the geographical and demographic distribution of 
transborder kin. Criteria are respectively: a relative majority (50%) of the 
minority living in a concentrated, minimally inter-mixed manner (1.00), living 
dispersed but along the inter-state border between host and parent state (2.00) 
or -  Horowitz’s ideal case scenario for retrieval -  bearing both features (3.00). 
In case none of the above applies, a score of 0.00 was awarded.
Value Label 
0.00 None
1.00 Compact/homogenous settlement
2.00 Border-near settlement
3.00 Compact and border-near
99.00 Missing value
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5 COMBHOM Combined Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity of Parent State
(PS) and Transborder Community (TC)
Measurement Level: Nominal
Combined variable recording all possible pairings of both irredentist actors’ 
different situations regarding ethno-territorial homogeneity.
Value Label
1.00 TC neither border-near nor compact, PS ethnically homogenous
2.00 TC neither border-near nor compact, PS has retaliating minorities
3.00 TC border-near, PS homogenous
4.00 TC border-near, PS has retaliating minorities
5.00 TC compact but not border-near, PS homogenous
6.00 TC compact but not border-near, PS has retaliating minorities
7.00 TC compact and border near, PS has retaliating minorities
8.00 TC compact and border near, PS homogenous (Horowitzian ideal case)
6 PSECON Economic Benefit for Parent State from Retrieval
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable assesses the potential or actual material benefit from retrieval to 
the parent state (see chapter 3). The criteria are local economic factors, 
regarding both human capital and the regional economy (data used according 
to availability). Indicators thus include in various combinations the level of 
unemployment amongst transborder kin, its average education and/or 
vocational skills, levels of literacy etc. Regional wealth was captured via local 
economic growth rates, host state investment and foreign direct investment 
into that area, levels of regional infrastructure, and the region’s general 
character (primary-agricultural, secondary-industrial or tertiary-service 
economy). Rather than awarding scores on these features and then 
establishing critical levels for economic profit, judgements are based on the 
region’s overall situation. Verdicts were given regardless of a parent state’s 
own situation and only regarding the intrinsic material benefit brought by 
retrieval.
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Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
7 MINECON Economic Benefit for Minority from Retrieval
Measurement Level: Nominal
This records whether retrieval brings material advantages to the transborder 
minority. One criterion is comparative-quantitative, evaluating the parent 
state’s key economic indicators versus those of the host state’s (annual growth 
and inflation rates). The second criterion is qualitative. It assesses 
discrimination, i.e. whether the minority actually does get a share in its host 
country’s wealth, regardless of whether the latter is wealthier than the parent 
state. In case of socio-economic discrimination (lower public investment in 
minority areas, higher levels of unemployment, lower average of education, 
lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality than majority nation), retrieval 
is taken to be economically profitable for the minority. This applies unless such 
disadvantages are offset by an overall higher standard of living when 
compared to an overall less wealthy parent state -  an example would be the 
fate of Estonia’s Russian minority.
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.0 Missing value
8 COMBECON Combined Economic Benefit for Parent State and 
Transborder Community
Measurement Level: Nominal
Summary variable recording all possible combinations of both irredentist 
actors’ different situations in terms of a material benefit from retrieval.
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Value Label
1.00 No actor benefits
2.00 TC does not benefit, PS does
4.00 TC benefits, PS does not
5.00 Both actors benefit
9 CLEAVAGE Are there any Intra-group Cleavages?
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable records the existence of tribal, religious or strong ideological 
cleavages within the irredentist group as a whole, i.e. between the minority and 
its parent state.
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
10 PRESTIGE Prestiqe-Benefit for Minority via Retrieval
Measurement Level: Nominal
The variable records whether retrieval means for the minority incorporation into 
a state with higher international standing. Criteria are comparative economic 
strength as well as international status (membership in powerful regional 
associations which can be military and / or economic, changed diplomatic 
position due to recent defeat or victory in war, targeting by international 
sanctions etc.).
Value Label
1.00 Yes
2.00 No: HS prestige higher or equal
99.00 Missing value
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11 MINSELF Minority Elites* Self-interest Adverse to Irredentism
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable records any self-serving minority elite interests that run counter to 
the irredentist project. These can be parallel aspirations to independent 
statehood or endeavours to strike a deal with the host state government in 
order to preserve local power. This precision is necessary because Horowitz 
(1985:285; 1990:17) assumes that the very existence of self-interest among 
minority elites compromises their desire for retrieval. Such leadership interests 
manifest themselves in significant co-operation with the host state government 
about an alternative settlement whilst still pursuing retrieval. “Significant” co­
operation does not include the mere agreement of a ceasefire for example, but 
describes negotiations / agreements about co-optation (local autonomy, 
governmental participation, economic rewards etc.) in exchange for 
abandoning irredentism. Another indicator is the existence of important 
factions within the minority pressing for alternatives to retrieval (e.g. Kashmiri 
Muslim endeavours for secession rather than retrieval by Pakistan). 
Furthermore, I had observed that the relationship between irredentist minority 
leaders and the parent state government is skewed into receiving and 
executing the latter's orders, and that the strength of such subordination 
describes a minority’s political allegiance and thus wish for retrieval (section 
1.3.1). In light of this observation I hence also count as sign of self-interest any 
major disagreements between parent state and minority elites over the 
conduct and outcome of retrieval.
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.0 Missing value
12 PSAFFIN Particularised Affinity of Parent State Elites
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable measures both the existence and extent of particularised affinity 
in mainland elites. Particularised affinity is given when significant parent state
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individuals have some intimate personal connection with the territory to be 
retrieved beyond the general bond on which irredentism is founded. This 
means they may have been born, raised or schooled there, their families may 
originate from that area, they have or had property there, they belong to the 
particular subgroup that inhabits the area, etc. Significant individuals are those 
in government positions (heads of state and government, cabinet members), 
persons directly associated with the policy-making process (members of 
parliament, members of expert committees to the legislature, policy advisers, 
senior civil servants) and, to a lesser extent, opinion-makers (eminent 
personalities of public life such as journalists and editors, writers, academics, 
artists, etc.). I have recorded ‘some’ or ‘moderate’ affinity (value label 1.00) 
when it applies to merely few such figures. Where this feature is in turn wide­
spread or frequent I have assigned value label 2.00 (extensive/strong).
Value Label 
0.00 None
1.00 Some/Moderate
2.00 Extensive/Strong
99.0 Missing value
13 PSAFF2 Particularised Affinity of Parent State Elites
Measurement Level: Nominal
The same variable as above (no. 12), but recorded with less differentiation into 
binary mode. Any case that the previous variable described as ‘moderate’ or 
‘strong’ is awarded value label 1.00 (yes -  there is personal affinity). Negative 
outcomes have remained with value 0.00 (no affinity). This simplification 
minimises the number of distribution over cells, thus maximising the degrees of 
freedom for chi-square testing (see section 2.4).
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
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14 MINAFFIN Particularised Affinity of Minority Elites
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable measures both the existence and extent of particularised affinity 
in minority elites. Particularised affinity is given when these possess some 
intimate personal connection with the parent state population and territory 
beyond the general ethnic bond on which irredentism is founded. They may 
have been born, raised, or schooled there, their families may originate from the 
parent state, they have or had property there, they belong to a particular 
subgroup that inhabits it etc. The term “elites” describes persons in the 
minority political leadership (higher ranking minority party politicians, civil rights 
activists, leaders of any existing minority militia) and, here equally importantly 
(whereas only second-ranking in the parent state), those individuals who 
personify and are seen to defend the group’s cultural-linguistic identity: writers, 
actors and other artists, journalists and editors, philosophers etc. See variable 
12 (above) for how value labels have been accorded.
Value Label 
0.00 None
1.00 Some/Moderate
2.00 Extensive/Strong
100.0 Missing value
15 MINAFF2 Particularised Affinity of Minority Elites
Measurement Level: Nominal
The same variable as above (no. 14), but recorded with less differentiation into 
binary mode in order to reduce the number of distribution over cells, thus 
maximising the degrees of freedom for chi-square testing. For an account of 
how value labels have been accorded see variable 13 (above).
Value Label 
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
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16 COMBAFF Combined Value of both Parent State and Transborder
Community Elites’ Particularised Affinity
Measurement Level: Nominal
Summary variable recording all possible combinations of both irredentist elites’ 
particularised affinities towards the respective other side (based on binary 
variables 13 and 15).
Value Label
1.00 No particularised affinity in either actor
2.00 PS affinity, but none in TC
4.00 TC affinity, but none in PS
5.00 Particularised affinity in both PS and TC
17 PSGOVERN Regime Type of Parent State
Measurement Level: Ordinal
This variable describes the regime type within the parent state. Values are 
taken from the Polity IV (2003) dataset and recoded into ordinal categories. 
Jaggers, Marshall and Gurr’s Polity score assumes for the core qualities of 
democracy and autocracy as defining opposite ends of a governance scale 
which ranges from -10 (fully institutionalised autocracy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). Anocracies (stalled or developing cases of democratisation) are a 
middling category which mixes these systemic features and thus ranges 
between -5 and +5. I thus assigned value labels to cases depending on their
placement within this scale (see also section 2.3.1). Categorising regime types
over the whole life-span of an irredenta also brought up the problem of 
(sometimes multiple) regime change. In such cases I have referred to Polity 
IV’s (p4v2003 dataset) translation of ‘standardised authority codes’ to normal 
scale polity values for the period (irredentist life span) treated.
Value Label 
0.00 Autocracy
1.00 Anocracy
2.00 Democracy
99.00 Missing value
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18 PSGOV2 Regime Type of Parent State
Measurement Level: Ordinal
The same variable as above (no. 17), but recorded with less differentiation into 
binary mode in order to reduce the distribution over cells, thus maximising the 
degrees of freedom for chi-square testing. Value 1.00 includes both 
autocracies and anocracies. Democratic regimes (Value 2.00) are only those 
that have an established track record or which are considered to have 
successfully completed democratisation, i.e. passed beyond the anocracy 
stage.
Value Label
1.00 Non-democratic
2.00 Democratic
99.00 Missing value
19 HSGOVERN Regime Type of Host State
Measurement Level: Ordinal
This variable describes the regime type within the host state. Regime types are 
ranked in descending order according to how accommodative they are towards 
defectionist minorities on the latter’s own terms, i.e. by extending collective 
rights, power-sharing and some measure of self-rule, and thus how likely they 
are to minimise their disaffection. Non-democratic regimes are not 
differentiated since they are assumed to be either inherently repressive on this 
score or to co-opt inconsistently and without legal-constitutional guarantees. 
Democracies in turn are distinguished along Smooha’s fivefold typology 
(2002a) which categorises along two combined criteria: state neutrality in 
terms of ethnicity, and collective recognition of minorities.
Value Label
1.00 Non-democratic state
2.00 Ethnic Democracies
3.00 Republican Liberal Democracies
4.00 Individual-Liberal Democracies
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5.00 Multicultural Democracies
6.00 Consociational Democracies or containing consociational features
99.00 Missing value
20 HS6QVERN Regime Type of Host State
Measurement Level: Ordinal
The same variable as above (no. 19), but recorded with less differentiation into 
binary mode in order to reduce the number of distribution over cells, thus 
maximising the degrees of freedom for chi-square testing. Following Smooha’s 
typology (see above), I have categorised states as non-accommodative (Value 
1.00) if they are non-democratic, ethnically biased, civic integrationist 
(Republican-Liberal Democracies) or if they do not recognise group identities 
(Individual-Liberal Democracies). Accommodative regimes (Value 2.00) in turn 
are Multicultural Democracies, Consociational Democracies, or those 
democracies that contain consociational features (i.e. what I have termed 
‘quasi-consociational practice’ -  see chapter 7)
Value Label
1.00 Non-accommodative
2.00 Accommodative
99.00 Missing value
21 COMBGOV Combined Regime Situations of Parent State and 
Transborder Community
Measurement Level: Nominal
Combined variable recording all possible pairings of both irredentist actors’ 
different situations in terms of their respective political regime contexts.
Value Label
1.00 No actor in a democratic / accommodative democracy
2.00 PS democratic, TC in non- accommodative democracy or in a 
non-democratic regime
4.00 PS non-democratic, TC in accommodative democracy
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5.00 Both actors in democratic / accommodative democratic regimes
99.00 Missing Value
22 IR Attitude of Inter-State System
Measurement Level: Nominal
This variable describes the inter-state system’s general disposition towards 
border changes during the particular sub-period within the four thematic waves 
of irredentism (see sections 1.3.1, 5.1.1 and Dataset 1, variable 3). Exceptions 
for particular cases were recorded where appropriate. For example, despite 
the restrictive inter-state consensus after 1989 the international community 
exceptionally approved Germany’s reunification.
Value Label
1.00 Permissive
2.00 Restrictive
99.00 Missing value
23 PATRON Presence of a Patron Power
Measurement Level: Nominal
The variable assesses whether an irredenta enjoys significant support from a 
third party and/or protection by another revisionist power. Several indicators 
are taken as sign of an irredenta’s patronage: revisionist military alliances 
(Hungary and the Axis Powers), military support in terms of materiel, personnel 
and/or advice (Somalia and the USSR), and diplomatic backing/ 
encouragement of the cause by a third party (nineteenth century Serbia and 
Tsarist Russia). If a parent state is militarily and geopolitically powerful enough 
to act as its own patron (e.g. Nazi Germany) the case was also coded as 
positive value.
Value Label
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value
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